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THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

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AN INTRODUCTION TO ŚĀNKARA'S
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

PUBLISHED BY KITAB MAHAL (W. D.) PTE. LTD. REGD. OFFICE :
36A, ZERO ROAD, ALLAHABAD AND PRINTED BY J. K. SHARMA
AT THE ALLAHABAD LAW JOURNAL PRESS, ALLAHABAD
S. No. 211

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE
AN INTRODUCTION TO CREATIVE HUMANISM

By

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*With a Foreword by
F. S. C. NORTHROP*

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
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To
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
PATRIOT, AUTHOR, HUMANIST STATESMAN



FOREWORD

Our era is notable for a development of the science of anthropology and the philosophy of culture. This book is a rich, subtle and broad-gauged approach to this subject.

Its author brings to his study an intimate understanding of the classic thinkers of Buddhist and Hindu Asia and a wide, thoughtful and documented examination of the major analytic philosophers in the contemporary Anglo-American world. If anything, radical empiricists such as Bertrand Russell, logical positivists such as Carnap, pragmatists such as Dewey, ethical emotivists such as Ayer, Western idealists such as Kant and Bradley and physicists such as Eddington and Bridgman receive more attention than do Indian sages such as the Buddha, Ramanuja and Sankara. Nonetheless, the intuitive spirit of these Far Eastern Indian thinkers comes to expression between the lines throughout this book and in its constructive conclusion. To this is added an empathetic understanding from within of the major literary classics of the West, in particular the novels of Tolstoy.

It may be asked why such an approach to the subject-matter of anthropology is important. Why is it necessary in studying culture to consider recent philosophical analyses of the meaning of (a) ethical concepts and (b) the non-ethical concepts of the natural sciences such as mathematical physics?

There are several reasons: (1) Any culture embodies norms and values. Hence, any science of culture must use ethical concepts. The science which analyzes the meaning of ethical terms is ethics. (2) Cultural norms and values entail meanings, and the science which investigates the different types of conceptual meaning is epistemology. (3) Science aims at conclusions which are objective. But are not evaluations subjective? If so, how is a science or philosophy of culture possible? Clearly an analysis of the senses in which the data and conclusions of physical science are "subjective" and "objective" is relevant. Furthermore, (4) if cultures embody values, does not the assumption that a science of culture is possible assume that evaluative concepts and sentences are cognitive, asserting something about an "is," instead of exclamatory or hortatory expressions merely uttering an ejaculation or issuing a command? Analysts of ethical concepts, such as Stevenson or Ayer, argue for

the latter thesis. Hence the necessity of meeting such arguments. It is the merit of Dr. Devaraja's book that it has faced these questions and proposed an answer.

F. S. C. NORTHROP

P R E F A C E

The object of the present work is twofold : first, to combat the prevailing negative, sceptically relativistic, and theoretically indifferent attitude towards values with a view to restoring the modern man's faith in the objectivity and universality of values; and second, to achieve a connected consciousness of the different kinds of value with the pursuit of which civilised human beings have been and ought to be concerned. The attempt to attain these ends through systematic discussion has led the book to develop into a comprehensive philosophy of culture. Only such a philosophy, it was felt, could be a sufficient answer to the numerous queries with which our age is faced.

The "scientifically" inclined thinkers of our time, the anthropologists and sociologists no less than philosophers with positivistic leanings, are suspicious of all evaluative studies and pronouncements. Value judgments, it is contended, do not report facts, and so they can be neither true nor false. Those judgments can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed, since they lack what the semanticists call the cognitive meaning. The positivistic quest of certainty, thus, leads to the denial of all the values cherished by man. In his *History of Western Philosophy* (Chapter XXIV) Russell remarks : 'What they (i.e. the Greeks) did in art, in literature, and in philosophy, may be judged better or worse according to taste, but what they have accomplished in geometry is wholly beyond question'. It may be doubted if any historian of any branch of culture ever indulged in such a cynical comment.

Russell's remark concerning Greek achievements includes philosophy among commodities of doubtful value. This plight in which value studies including philosophy find themselves today is due to the non-appreciation, or insufficient appreciation, on the part of European philosophers, of the significance of the warning which Aristotle gave in the introduction to his great *Ethica* long ago : 'It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proof'.

Our reply to the positivists and other sceptics is as follows : It is not necessary to decide whether or not value judgments admit of

being true or false in order to get philosophically interested in them. It is enough for us to know that some value judgments may be considered *better* or more reasonable than others in respect of the same situation or object. Granted that Shakespeare is a greater dramatist than, say, Victor Hugo, the question may be posed: What makes the best plays of Shakespeare superior to the best play or plays of Victor Hugo? Similar questions may be asked with respect to particular poems, stories, etc. and with respect to particular moral acts. It would be foolish on the part of the philosopher to ignore the opinions of expert critics in regard to literary writings simply because those opinions could not be neatly classified as being either true or false; it would be equally foolish to ignore the moral opinions of enlightened men and women.

It is arguable that, like aesthetic and moral judgments (and theories), scientific statements and theories, too, do not admit of being characterised as true or false. The only sense in which one scientific theory may be *truer* (if that expression may be permitted at all) than another is that the former, in some sense, *works better* than the latter. Different aesthetic and moral opinions and theories may likewise be shown to be more or less workable.

What is true of scientific statements and theories is, according to some thinkers, true of empirical statements in general. In the first edition of his *Language, Truth and Logic* Professor A. J. Ayer argued, correctly according to J. O. Urmson (Vide, *Philosophical Analysis*, p. 139) that no genuine synthetic proposition could be ostensive and hence absolutely certain, and Karl Popper requires that even basic statements be inter-subjectively testable.

According to Popper the central problem of epistemology is the *growth* of knowledge, and not so much its *truth*, and he believes that 'the most important and most exciting problems of epistemology must remain completely invisible to those who confine themselves to ordinary or common-sense knowledge or its formulation in ordinary language'. (*The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 1958 Preface). Analogously we believe that, in the domain of value judgments, what matters for philosophy is the *relative superiority* of some judgments or theories over others.

This approach yields to us a new conception of the nature and aim of philosophy. Philosophy, on our view, analyses and interprets the modes of cultural activity or experience embodied in art, scientific thinking, morality, religion and philosophy itself, with a view to discovering the criteria or principles by which the relatively higher, maturer or more adequate forms of those activities or experiences could be distinguished from the inferior, less mature or less adequate forms. On this view aesthetics, ethics and philosophy

of religion are as much the branches of philosophy as logic and epistemology.

Those who advocate the exclusion of value studies from philosophy on the ground that certainty and truth are unavailable in them should tell us how much certainty and truth have been achieved in the branches of philosophy pursued by empiricists and positivists. Has any agreement been reached concerning the nature of perception, the existence and nature of sense data and their relation to physical objects, the nature of erroneous knowledge, etc.? The analyses offered by the empiricists of general propositions, scientific laws, counterfactual conditionals, disposition predicates, etc. are, to say the least, inelegant and far-fetched; and they can convince or even satisfy only those who are already wedded to the empiricist dogmas concerning knowledge and meaning.

We reject the thesis that language is truth-functional and the extensional logic that goes with it. The capacity to represent to himself meaningfully what is merely *imagined* and to react to it is part of man's fundamental endowment. All judgments on historical situations and personages and all plans and schemes for the future depend on that capacity. The successful use of that capacity, of course, presupposes the reign of a measure of uniformity in nature and in man. It is this capacity which renders meaningful to us the counter-factual conditional statements of the following type: 'If . . . the Persians had defeated the Greeks at Marathon, the history of civilization would doubtless have been a different story'; and, on 19th Brumaire in Paris, had 'the cries (of "Hors la loi", i.e. outlaw Napoleon) at once taken form in a decree, the history of the world might have been different'. These statements, made by the sober American and British scholars, R. M. McIver (in his *Social Causation*, p. 171) and J. H. Rose (in *The Life of Napoleon I*, p. 225) respectively are perfectly intelligible and meaningful. The empiricist theories of knowledge and meaning fail completely to do justice to such statements; they also fail to account for the meaningfulness of philosophical discourse. If philosophical analysis consisted of nothing but analytical statements, then there would be no room left for controversies in the camp of the analytical philosophers. In that case all philosophical positions would become self-evident truths. Contrary to this we hold that every piece of philosophical analysis, relating either to concepts or to statements, needs justification with reference to the shared, symbolised experience of man.

The logic of human behaviour, insofar as that behaviour is creative, is bound to be different from the logic applicable to nature's behaviour. The major difference between the physico-biological

sciences on the one hand and the human studies on the other arises from the fact that while the former are concerned mainly with spatio-temporal occurrences, the latter have to deal primarily with qualities or values, *i.e.* events and actions considered as bearers or producers of values (or disvalues), *e.g.* defeats and victories, failures and successes, satisfactions and dissatisfactions, preferences and rejections. Consequently, the relations and interconnections explored by the human studies are qualitatively different from those investigated by the physical (and also the biological) sciences. It is the unawareness or disregard of this all-important fact which lures social scientists into the application of quantitative methods in the domain of their studies. Non-appreciation of the fact has also been at the back of the repeated attempts made by European thinkers to make philosophy mathematical or scientific.

Despite its occasional polemical tone, the main inspiration and object of the present work has been constructive. The thinking out of the central issues as presented here, however, has not been to the author merely a theoretical pastime. He has had to struggle as much against his own deep-rooted scepticism, as against its manifestations in contemporary thought. It is probably for this reason that, while rejecting naturalism, he has not been able to align himself with any type of idealism. It may amuse the readers to know that the writer felt unusually and delightfully excited, when, one fine day, he discovered that his rather unusual view of philosophy had affinities with the views professed by, and reflected in the practice of, some important idealistic thinkers of India. I say "affinities", for the exclusively religious bias of the Mahāyāna systems and the Vedānta cannot wholly accord with even a Qualitative Humanism. Creative Humanism agrees with these only insofar as they refuse, in their capacity as philosophies, to concern themselves with the nature, origination, etc. of the physical world.

The book is intended as much for the intelligent layman interested in the problem of values as for the specialist in philosophy. The writer neither expects nor desires that his theses and conclusions be received by the reader in a spirit of passive acquiescence. This explains his obsession with the questions of method and evidence, interpretation and proof raised and discussed not only in Chapters II and V dealing with the methodology of the human studies and the nature of philosophy respectively but also in several other places. The philosophic reader would appreciate that the author's assumptions concerning human creativity, the nature of culture, and the nature of philosophy—the three pillars on which the edifice of his system is supported—could be seen to be justified, to any extent at all, only in the light of their elaboration in the whole work.

Equating creativity with the urge to produce values the present work studies that peculiarity of man insofar as it is reflected in his pursuit of the various values. It is characteristic of this study that it uses the concept of human creativity both for the understanding of the major cultural concerns of mankind, and for the solution of the outstanding problems of the modern world. The term "creative" or "Creativity" naturally acquires a progressively richer and more definite meaning as the discussion proceeds; however, it will be seen that the concept has no esoteric or even metaphysical significance here. In this respect the present writer's views have almost nothing in common with Bergsonian philosophy. For, in the last analysis, Bergson's system cannot escape the charge of being speculative, while the method of philosophising which appeals to the present writer is one which does not stray farther away from familiar experience.

My views concerning the mode of the existence and functioning of man's "cultural self", perhaps, have some affinity with those of Ernst Cassirer. However, apart from the fact that I have not so far been able to look into his volumes on *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (though I have glanced through his *Essay on Man*), I feel that my approach to the problem of man's symbolic and cultural life has had an entirely different orientation. I wonder if the concept of *anāsakti* or detachment has any place at all in the philosophy of the German philosopher.

This book is a revised and slightly reduced version of a thesis which was submitted for the D. Litt. degree of the Lucknow University early in the year 1956. That, however, should not be taken to imply that I am fully satisfied with the book as it stands today. I am particularly conscious of many gaps in discussions in the chapters on "Methodology" and "Religion." To have undertaken to fill these and other gaps would have meant to rewrite the whole book, or to write a new book altogether. I can only hope that the errors and shortcomings of the present work will be removed, at least partly, in my future writings.

I take this opportunity to record my grateful thanks to Dr. Radhakamal Mukerjee and Prof. K. A. S. Iyer, formerly professors at Lucknow University, who lent their moral support to my intention to write a dissertation on culture considered as a value, and gave encouragement and valuable suggestions from time to time.

I do not know how adequately to express my deep sense of gratitude to Prof. F. S. C. Northrop of the Yale Law School. Prof. Northrop was one of the examiners of the original thesis; he later on acceded to my request to contribute a "Foreword" to it. May I hope that the analyses and concepts presented here would prove

helpful to that cause of East-West understanding of which Prof. Northrop is such an able advocate?

In the body of the book, particularly after the second chapter, the word "culture", when enclosed within quotation marks, carries the sense current in anthropological literature; without those marks it bears the meaning imparted to it by the present writer.

Varanasi

December 15, 1962

N. K. DEVARAJA

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INTRODUCTION

I

CONTEMPORARY CRISIS AND ITS DISTINCTION FROM CRISIS EXPERIENCED IN NINETEENTH CENTURY

MAN to-day finds himself in the midst of a deep and pervasive crisis. The sense of crisis denotes two related mental conditions, intellectual confusion and the feeling of insecurity. *The experience of crisis is possible only to imaginative and creative beings.* Other animals, perhaps, when faced with an unusual or dangerous situation, can only feel perplexed or terrified. Among men, too, it is the relatively more intelligent and sensitive who suffer from the sense of crisis. Crisis may be of two kinds. One type of crisis exists when, knowing the danger ahead, man's reason and imagination find themselves impotent to devise the means of averting it. In the modern world, crisis of this description is constantly present in the form of the threat of a future world-war, with all its attendant horrors and miseries. Peoples of the world seem to have resigned themselves to the feeling that, while the actual date of the outbreak of a war may, through the efforts of some noble statesmen, be postponed every now and then, the grim possibility of that war cannot finally be eradicated.

The second type of crisis, though less spectacular, is more serious than the first. Nor is its seriousness diminished by the fact that its nature and extent remain largely unapprehended. As the psychoanalysts tell us, the phenomena operating at the level of the unconscious (or the subconscious) may be more dangerous to our mental health than those affecting the conscious mind. The crisis in question concerns chiefly the lives of the individuals, and consists in the incapacity of their imagination to confidently visualise the ends for which they should live. A state of crisis exists when the human imagination, plunged in a state of uncertainty and confusion, finds itself disabled to play its normal creative role. That role consists in presenting the aspiring individual with progressively higher and nobler models of worthy existence. In the absence of such models, confidently propounded by the ruling philosophies of the day, and fondly cherished by superior natures, life tends to lose direction, and to become pointless and boring. This spiritual boredom seems to be the central malady affecting modern man's

life. The sensitive and intelligent individual of our time finds it impossible to propose to himself a goal or objective worthy enough to call forth and engage his best energies. In the absence of such a goal, his countless activities and pursuits, even his successes, fail to produce in him a sense of real satisfaction and fulfilment.

Man, it appears, feels insecure not only with respect to his present position but also in regard to his future possibilities. He wants to have the feeling of security in respect of the adopted course of life, which contributes to the fulfilment of his daily needs. However, he craves for another kind of security. He wants to see and feel himself launched on a course of living which would ensure a continual succession of thrills of unexpected fulfilment. Man seeks, in other words, not merely the security of the *status quo*, but also *the security of continued creative advance or achievement*. Viewed in this light, crisis may be defined as *arrested creativity*. This arrest or interruption of the creative forces of life is all the more depressing when it is due to the loss of faith in life's values or possibilities. Other factors also exist, which intensify the crisis of our turbulent times. We have already spoken of the ever-present threat of war. Another significant factor which is correlated with the modern man's restlessness and deep-rooted dissatisfactions is—his lack of leisure. Our technical civilization, with its noise and hurry, its countless mechanical attractions, such as the cinema and the radio, its tempting display of a thousand covetable objects and appliances, its enormous volume of contractual and business-like human intercourse, tends to deprive the individual of the opportunity to engage in purely contemplative and creative pursuits. In the lives of most of the modern men and women, no matter whether they are workers in a factory or clerks in an office, whether they are members of the bureaucracy or managers and directors related to an industrial concern, work tends to be divorced from the exercise of joyous creativity.

A worker in a modern factory no less than a soldier in a modern army finds himself reduced to what Jaspers calls 'a mere replaceable cog in a wheelwork regardless of his individuality'.¹ Modern man seems to have lost both his individuality and his faith in the possibility of living a truly heroic life. For lives devoted to the pursuit of inwardly cherished ideals, our age tends to substitute those involved in the hectic chasing of conventional advantages and amusements.

Anxiety and Fear, Dread and Despair, Care, Irresolution, Loneliness, etc.—the typical existentialist categories—describe the modes of existence of the modern man, which spring as much from the uncertainties of our socio-political and industrial environment as from our loss of faith in the shared pursuit of spiritual values.

Knowledge of the environmental forces, physical and social, is a liberating agent in the sense that it enables us to procure necessary goods and services. However, it is the discrimination and wisdom as to the objectives and ends that ought and ought not be pursued which can help us to attain true fulfilment. So long as men are lacking in this discriminatory wisdom (*Viveka*) they cannot make a proper use of the instruments and resources placed at their disposal by science. It is through the exploration and enjoyment of the varied possibilities of our physico-spiritual being, rather than through extensive training in mechanical manipulation, that man learns to distinguish more desirable forms of living from those which are less desirable or undesirable. Human life, in other words, can be truly liberated and enriched only by an insight into the qualitative differences between different modes of man's being on physical, social and spiritual planes. Such insight or wisdom, involving the knowledge and application of standards of varying degrees of precision in the spheres of logic, art, morality and religion, is the goal traditionally ascribed to the pursuit called philosophy. Contemporary crisis, therefore, which springs mainly from the failure of man's sense of values, constitutes a challenge primarily to his philosophical intellect.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Human intellect had to face a similar challenge during the nineteenth century, when the Darwinian theory presented a novel account of the origin of the species. That account sought to explain, or explain away, the apparent purposiveness of the structures of the living bodies by the magic formula of "natural selection" working on "chance variations" occurring in over-productive organisms that had constantly to struggle for the means of subsistence. Darwinism dealt a decisive blow to the comfortable illusions of that "all-saving" philosophy which, under the banner of Hegel, had the audacity to declare the universe as a whole to be subservient to human interests and purposes. The disturbing character of Darwinism lay, not so much in the fact that it seemed to do away with the need of an all-knowing designer and creator—atheistic philosophies had been known to the civilised man, in both Asia and Europe, long before Darwin—as in the circumstance that, by assimilating man to the animal world, the theory under reference denied that human life could have a goal transcending animal existence. The real reason why materialistic views of life and the universe do not satisfy the more sensitive and inquiring natures is precisely this, that those views fail to account and provide for the latter's longing to pursue the goal or goals which are infinitely meaningful and valuable. The *Chhandoga Upanishad* (7, 23, 1) says:

'Only the infinite contains bliss, there is no joy in the finite'. A satisfactory philosophy of life must discover a rational basis for this apparently irrational predilection for the infinite present in the finite human mind.

The nineteenth century overcame the depressing effects of Darwinian materialism by adopting two devices. In the first place, it pitched the logic of evolution against evolutionary materialism itself. The universe which made possible the evolution or emergence of man could not be a theatre of the operation of merely the blind material forces. Viewed in this light, evolutionism supported rather than contradicted the idealistic dialectic of Hegel. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the idealistic philosophers of Europe erected a second line of defence against materialism. The defence took the form of subtle epistemological speculations calculated to undermine the very foundations of materialist thought. These speculations which culminated in the systems of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley in England, Josiah Royce in America, Benedetto Croce in Italy, and Windelband, Rickert, Eucken, etc. in Germany, marked a return to the rationalistic spirit of Hegel.

TWENTIETH CENTURY IRRATIONALISM, RELATIVISM AND SCEPTICISM

The twentieth century opened with a series of reactions against the intellectualist preoccupations and speculative excesses of the idealist thinkers. William James in America, F. C. S. Schiller in England and Henry Bergson in France were the pioneers who led the reaction. Of these James and Schiller were expressly inspired by resentment against the British absolutists headed by F. H. Bradley. Bergson's anti-intellectualism was directed mainly against the mechanistic tendencies of science, though he was equally opposed to idealistic finalism. James and Schiller stressed the importance of Will as against the Intellect, and the former propounded the criterion of practical success, as opposed to coherence, as the determinant and revealer of truth. The schools of *New* and *Critical* Realism, which came in vogue during the second decade of this century, directed their challenge mainly against idealistic epistemology. The realist thinkers, however, did not share the anti-intellectual bias of James and Bergson.

After the first world-war other influences began to dominate the intellectual scene in Europe and America. The most important of these was the influence of new physics. Although the Quantum Theory had been advanced by Max Planck as early as during the closing months of the nineteenth century, and the Restricted Principle of Relativity had been put forward by Einstein in 1905, their revolu-

tionary implications were slow to be realised by thinkers working in other fields. Einstein's General Theory of Relativity was propounded in 1915, and Heisenberg announced his Principle of Indeterminacy in 1927. The impact of these developments in physics led to the rise and development of that important school of contemporary philosophy, Logical Positivism, which was destined to dominate the philosophical scene during the subsequent decades.

Logical Positivism may be described as an extreme form of empiricism, characterized by uncompromising hostility to speculative metaphysics. The logical positivists, though not anti-intellectual, have yet a deep distrust of speculative reasoning, and would not pay any attention to an hypothesis or theory unless it were testable with reference to sense-experience. Building itself into a powerful philosophy of science, logical positivism denied that there were any indisputable axioms, and made the significant declaration that all scientific theories were tentative hypotheses, which might have to be modified or abandoned in the light of future experimental findings. Thus, according to logical positivism, no scientific theories may be looked upon as revelations of ultimate truth; all such theories are mere working hypotheses. The logical positivists, indeed, are frankly sceptical as to the capacity of science to attain ultimate truths about nature. They are still more sceptical concerning the possibility of the attainment of any truth whatever in non-scientific spheres, such as ethics and aesthetics. Thus, with respect to the possibility of arriving at indisputable and ultimate truths through intellection or reasoning, even through reasoning checked by empirical observation, the attitude of the logical positivists is negative and pessimistic. Logical positivism, thus, shares the anti-intellectual bias of James and others. However, it does not pin its faith on any other faculty of man; for it, in all matters, the final court of appeal is man's sense-experience. As in Hume, the emphasis on sense-experience leads logical positivism to sceptical denial of synthetic *a priori* truths.

Freudianism is another powerful creed which lends support to the anti-intellectual bias of our times. Most of our reasoning, according to Freud, is of the nature of rationalization. Reason, therefore, is hardly an instrument which can be depended upon for the attainment of true knowledge.

Let us pause to take note of some of the devastating implications of the above theories. According to logical positivism we can aspire to have only working knowledge of nature, while we cannot have any definite knowledge whatever about matters which seem to concern us most, namely those connected with our pursuit of the various values. Freudians, too, declare human conduct to be wholly irrational. Since man is congenitally incapable of behaving ra-

tionally in choosing his ends, the question as to what constitutes the proper goal of his efforts is meaningless.

A like conclusion is forced on the modern man from another side. The young social disciplines, Sociology and Anthropology, remained wedded to evolutionism during the nineteenth century. Their influence on the general outlook on life in that century was inseparable from that of the evolution theory, interpreted in an optimistic vein. As Sorokin remarks: '... the social thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was indeed stamped by a faith in linear laws of evolution and progress'.² In the present century, these sciences have shaken themselves free from the magic of evolutionism and tended to attain a mature independence. Their faith in a linear trend of progress has gone. Instead, they have tended to lay stress, during the last few decades, on what may be called Radical Axiological Relativism.

Among sociologists Westermarck's name is specially associated with *ethical relativity*, which is also the title of one of his works, published in 1932. In an earlier book, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Westermarck had reached the conclusion that moral judgments were emotional in origin. This conclusion, according to him, 'leads to a denial of the objective validity ascribed to them (i.e. moral judgments) both by common sense and by normative theories of ethics'.³ Ethical relativity 'implies that there is no objective standard of morality'⁴ which may be acceptable to all human beings. A similar spirit of distrust as to objective evaluative standards pervades the writings of modern anthropologists.

We have enumerated the factors that have led to the present state of crisis, *i.e.*, the state of uncertainty and confusion as to the values and ideals that should govern human life. The crisis of our time, indeed, is more radical in character, and, consequently, more pernicious in its influence, than the one that affected the nineteenth century. For that century still believed that human reason could discover and know the truth. Our century has completely lost that faith in human reason, and seems to stand committed to the view that man can never ascertain the nature of the values he should live for. Any view concerning values that man cares to adopt is destined to be subjective, which means that there are no objective values with reference to which his life may be lived.

* * * * *

Misjudging the character of the plight in which the "sciences of man" find themselves to-day some of their votaries have advocated that those sciences should adopt the methods of the physical sciences. The application of those methods, it is naively supposed, would

give man greater control over himself and his destiny. As if the quantitative operations of measuring and counting could ever lead men to discern the differences of quality between policies and actions ! As if the amount of control exercised, through press, radio and police, by the governments of the world over their respective peoples, were already not excessive !

The very notion of crisis is qualitative, and involves a series of qualitative or evaluative judgments. How can it be understood by the application of axiologically neutral concepts, and resolved by purely quantitative manipulations ? Unless it can be shown conclusively that the qualitative perceptions and predilections of man—his logical behaviour no less than his aesthetic and ethical responses—are invariably associated with determinate mechanical and/or chemical changes, the plea for the employment of quantitative methods is not justified. The real problem of our time—and probably of all time—is to make men discriminate between the higher and the lower, and to incline them to work for the preponderance and ascendancy of the former.

II

The present work aims at unfolding the nature of culture considered as a value. The treatment of culture, as undertaken here, depends on two fundamental notions, which are comprehended in the expression "Creative Humanism". I shall first define the theoretical attitude which this expression is intended to convey.

The term Humanism has meant, and continues to mean, different things to different persons : anti-medievalism and the absence of religiosity; paganism and the affirmation of the rights of the senses; secularism, rationalism and individualism; interest in the study of the humanities, or the classics in literature, philosophy, religion, etc. ; faith in the value and significance of man and his experience; etc. etc. Since the sixteenth century, according to Professor Edward P. Cheyney, Humanism has had its greatest significance as 'a philosophy of which man is the centre and sanction'.⁶

The last description of Humanism, despite some vagueness, is far too attractive to be unacceptable to any votary of that creed. Its vagueness, as also the vagueness of the Protagorean maxim, *Man is the measure of all things*, arises from the fact that neither of them specifies the precise significance of the term man. Surely it cannot be meant that the wise man and the fool, the normal human being and the abnormal or the subnormal, equally constitute the "sanction" of the Humanist philosophy ! For these and other similar reasons, I would request the reader not to load the phrase "Creative Humanism", as used here, with traditional and customary associations of the term humanism, but to treat the whole as a technical

expression. Indeed, from a different angle, the sort of Humanism that I want to advocate would be better described by the expression "Qualitative Humanism". Such humanism will have to be distinguished, e.g., from what Crane Brinton, in his *Ideas and Men*, calls "Exuberant Humanism". If I prefer the term "Creative" to "Qualitative" it is because the former has wide and significant implications with respect to my views concerning human nature and the nature and import of human achievements.

Creative Humanism is a type of man-centred philosophy which takes creativity to be the dominant, and most important, characteristic of the human beings. Here the term "man-centred" has a two-fold significance. It implies, in the first place, that the proper object of philosophical inquiry is man himself, i.e. man in his capacity as the bearer and creator of values. This emphasis on the study of man as the subject-matter of philosophy is contained in the description of that discipline as "the phenomenology of the human spirit, or of human culture". (Philosophy has been defined here as the attempt to analyse, interpret and evaluate cultural experience). The emphasis is in consonance with the ancient adage, "know thyself", which is to be met with in the *Upanishads* as well as in the teachings of the Platonic Socrates. In the second place, the epithet "man-centred" is intended to exclude superhuman reference from our view of the universe. I have deliberately chosen the adjective "superhuman" in preference to "supernatural", for I consider man himself to be in some respects supernatural, i.e., unassimilable to the order of physical nature. Those thinkers who repudiate supernature are generally inclined to call themselves naturalists, or believers in naturalism, a term which is almost synonymous with materialism. Creative Humanism refuses to identify or ally itself with any brand of materialism.

Since no definition of matter acceptable to all parties concerned is available, we may agree to describe it as the order of phenomena, macroscopic and microscopic, which are studied by the physical sciences. It is our belief that human life and experience cannot, with any degree of adequacy, be studied by those sciences. The specifically human phenomena elude completely the grasp of such physical sciences as physics and chemistry. Hence there is no point in taking a materialistic view of man's life and experience.

The exclusion of superhuman reference implies, further, unwillingness to postulate entities, such as God or the Absolute, which are supposed to transcend human experience. This does not mean, however, that creative humanism is irreligious. Religion, to us, is a type of human experience, and, in some respects, the highest type of that experience. Still, insofar as it is *human* experience, it is neither transcendent nor incomprehensible. The essence of

religion, according to the present writer, consists in the spirit of detachment towards the finite or the perishable values, together with a sense of mysterious possibilities laden with unmeasurable worth. An element of religious detachment, as well as of religious intoxication, is present in all higher types of cultural activity; it is also characteristic of the intense and deep type of Platonic love. All normal human beings are capable of sharing, through imaginative self-expansion, the rapturous transports as well as the pangs of the mystics and lovers of all ages and climes.

The term "man-centred", in fact, expresses a methodological postulate which may be stated thus: There is no knowledge unrelated to human interests, and transcending human experience and imagination. We have already explained the later part of this maxim, and shall now proceed to elucidate the earlier.

All knowledge, particularly organised knowledge, is interested. Sensory cognition when it is not directly related to man's aesthetic interests, is sought as a means to the attainment of organised practical or scientific knowledge. All symbolical thought-processes, all conceptual cognitions, inevitably refer to one human interest or another. All human discourse is interested, and concepts and statements have meanings only in the contexts of varied human purposes. The apparent disinterestedness of science is due to the fact that science is directly concerned with the order of means, and only indirectly with the ends pursued by man. Science is completely objective and rational in the sense in which the choice of means to achieve a well-understood end may be objectively rational. As for the ends, none of them is capable of having its reasonableness or value demonstrated by rigorously rational or scientific methods. Thus it cannot be proved by rational methods that the survival of mankind or the healthy condition of the human organisms is an end worth being promoted. As for the categories describing the order of the means, they cannot be shown to be wholly unrelated to the ends cherished by man. Thus the physical categories of mass, distance, velocity, etc. are all related, directly or indirectly, to one or more human purposes. Man employs these categories in the description of nature because he is interested in traversing distances and in moving masses of different substances from one place to another.

To say, however, that all human knowledge is interested is not to deny the possibility of impartial, objective or detached inquiry. With respect to this problem, I suspect, orthodox pragmatism has been guilty of confused thinking. Man's use of the category "speed" is related to his stock of interests, but the determination or calculation of the speed of light or sound need not be influenced by the *personal* interests of an investigator. According to the present

writer, in fact, detachment towards the personal and the utilitarian is a necessary element in all forms of higher cultural activity. Human knowledge is of necessity cast into the moulds or frames furnished by man's interests; those interests, however, relate to the general constitution of his species, and are not to be confused with the exclusive interests of different individuals.

The interests of man or the human species, further, include the interest in consistent intellectual reconstruction of experience, or the creation of harmonious patterns of experience. This interest is strictly non-utilitarian or aesthetic. It tends to make the investigator or artist detached as regards the grosser utilities.

The last-named interest of man works in conjunction with another urge or impulse in his nature, *viz.*, his impulse towards the extension of the bounds of his spiritual being.

We shall now attend to the implications of the second postulate of Creative Humanism, *viz.* the postulate of human creativity. Man's creativity is a fact revealed to us by our own self-experience. If it is accepted here as a postulate, it is because the phenomenon of creative self-determination as a character of human beings cannot be rigorously demonstrated. Man is creative both on the utilitarian and on the cultural plane. His creative nature expresses itself in the following principal forms :

(a) Man expresses his creativity by disturbing the natural order of physical objects and processes and rearranging them in ways that serve his interests, utilitarian and aesthetic. Manifestations of this type of creativity are not wanting in lower organisms such as the birds who construct nests. Whenever a living being refuses to accept things as they are presented by nature, and seeks either to rearrange or to break and refashion them, it is behaving creatively. But for man the wholly artificial environment of a modern city in which we live, and which is altogether foreign to nature's intentions, would not have come into existence at all.

(b) Man views his environment as a meaningful order, and responds similarly to different objects, and differently to same objects, on different occasions. His responses to things and events, in other words, are not fixed or mechanical, but vary according to the meanings they bear for him on different occasions. Man fulfils his same needs in different ways on different occasions, and is constantly organising the order of his needs and their gratifications in novel ways.

(c) Man is constantly seeking to extend the scope of his responsiveness to an ever-widening circle of reality. This explains why he wants change, likes to travel, is sociable and listens to gossip, goes to cinema, reads fiction, and does a hundred other things.

(d) Lastly, man's creative nature is clearly reflected in his mani-

fold imaginative constructions expressed in symbols. Not only poetry and fiction, but even systems of scientific and speculative knowledge, various kinds of theories and dogmas, plans and ideals—all these are expressions of his constructive or creative imagination.

Creative humanism may be profitably compared and contrasted with some other types of philosophical humanism. A type of humanism, closely allied to pragmatism, was propounded by the late Dr. F. C. S. Schiller of Oxford at the beginning of this century. Schiller took as his starting-point the Protagorean maxim, *Man is the measure of all things*. He rightly interpreted or reinterpreted the word "man", occurring in the maxim, as meaning not the individual man but man in general, or the human race. We are not sure, however, if he was correct in interpreting the other significant term "measure" as implying the demand for measurement⁶. Humanism, as expounded by Schiller, stressed the following points. (a) It made conduct primary and thought secondary. (b) It deprecated intellectualism or preoccupation with pure thought, and declared "pure" reason to be a myth. (c) It stressed the function of will in cognition, defined "Reality" as the response to a will to know and conceived reason as being a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means of achieving adaptation. (As a corollary it followed that useless knowledge was false). (d) Following Kant in his emphasis on the primacy of Practical Reason, it upheld the supremacy of the "Good" over the "True" and the "Real".

Creative humanism agrees with Schiller in regarding knowledge as being relative to human interests. However, it differs from him in its refusal to conceive those "interests" to be purely utilitarian or practical. Human life is not mere adjustment to the external environment, and the functions of human reason are not exhausted in achieving adaptation. Rising far above the requirements of successful adaptation and effective existence, man's faculties of reason and imagination launch him on the career of creative self-expansion manifesting itself in magnificent productions in art, science and philosophy. An aspect of the creative temperament is a measure of detachment towards what is merely useful or personal. Hence the avowal that all knowledge is interested does not involve the acceptance of the pragmatic thesis that all genuine knowledge is useful. Nor is creative humanism committed to uphold the primacy of the ethical over the aesthetic and the intellectual. Indeed, as will be shown in a later chapter, the word ethical is ambiguous; it may mean either that which pertains to routine duty, or that which relates to the creative exercise of virtue. In the latter sense, the ethical may be considered to be in some respects more satisfying than the aesthetic and the intellectual. This type of superiority of the ethical, however, is quite distinct from the sort

of primacy which it is alleged to have by Schiller. As for the useful, which belongs to the realm of the means or the instrumental values, it is distinctly inferior to aesthetic and other ultimate values. While the categories of utilitarian origin may predominate in the descriptions and formulations of the physical sciences, they do not play any significant role in aesthetic and logical constructions. Even scientific constructions, in their higher forms, tend to be controlled by purely aesthetic and logical requirements.

In his recently published book *Humanism As A Philosophy* Corliss Lamont of New York has attempted to present a comprehensive outline of what he calls "Naturalistic Humanism". Lamont has laid great stress on naturalism or materialism as an element in the philosophy of humanism, and he tends to regard all the materialist thinkers of the past, from Protagoras and Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius down to La Mettrie and Helvetius, Holbach and Diderot, Marx and Engels, Comte and Mill, Russell, Dewey, etc. as philosophical forerunners of the type of humanism he represents. Humanism as conceived by Lamont is frankly irreligious. He commends the renaissance ideal of the well-rounded personality; and lays stress on man's enjoying whole-heartedly his life in this world.⁷

Lamont's enthusiasm is commendable. However, the sort of enjoyment of life that he recommends as ideal smacks of superficiality. Lamont's philosophy fails singularly to provide for that "desire for heroic life" which Maritain considers to be such a characteristic feature of man.⁸

It is not enough that man should create civilization and enjoy its amenities; it is also not enough that those amenities be made available to all the human beings. The fulfilment of man's life does not consist merely, and even mainly, in the satisfaction of his needs. Man fulfils himself, on the contrary, by transcending the sphere of needs, by seeking to attain the consciousness of things farthest removed from those needs, and by projecting his being into the infinitude of possibilities of useless relationship with the universe. It is not so difficult, after all, to cast off traditional restrictions and to revel in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures. There has ever been plenty of scope for that enjoyment even within the limits imposed by historical societies. There have always been people who did not honour custom or fear gods. The way of sensual enjoyment, however, is not what ennobles and elevates the being of man; on the contrary, by keeping his sensibility tied to the immediate, it tends to clip the wings of his imagination and to hinder the development of his personality to its full spiritual stature.

Lamont declares the dualism of Man *versus* Nature to be false. Creative Humanism, on the contrary, adopts this dualism as a

methodological postulate. The conscious conduct of man is seldom determined in a fixed, single direction. The human actor generally operates in a field of several possibilities, one of which is realized through the intervention of his own free will. As a consequence, his behaviour, though intelligible and explainable, is not strictly predictable. In these respects nature or the material phenomena seem to stand just on the opposite pole from man. The methods useful in the study of nature, therefore, can hardly be applied in the study of man.

III

The first step towards the understanding of man consists in a frank recognition of his creative nature, which makes him different from the natural phenomena. Failing that recognition, we may go on wondering for an eternity why the human studies are not making the sort of progress that is being made by the physical sciences, without advancing an inch towards the solution of the riddle. For the circumstance is an insoluble riddle to those who are determined to assimilate man to nature. However, those who recognise the obvious fact of the creative variability of human responses, should proceed patiently to study the far-reaching effects of that trait on man's behaviour, and its consequences for the human studies.

THE MEANING OF OBJECTIVITY

Man apprehends the various items in the universe as meaningful factors, which tend, in his mind, to form parts of meaningful systems. Owing to the multiplicity of his interests man finds things meaningful in different ways. The same object may mean different things, or bear different values, for the same person on different occasions; conversely, objects or phenomena that appear to be different may carry an identical meaning or significance. Thus a tiger or a crocodile may be an object for aesthetic contemplation when seen in a zoo, and an object of terror when confronted in nature. To persons interested in selling and buying currency notes mean the same thing as gold or silver coins. Further, different persons may look differently at the same object or occurrence according as they tend to place it in one context of meanings or another. The activities of a pacifist may appear to be irrational and unpatriotic to one set of persons, and humane, noble and reasonable to another. Take other instances. Gold is not valuable to the saint or *Śāṅkyāśin* whose aim in life is the attainment of liberation as conceived by the Hindus. Nor has the "Table of Logarithms" any significance for persons interested in poetry.

Are, then, the values we attach to objects and activities merely

subjective? Our reply is as follows. If the subjective means what is related or relative to the knowing subject, or what is located in the knowing organism or mind, then the readings from the scientific instruments are no less subjective than the so-called secondary qualities and the values. In that case everything becomes equally subjective, and the distinction between the subjective and the objective disappears. To avoid that predicament we may define the objective as follows: A meaning is objective if in the same contexts it connotes the same thing to all normal observers. Meanings exist only in the contexts of different interests and purposes, and all normal human beings can, by sympathetic imagination, enter into all those contexts. The apprehension of meanings, thus, is frequently a function of man's creative imagination, which can operate independently of the needs of his immediate present.

I accept the Bradleyan thesis that all qualities are relative and the more general thesis of Nāgārjuna, as interpreted by Stcherbatsky and others, that everything is relative, though I should prefer to employ the term 'relational' instead of 'relative.' Everything has its being and can be defined only in relation to others. I, therefore, discard the notion of the Absolute which is supposed to be relationless. I agree with the idealists in holding that the universe, *as known*, has a necessary reference to the human mind. In fact, I believe, in the Kantian fashion, that the world as known bears the impress of the forms imposed by the human understanding, or the human interests. I do not, however, see how this circumstance can be invoked to support idealism as against realism, for the interests of man would not be intelligible except in relation to the external world. The human mind and the world are both intelligible only with reference to each other.

Westermarck says: 'The supposed objectivity of moral values . . . implies that they have a real existence apart from any reference to a human mind.'⁹ I do not see how the objectivity of values, moral, aesthetic or logical, can mean anything so absurd. It is difficult, indeed, to discover any features in the known universe which are without reference, direct or indirect, to the knowing mind. As for (ultimate) values, they are identical with certain types of sentient experience. Instrumental values, too, cannot be understood except as related to such experience. The objectivity of values consists in this, that they can be apprehended by all men of normal sensibility and imagination as constituting either the content or the condition of the well-being of sentient creatures.

The possibilities of sentient experience may themselves be termed objective, if they can be imaginatively comprehended by all normal men and women.

All reasoning, all extension of knowledge through avenues other

than direct apprehension, depends on the comprehension of possibilities. This is true equally of the positive as well as of the normative spheres of knowledge.

Scientific and mathematical thinking on any significant scale cannot conceivably proceed without hypothetical reasoning, which consists wholly in the apprehension of the possible consequences of an assumed premise or set of premises. In the normative field, the possibilities that are weighed and evaluated are of two kinds. Some of the possibilities are such as may be comprehensible in terms of man's well-known experiences. Most of our plans of reconstruction and schemes of reform belong to this class. Other possibilities are understandable only in the light of certain assumptions, metaphysical or religious, whose truth is not ascertainable by direct insight. Examples of such speculative assumptions are : the disembodied state of release or *Moksha* of the Hindu philosophers, the stateless society conceived by the communists, etc. Any possibilities of behaviour or existence visualised on the basis of such assumptions are bound to remain uncertain. *Hypothetical or speculative reasoning of this type, on our view, is permissible only in those positive sciences where possibility of verification exists; it is not permissible in the sphere of the human studies, particularly the normative or evaluative studies.*

On the other hand, the sort of apprehension of possibilities which depends on "the extension and rearrangement" of our everyday experiences can be legitimately practised by the human studies. The non-speculative type of "laws" or "principles" of the humanistic sciences, such as Economics and Politics, no less than the principles or norms laid down by such evaluative studies as Ethics and Aesthetics, are obtained, in the opinion of the present writer, through such extension and rearrangement of our familiar knowledge or experiences. Such laws and principles may prove to be better-founded than even the verified laws of the physical sciences. For, in the last analysis, the laws of the physical sciences are speculative or metaphysical, and the justification they have is, in the final analysis, pragmatic. It follows from this view that the human studies may, and in some respects do, achieve *greater certainty* than the physical sciences. The certainty of the non-speculative or "empirico-imaginative" laws and principles (as they may be called) of the human studies, is wholly *qualitative*. Even the application of statistical methods and quantitative techniques cannot enable us to obtain quantitative laws in those studies. Statistical data, case studies and historical experience alike are serviceable in arousing in us the vision of the qualitative possibilities of human experience and behaviour. What the human studies can investigate are the

qualitative interconnections of "meanings" which constitute man's life and experience.

The psychological, aesthetic and moral preferences which form the data of the normative studies are as surely rooted in human nature as the ways in which man perceives and argues. Radical differences and even aberrations in evaluative fields are due, in the main, to two factors. Speculative conceptions of ideals or ends tend to vitiate human vision as to the character of real values, *i.e.* values which appeal to normal human sensibility. This explains how ascetic practices, *e.g.*, come to be adopted and admired. (In this connection it may be remembered that the capacity for self-control and for taking pains is an admirable trait which may contribute towards the qualitative development of a man's personality). Secondly, the fact that human beings can be happy and unhappy and achieve qualitative distinctions in different ways, tends to confuse people as to the nature of real values. Investigators find it easier to deal with material phenomena, whose modes of behaviour are fixed and invariable. The character of the values of human life, on the contrary, can be comprehended only by the imagination which can seize them in their creative variability.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEOUS VALIDITY OF DIFFERENTS AND CONTRARIES

Validity in the present context connotes two things: logical possibility and axiological commendability. The *Principle of Simultaneous Validity* may be stated in two related propositions. In the context of the same forces, a human being can be validly imagined to behave in more ways than one, and those ways may be not only different from but even contrary to one another. Secondly, two different, and even contrary, modes of existence may be seen to be desirable by human beings of normal sensibility and imagination. The first part or statement of the principle explains why readers of a novel should feel being in *suspense* as to the future courses of response or behaviour of the different characters; the second explains why the same people should be swayed and attracted by different, even conflicting, impulses and ideals. The two statements of the principle are related by the circumstance that deviations from the adopted line of action are generally due to the sudden ascendancy of a different impulse or ideal.

The Principle of Simultaneous Validity explains why human beings should react differently to the same situations and values. The reactions may not be strictly *predictable*, but they are certainly *intelligible* to careful investigators after their occurrence. This means that even the evaluative behaviour of human beings is funda-

mentally rational. Were it not so, it would not be possible for the anthropologists to understand and interpret the behaviour of the people whose "culture" is considerably different from their own. There is no good reason, then, to declare the evaluative behaviour of men to be subjective in any significant sense of that term¹⁰.

THE CREATIVE ELEMENT IN KNOWLEDGE

We have already indicated that the laws or generalisations in the human studies are obtained by the "extension and rearrangement" of the elements of familiar experience. Both these processes are creative. The comprehension of possibilities that constitutes humanistic knowledge of the general type is a creative enterprise. However, it does not seem necessary to suppose that the phenomenon of creative apprehension is peculiar to the sphere of the human studies.

Indian philosophical tradition—and it is a very respectable tradition—recognises two sources of knowledge which are almost universally accepted. These are perception and inference. Reasoning is not admitted to be a source of new knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by Indian logicians¹¹. Western philosophers, on the contrary, do not draw any distinction between inference and reasoning. However, until recently, most of the Western philosophers were inclined to accept either perception or reasoning (or inference) to be the sole source of knowledge. From Bacon onwards, western logic has also tended to draw a distinction between Formal or Deductive reasoning on the one hand and Material or Inductive logic on the other. Indian logic, too, accords recognition to inductive reasoning as an instrument of the establishment of *Vyāpti* or the rule of universal concomitance. An example of such a rule is: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

Critics have found fault with both deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. John Stuart Mill levelled the charge of *petitio principii* against syllogistic or deductive reasoning; and it has never been satisfactorily explained how the inductive leap from *some* to *all* may be justified. Modern philosophers of science tend to take the view that scientific reasoning is fundamentally deductive, or hypothetical-deductive. In any case the problem remains: Can deductive reasoning at all, and justifiably, give us new knowledge, i.e. knowledge which is not already contained in the premises?

The logical positivists take both deduction and analysis to consist in tautologous transformations. Mathematics, on this view, becomes a stupendous system of tautologous assertions and transformations. The logical positivist seeks to reduce philosophical statements to a similar system.

Is mathematics, then, nothing but a gigantic tautology? The great French mathematician, H. Poincare, in his *Science And Hypothesis* raises this question, and finally answers it in the negative. He points out that the mathematical method, which proceeds from the particular to the general, cannot be called deductive. Mathematical reasoning, according to him, 'has of itself a kind of creative virtue, and is therefore to be distinguished from the syllogism.' Mathematical reasoning or mathematical induction, in Poincare's opinion, consists of "proof by recurrence". He says:

Induction applied to the physical sciences is always uncertain, because it is based on the belief in a general order of the universe, an order which is external to us. Mathematical induction—i.e., proof by recurrence—is, on the contrary, necessarily imposed on us, because it is only the affirmation of a property of the mind itself.¹²

What is the secret of the peculiar certainty of mathematical induction, or proof by recurrence? Poincare sometimes writes as if he believed that that reasoning 'contains, condensed, so to speak, in a single formula, an infinite number of syllogisms.' Elsewhere he suggests that the rule (of reasoning by recurrence) is inaccessible to analytical (i.e. deductive) proof and to experiment, and is 'the exact type of the *a priori* synthetic intuition.' His final view seems to be contained in the following passage:

Why then is this view imposed upon us with such irresistible weight of evidence? It is because it is only the affirmation of the power of the mind which knows *it can conceive of the indefinite repetition of the same act, when the act is once possible*. The mind has a direct intuition of this power, and experiment can only be for it an opportunity of using it, and thereby of becoming conscious of it. (*Ibid.*, p. 18).

Mathematical induction, as explained by Poincare, seems to be a particular case of what we have called *extension* of our familiar knowledge. "Repetition of the same act" is one of the ways in which extension of known experience is achieved. It is by the method of such repetitive extension of the familiar, and *not* through analytical or tautologous transformation, that we come to comprehend such large magnitudes as the number "one million".

Generalised mathematical knowledge, then, is an example of knowledge by creative extension of familiar experience. I want to emphasize that the knowledge of history is made possible by an analogous process of "extension and rearrangement" of motives and procedures made familiar to us by our experience. This point needs elucidation. We are able to comprehend the life of a Napoleon or a Goethe, a life which is so very different from and so much richer.

than our own, neither through induction nor through deduction. It is obviously not comprehended through direct perceptual experience. That life is grasped and appreciated mainly through the processes of creative extension and reorganisation of the possibilities of our own experience.

In all cases where deduction seems to give us something more than what is contained in the premises, and where we seem to take an inductive leap which is not wholly justified, we may be sure that our powers of cognition have been active in a creative manner. The creative element, indeed, invariably enters into all significant forms of organised knowledge. The hypotheses of the scientists, no less than the visions of the poets and the revolutionaries, are constantly transcending the boundaries of what is immediately given.

Human creativity expresses itself both in the framing of the concepts in sciences and in philosophy, and in the assumption of the hypotheses which combine those concepts in novel ways. The concept of causation, for instance, as Hume rightly pointed out, contains much more than what is given in experience. Important explanatory concepts in science and philosophy arise, not through the abstraction of common features from a given class of objects, but through the attempted picturing or attributing of a structure to the given phenomena.

In the *Phaedo* Platonic Socrates propounds the rather queer theory that all knowledge is remembrance. Since the idea of absolute or perfect equality could not be suggested by actual sensory experience, which must always refer to cases of imperfect equality, that idea should be a remembrance of a cognition obtained elsewhere in a previous life. There is no reason, however, why we should rule out the possibility of the mind's being able to conceive more or less perfect equality on the basis of its experiences of imperfect equality. Similar remarks apply to the possibility of the suggestion of schemes envisaging improvements in the existing socio-political arrangements.

The creative powers of the human intellect are strikingly exhibited in the manipulations involved in the devising of new experiments, exploratory or illustrative, and in the construction of new thought-systems. Rignano gives a simple yet telling example of the former kind. The knowledge of the premises that "Metal bars lengthen under the action of heat" and "A longer pendulum oscillates more slowly than a shorter one" contains no suggestion whatever for carrying a given pendulum from a cold room into a warmer one. "This transportation gave rise to a new historical succession of events freely created by my imagination, at the end of which I was able mentally to "recognise" that the pendulum now oscillating more slowly in the warmer room was the same which

*oscillated more rapidly in the colder room.*¹²

The creative ingenuity displayed by the human mind in the construction of a thought-system needs no illustration. The positivistic denial of the element of novelty in deduction and analysis, and of necessity in synthetic knowledge, seem to be based on the non-appreciation of the creative mental factors involved in knowledge.

EXPRESSIONS OF HUMAN CREATIVITY: CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

To say that man is creative is to assert that he is not merely a passive entity suffering changes under the dispensation of the causal laws. One of the most important consequences of his creativity is this, that *all his voluntary actions are directed towards the production of values* (and sometimes disvalues). The conscious creativity of man, in other words, is indistinguishable from his propensity to pursue values. This pursuit also involves *acts of preference* relating to different modes of being and behaviour. These acts are determined (if that expression may be at all used) not by causal laws but by *insight* into the character and worth of different imagined states of the actor's self and the likely consequences of his actions.

Almost everything that is precious and valuable in human life and man-made environment owes its rise and continued existence to the creativity of our species. This creativity is exercised both on external reality and on inner being, and its purpose may be either *utility* or the *expansion and enrichment and qualitative refinement* of man's spiritual life. Operating on the plane of utility human creativity produces the technological order, which is an essential element in civilization; engaged in the exploration of the structure and possibilities of significant modes of man's being it produces culture, which embodies itself in the works of art and thought, and in virtuous and saintly lives. The institutional life of man marks the meeting-point of the utilitarian and cultural orders. Scientific activity, insofar as it is disinterested, belongs to the cultural order.

Culture is creative contemplation; it consists of the operations or activities whereby man attains a connected consciousness of the significant though useless aspects of reality. Culture may also be defined as the sum total of the activities which bring about an expansion or enrichment of man's spiritual life. The spiritual life of man generally embodies itself in symbols. In its more active phases cultural activity manifests itself in the *creation* of significant, and imaginatively sharable, modes of spiritual existence. Speaking generally, we may describe culture as the creation of, and/or parti-

cipation in, the modes of the common spiritual life of mankind. Considered as an achievement, the culture of man is cumulative and historical. The advance of culture consists in the *multiplication* and progressive *refinement* of man's spiritual modes of feeling and cognition.

Cultural life is independent of spatio-temporal existence in a peculiar sense; it is made possible by some measure of detachment towards that existence insofar as the latter concerns one's person. It is life directly and primarily related to the order of values, and only indirectly and secondarily to the order of factual existents.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Both science and philosophy are cultural activities. Science contemplates the order of the existents, and seeks to discover or evolve the laws which govern the appearance and disappearance, as well as the transformations, of the various classes of existents. Philosophy, on the contrary, contemplates those forms of man's activity and experience which are valued by him for their own sake, and which contribute to his life as a cultured being. Now the modes of our being which are desired and valued by us for their own sake constitute for us the ultimate values. Philosophy, therefore, may be defined as the general science of values, or as the study of ultimate values. The main purpose of philosophy is the discovery of the criteria whereby the *validity* and/or *worth* of different forms of cultural activity may be ascertained.

Philosophy, of course, seeks to analyse and interpret various forms of cultural experience; she does so, however, with a view to their final assessment. Logic, ethics, aesthetics and philosophy of religion, thus, constitute the main departments of philosophy, though these do not exhaust the functions of philosophy. Viewed in this light philosophy would appear to be *the instrument of the qualitative improvement* of human life and experience.

Some German thinkers, e.g. Rickert, Windelband, Dilthey and Spranger, are reported to have drawn a distinction between the "natural" and the "cultural" sciences. According to them, while the former seek to "explain", the latter aim at "understanding"; the former concern themselves with the general, while the latter deal with the individual.¹⁴ We accept the distinction with some reservations and qualifications. While distinguishing the "human studies" from the physical sciences, on the basis of both their respective subject-matters and their methodological procedures, I further distinguish the "humanistic sciences" from the "humanities". On my view the common aim of the sciences, physical and humanistic, is the attainment of causal explanations of the phenomena under investigation. These explanations are hypothetical and

quantitative in one case, and direct (or artistic) and qualitative in the other. As distinguished from the humanistic sciences the humanities concern themselves either with the *creation* or with the *analysis*, *interpretation* and *evaluation* of different forms of cultural or spiritual experience. Art, morality and religion constitute the modes of spiritual living which are submitted to analysis and critical assessment by the philosophical disciplines of aesthetics, ethics, etc. Logic and epistemology, another department of philosophy, concern themselves with the interpretation and evaluation of man's scientific and reflective activity in all its varied forms.

The viewpoint which regards philosophy as the study of values or spiritual preferences finds striking support in the tradition of Indian philosophy represented by the Vedāntic thinkers; it is also characteristic of Buddhist and other forms of idealism. Only the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika, and to a lesser extent the Sāṅkhya, seem to constitute exceptions to it. Dr. S. K. Maitra, therefore, is not wrong when he asserts that 'our tradition is to be value-centred, and not existence-centred as that of the West is'.¹⁵

Professor Northrop, the distinguished American scholar, has suggested the existence of a different type of contrast between Oriental and Occidental cultures. The East, according to him, tends to concentrate its attention upon what he calls "the differentiated aesthetic continuum," while the West tends to occupy itself with the formulation of deductively fertile postulational theories. 'The Orient, for the most', he observes, 'has investigated things in their aesthetic component; the Occident has investigated these things in their theoretic component'.¹⁶ Eastern thinkers, according to him, operate mainly with "concepts by intuition", while Western thinkers are inclined to use "concepts by postulation". It has been pointed out by Northrop's critics that *some* concepts by postulation, at any rate, can be met with in Indian (and Chinese) philosophy also, e.g. those of *karma*, *apūrva*, atoms, *prakṛti*, *purusha*, *guṇas*, *tanmātras*, etc.¹⁷ It may be replied on behalf of Northrop that most of these concepts, not excluding Nyāya-Vaiśeshika atoms and Sāṅkhya *prakṛti*, continue to retain elements drawn from the aesthetic continuum. It is noteworthy that even the universals of the Nyāya are known through a kind of perception, and the Sāṅkhya *prakṛti* is constituted by *guṇas* characterized by such intuitable qualities as lightness and heaviness, pleasure and pain. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that ancient Indian thinkers were aware of the prevalence of "concepts by postulation". They used the term *vikalpa* to denote such concepts. The term is of frequent occurrence in the writings of the Buddhist philosophers such as Dharmakīrti, who consider all intellectual concepts to be *vikalpas*; it is also known to Hindu logicians and philosophers. Thus Vāchaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-*

vārttika-tātparyatikā (1, 1, 4) concedes that the concepts of God and *Prakṛti* are *Vikalpas*, i.e. intellectual constructions.

Postulational theories are specially characteristic of modern physical science, and of systems of philosophy developed in Europe after the rise of science, e.g. those of Spinoza and Hegel, Alexander and Whitehead. However, the awareness of the postulational method is comparatively a recent phenomenon, made possible by the invention of the non-Euclidian geometries and the downfall of traditional physics. One negative trait of the ancient Indian, and I suppose Eastern, philosophical mind is its utter lack of interest in mathematics and its physical applications. In this respect Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti no less than Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, present a sharp contrast not only to Descartes and Leibnitz, Kant and Russell, but also to Plato and Aristotle.

This philosophical indifference to mathematics, to measurement and counting, which, presumably, prevented the emergence of modern science on the Asian soil, was itself rooted in the peculiar character of Eastern cultural consciousness, not unrelated to their preoccupation with the so-called religious or ultimate values. Oriental culture in general, and Indian culture and philosophy in particular, have been concerned more with the problem of the suffering and transformation of the individual than with the control and transformation of the external environment. The religions of Asia, particularly those of India and China, such as Buddhism and Taoism, are acutely conscious of the phenomenon of human finitude and suffering, and their main concern is getting rid of these. Further, ancient Asian thinkers tended to believe that the factors responsible for the suffering and happiness of the individual lay mostly within his own self. The sage-philosophers of Asia, therefore, directed their energies mainly towards the analysis and assessment of the phenomena related to the health and wellbeing of the individual psyche. Since the nature of these phenomena can be grasped only by imaginative intuition or insight, these thinkers appear to be exploring the contents of what is immediately apprehended, i.e. the aesthetic continuum. This explains why the philosophers of India should have laid special emphasis on *sākshātkāra* or direct realization. It may be noted in this connection that these philosophers are but little interested in investigating the nature of the external, sensible continuum. In the terminology of the present work it may be asserted that Asian philosophers in general, and Indian philosophers in particular, are concerned more with the cultural or spiritual refinement of the individual than with the improvement of the physical, and even social, conditions of his existence. Their interest in the organization of society is, in the main, a derivative of their desire to see established the conditions

of the individual's spiritual progress. The practice of virtue (as distinguished from mere duty) is commended because it leads to the purification of the self through purgation of the lower impulses and the elimination of the selfish motives. Ancient Indian philosophers do not seem to have felt any concern for the *enrichment* of the human personality; what interests them mainly is its moral and spiritual growth or advancement.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION

Modern thinkers generally, and the humanists particularly, seem to be unduly suspicious of the religious attitude. From the renaissance onwards the humanistic spirit has been generally regarded as being anti-mystical and rationalistic, sensuous and secular. Thinkers like M. N. Roy and Corliss Lamont are inclined to characterize their humanism as naturalistic. The Marxists love to describe religion as the opiate of the people. Anthropologists like Frazer believe that the religious mode of thinking and feeling is destined soon to disappear.

These denunciations of religion and the gloomy prophecies about it seem to proceed from the assumption that religion or the religious attitude is something alien or adventitious to man's real nature; they are also due to misconceptions about the nature of religion. Thinkers like Frazer consider religion to be a stage in the growth of science, which is an attempt to understand and explain the universe around us. Such accounts of religion miss completely the specific nature and function of religion. Insofar as the religious attitude involves beliefs, they refer to the nature and ultimate ground of certain values which man feels impelled to pursue. The religious man is *not* concerned with the sort of explanations and forces with which science is occupied. Any appearance to the contrary is due to the fact that the religious consciousness in the primitive man is mixed up with most other forms of consciousness, aesthetic and utilitarian.

As Dr. Radhakrishnan remarks: 'Religion cannot be an opiate unless there are unsatisfied longings which are not all on the material plane.'¹⁸ The immaterial plane, however, need not be regarded as lying in a super-human sphere. It is surprising that the humanists of different descriptions, with all their professed concern for the powers and achievements of man, should neglect to inquire into the nature and meaning of the attitude or attitudes which produce the saintly character. For, viewed as a product or achievement of human culture, that character is in no wise less significant than the highest works of art and reflection. The life of the saint marks the highest development of the spirit of detachment, the sovereign remedy for the evils attending man's conscious struggle for existence.

The cultural growth of the individual proceeds along two distinct though related lines. It involves, on the one hand, the extension of the individual's consciousness into thousand modes of disinterested feeling and cognition evolved and stored up in symbols by the human mind. On the other, it consists in the growing discrimination between the higher and the lower, and in the increasing indifference or detachment towards values of the lower order. The religious attitude marks the highest development of this latter type of consciousness. The existence of culture in any form is bound up with man's capacity to transcend the order of utilitarian values, *i.e.* the values which contribute to his existence and survival; religious culture implies a complete transcendence of that order or those values. The religious man is a thoroughgoing aristocrat who refuses to bother about problems which concern his mere existence. He lives like a being belonging purely to the sphere of ultimate values, paying little or no attention to the causal order enveloping his spatio-temporal life.

To sum up: the specific essence of man consists in his urge towards creative pursuit of values. In opposition and contrast to the order of existents created by nature, man sets out to create an order of values realizable in his person. This creation is made possible by two processes. Having secured the means of subsistence man finds it possible to withdraw his attention, albeit temporarily, from the utilitarian aspects of life and the world and to occupy himself with only those phases of them which generate intrinsically significant forms of consciousness. This process may be called the process of evaluative abstraction. Man practises it in relation to the universe in his moments of leisure. The second process, which frees us from the limitations and suffering bound up with our involvement in the order of utilities, is detachment. The virtue of detachment, enjoined by religious teachers and practised by saintly natures, however, is not incompatible with a life devoted to the eradication of suffering in others and the production and promotion of values. Nor is it incompatible with the exercise and acceptance of friendship and love. In fact, the life of the detached saint, if it is to escape being arid and frustrated, must fulfil itself in disinterested, creative work attended with appreciative acceptance and loving cooperation by others.

Man fulfils himself only by living in conformity with the demands of his creative (*i.e.*, value-pursuing) nature. The direction of his advance lies in the expansion and progressive refinement of his cultural or value-bearing consciousness. It is towards such expansion and refinement of the human personality, towards—to use a happy phrase of Mumford's—the "reestablishment of the primacy of the (creative) person"¹⁹ and not towards unlimited and

unscrupulous acquisition of wealth and power, that the political, economic and educational activities of individuals and nations, of different national states and international organizations, should be directed.

CHAPTER I

OBJECTIVITY OF VALUES : ORDERS OF EXISTENCE OR REALITY

THE aim of this book is to set forth an adequate conception of culture considered as a value. The adequacy of a conception or statement, whatever else it may mean, implies its acceptability by all normal persons competent to examine it. Such a conception or statement, in other words, lays claim to some sort of validity. That statements about values can have any objective validity, that there can be a scientific or systematic treatment of values, is denied by some thinkers notably the subjectivists and the logical positivists. Before embarking on the treatment of culture, therefore, it is necessary that we examine the contentions of these thinkers.

Criticism may be either formal and destructive or vital and constructive. The first type of criticism seeks to discredit a view mainly by exposing its logical inconsistencies. The method of *reductio ad absurdum* is a variety of formal or destructive criticism. Constructive criticism, on the contrary, tests a view or theory chiefly with reference to the actualities of life and experience, and proposes to modify, reformulate or reject it purely in the interest of a better understanding or explanation of that experience. The object of formal criticism is to discredit a particular approach or theory; the final aim of constructive criticism is the sharpening and enrichment of our perception of reality. It is not suggested that criticism of the first variety is illegitimate. Nevertheless we hold that serious criticism should be constructive, both in its motivation and in its results. Criticism of the destructive type, indeed, has been practised extensively by the sceptical thinkers of all types not excluding the subjectivists and the logical positivists. Such criticism, while producing a false sense of victory and a puerile feeling of elation in those who practise it, seldom helps to settle major issues. With these reservations we shall pass on to a brief consideration of some sceptical views concerning values or value judgments.

A CRITIQUE OF VALUE SCEPTICISM

We shall be concerned here mainly with ethical scepticism, or scepticism respecting moral judgments and moral values, and only incidentally with that relating to aesthetic values and aesthetic judg-

ments. Modern ethical scepticism assumes two important forms, subjectivism and emotivism. The main cause behind the emergence of the sceptical theories is the prevalence or discovery of differences of opinion concerning moral and aesthetic matters among individuals and groups belonging to same and different "cultures".

Subjectivism may be viewed as an attempt to account for these differences. According to it value statements, relating either to actions or to works of art, do not really tell us anything about those objects. When a person passes a moral or aesthetic judgment, what he is really asserting is not the presence of any quality or characteristic in the object before him (e.g. a painting or an action), but the presence of a feeling (of aesthetic or moral approval or disapproval) in himself. Value judgments, in other words, are varieties of psychological statements. Different individuals and groups may entertain, or experience, different feelings and sentiments with respect to same or similar situations and objects, and be thus led to judge them differently. It follows that evaluative judgments, moral as well as aesthetic, cannot lend themselves to be welded into scientific unity. Subjectivism thus is led to deny the possibility of the disciplines called ethics and aesthetics.

The critics of subjectivism have pointed out how that theory leads to a number of paradoxical conclusions. G. E. Moore has noted that the theory involves, in its application to ethics, 'the very curious consequence that no two men can ever differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong'.¹ For, while passing a moral judgment, each person is talking about his own private feelings, and not about the action or person that is supposed being judged. This startling consequence of subjectivism undermines the very basis on which that sceptical theory rests. The second consequence of the subjectivist thesis is that no moral judgment could be false 'unless the person judging made a mistake about his own psychology'.² Thirdly, no two moral judgments could mean the same thing—not even judgments made by the same person on two different occasions—for each time the person judging would mean "I now feel approval or disapproval of this". Similar remarks would apply to the aesthetic judgments.

Another paradoxical implication of the thesis in question is that a person can never be in doubt as to the moral quality of an act, accomplished or contemplated. For nobody can possibly be in doubt as to the feeling that he or she is experiencing. Subjectivism, in other words, fails to provide for the phenomenon of moral conflict.

What is the source of these troubles of subjectivism? They are rooted, in our view, in its failure to see that feelings do not arise in a vacuum, and that they do not stand alone: feelings are consistently referred to specific objective situations. A person starts

having a feeling of moral approval or disapproval only when he is confronted, or believes himself to be confronted, with a moral situation. Similar remarks apply to the appearance of aesthetic feelings. If this were not so, it would be possible for a person to experience all the feelings normally aroused by the perusal of *Hamlet*, without ever having read that play at all. Again, it would be utter simplification of facts to assert that *all* good or right acts aroused similar feelings of approval and *all* bad or wrong acts similar feelings of disapproval. The feelings aroused by a good act of heroic dimensions are not the same as those aroused by an ordinary good act. Nor can these feelings be characterized with any accuracy *without reference to the objects or situations by which they are evoked*, or to which they are regarded as being responses.

A moral judgment, in our view, is a reaction to a situation which has a moral meaning, *i.e.* a meaning or significance in terms of worth or value of a peculiar kind. Moral judgments by different individuals and groups differ mainly because the latter tend severally to interpret the given situations differently. Thus, the killing of a chicken for food may mean: (1) infliction of avoidable pain (to a Buddhist); or (2) legitimate use by man of a creature produced by God for man (to a Moslem or Christian). An atheist may justify the killing by saying that (3) the provision of proteins for the health of man is more important than the preservation of the life of the chickens. The moral judgment is passed, *not* on the series of *physical movements* involved in a situation, but on the *meanings* or values that those movements are seen as indicating or producing. The subjectivists, therefore, are wrong in attributing moral differences to differences of feeling with respect to *identical or similar situations*. The position is just the reverse: *men judge differently because they see differently*². In all cases the relation between the feeling and the situation—this is the important point—is considered and believed, by those who pass moral judgments, to be natural (or objectively conditioned) and *intelligible*, even as the relation between the different sets of premises and their conclusions is regarded by those who argue to be objective and intelligible.

The reader is requested to carefully note the following points in this connection. (1) The moral judgment is not passed on the *physical movements* constituting an act which are seen. The movement of a knife in the hands of a surgeon has a very different moral quality from its movement in the hands of an assassin. The two movements *do not* constitute the same or similar acts. Human studies, it may be noted, concern themselves with *meanings* and not with physical phenomena, and morality and ethics deal with matters falling within the field of the human studies. This point is not appreciated by some of the best investigators. Thus, in his *Langu-*

age, *Truth and Logic*, Chapter VI, Mr. A. J. Ayer asserts that the sentence, "you stole that money" says as much as the proposition, "you acted wrongly in stealing that money". He rightly thinks that the two sentences refer to the same *physical* fact, but he fails to see that they may convey different *meanings* in different contexts. (Here the use of the word "stole" is unfortunate; that word should be replaced by some such axiologically neutral expression as "removed and took in your possession without the knowledge and consent of the owner"). A terrorist leader, who does not regard the stealing of money as bad provided the money is used for helping a poor widow, or for advancing the cause of the party, may actually use the above expression as praise for the person concerned. Similarly, in the sentence "that poor man stole that injection in order to save the life of his dying child", reference to stealing cannot be taken to be condemnatory.

(2) This leads us to the second point. The moral quality of an act does not inhere in it in the manner in which greenness seems to inhere in the leaves. An act may get varying degrees of "badness" according to the amount of injury it inflicts, or is intended to inflict, on the victim; the badness also varies with the extent to which we judge the victim to have deserved or not deserved that injury. Thus, if the victim himself is a robber or a rogue, we are not inclined to extend our sympathy to him and to judge the thief too harshly, especially if the latter had deliberately sought to injure or exploit a wicked person. This example shows, incidentally, how our moral judgment may be influenced by information concerning the agent and the victim, as well as the beneficiary, of the so-called wrong act. Similar remarks would apply to judgments concerning the good acts. Our opinions concerning exceptional deeds of historical personages and masterpieces of art and thought belonging to the past, may also change in consequence of the performance of other deeds and the appearance of other masterpieces in our own time.

The logical positivists attempt to reduce ethical judgments to (a) statements of sensory facts; (b) expressions or excitants of feelings; and (c) imperatives to act in certain ways. On careful scrutiny all such reductions are seen to be illegitimate. It cannot be too often emphasised that statements in the human studies, both assertorial and evaluative, refer to the meanings or meaning-aspects of facts, and not to their physical characteristics. As regards the other two types of reduction, the following comments are in order. (1) The historian may pass moral judgments on actions, persons and policies in respect of which anger and hatred as well as praise and commendation are alike useless. (2) As W. D. Ross points out, the command theory fails to do justice to those cases of the judgment of moral obligation where it has reference either to a third person, and

not the person addressed (e.g., he should do so-and-so), or to the past (e.g., he or you ought to have done so-and-so), or to an unfulfilled past condition (e.g., if this and that were the case, you ought to have done so-and-so), or to a future treated merely as possible (e.g., if this and that were the case, you ought to do so-and-so), or to the speaker himself (I ought to do so), etc.⁴

Our moral judgments are generally accompanied by indications of the reasons which justify them. These indications may consist of the barest hints as to the principles involved, when these latter are generally known and accepted, or they may include elaborate explanations. Our endeavour in every case, particularly when criticism is feared or suspected, is to make others *see* the whole context which has occasioned the judgment. Logical positivism seems to take no notice of the processes by which parties in a moral situation seek to convince each other or the spectators. Nor can that theory offer any plausible account of the feelings of remorse and the phenomena of moral conflicts.

Neo-positivism is emphatic on the point that meaningful synthetic propositions should be testable. However, it has not cared to inform us *how a piece of analysis may be tested as to its validity*. How are we to ascertain whether or not the proposition 'Killing is bad' means 'Do not kill'? We shall see in a later chapter that the analytical philosophers, not excluding the logical positivists, are utterly confused as to the nature of (1) philosophical propositions, and (2) philosophical proof.

The most serious charge against the sceptical theories under review is that they are false to the history of the civilised man. They require us to believe that all the moral teachers and philosophers from the Buddha and Confucius down to Kant and Gandhi and all the aestheticians from Aristotle down to Mammaṭa and Croce have been engaged in a task which is inherently vain and futile; and that all those teachers who seek to inculcate in their students the capacity for sound judgment with respect to, say, the works of art, are trying to deceive not only the students but also themselves, for the judgments in these spheres do not, properly speaking, admit of the distinctions of being correct or incorrect. In their application to sociopolitical ideals and practices the theories in question would seem to involve a total negation of the entire liberal tradition of Europe, the tradition which maintained that it was possible to test 'the validity of behaviour and institutions in terms of the rational consent of men'.⁵

If agreement about moral and aesthetic matters were as impossible of attainment as sceptical thinkers make it out to be, there would be no common laws guaranteeing successful communion, national and international, among men; and literature produced by

one individual in one country would not be appreciated by other individuals in the same country, not to speak of individuals in other countries. In that case, the following statement of Prof. A. A. Macdonell would be wholly unaccountable : 'Since the Renaissance there has been no event of such world-wide significance in the history of culture as the discovery of Sanskrit literature in the latter part of the eighteenth century'.

OBJECTIVITY OF VALUES

Are, then, we justified in regarding values as objective? Our previous account implies that the moral quality of an act depends on the *relations* in which it stands to several factors in a given situation, including the motive and intention of the actor and the deserts of those with whom that actor is dealing. This means that the meanings which constitute values are relational or relative. This circumstance, according to some, implies the conclusion which we are anxious to avoid, namely, that the values are subjective. The situation demands a careful investigation of the nature of the objective or of objectivity, which we shall now undertake. Afterwards, we shall endeavour to unravel the factors which make for differences of perception and opinion respecting values. For it is our faith that an insight into the causes that make people differ from one another in regard to a particular matter contributes towards the clearing up and resolution of their differences. In this connection we are inclined to lay down the following general rule : *A difference which can be explained and made intelligible is a difference grounded in an objective situation.*

THE DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVITY

There is a deep-seated prejudice which determines or colours most of the contemporary approaches to the problem of values. The prejudice has its roots in the famous distinction drawn by Galileo the scientist and John Locke the philosopher between the so-called primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities are actually there in the bodies; the secondary qualities owe their appearance to the constitution of the observer. 'Without the eye there would be no colours; without the ear, no sounds, and so on'. The primary qualities are objective while the secondary ones are subjective. The objective, it follows, is that which exists without dependence on, or relation to, sentient beings and their experience.

The philosophical distinction between primary and secondary qualities assumes different forms in the hands of different thinkers, and appears under different names. Mr. Stace, for instance, draws a distinction between the subjective and objective as follows :

Any value will be called subjective if the existence of the value depends, wholly or in part, on any human desires, feelings, opinions, or other mental states. An objective value will, of course, be the opposite of this. It will be a value which does not depend on any human desire, feeling, or other mental state.

Going farther than Stace F. A. Hayek declares that the data of the social sciences are all subjective. The social sciences do not deal 'with the relations between things, but with the relations between men and things or the relations between man and man'. And, so far as human actions are concerned, 'things are what the acting people think they are'. To acting men and women things are "suitable for" or "intended for" something. The facts of the social sciences, Hayek announces, 'are merely opinions, views held by the people whose actions we study'. He also proposes to contrast "objective" with what is "attributed", in case the word subjective is considered to be ambiguous.

Here a question arises: If the subjective is what depends on the human mind, should logical implication be regarded as subjective? Obviously logical implications could not exist except for the mind or minds that apprehended them. But if logical implications are subjective, then all scientific discourse, not excluding that to be met with in the physical sciences, becomes subjective.

So far as philosophy is concerned, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is now taken to be an exploded one. Long ago Berkeley argued that the so-called primary qualities could not be shown to be independent of the knowing minds, and thus in any way different from, or more objective than, the secondary qualities. Russell remarks: 'Ever since Berkeley, Locke's dualism on this point has been philosophically out of date.'⁹ It is noteworthy that post-relativity physics, on the whole, seems to be inclined to agree with Berkeley. Thus in his *Limitations of Science* Mr. J. W. N. Sullivan writes¹⁰:

It is not at all obvious that nature's mathematical characteristics are not also subjective. Mathematical characteristics, it may be argued, are put into nature by us. We inevitably arrange phenomena in a mathematical framework because of the structure of our mind. This was Kant's view, and it is also Eddington's view Indeed, Mr. Bertrand Russell tells us that it can be shown that a mathematical web of some kind can be woven about any universe containing several objects.

In a different context Sullivan remarks that if mathematics 'has an objective reference it is only in the sense that logic, according to some writers, has an objective reference.'

'These passages speak for themselves. Indeed, in this era of Relativity, it is commonplace to assert, in the words of Caudwell, that 'absolute length, mass, energy, space, time and motion do not exist.' For 'unless some body at absolute rest can be found, it is impossible to find the true speed of any particle, and hence its inertia, and hence its mass.' The principle of Relativity, according to Caudwell, 'describes the limits of our knowledge about reality in such a way that these limits become real descriptions of the nature of matter in *relation to us*'.¹¹ On the analogy of the fisherman's generalizations that apply only to *catchable* fish Eddington proounds his *Selective Subjectivism* in regard to our scientific knowledge of the universe. Dropping analogy he explains¹²:

If we take observation as the basis of physical science, and insist that its assertions must be verifiable by observation, we impose a selective test on the knowledge which is admitted as physical. The selection is subjective, because it depends on the sensory and intellectual equipment which is our means of acquiring observational knowledge. It is to such subjectively selected knowledge, and to the universe which it is formulated to describe, that the generalisations of physics—the so-called laws of nature—apply.

Bridgman, adopting the operational viewpoint, substitutes for Eddington's "Sensory and intellectual equipment" the "operations" that define concepts, and makes all our knowledge relative to those operations. Since, he says, 'experience is described in terms of concepts, and since our concepts are constructed of operations, all our knowledge must unescapably be relative to the operations selected'.¹³ Eddington confirms this view of Bridgman when he says: 'It has come to be the accepted practice in introducing new physical quantities that they shall be regarded as *defined* by the series of measuring operations and calculations of which they are the result'.¹⁴

Eddington also refers to properties of particles (matter) "imposed by our procedure of observations". This makes the universe described by science still more subjective.

In the last paragraph I have used the word subjective, though the term relative would be equally appropriate. The physical universe, insofar as we know it, is relative to us. If, however, we choose to describe it as subjective, then no distinction is left between the subjective and the objective. In that case everything in the world becomes subjective, and the distinction between the subjective and the objective disappears. If, however, that distinction is to be retained, and I believe it has to be retained, then the objective should be defined by a characteristic other than non-relativity.

Relativity and objectivity, to my mind, are not opposed conceptions. In fact, all the properties of any and every object exhibit themselves only in relationship with other objects. Thus movement is relative, so is greenness and redness. Over half a century ago the philosopher F. H. Bradley said : 'quality without difference is in every sense impossible', and difference is a relation. 'To find qualities without relations is surely impossible.'¹⁵ Nor do I believe that this sort of relativism argues for idealism as against realism. For relation to the knowing mind is one among many relations that a thing may bear to other things. That being so, the conception of objectivity needs to be redefined, so as to make room for relativity.

In his *Analysis of Matter* Bertrand Russell defines objectivity as follows : 'When two people simultaneously have percepts which they regard as belonging to one group, if the inferences of the one differ from those of the other, one of them at least must be drawing false inferences, and must therefore have an element of subjectivity in his perception. It is only when the inferences of the two observers agree that both perceptions may be objective.'¹⁶

The objective, according to Russell, is what is commonly perceived or experienced. The definition, it would appear, fails to cover the cases of private or introspective data. Should the experience of toothache be regarded as objective, or as subjective ? Obviously the experience is different from illusions and hallucinations, else the physicians would not endeavour to cure it by administering medicines. It may be asserted that the physical or organic correlates of toothache or headache are cognizable, at least in theory, by all persons. The reply is that medical science might not have cared to devise remedies for the organic symptoms unless it believed in the objectivity of pain that accompanied them. It is interesting to note that the homoeopaths and biochemists administer their remedies for headache, etc. *purely on the basis of the introspective reports of their patients*. Surely those physicians regard such reports as objective and reliable.

A correct definition of objectivity, then, should accommodate within its scope the private or introspective data as well. The following description of "objective" and "objectivity", contained in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1918), is more appropriate :

That which is known may also be distinguished from that which is erroneously assumed or accepted—from that which we deceive ourselves into believing; hence object is used as equivalent to real. This sense . . . is most frequent with the adjective objective, which designates that which belongs really to any subject-matter as distinct from that which is imported or reflect-

ed into it through the prejudices, illusions, fallacies, or errors of the person observing or judging: opposed to that which is merely in the mind.

That which is merely in the mind is the illusory or the imagined, and different from what is genuinely perceived or felt. In an article entitled "Objectivity and Value" contributed to *The Journal of Philosophy* Mr. Donald Walhout suggests "over-personal control" as the generic definition of objectivity.¹⁷ According to this definition toothache would be objective inasmuch as it were capable of being controlled by medical science or by a number of medical experts. The objective is what has a "trans-egoistic", "over-subjective" or "over-individual" status. According to S. Alexander the objective is not necessarily what is independent of the mind, but that which is "not dependent on an individual mind, but is a common possession of many minds."¹⁸

Is, then, toothache objective? The peculiar kind of toothache experienced by Mr. X, it would appear, is not a common possession of several minds. Homoeopathy apart what the medical science treats are the physiological correlates of the felt toothache, and these correlates have "behavioral observability" which the felt toothache lacks. The felt toothache, then, is not an object of common observation either physical or mental.

And yet the felt toothache, inasmuch as it is neither illusory nor a product of imagination, is in some sense real or objective, and is commonly believed to be so. There is no earthly reason why a definition of objectivity should exclude such phenomena from its scope.

OBJECTIVITY AND NORMALITY

As a matter of fact we tend to regard as objective all those phenomena which are consistently experienced by the normal people. (Consistency here means the mutual compatibility of experiences regarded as objective at a certain level of abstraction or analysis, or with respect to a group of related purposes). Thus we believe in the objectivity of a person's toothache unless we have reasons to doubt his veracity or sanity, and hence the authenticity of his report. In this way the concept of objectivity becomes linked up with that of normality of the observer or observers. This conception of objectivity is implied in Professor Dingle's definition of science. He takes science to be 'the recording, augmentation, and rational correlation of those elements of our experience which are actually or potentially common to all normal people'.¹⁹

Is the concept of normality capable of being precisely defined or analysed? I must confess that I am unable to give an affirmative reply to this question. It is no fault of a concept, however, that

we are not able to define it. Indeed, it may be questioned if there is any concept relating specifically to man that can be precisely defined. I am thinking of such concepts as love, hatred, ambition, progress, etc. Concepts such as that of number were used by mathematicians long before their definitions could be attempted.

Certain characteristics of normality as applied to man, however, can be indicated by showing what it definitely includes or excludes. First, the normal in relation to man has no affinity whatever to the average of the statistician. The normal certainly excludes the subnormal both in the intellectual and the emotional sense; but it as certainly includes the supernormal. All the imaginative and creative possibilities of human nature, of the geniuses in different fields, are definitely included in the concept of the normal man. In fact, in the various specialised fields of human activity, it is the expert whose opinion is considered to be normal, *i.e.*, such as would be sharable by others if the latter were properly trained. The circumstance of being trained under expert supervision, thus, is regarded not only as not inimical but necessary and helpful to the development of normality in men and women. And since there are different degrees and kinds of expertness, normality cannot be regarded as a static concept. Being unequatable to the average it is obviously not a quantitative concept.

GENIUS AND NORMALITY

The problem of the relation of genius to normality raises more complicated issues. Who is more normal, the revolutionary genius or the conservative average person? Several investigators have expressed the opinion that the genius, particularly the literary genius, is in some sense abnormal. Such was the view of Platonic Socrates who regarded inspiration as an abnormal state; such, again, appears to have been the view of Shakespeare who playfully compared the poet to the lunatic and the lover. Brown observes: '... many geniuses have also been neurotic and the genius is closely related to the neurotic'.²⁰ Not all literary geniuses, however, are equally different from the common people. Kālidāsa and Tolstoy, for instance, appear to be much nearer to the common man in their sensibility than do, say, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.

The believers in the abnormality of the genius, however, have failed to consider one pertinent fact: why, in the long run, do the opinions and sentiments of the genius come to prevail, and those of the average, respectable man to be superseded? Not that geniuses do not contradict one another; nor that every genius comes to be wholly accepted. But the fact that a person is regarded as a genius, is remembered and even adored, goes to show that, in some sense or the other, the human soul finds that person useful and worthy.

The fact is that while men in general are conservative human nature is essentially expansive and creative. Within limits, and in accordance with certain laws, it delights in enlarging its possibilities of feeling and cognition. The genius brings about this enlargement by creative development of the normal potentialities on the one hand, and by the opposition and removal of non-normal restrictions and inhibitions on the other. Thus most revolutionary geniuses are, in a sense, better spokesmen of the normal human self than the conservative defenders of tradition. The seeming abnormality of the genius, however, is related, not so much to his perceptions and feelings as to his exceptionally vital and courageous temperament which refuses to abide by the ordinary rules of safety and is impatient and disdainful of hypocrisy. The genius appears to be abnormal or unbalanced chiefly to those who have become too tamely accustomed to various kinds of restrictions, and whose creative urge is too feeble to burst the bonds of habit by which they have got used to live.

'Genius', says Schopenhauer, 'is simply the completest objectivity,'²¹ which is the same as saying that it is completest normality *operating creatively*. Dr. Richards equates the normal to the standard.²² The equation may be accepted, provided that the standard is not interpreted in any highbrow sense. As a matter of fact the standard response both on the part of the artist and on that of the dependable critic is, in a peculiar sense, the innocent or naïve response; it is unaffected by theories and prejudices that characterize exclusively a particular "culture" or cultural epoch. While it may be admitted that no artist in the world has so far achieved this standard of complete normality, it must be recognised that the greatest artists and poets of any nationality are usually the ones who are more readily understood in other countries and other cultural epochs. In order to be an artist at all a person must be able to shed off his personal idiosyncrasies; in order to be a universal artist, he must be able to eliminate or transcend the idiosyncrasies of his nation or epoch. This, at any rate, is the direction in which the development of man's intellectual, aesthetic and moral life must ultimately proceed.

Normality of man, thus, is defined, on the one hand, by the impulses shared in common by all men; and, on the other, by the innumerable possibilities of combinations of needs and motives flowing from different impulses and attaching themselves to different objects obtainable by different methods in differing physico-technological and moral environments. Thus understood normality is a highly differentiated and mobile equilibrium, a system of relations between man and his environment into which the child has to be introduced by deliberate educative effort. In the world as we know

it, a child can be made normal not by being forced to stay in the state of nature, but by being imparted as wide and catholic an education as possible. Through the study of Geography, through travel, through the perusal of History and of imaginative literature, and through the scrutiny of various religio-philosophical and moral systems does the individual ascend to the seemingly commonplace yet significant viewpoint of the normal man.

EDUCATION AND NORMALITY

Let us examine a little more closely the relationship between education and the development of normality. Only to a superficial extent is the education of a human child concerned with the co-ordination of the different sensory responses either in his own person or in relation to other persons. Children acquire such coordination mostly by themselves. The specifically human education consists in gradually introducing the child to the rich imaginative heritage that shapes and more or less constitutes the cultural life of his community. The child learns about the gods and goddesses, angels and saints, kings and queens, princes and princesses associated with the religion, mythology and history of the community. He thereby acquires a certain sense of values, a certain conception of norms and ideals by which his life should be regulated. He also comes to be acquainted with certain specific imperatives, injunctions and inhibitions, enforced by the community. As the child grows into youth and adulthood, particularly in a modern community, he tends to become aware of the half-solved or unsolved problems, moral, intellectual and even aesthetic, which the more advanced members of the community (and this community may now include all the known humanity) are trying to tackle. The unsolved problems are of two kinds: those arising out of the disagreement of newly ascertained facts with accepted theories, and those consisting in the perceived inconsistencies among the norms or values, or between values and practices, accepted and sanctioned by the community. Such problems, disagreements and inconsistencies and their attempted solutions, it will be seen, can be appreciated only by those members of the community who have been previously introduced to its imaginative heritage. To take a particular instance, the full weight of the problem of causation can be appreciated only by the person who has some acquaintance with the various imaginative forms in which the problem has been stated and discussed by various thinkers. Similar remarks apply to the possibility of the appreciation of such major imaginative constructions as works of art and literature, systems of philosophy, mathematical and physical theories, etc. The growth of man's imaginative life is a continuous process advancing through various levels and stages to its higher or more complicated

forms; and no person can have access to the maturer forms unless he has passed through some of the more significant stages of its earlier history. Education is the process by which the individual traces his advance from the earliest to the later stages of a particular form of imaginative life.

Thus the fact that the layman fails to comprehend the significance and feel the fascination of a philosophical problem does not prove that the problem is abnormal or artificial. Rather, it proves that the person concerned lacks imaginative equipment needed for its comprehension. The imaginatively underdeveloped may similarly fail to grasp the revolution in thought brought about by a new theoretical development. Such conflicts and revolutions, and various sorts of inconsistencies and contradictions, relate generally to the imaginative constructions of man and their interrelationships. Most of the more significant facts of our mental or symbolical life, which figure in the human studies, are of the nature of such constructions and not like the simple perceived phenomena, though the various joints of those constructions are as immediately perceivable as logical relations.

Education, thus, seems to produce the following effects on men : (a) it introduces them to the imaginative life of the community; and (b) it inculcates in them norms and outlooks accepted by the community, thereby promoting cooperation and cultural unity among them. A third effect of education may also be noted : it tends to divide members of one community from another, particularly in respect of the differing norms and values which it propagates. This last effect of education can be annulled, not by declaring that norms and values as such are irrational phenomena, but by discovering truly scientific methods and criteria for dealing with those phenomena. It is interesting to note that members of different communities find it possible to share the imaginative creations of one another, insofar as the validity of those creations is independent of the peculiar prejudices, theoretical and practical, of the several communities. It is also noteworthy that relatively greater poets, moralists and philosophers belonging to different lands or communities have had more universal appeal than their lesser brethren.

We have defined normality. In addition to sharing with the generality of his kind the capacity for certain perceptions and the aptitude for feeling certain wants and needs in terms of which those perceptions are generally interpreted, the normal man or woman agrees with others in having a certain mental structure with characteristic logical habits, imaginative functions and emotional propensities. It is in virtue of these latter qualities that normal human beings are able to argue with one another, discuss schemes and plans

together, and entertain similar feelings on the occasion of a common gain or misfortune. The objective, then, is anything, an object or a relationship, which a normal person perceives, or may be led to perceive through suitable imaginative preparation.

ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing conception of objectivity has affiliations with what is known in epistemology as the realistic theory of knowledge, though there are important differences between the realist view and ours. The realists believe that there is no knowledge without an object, and the logical relations of implication, incompatibility, contradiction, etc. do in some sense *subsist*. On our view the aesthetic and moral features of objects or situations, too, are in some sense objective. The realists, however, deny that relations have any hand in determining the existence and character of objects. In particular, they are averse to attributing any causal efficacy to the knowledge relation, *i.e.* the relation of objects to the knowing mind. On our view, however, qualities of objects can exist, or be known to exist, only in relation to other objects. Thus the existence of logical relations has no intelligible meaning except in relation to intelligent human beings who construct propositions and apprehend their mutual connections. Similarly the sentiments of love, hatred, jealousy, etc. can exist in a person only in relation to other persons.

The ontological implications of the view we are advocating here are, indeed, very wide. On this view any entity that consistently enters into the experience of normal observers is in some sense objective and real. Thus, according to us, colours, sounds and other so-called secondary qualities are as objective as the primary or mathematical qualities. Aesthetic, moral and logical qualities, too, are similarly objective.

The truth of the above thesis can be established by the method of *reductio ad absurdum*. The denial of the view in question leads to paradoxical results and to endless confusion. Once we start denying reality to objects and qualities universally apprehended, there is no knowing where to stop. Thus the scientists and scientifically inclined philosophers began by saying that the non-mathematical qualities of objects were not real; they have ended with the assertion that those objects themselves are not real. Not merely the greenness of the leaves but the leaves themselves, according to modern science, are in some sense fictitious or unreal. Thus, having distinguished between the familiar table of everyday experience and the scientific table as revealed by physics, Eddington observes: 'Indeed I need not tell you that modern physics has by delicate test and remorseless logic assured me that my second scientific table is the only one which is really there whatever "there" may be'²³. In

other words only the scientific table is objective, and the familiar table is, in some sense, an illusion. A similar conclusion is reached by Bertrand Russell. Physics, he says :

assures us that the sun is not "bright" in the sense in which we usually understand the word; it is a source of light-rays which have a certain effect upon eyes and nerves and brain, but when this effect is absent because the light-rays do not encounter a living organism, there is nothing that can be properly called "brightness". Exactly the same considerations apply to the words "hot" and "round"—at least if "round" is understood as a perceptible quality. Moreover, though you see the sun now, the physical object to be inferred from your seeing existed eight minutes ago: if, in the intervening minutes, the sun had gone out, you would still be seeing exactly what you are seeing. We cannot therefore identify the physical sun with what we see.²⁴

The conclusion is that the sun that we see, the visible sun, is somehow *not there*: it is not objective. Russell seems to believe that there is an astronomer's sun which somehow determines the appearance of the visible sun, though the former is quite different from the latter. Eddington, however, would reduce even the astronomer's sun to what he calls "the shadow world of physics". Russell is hesitant to deny "roundness" to the astronomer's sun; no such hesitation is discernible in the accents of Eddington.

Russell further complicates the analysis by saying that what I actually experience are certain physiological processes that take place in my brain *here*. The causal chain starting from the "reals" of physics ends in some physiological processes that are felt or interpreted as percepts of seeing, hearing etc. Take, for instance, the percept of hearing a noise. This percept 'has a series of antecedents, which travel in space-time from the physical source of noise through the air to the ears and brain. The experience which we call "hearing the noise" is as nearly as can be determined simultaneous with the cerebral term of the physical causal chain.' 'The only region of space-time with which this noise has any direct connection is the present state of the hearer's brain; the connection with the physical source of the sound is indirect. Exactly the same argument applies to things seen.' Russell insists that 'there is one, and only one, region of space-time with which my seeing is always causally bound up, and that is my brain at the time of the seeing.'²⁵ All this, Russell believes, is something 'which is obvious to educated common sense.'

I am sorry to have troubled the reader with these long extracts. However, I had to do it in order to introduce him to the state of

utter confusion that prevails in regard to the character and status of the objects of everyday experience. According to Eddington only "the shadow world of physics" is real or objective, and the world of objects an illusion or appearance; according to Russell, alongside with the world of physical objects (*i.e.*, objects recognised by physics) there is another world which is real, *viz.*, the realm of the physiological processes. The world of everyday objects is somehow an epiphenomenon or appearance (shall we say?) of the latter, or of the latter and the former together.

Russell, however, seems to forget that the brain, as viewed by a medical student in another's body, is part of the realm of everyday objects, while viewed as a theoretical construct it has more or less the same status as the objects or entities of physics.

As a neutral monist, Russell rejects the dualistic view of perception, as a relation of a subject to an object. To him the subject and the object merge into one. He says: "The distinction between "seeing the sun" as a mental event, and the immediate object of my seeing, is now generally rejected as invalid, and in this view I concur."²⁸

From the above the following paradox emerges: My brain is nothing but a series of physiological processes in the brains of X,Y,Z, etc.; and their brains, too, are nothing other than the physiological processes in the brains of P,Q,R, etc., and myself.

The above paradox is involved in Russell's peculiar position. The common position of Russell and Eddington, which denies reality or objectivity to everyday objects, involves an equally inconvenient paradox or contradiction: The body of knowledge called physics is, in the last analysis, an inference from everyday experience; however, if physics is true, everyday experience is illusory. Here is a case of the conclusion contradicting the premises!

The contradictions and paradoxes referred to above arise, I believe, from a fundamental confusion concerning the nature and limits of man's theoretical knowledge. A theoretical construction in any field, in physiology no less than in physics, psychology or economics, is an attempt to produce a conceptual scheme which would symbolise, as fully as possible, the relational structure of entities or processes composing a given area of experience. Every conceptual scheme is of necessity (a) abstract or one-sided, (b) partial or incomplete, and (c) more or less external or independent inasmuch as it deals with only a select feature or set of features of the area concerned. The symbols or symbolised concepts employed in a scheme have their own peculiar logic or modes of connection, which may have little or nothing in common with the logic or modes of connection to be met with in other conceptual schemes. Thus, the ways in which colours or colour-experiences are related to one

another in respect of their aesthetic effects have nothing in common with the ways in which different wave-lengths are related in respect of their causal and mathematical properties. The different aspects of the world of experience correspond to the different interests of man. However, as it is difficult to discover a common element among man's practical and aesthetic interests, so it is not possible to weld his aesthetic and causal-scientific discourses into a systematic unity.

Conceptual schemes are partial and incomplete in two respects. First, man's acquaintance with the data which are fitted into such schemes is ever growing and ever incomplete. New experiments and fresh historical experiences are constantly adding to the stock of the data of various inquiries, a process which may sometimes upset the best constructed and most coherent schemes. This has happened in the case of Newtonian physics and of such ambitious interpretations of history as those of Hegel and Karl Marx. The second factor which renders every conceptual scheme imperfect is the general inadequacy of symbols with their fixed modes of interconnection to present the flexible and variant behaviour of reality in each of its various aspects.

The inadequacy may be seen even in the sphere of physics where the perfect symbolism of mathematics is available. Indeed, the very perfection of symbolism becomes a defect when we have to deal with reality whose behaviour is only imperfectly regular. This irregularity affects on the one hand the measurements made by the scientist and the accuracy of laws on the other. All measurements are only more or less exact. Further, the correlations or relationships as exemplified in nature (or experiments on nature) are variant. Weinberg poses the problem thus: 'how can an invariant law be derived from variant relationships . . . observed prior to the formulation of the law? The inexactitude of nature seems incompatible with the exactitude of law'²⁷. It appears that the laws do not describe the data from which they are derived exactly; they are, instead, the closest "invariant and simple" descriptions of the data. There usually remains a difference between the true or the calculated value and the observed value. The "true" values as calculated from the law are, in practice, unobservable.

These observations relate mainly to the empirical laws, which are further unified or explained by physical theories. Opinions differ as to whether the entities postulated by theoretical physics, such as atoms, electrons, protons, etc., should be regarded as mere "constructs" or as actual existents. While the logical positivists such as Gustav Bergmann favour the former view, writers like A. D. Ritchie, William Knèale and Lewis White Beck uphold the latter. However, it is universally recognized that the entities postu-

lated by physical theory are created on the basis of certain special or *selected* features of our experience, and are endowed *only* with those mathematical properties which are necessary for the explanation of those features of experience as recorded in the experimental data. It is futile, therefore, to seek to deduce from those entities other features of that experience.

We have seen how the empirical laws fail to symbolise perfectly even those quantitative aspects of experience with which they are professedly concerned. The concepts and principles of theoretical physics are still farther removed from experience and consequently enjoy a lesser degree of certainty. Says Einstein: '... in science the logical foundation is always in greater peril from new experience or new knowledge than are the branch disciplines with their closer experimental contacts. In the connection of the foundation with all the single parts lies its great significance, but likewise its greatest danger in face of any new factor'²⁸.

It is preposterous, then, to repudiate in the name of "the shadow world" of physics, a world constructed by the human imagination out of abstracted features of experience expressible in mathematical symbols, the reality of the world revealed in experience itself. Even while admitting, on pragmatic grounds, that the theories of physics describe in some sense the structure of an actual reality, it may be denied that his description is complete, or is ever likely to be complete, *even in regard to the particular aspect or set of aspects of reality studied by the physicist*.

As a matter of fact there is no conflict between the common-sense view of objects and the scientific view; the views refer to different levels of description or analysis and understanding. Commenting on Eddington's reference to two tables, the common-sense table and the scientific table, William Kneale observes :

The mystery disappears as soon as we recognize that when the table is said in perceptual objective terminology to be solid, the word 'solid' is to be understood in the appropriate way, *i.e.* as a word of the preceptual object terminology. On the contrary, the sentence "the table is solid" can quite well be translated as a whole into the terminology of physics. It would be strange if it could not; *for the terminology of physics is designed to explain, among other things, why some perceptual objects are solid and others not*.²⁹

Physics, in other words, is required to explain, and not explain away, what is encountered in experience. As Köhler rightly suggests both 'the demarcation of macroscopic objects and their atomic constituents are legitimate notions which are well-founded on physical evidence'. As an example he states that 'independently of their

molecular make-up macroscopic objects swim in water according to Archimedes' principle'.³⁰ Principles like these are not likely to be modified by further researches in theoretical physics.

What is true of "solidity" is true of other features of objects. It may be convenient for chemical purposes to ascertain the number and quantity of the various elements of which a living body is composed. These elements continue to be the constituents of the body even when the latter has been converted, through the sudden death of the organism, into a corpse. This fact, however, would hardly justify the chemist to declare the characteristic features of the living body to be unreal or illusory, and to equate the corpse to the original organism.

The physicist's and the physiologist's accounts of our world, when taken at their face value, are, indeed, highly paradoxical. Suppose that the objects of everyday experience do not exist, and only the physical and the physiological processes exist. In that case, how does such an extraordinary world, so colourful and so variegated, so beautiful and so ugly, consisting of such lovely objects as birds and flowers and streams on the one hand and such fearful and ugly objects as the serpents, the tigers and the rhinoceroses on the other come to be imagined, constructed or inferred? Can we really attribute such wonderful powers of imagination or construction to the human mind? And to say that the physiological processes in different brains are occurring and grouping themselves in such wonderful ways as to produce the appearances of such wonderful objects, such wonderful books, is, to say the least, incredibly superstitious. And in saying this I appeal to the same educated common sense to which Bertrand Russell has, rightly, appealed.

In this connection it is pertinent to recall a criticism levelled by Śaṅkara against the mentalist or the subjective idealist. The latter holds that the externality of physical objects which are really in the mind is an illusion. Śaṅkara objects: 'How can a person who has never experienced *externality* suffer from an *illusion of externality*? Nobody ever has the illusion that Mr. X appears to be a barren woman's son'. (*Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya*, 2, 2, 28). The power of human imagination to produce illusory appearances is strictly limited by the actual experience of man. Imagination merely rearranges the material furnished by experience.

ORDERS OF EXISTENCE OR REALITY

The fact is that there are to be found in the universe various orders of existence or reality whose behaviour obeys different kinds of laws. There are, for instance, various orders of macroscopic objects: the chemical elements; different classes of compounds; organisms; planetary systems; stars; etc. The existence of these is revealed

mainly by experience. Reasoning or hypothetical construction can give such entities as electrons, space-time continuum, etc.; these entities, however, to the end, remain hypothetical in character, and can never become as real to us as the objects revealed directly by sense-experience, which latter includes the perceptions made by the aid of such instruments as telescopes and microscopes. In fact, even our faith in electrons is bound up, ultimately, with our perception of certain appearances during the course of certain experiments.

The same experience which reveals to us the existence of coloured surfaces and graduated scales, reveals also the presence of aesthetic and moral features in certain objects and situations with this difference that those features do not always inhere in visible objects but are frequently to be met with in wholes constituted by meanings. These meanings or wholes are cognised not through sensory perception but through imaginative understanding or empathy.

The objective, we have said, is what is consistently experienced by the normal people, *i.e.* what presents a consistent appearance to normally constituted persons. We reject certain experiences as erroneous because they conflict with our better known or practically tested experiences. When two experiences disagree, the situation demands explanation. The explanation takes the form of the specification of the conditions under which alone an *expérience* is dependable, or of those which produce illusory appearances. Ultimately, the test of the valid (*i.e.* real) or illusory character of an experience is twofold : one practical, consisting in the fulfilment or failure of expectations; and the other social or communal, consisting in the agreement of the reactions of the normal people. The two tests may coincide, or, in a particular case, only one of them may be applicable. Thus the belief that the sky is blue is regarded as correct mainly because, in regard to that matter, there is agreement among the normal people.

Ultimately, the agreement of the normal people is the thing that counts, for even the practical consequences have to be apprehended or experienced in order to be ascertained. The advantage with the practical or pragmatic test, however, is this, that it compels quick agreement. A person can disagree with impunity with the proposition that Kālidāsa is a great poet, or that betrayal of a just cause is a sin; but nobody can question with the same ease or impunity the proposition that fire is hot, or that the atom bomb is a powerfully destructive weapon.

The reason why science has come to command such unqualified and universal assent is this, that it uses the method of securing quick agreement, namely, the practical or pragmatic method. Not that science can dispense with dependence on the agreed experience of

the normal people; this dependence, however, is limited, almost wholly, to the field of sense-perception. In this field scientific experience has been materially extended or aided by the invention of such powerful instruments as the telescope and the microscope.

Science has found it possible to coordinate or organise man's experiences concerning material phenomena without paying attention to certain features of those phenomena. These features, it has been found, do not affect the grossly practical affairs of men. From this the grossly practical and the less sensitive people can easily conclude that the ignored features of the material phenomena are in some sense unreal or illusory. This is how men, mostly those who are scientifically inclined, have come to believe that the colours, sounds and aesthetic features of nature are in some manner illusory or, at any rate, less real.

Action for science consists in the displacement or movements of material objects; and the only purposes that science can understand are those connected with the movements of bodies. Practical success for science means success in causing desired movements in things. The only other success that science can appreciate is that involved in the anticipation of perceptual reactions. The only type of sensitiveness for which science cares is perceptual sensitiveness.

That there are other kinds of purpose, other types of success, other classes of action and other forms of sensitiveness seems to be denied by scientist-philosophers. Thus there are actions whose essence is not involved in peculiar sets of movements; the use of the surgeon's knife may be moral in one case, and immoral in another. The success attending the composition of a poem or the construction of a theory is very different from that associated with the movement of an engine. And finally, aesthetic sensitiveness is quite distinct from perceptual sensitiveness.

All the different kinds of purpose, and the different species of sensitiveness, involve their own peculiar standards or criteria of success and consistency. These various sets of standards and laws, which govern human activity in different spheres, may not, however, be mutually continuous or commensurable. Thus the norms and criteria which indicate success in chess-playing or motor driving are very different from those which point to the excellence of composition in music or poetry. Speaking generally, the criteria applicable in one sphere are often irreducible to or non-deducible from the criteria applicable in another sphere.

As observed earlier there are various orders of qualities and objects even in the realm of the quantitative. According to modern chemistry the fundamental properties of the various elements are their atomic numbers, *i.e.* the numbers of electrons that are supposed

to revolve round the nuclei in the atoms of the different elements. Thus the atomic number of hydrogen is one, that of oxygen eight, and so on. The question is: Are the manifold properties of different elements, even if the former be regarded as being wholly deducible from the atomic numbers of those elements, in any way less real than those numbers? Should an effect be considered to be less real than its cause or causes? Is the death of a Socrates less real than the cup of hemlock that brings it about? Granted that the musical character of certain sounds is invariably associated with certain characteristics of the vibrating bodies, does it prove that that musical character is an illusion? The assertion that potassium cyanide is a compound of some elements with certain atomic numbers, does in no way contradict the fact that it is a deadly poison, i.e., has a peculiar kind of effect on the living organisms. It is, indeed, quite impossible to decipher what the scientist may be meaning when he declares everyday objects and their sensible properties to be unreal.

Any view of reality which fails to make intelligible to us the world of our day-to-day experience is to that extent unsatisfactory. "The shadow world of physics", considered as a concept, is no more acceptable than the Hegelian system of bloodless categories or the Bradleyan Absolute. The world as given in experience presents a plurality of features which affect us in different ways. We cannot but assess the significance of those features in terms of the values and expectations cherished by us, i.e. by our species.

VALUATIONAL DIFFERENCES

After this general defence of the objectivity of our value-experiences we shall proceed to show how differences in the valuations practised by different individuals and groups may be explained and understood. The perception that the differences in question rest on *intelligible* grounds may lead us to discover how those differences can be resolved, or, failing that, to see why they should be tolerated. To understand all, it has been said, is to forgive all. Does it mean that it is possible for every person to identify himself with the viewpoint of every other person? In that case, however, it will no more be possible to speak and complain of genuine differences.

The problem of valuational differences may be divided into three parts. Values are either *intrinsic* or *extrinsic*. Following C. I. Lewis the extrinsic values may be subdivided into the *inherent* and the *instrumental*. Needless to say some values may be regarded as intrinsic in one context and as extrinsic in another. Thus health may be looked upon as having both intrinsic and extrinsic (inherent as well as instrumental) value. In general, intrinsic value is constituted by a satisfactory condition of life or experience. Inherent

value attaches to the object, such as a sunset or a work of art, which, when presented, directly produces an intrinsically valuable experience; while instrumental value belongs to objects and processes which help to produce objects having inherent or intrinsic value. Differences of opinion may arise with respect to all three kinds of values.

INSTRUMENTAL AND INHERENT VALUES

When Hayek says that the data of the social sciences are subjective he implies that the significance or value attributed to the objects and situations studied by those sciences is relative to the ends pursued by human beings. Economics, for instance, is a subjective science because, neither a "commodity" or an "economic good", nor "food" or "money", can be defined in physical terms but only in terms of views people hold about things. Economic theory has nothing to say about the little round discs of metal as which an objective or materialist view might try to define money. It has nothing to say about iron or steel, timber or oil, or wheat or eggs as such. The history of any particular commodity indeed shows that as human knowledge changes the same material things may represent quite different economic categories.³¹

Mr. Hayek's premises are true, but the conclusions that he draws from them are highly ambiguous and misleading, if not false. The characteristics of things in virtue of which they fulfil human needs are no more fictitious or subjective than those needs themselves. If hunger is an objective fact, then the value of a particular kind of food such as eggs is also objective. In the context of economic relations, the value of a food or commodity in terms of money is also objective. In case, however, we insist that every individual person has a different view of the meaning or value of each particular commodity, then the possibility of a common description of values, and consequently of the science of Economics, disappears. The existence of the discipline called Economics proves that commodities have values irrespective of the whims of individuals living in a particular society; the science of dietics similarly proves that the eggs have a food-value which is wholly objective.

The eggs, we should add, have value only for persons who need and assimilate proteins in the normal way. Eggs may be forbidden to patients of certain types. Similarly a person who is oppressed by a loss or sorrow may not be able to enjoy a sunset or a painting. *Each kind of inherent value, it seems, presupposes a peculiar kind of normalcy for its apprehension.* One's mind must be free in a special sense from personal, utilitarian disturbances if one is to enjoy a sunset or a work of art.

Why do different persons, and persons of different ages, find

the same women beautiful in different degrees? Why should different men and women fall in love with different members of the opposite sex? These questions cannot be completely, even adequately, answered without a prior decision as to the nature of beauty, and perhaps the nature of love. An analogous question may be asked with regard to men's differing tastes for different foods. The advocates of the "wisdom of the body" may suggest that men tend to prefer foods which are needed by their bodies. Maybe the woman I feel inclined to love will be able to bear me better children —as Schopenhauer thought; or will be better able to stimulate my creative powers of various kinds. And yet it is not true that judgments respecting the beauty of body and face do not tend towards unanimity as much as they do towards diversity. If that were so, better known film stars, particularly the actresses, would not come to be *so universally* admired for their beauty as well as for other graces.

The most important cause of divergence of views concerning inherent values may now be stated. All pieces of, say, copper behave similarly towards another element, say, oxygen, under similar conditions. Human beings, however, endowed as they are with numerous needs and impulses which may be developed in different degrees and in different proportions, may become so different from one another, and be so different themselves on different occasions, that they would not behave uniformly towards the same object. For example, my own palate may react differently towards saline dishes on different occasions, in accordance with the varied conditions of my body with respect to the need of salt.

INTRINSIC VALUES

One factor which makes me attach different values to different "states of satisfaction" is my past experience involving those states. As regards the unenjoyed or unsuffered states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction my imagination may be adequately trained for the appreciation of some and not so trained for others. A third, and more important, factor may be noted. Man is an imaginative animal who seeks to plan, *not merely the satisfaction of this or that impulse, but the course of his whole life*. On the one hand man sets about to map out the universe in which he is living, on the other he endeavours to chalk out the whole course of his life in the light of the highest possibilities which he deems realizable. In doing so he behaves not merely as an individual and as a social being, but also as a *metaphysical* and *religious* creature. Having visualised the desirable course of his total life, individual and social, this-worldly and other-worldly, man starts arranging different ends or satisfactions in a graded order, as a hierarchy either of means and

ends, or of progressively higher and nobler attainments. Men who have so visualised the course of an ideal life, tend to assess different ends, and different modes of life, with reference to that course and its culmination.

Man visualises not only an ideal course of individual life but also an ideal arrangement of society and social relations, including the relationships between the sexes and among different classes. Men's differing *metaphysical world-views* and *social philosophies* generally incline them to view different ends and values in different lights.

In the above account of valuational differences it has been presupposed that those differences have reference to objective entities or situations, though these latter are differently viewed and interpreted in the light of the *needs* and *prejudices* of the observers. Differences in respect of instrumental values can always be resolved through discussion and calculation, provided the ends are clearly defined. It happens that many of the more significant ends pursued by man, in the form of both inherent and intrinsic values, are too vague and mysterious to be clearly definable. Who can tell the poet or the painter the means which would enable him to produce the *enigmatic* effects associated with great art? The problem cannot be solved by the all too naïve assertion that effects produced by art are merely subjective. The effects produced, say, by a painting are no less objective than the colours used by the artist—though Mr. Julian Huxley informs us that the world as seen by even most mammals (not to speak of inferior creatures such as insects), is a black and white world, not a coloured world.

One can claim as much objectivity for the inherent aesthetic values as for colours. Differences in respect of their apprehension arise from the fact that men and women are not always physically normal and mentally detached. Greater unanimity can be achieved in regard to intrinsic values where similar assumptions and beliefs concerning matters transcending experience, perceptual and affective, are entertained. We shall see in the next chapter how the powerful medium of symbols (which embody universally communicable meanings rather than percepts), created by man himself, enables him to achieve community of understanding and feeling with his fellow-beings in the sphere of that detached living or existence which constitutes his culture.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY OF THE HUMAN STUDIES

THE phenomenon of valuation is part of the wider phenomenon called human behaviour. Valuation is a particular kind of human behaviour, unless we believe it to be coextensive with that behaviour. In either case the method of approach to, or the study of, valuation should be closely related to the study of human behaviour in its varied manifestations. Value studies, in other words, form part of a wider class of studies called the human studies. The methodology of the former, therefore, cannot be separated, and considered apart, from that of the latter.

Here it may be useful to define more precisely the nature and scope of the human studies. Very generally, these studies deal with such changes suffered and produced by man as are accompanied by some degree of consciousness. While concerning themselves mainly with the actions of some men and effects of those actions on the actors themselves or on other men, the human studies also take note of those human phenomena which, though willed by nobody, are still the results of interactions among men, and tend to affect the lives of human beings. Examples of such phenomena are: inflation, unemployment, etc. The subject matter of these studies, thus, comprises the operations, objects and situations in the shaping of which conscious human beings have had an understandable share. Physical and biological sciences, such as Chemistry, Anatomy and Physiology are excluded from the circle of these studies, for the phenomena with which they deal, though eminently connected with human welfare, are, in general, unaccompanied by human consciousness and unaffected by human volition. It may be supposed that the presence of unconscious motivation constitutes an objection to our definition. However, apart from the fact that the Freudian unconscious is a hypothetical entity, or a theoretical construct, even the actions prompted by the unconscious motives are performed on a plane involving some degree of consciousness. Even on the premises of Freud, the so-called unconscious motives are ultimately traceable to conscious life. They arise as a consequence of the repression of conscious or semi-conscious wishes; and they can be brought to consciousness through psycho-analytical treatment.¹

The human studies comprise the humanities, *i.e.* the arts and literature, ethics and aesthetics, philosophy and religion on the one hand, and the psycho-social sciences on the other. The question may be asked: Since the subject-matter of the human studies is one and the same, *i.e.* conscious human life and behaviour, why should we have a number of disciplines dealing with it? A complete answer to this question involves, on the one hand, the analysis and unfolding of the complex nature of human behaviour; and, on the other, a disclosure of the characteristic features and limitations of the human studies.

THE COMPLEXITY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

That human behaviour is exceedingly complex is recognised by all investigators in the human studies. What exactly is the nature of this complexity? The complexity in question does not relate to the visible movements of the organisms called human beings; for the movements of other organisms, such as wasps and birds, are no less complex. Despite the fact that man is supposed to have greater dexterity of hand than other animals, it cannot be shown conclusively that the curve describing his movements will be more complicated than that tracing the movements of a wasp or bird engaged in building its nest or habitat. As a matter of fact when we talk of the complexity of human behaviour what we have in mind is something quite different from man's physical movements: we are thinking, then, not so much of his overt behaviour as of the psychical attitudes and processes that accompany that behaviour. The inscrutable mystery that seems to surround some persons consists, not in the oddity of their physical movements, but in the suggestions of an unusual nature, intellectual, moral and emotional severally involved in their peculiar movements. The complexity of human beings is essentially the complexity of their temperaments, moods and attitudes correlated with the complications in their cognitions, beliefs, ideals, etc. Like all significant behaviour of man his complexity is comprehensible only from within; it is not accessible to mere observation, however careful, divorced from interpretation in terms of spiritual meanings.

What are the sources and components of this complexity?

According to Messrs Parsons and Shils the elements of action can be organised into three different interdependent and interpenetrating kinds of systems, *i.e.* personalities, social systems, and cultural systems.² The goals pursued by different actors are determined by factors belonging to all these systems. Adopting the above scheme in a slightly modified form we shall describe the factors determining goal-formation under the following three heads:

Personal Determinants, Environmental-Social Determinants, and Ideological Determinants.

(a) *Personal Determinants.* Inasmuch as all the factors determining conscious human behaviour operate through the medium of personal choice, they may all be called personal. In this sense all the ends and means adopted by an individual are personal. However, specifically personal goals are those which derive from the individual's motives. Motives are the psychological determinants of the individual's behaviour, i.e. they are the determinants specifically studied by psychology.

More original than the motives are the drives or urges which the individual shares with the rest of his species. These drives or urges have been variously described as "instincts", "psycho-physical dispositions", "inherent preferences", "prepotent reflexes", etc. etc. There can be no doubt that man has certain needs or urges in virtue of his bio-physical or physiological constitution; equally, he seems to have needs in virtue of his psycho-social nature. As an example of a purely psychological or mental need we may mention what Ralph Linton calls the need for novelty and variety of experience.⁸ Other examples are the needs for love, approval, esteem, etc. We are not interested here in tracing the order in which these various needs develop in the individual nor in deciding as to which of them are original and which derivative. What interests us here is the fact of the presence and variety of the needs experienced by man.

Man is driven to act on account of his unsatisfied needs. However, in an environment offering alternative satisfactions, his needs are soon converted into desires, which become fixed on definite objects. Desires, when associated with the energy of original drives or needs, give rise to the motives of action. A motive is a complex tendency to see, desire and do certain things with a view to securing certain relationships to the goal objects.

Complications arise through conflicts of desires and the interdependence and incompatibility of different goals pursued by the actor. These phenomena give rise to dominant aims and ambitions in individuals. Men are known to exercise tremendous control over a number of their desires in order to achieve the fulfilment of their cherished values and ideals, ambitions and aspirations.

It may be supposed that the aims of the above kind exert a stabilising influence over the impulses and desires of the individual concerned. This, however, is only partly true. Few, indeed, are the heroic souls who continue to pursue a great ideal in the midst of repeated disappointments and failures. Most of the people are constantly oscillating between one ideal of life and another; both

the nature and the level of their aspirations is being constantly modified by the degree of success attending their varied efforts.⁴

While conscious human behaviour is goal-directed, it is difficult to specify an ultimate goal for which life is lived. In the lives of most of us, and with respect to most of our affairs, ends and means are frequently interchangeable. In the lives of both individuals and groups success of one kind generally leads to success of another kind; wealth tends to bring prestige and power, and these in their turn tend to bring wealth. In competitive societies high offices and advantageous connections generally lead one to the other. Wealth and positions of power, in fact, are universal means for attaining most of the other ends; they are also the ends universally pursued. Men and women do hard work, undergo specialized training, indulge in the flattery of influential persons generally for the sake of gainful posts and seemly offices. The various forms of the pursuit of wealth and power, however, are relative both to the present position of the individual or group concerned, and to the imagination, tact and resourcefulness which they can severally command.

(b) *Environmental-Social Determinants.* The individual's environment consists of physical and socio-cultural objects. The physical environment includes the technological order. The presence of a multiplicity of useful objects in this environment gives rise to numerous alternative possibilities of gratifying the given needs; it also gives rise to fresh needs for comforts and luxuries. The modern man's need for cars and radios, e.g., is a function both of the fact of their presence or availability and of the valuation that society sets on them. The socio-technological environment similarly determines our needs for housing, clothing, amusements, etc. The most important way, however, in which society determines the course of the individual's life is by assigning him a *role* in the hierarchy of social functions, which also involves the establishment in him of *expectations* with respect to other individuals with similarly institutionalized roles. 'The social system', according to Messrs Parsons and others, 'is in a sense composed of a variety of roles or role-expectations; each of these assures that some need of the social system will be met'.⁵

Through the allocation of role-expectations society aims at the gratification of needs of its members on a cooperative basis. In spite of that, however, life in society is inevitably involved in conflicts. The favours of the same lady may be sought by several lovers, and there may be a number of aspirants to a post or an office. Owing partly to the phenomenon of the scarcity of coveted goods, and partly the exclusive character of certain privileges and powers, society everywhere remains a theatre of conflicts, open or

concealed, among individuals and groups. These conflicts are putting constantly to test the ingenuity and tact, intelligence and industry of the individuals, and the virtues of cooperation and discipline of the groups. Even in the seemingly non-competitive societies such as those of the Soviet Union, conflicts for positions of power in the state and in the party continue to prevail. Such conflicts influence the behaviour of the participant individuals and groups by modifying not only their scruples as to the adoption of means but also their goals and aims and ultimately their characters and personalities themselves.

The desire for the elimination or minimising of these conflicts leads thinkers and reformers to propose either improvements in the existing modes or new modes and schemes of organisation of the various socio-economic relationships among individuals and groups in a society.

(c) *Idéological Determinants.* I take this class of determinants to include both the idea-and-value systems which support the existing order in a society and those which seek to modify or destroy it. In a modern society, in fact, ideological differences are the rule rather than the exception. A stable society tends to inculcate in its members ideas and value-attitudes which have been handed down by tradition. These traditional attitudes secure the individual's conformity to existing forms of economic and other relationships involving differential modes of allocation of the community's resources in wealth, power and privilege. These modes of relationship and allocation impose various kinds of restrictions on individuals and groups. Thus the caste rules and regulations in our society tend to exclude some groups from certain occupations and socio-religious functions. Ordinary individuals and groups that are culturally backward tend to abide by these rules, unless they are provoked to break them by rebel leaders and reformers. In most of the democratic modern societies individuals and groups are being constantly exposed to rival ideological influences. Thanks to the growth of individualism, consequent on the propagation of liberal-democratic ideals and the enormous increase of educational facilities, the processes of imitation and identification, which used to secure the individual's acceptance of traditional norms and values, are becoming increasingly less effective. Men's religio-philosophical attitudes towards life, which inclined them to acquiesce in traditional social and moral standards, have been rudely shaken by developments in physical, biological and even social sciences. These factors render the ideological bases of the conduct of a modern individual highly uncertain and enigmatic, a phenomenon which is prominently reflected in the novels of such writers as James Joyce and Jean-Paul Sartre. Men's attitudes towards political and econo-

mic matters, however, are relatively more stable and exhibit fewer varieties of forms. This means that the economic and political behaviour of a modern individual may be relatively more intelligible than, say, his behaviour relating to ethico-religious and emotional matters.

Human beings, in virtue of their imaginative nature, seek to visualise the whole course of their lives and to subordinate their ordinary pursuits to the quest of a higher or ultimate goal. It used to be the function of philosophy and religion to define such a goal and to indicate the way to its attainment. The collapse of the religious world-view and the distrust of philosophy have left the modern man without any conception of an ultimate goal, without even the hope of ever reaching such a conception. As a consequence, his various pursuits lack the force of a unified policy, and his valuational attitudes towards different matters tend to be unconnected and unpredictable.

We have enumerated the factors which determine the formation of goals pursued by men. We have also hinted that many of the goals are pursued merely as proximate ends, which serve as means for more ultimate purposes. Thus no clear line can be drawn between ends and means insofar as they influence action. However, it may be useful to note some factors which complicate human behaviour mainly by affecting the choice of the means.

The ways and methods which the actors adopt for gaining their ends are determined by two classes of factors, their intelligence, tact and resourcefulness on the one hand, and their moral scruples and attitudes on the other. The operation of the first factor is obviously linked up with man's creative ingenuity. Both in the lives of the individuals and in history the events that count most and interest us most are those which flow from creative vision or foresight and unusual decisions. The main secret of Napoleon's military successes, we are told, was 'that swiftness and fertility of resource which astonished both friends and foes', that 'audacity of his combinations' which bewildered his enemies.⁶ While it is true that human action has to take place in an environment offering a limited range of possibilities, it may be doubted if theories of human behaviour, psychological, economic or sociological, can ever enable us to anticipate all the turns and sinuosities, even perversions, of behaviour that human ingenuity can devise. Machiavelli records how the Duke Valentino managed to trap and murder a large number of his rivals and enemies by an unforeseeable act of treachery.⁷

To sum up: human actions are determined and complicated by psychological and socio-cultural factors interacting with human creativity. While the motives of men are shaped chiefly by psychological factors, the ends proposed by those motives are determined

mainly by social realities and cultural attitudes that constitute the actors' environment. Needless to say, the psychological and socio-cultural factors are constantly in interaction. Thus the phenomena of frustration and success tend to modify the individual's choice of ends, and the value-attitudes imbibed from the cultural *milieu* tend to affect his motives. Various human studies arise out of man's attempt to understand either the detailed workings of his various motives, or his pursuit of different kinds of ends or values.

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN STUDIES

Human behaviour may be viewed from two different angles : it may be viewed as an expression of the personality or personalities of the actor or actors; and also as an attempt or series of attempts to order reality in the desired manner. Investigators of human affairs may be interested, mainly, either in the men and women behind the affairs, or in the objective course and consequences of those affairs. Inquirers of the first category are inclined more to probe into the secret springs of motivation—into the genesis and development of various emotional or value attitudes—of the heroes and heroines involved in a given course of events; while the students of the second type pay greater attention to the actual events and their visible effects or repercussions. The two attitudes towards human affairs give rise to two distinct though related varieties of discourse about those affairs. On the one extreme we have biography, on the other national and international history. These two constitute the fundamental descriptive studies of the panorama of human life. In practice, however, history splits up into a number of disciplines, e.g. political history, economic history, ecclesiastical history, etc. Biographies, too, may be of several kinds, according as they deal with the development and manifestation in a life of one connected series of motives or another. Only in our own times has biography sought to encompass the total significant life of the individual concerned.

Another principle of classification is yielded by the degree of generality sought to be attained by different studies. Both biography and history deal, or ought to deal, with the particulars. Psychology may be looked upon as a generalisation of the biography. While biography studies the growth of motives, together with their manifestations, in the life of a single individual, psychology seeks to discover the general principles that govern the development of motives or chains of motives in the lives of all the individuals. Psychology differs from the social sciences mainly in the fact that its categories of description and explanation are person-centred, and refer to environmental factors only in a secondary manner. However far the psychologist may stray in his quest of the causal

factors, he must ultimately return to the individual. Even crowd psychology studies the behaviour of the *individual in crowd*; social psychology, similarly, studies the *individual in society*.

Social sciences may similarly be viewed as generalisations of history. Economics, for instance, is a generalised study of the phenomena which constitute economic history. As a generalised study, it seeks to discover the laws that govern the economic behaviour of men or societies. In general, social sciences are interested in phenomena that have been only partly determined by the conscious or voluntary activities of the members of various societies—though those phenomena are full of meaning and significance for conscious individuals and only for them. Examples of such phenomena are legion: the renaissance, the reformation, the rise of capitalism, the French revolution, periods of inflation and deflation, incidence of suicide, crime, or unemployment in a given society at a particular period, etc. etc. Not satisfied with an analysis of the factors leading to the emergence of such phenomena, the social sciences, as distinguished from history, seek to investigate the general laws that would explain those phenomena.

In between psychology and the social sciences, which aim at being generalised studies of personal biography and international history respectively, there may be studies which seek to understand the trends of national or communal histories in their various phases. Examples of such studies are: Max Weber's studies of Confucianism, Hinduism and Protestantism; Nikolai Danilevsky's study of Russia and Europe; etc.

A third principle of classification follows from the fact that the stream of life which constitutes history is multicoloured. The selection of different important aspects of man's life for study gives rise to different disciplines. Thus politics deals with the phenomenon of the pursuit of power, and economics with activities relating to the production, distribution and consumption of wealth. In general, different humanistic sciences concern themselves, as we have already remarked, either with the detailed working of man's different important motives or sets of motives, or with his pursuit of different kinds of goal-objects. This principle, combining with the first two, gives us various branches and sub-branches of psychology on the one hand, and various types of social science on the other.

Thus the "Psychology of Leadership" studies, from the personal angle, aspects of the same phenomena that are studied by Politics. Similar remarks apply to "Industrial Psychology" *vis-a-vis* Economics and to "Social Psychology" in its bearing on or relationship to Sociology. As Mannheim points out every human action can be viewed both from the psychological and from the sociological (or social) standpoint.⁸ Every action is both an expression of per-

sonal motives and an attempt to achieve a goal through socially sanctioned, or socially guarded, channels.

A fourth principle of classification must be mentioned. Our approach to life and history may be either factual and scientific, or normative and artistic. The former approach leads to the founding and elaboration of different psycho-social sciences, the latter to such activities and studies as the arts and literature, ethics and aesthetics, religion and philosophy. These latter disciplines are collectively known as the humanities. They seek to use the material provided by human life and experience for fashioning different kinds of norms and models, emotional and aesthetic, moral, aesthetico-moral and supramoral, speculative and logical. The special features of some of these norms and models will be noted in chapters dealing with art, philosophy, morality and religion. Meanwhile we shall proceed to scrutinise some essential features common to all the human studies.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN STUDIES

Human Studies are Abstract. The most noteworthy characteristic of the human studies is that they are abstract. Not that the physical sciences are not abstract, but the abstraction practised in the human studies is of a different kind. The physical sciences abstract the quantitative features of the objects of their study, rejecting others as epiphenomena or mere appearances, which latter do not interfere with the course of the quantitative changes. The human studies, however, are compelled to disregard aspects of man's behaviour which are not regarded as epiphenomenal by them, and which are not wholly unconnected with the aspects they study.

Human studies are not interested in man's behaviour as a series of physical movements; what interests them is the *meaning* of those movements, *i.e.*, their relevance in terms of the purpose that is sought to be realized by the actor or actors concerned. Other factors, too, such as the severity of the Russian winter that thwarted the designs of a Napoleon or Hitler, are studied by those sciences from a similar standpoint. Further, those studies do not concern themselves with all the meanings that a course of behaviour entails; each of them confines itself to the study of a particular meaning or class of meanings. This twofold abstraction practised by the human studies serves to mark them off from the physical and biological sciences and from one another. The methodological implications of the practice of the first kind of abstraction by the human studies will be examined later on.

The abstract character of those studies insofar as it depends on their preoccupation with specific kinds of meanings may be illustrated by the examples of history and fiction.

That historical studies are based on extensive abstraction is not difficult to see. History does not study the doings of all men; it studies the activities of only the prominent men. But it does not study *all* the activities of these latter either. It studies their activities only insofar as they were relevant to, or affected, the course of important events. History, in fact, deals with the fulfilment or thwarting of a certain class of purposes having national or international significance. Another way to bring home the abstract character of history is to consider the nature of the historical data; these data are obtained, mostly, from written records, and from remains such as implements, buildings, pictures, etc. Thus the collection of historical data involves twofold selection: the documents, by far the most important sources of historical facts, are necessarily selective; and the historian selects, in accordance with the criteria of *authenticity* and *credibility* on the one hand and that of *relevance* on the other, from among the facts provided by the documents.

The above conclusion may be reinforced by another consideration. It has been said that history 'has no subject-matter at all'. In order to acquire a content, it has to associate itself with some adjective or other.⁹ Thus we have *political* history, *religious* history, *economic* history, and so on. History, in other words, concerns itself only with some aspect or aspects of the tangled life of a people, a country or an epoch. For an understanding of the other aspects of that life we may be required to turn to the literature, philosophy, legal codes, etc. of the people, epoch or country concerned.

Hence, it is not quite correct to say that, in contradistinction from the sociologist who 'seeks to formulate the laws inherent in its very nature which regulate social existence', the historian 'devotes himself to acquiring concrete knowledge of this existence during its span'.¹⁰ No history can possibly picture the concrete existence of a people or epoch in its entirety. What the historian does aim at is to give a vivid and connected account of certain events or series of events which, occurring in the life of a people and their leaders, produced certain significant results. This significance of resultant effects, understandable only in terms of one or more dominant purposes involved in the life in question, controls both the selection of events and the distribution of emphasis on their different aspects.

History, then, cannot help being abstract. Even fiction, which aims primarily at depicting individual life and character, has inevitably to proceed by abstraction. It is noteworthy that the aspects of life upon which the novelist loves to dwell are quite distinct from those dealt with by the historian. That shows how incomparably richer is life than what the historians and novelists represent it as being. 'The main facts of human life, according to Mr. E. M. Forster,

'are five : birth, food, sleep, love and death'.¹¹ How little does the historian talk about these, excepting probably the last ! Even the novelist does not talk enough, and objectively, about these phenomena. Imagine how a novelist would bore you if he tried to describe every occasion of his character's sitting down to eat during the period of the latter's life depicted in the novel. In fact, food in the novel serves, not so much to nourish the characters as to 'draw them together'. Its function there is 'mainly social'.¹² Another illustration of abstraction as practised by the novelist is furnished by 'the constant sensitiveness of characters for each other' which 'has no parallel in life'.¹³

What is true of fiction is also true of the biography, though to a smaller extent. If the biographer did not abstract from the affairs of the life he described, he would tire the patience of the greatest enthusiast for facts.

From the above characteristic of the human studies follows another, *their essentially evaluative character*. Insofar as a biographer or historian selects certain details for treatment and excludes others, he is using an implicit criterion of significance or value. Shrödinger has observed how the generalisations of the scientist depend on data which are of necessity selective. Of innumerable possible experiments, we elect to perform a few. The possibility of some is excluded by considerations of expenditure, of others, by the direction of our interests.¹⁴ In the human studies, however, details of experience are ignored for no other reason than that they are uninteresting. The historian no less than the economist or the sociologist concentrates his attention on what is regarded as spectacular or otherwise noteworthy in human affairs. Thus no historian ever took notice of the fact how Caesar, the author of *The Conquest of Gaul*, adjusted his fingers in relation to the pen that he used for writing, or how he lifted his foot while mounting his horse.

I have been saying that the human studies are essentially evaluative; I now proclaim that they ought to be evaluative, in the sense of being selective with respect to their materials. These studies must concern themselves with the investigation, not of the total causes of total effects, but of specific causes of specific significant effects. This is what wise thinkers and teachers in all ages have done, and what modern human studies ought to do, if they are to escape the sterility besetting research in psychology and in the social sciences. *

A modern American psychologist, commenting on the difficulties of his fellow-workers in his country, remarks :

... it is not surprising that American psychology has created little theory of its own; ... if he (i.e. the psychologist

in America) covets his reputation as a scientist, he is under pressure to confine himself to the analysis of relatively simple phenomena where the variables are few, discrete, and susceptible to rigorous experimental control. The most significant aspects of human behaviour, however, are not likely to be found in the category, for they are characteristically elusive and multi-determinate. As a result . . . the study of human behaviour in America shows a bimodal distribution with undisciplined speculation at one mode and rigorous sterility at the other.¹⁵

While no right-minded person will defend "undisciplined speculation" it must be admitted that the tendency to ignore higher forms of human behaviour—behaviour whose understanding counts from the viewpoint both of enlightenment and of human welfare—cannot be justified on any grounds. And if psychology and other studies continue to ignore the more valued types of man's behaviour, then they are bound to become sterile, and fail in their essential task of contributing to the wisdom of living.

A third characteristic of the human studies is that they are historical, in the sense that their subject-matter is spread in the stream of history, and consists of the actions and events that have formed part of the life-processes of individuals and groups. 'All human action,' observes Eucken, 'belong to history. The work of the miner or shop-keeper . . . belongs to the history of this year, and thus to history'.¹⁶

Let us pause to take note of some far-reaching implications of the observation made above. We may once more quote Eucken. 'A single order of Nature', he says, 'exists and has existed, but there is an unlimited and constantly changing variety of economic "orders" or systems'.¹⁷ What is true of economic orders is true of other orders as well, e.g. political and social orders, moral and religious orders, etc. As historical, the human studies are condemned to study severally a multiplicity of each kind of orders or systems of human activity. This is obviously the case with history, which is divided vertically into periods such as ancient, medieval and modern, and horizontally into the histories of nations. No nation, in any phase of its life, lives exactly the same history in different epochs and no two nations follow exactly the same course of development.

In history, it has been said, to present the events of a period as connected is already to explain them. A typical historical explanation is always an explanation of the particular. History, as a science, therefore, does not seek to discover the general laws in accordance with which actual history proceeds. The attempts to discover such laws have come to be called or miscalled philosophies of history.

As observed earlier the various human studies derive their respective materials for study through abstraction from either biography or history. While the social sciences seek to understand these materials scientifically, the humanities, e.g. art, literature and ethics, use biographical and historical material for creative and normative purposes. In this connection two significant observations may be made. First, the social sciences, so far, have not paid as much attention to other aspects of history as to political history. While the term historian generally refers to a person who has made a scientific study of the general history of one or more periods or of one or more nations, the term economist, e.g., does not carry any such meaning. An economist is not supposed to have bothered himself much with the economic history of certain periods or countries. In the second place, unlike the historian proper, and very much like the philosopher of history, the economist concerns himself with the investigation of laws, which are intended or supposed to be applicable, not to this economic society or that, but to all economic societies, including not merely the societies that have existed, but also those that will exist in the future.

What is the character of the explanations offered by the typical historian, who concerns himself with the particulars, on the one hand, and those given by other social scientists such as the economists, anthropologists, sociologists, etc. on the other? How can the validity of the different explanatory procedures and principles in the human studies be tested? These are some of the important problems which we should now proceed to discuss.

EXPLANATION IN THE HUMAN STUDIES : A GENERAL REVIEW

Explanation as a human activity is directed towards a goal, which may be described as either the satisfaction of curiosity with respect to a given phenomenon or the achievement of the understanding of that phenomenon. Now the curiosity which prompts a person to seek explanation may be idle and superficial or genuine and deep, and the understanding that is achieved may have varying degrees of adequacy. Only trained and developed curiosity asks right types of question and knows where its queries should or should not stop.

There are two general modes of curiosity, which relate to the realms of existence and value respectively. About a given phenomenon we may ask two fundamental questions : why or how did it come into existence? And, what is its meaning or significance for us, or with respect to the values we cherish? Here it may be added that, in the last analysis, all our curiosity is grounded in our quest of the significant or the valuable. Sciences, physical and social,

concern themselves with phenomena whose value for us is indirect, while the humanities deal with things or experiences which are directly meaningful or valuable to us. The subject-matter of the human sciences such as history and sociology, however, has a direct value insofar as it contributes to the enrichment of our life by stimulating the processes of vicarious living in us. Scientific thinking, too, has its aesthetic side, particularly in its higher flights. The distinction between curiosity and thinking directed on the existent, and those directed on the values, therefore, is largely one of degree and emphasis.

Corresponding to the two modes of curiosity there are two kinds of explanation, existential and normative, or scientific and philosophical. Existential or scientific explanation is essentially causal. It consists in relating the given phenomenon to the antecedent conditions that led to its occurrence. Normative explanation evaluates a given action, situation or experience with reference either to similar objects in a comparative spirit, or to a standard of activity or experience. Teleological explanation may be subsumed under causal explanation, since the so-called final cause determines action as the imagined end or purpose present in the actor's mind. Logical explanation, *i.e.* explanation or justification of a conclusion or consequence in terms of its "ground", may be similarly included in the category of normative explanation.

In recent times several thinkers have submitted the concept of causation to severe criticism, and advocated its abandonment as a principle of explanation. It has been pointed out that in physics the concept of causation has been found redundant, having been replaced by that of functional correlation. It is doubtful, however, if correlation can replace causation in the human studies. As MacIver has argued, for human life 'change is a one way sequence. It is here, in irreversible character of change, that we find the essence of causality, something that no "mathematical functions or equations" can ever represent or even suggest'.¹⁸ The fundamental reason why human affairs cannot be understood and explained without resort to causation is that man is a being supremely conscious of his own efficacy as a causal agent, and greatly interested in the causal role of his fellow-beings. He is also interested in the possibilities of his causal activity with respect to his environment. Thus, when a battalion start charging an enemy at the command of their general nothing is gained in the understanding of the situation by the assertion that the commencement of the charge was correlated with the utterance or hearing of certain words or sounds. Nor can a thousand things that were correlated with the solemnization of Napoleon's marriage with the Austrian princess, Marie Louise, explain the meaning or significance of that marriage to us.

This takes us to another characteristic of the explanation admissible in the human studies. What this explanation aims at illuminating is a certain aspect of the situation, *i.e.* its meaning, and not the situation taken in its absolute totality. The enactment of Napoleon's marriage involved the doing of a thousand things by thousands of persons, and yet most of those things are altogether irrelevant for the understanding of the significance of that marriage. The only important causal factors were the plan or idea that made Napoleon wish for the marriage, and the considerations that made Austria agree to it.

MacIver has significantly observed that 'any effective causal enquiry should be addressed to a specific difference between comparable situations'.¹⁹ To this we may add the proviso: in human affairs the specific difference is the difference in meaning or significance. By the term meaning in this context is meant the relevance of an item considered either as a means or as an end, or the significance of an activity, occurrence or situation in terms of the purposes and values that concern affected parties. It is not denied, however, that a single event or situation may involve several, and different, meanings for different observers occupying different viewpoints. Thus the failure of Napoleon's campaign in Russia meant one thing to France and another to Russia; and the causes of Napoleon's failure might not have been identical with those of Russian success. Nor were the effects of the campaign identical for Napoleon and France on the one hand, and for the Tzar and Russia on the other.

All explanations in the human studies are couched in terms of meaningful factors. These factors include the motives, plans and designs of the actors or parties concerned on the one hand, and the agencies of the physico-social environment obstructing or facilitating the realization of those plans etc., on the other. The explanations in question, therefore, are intelligible in a special sense, *i.e.* they can be apprehended as reasonable by human investigators capable of appreciating the meanings or values borne by the causal agencies.

The above view of explanation may be illustrated by an example of historical explanation, the simplest kind of explanation known to the human studies. The following excerpt is being taken from a chapter on Napoleon in *A History of Europe*, written by H. A. L. Fisher:—

In his enterprise of striking England to the ground, Napoleon hit upon the idea of a continental blockade. Starting from the premise that England was a nation of shop-keepers, he concluded that such a country could receive no wound more fatal than the closure of every continental market to its goods. Accordingly Spain was directed to invade Portugal, while a

French garrison dragooned the miserable sovereign of Naples into a commercial policy conformable to French design. It was plain, however, from the first that a Mediterranean blockade was in itself of little value. The policy was not one which could succeed by halves . . . drawn by the mirage of a universal blockade he was condemned to the pursuit of a universal Empire.²⁰

This passage brings out clearly the types of factors that act as determinants of human affairs. In addition to the motive of subduing England, the phenomenon of blockade was determined by the genius of Napoleon who "hit upon" that idea. Subsequent events, leading to the pursuit of the Empire, were determined not only by the persistence of Napoleon in his plan, but also by what may be called the logic of the situation, i.e. the environmental factors.

The explanation of Napoleon's activities from the partial commencement of the blockade onwards involves reference to a few types of meanings. In other cases the meanings involved may constitute a more complex whole necessitating a more complicated approach and explanation. Thus the series of changes known as the renaissance could be explained only with reference to a number of causes that affected the whole cluster of attitudes and values cherished by the people of Europe.

The above analysis enables us to resolve a number of conflicts that have divided the protagonists of different approaches and the advocates of different causal doctrines in the field of the social studies. The followers of the sociologicistic and the psychological schools, for instance, have claimed exclusive causal efficacy for the social and psychological factors respectively as determinants of human behaviour. In his well-known treatise *Le Suicide* Durkheim argued that the phenomenon of self-annihilation or suicide could not be accounted for by psychological causes, but could be understood only with reference to the social conditions of different groups and countries. Durkheim's conclusions have been, of course, questioned and challenged by psychologists, particularly the Freudian psychiatrists. It appears to me, however, that each of the two schools can account for one kind of specific effects more successfully than the others. Durkheim was specifically concerned with the varying rate of suicide in different societies and among different groups of people; this specific effect could be explained only in terms of social factors. On the other hand the problem that confronts the psychologist is this: given a set of social conditions, what determines the committing of suicide by some particular individuals rather than others? The fact that, under a given assemblage of societal conditions, only a small minority commit suicide, and not

the whole population, can be accounted for only in terms of psychological factors that predispose some individuals to react to those conditions in a manner which is too violently abnormal.

Human affairs are determined not only by psychological and social factors, but also by the geographical agencies and by the forces, structures and functions studied by physics and chemistry, anatomy and physiology. However, the effects produced by some of these causes are so general as to leave unaffected the specific aspects of events and activities in which the special social studies are interested. Thus Napoleon could not have been a successful general had he not possessed a sturdy constitution, with various organs such as the heart, the liver and the lungs in workable order; however, considering that similar constitution might have been enjoyed by thousands of soldiers, it could not be invoked to account for the distinguishing qualities of Napoleon as a general. To take another example, geographical factors such as climate and food may rightly be invoked to explain some general differences between the peoples of two different countries—differences as to their complexion, energy-level, etc.; however, they ought not to be dragged in to account for such special phenomena as the differing thought-habits, philosophical beliefs, socio-political institutions, etc. of those peoples. Several representatives of the geographic school, *e.g.* Montesquieu, Karl Ritter and F. Ratzel,²¹ who have advanced such explanations, are guilty of having misconceived both the evidential value of statistical correlations and the nature of causal determination characteristic of the human world.

QUANTITATIVE METHODS AND THE HUMAN STUDIES

We have so far been concerned to show that explanations in the humanistic sciences are causal, and that they refer to the specific aspects or meanings of events and activities under investigation. However, sciences do not aim merely at the explanation of particular phenomena. On the contrary, they endeavour to arrive at general laws, which would enable them, not only to explain what has happened, but also to predict what may occur in future. The question, therefore, that will now engage us is: What sorts of generalisations, if any, can be attained by the human studies, and with what degree of precision, if at all, may they be expected to predict the future?

It is a well-known fact that the social sciences are not able to predict the course of events in their respective fields with anything even remotely approaching the accuracy and precision of the physical sciences; nor have the former enabled us to control the human environment in the manner the latter have helped us to control the physical environment. This discrepancy between the achievements

of the two kinds of studies has led many investigators to advocate, and even adopt, the use of the methods of the physical sciences in the domain of the human studies. 'The contrast between man's amazing ability to manipulate his material environment and his pitiful incompetence in managing his own affairs', says Mrs. Barbara Wootton, 'is now as commonplace as it is tragic'.²² The obvious suggestion of the contrast, as pointed out by Mrs. Wootton, is that the human studies should start using the methods of the physical sciences.

The success of the physical sciences, however, is no more an argument for the adoption of their methods by the human studies than the lusty constitution of the lion is an argument for the horse's taking to the former's diet. As for the thesis that man's "pitiful incompetence in managing his own affairs" is due to his employing of wrong methods in the study of those affairs, it may be asked: how has the alleged causal relation been discovered and how can it be tested? I suggest that the thesis in question cannot itself be established by the scientific methods it recommends. Firstly, the advocates of the thesis should discover a quantitative index of the state of things called "competent management of human affairs." Secondly, they should be able to show that the relatively more prosperous periods of history in the lives of various nations and countries owed their success to the employment of certain methods in the domain of the human studies. I am not aware if the protagonists of the thesis under reference have ever attempted to do these things. Another way to test the thesis of Mrs. Wootton and those of her mind is to inquire, in regard to the numerous great achievements in the various spheres of the human studies, particularly those concerned with "the management of human affairs" or the art of living—to inquire as to the methods by the application of which those achievements have been possible. For aught we know the great and immortal thinkers of this planet, who have shaped the cultural history of mankind, from the Buddha and Confucius, Plato and Aristotle, down to Spinoza and John Locke, Rousseau and Voltaire, Goethe and Kant, Marx and Gandhi, even Whitehead and Russell—teachers and thinkers who have made abiding contributions to the science and art of wise living—never employed the quantitative methods of the physical sciences while reflecting over problems relating to human life. This will be borne out by almost any classic concerning human affairs associated with any of the names mentioned above—by Russell's "Freedom and Organisation" no less than by the "Republic" of Plato or the "Dialogues" of the Buddha.

It may be granted that the physical sciences have achieved a far greater control over the physical environment than what has been possible for the human studies to do in respect of the human

environment. However, it is doubtful if greater control over the latter would necessarily lead to man's greater happiness. The control over human affairs may be sought for two very different reasons. It may be sought with the mischievous motive of enslaving people, or with the motive of enabling them to lead free and happy lives. The former objective can be well achieved by perpetrating and exploiting the weaknesses or baser propensities of men and women; the latter, however, would need organisation of societies and encouraging of characters adapted for the realization of certain values. As it happens, most of the persons who seek power over others are not inclined much to worry about the welfare of the people. Without any knowledge of the technicalities of scientific method, such persons have always known how power can be attained and exercised. Thanks to the modern agencies of propaganda, the daily press and the radio, the power-seekers of our time are far better equipped than their predecessors to exercise control over the minds of the people. The extraordinary development of the physical sciences, too, tends to endow rulers with almost unlimited power over civilian population. There is no valid reason, therefore, for lamenting the incapacity of man to exercise control over the "human" affairs. *One would rather wish that this capacity were still more limited, so that most of the people could live with greater freedom.* In fact, the knowledge that mankind needs today, and has always needed, is not so much the quantitative and exact knowledge of how men actually behave, but the qualitative knowledge as to how they ought to behave. The knowledge of the former kind may contribute to the liberation of some and the enslavement or bondage of others; knowledge of the latter kind alone tends to set free both the rulers and the ruled.

Another prejudice should be removed before the problem of the methodology of the human studies can be impartially tackled. It is alleged that while the physical sciences have a record of continuous progress, no such progress is visible in the realm of the human studies. We consider the charge to be ill-founded, even in the case of that much-maligned pursuit, metaphysics. (To this point we shall return). The appearance of non-continuity of progress in the human studies is due, chiefly, to the fact that they have to adapt themselves to a material, *i.e.* human life, which is constantly changing or assuming creative variations. On the other hand the physical sciences are concerned with the progressive disclosure or delineation of the characteristics of a more or less fixed and formed reality, *viz.* nature. As new environmental conditions emerge human life comes forward with new sets of reactions, upsetting all previous calculations. When asked whether the new free facilities provided in health services would not invite abuse the

labour leader, Aneurin Bevan, gave a reply which might be enlightening to the methodologists of the human studies. He said: 'A prerequisite to a study of human behaviour is that human beings should first be allowed to behave'.²³ Except in some simple cases, the manifold and complex possibilities of human behaviour can never be fully visualized before their actual occurrence.

All the connected accounts or explanations of human behaviour, in fact, partake of the nature of artistic creations; though consistent and satisfying, they seldom embrace the totality of relevant details associated with even one type of activity. For the same reason, however, these accounts and explanations ever retain some point of interest for the students of human affairs. In this respect the physical sciences present an unfavourable contrast to the human studies. The value of their concepts and explanations lies strictly in their utility, and they may lose much of their charm for investigators after they have been replaced by superior concepts and more satisfactory hypotheses or theories. This explains why the *Principia* of Newton does not make half as exciting reading today as does the *Republic* of Plato.

The theorists of human knowledge should seriously face the question why the literary achievements of the ancient masters such as the *Illiad* of Homer and the *Rāmāyāna* of Vālmiki should still continue to delight us, their socio-political writings such as the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya and the *Politics* of Aristotle still to enlighten us, and their religio-philosophic discourses such as those contained in the *Bhagvadgītā*, the *Book of Tao* and the *Bible* to inspire us. One wonders what would remain of world's culture if all the so-called unscientific writings including the works of artists, utopian social thinkers, philosophers and religious teachers were to be destroyed on the charge of being not strictly verifiable.

We have disposed of what may be regarded as *a priori* or speculative arguments in favour of the application of quantitative scientific methods in the domain of the human studies; we have also tried to fight certain prejudices against those studies. This does not, however, imply either that we are insensitive to the merits of the quantitative methods, or that we are biased against their application in the field under reference. Our only contention is that the question as to the proper method or methods to be used by the human studies should be judged with reference to the character of their subject-matter on the one hand, and their actual practice and achievements on the other. We, therefore, propose to scrutinise the methodological machinery of the human studies under three heads: (1) the character of their data; (2) the nature of their explanations and generalisations; and (3) the problem of the verification or validity of those explanations and generalisations.

THE DATA OF THE HUMAN STUDIES

We have already noted that the subject-matter of the human studies is constituted by the historical experience of man. Even the biography is part of this experience, since individual history is one of the departments, aspects or parts of the general history of mankind. The history of the individual that matters from the viewpoint of the human studies is that part of the wider history of the individual's organism which is consciously lived, or which has repercussions on the lives of other conscious human beings. Dewey has somewhere remarked that all conduct is shared, *i.e.* has a social aspect. Such conduct of the individual necessarily belongs, howsoever indirectly, to the history of the community, and therefore of mankind.

Observation, examination of documents and other relics of the past, collection of statistics concerning the frequencies of the occurrence of different phenomena and of their interrelations with other phenomena—these are the methods by which the investigators carve out their materials from the stream of history. All these methods involve selection and therefore abstraction, and all selection or abstraction in the sphere of the human studies is controlled by the inquirer's interest in certain meanings or values.

Another kind of data are also admissible as evidence in the human studies; these may be described as "imaginary experiments". All reasoning depends on the seeing of implicational connections among statements or propositions; in human affairs a different species of connections enable us to pass from one event or action to another, *i.e.* the means-ends relationships. These connections have a necessity irreducible to the formal implications or relations studied by logic. Thus the connection between Napoleon's desire to subdue England and his launching of the blockade, or that between his ambition to found a dynasty and his marrying the Austrian princess, is of a type whose relevance or necessity could be proved not by logic but only by our sense of means-ends relationships coupled with our knowledge of the conditions under which those actions were performed. Imaginary experiments generally depend on appeals to such relationships, and they are indispensable in judging the relative worth of different plans and programmes, policies and ideals. While indispensable in normative-practical thinking, these experiments may also enable us to judge arguments as to historical possibilities. We shall illustrate these remarks with actual examples later. Suffice it to observe here that, since it is seldom possible to perform large-scale experiments on human affairs, it is legitimate to argue imaginatively what the consequences of the introduction or withdrawal of a factor in one of the two comparable situations

may be, or might have been.

A word may be added here on the data furnished by introspection. Our knowledge of the motives of human action, and of the interconnections of the motives, is often derived from the introspection of our own minds. A direct "feel" of what it means to love or hate, to be surprised or angry, etc. could not possibly be derived from any other source. However, it would be a mistake to suppose that introspection could reveal to us all the feelings and emotions, desires and ambitions and their varied combinations in all their intensity and depth that have swayed or moved mankind. Had that been the case history would have been useless as a source of new experience and of knowledge about human affairs. Two considerations would bring home to the reader the limitations of introspection as a mode of experience and knowledge. First, our mental or inner life is correlated with the cognition or awareness of the external world including men and women as well as the physical objects. There can be no rich inner life without extensive contacts with the external world, and the possibilities of these contacts in everybody's life are limited. Nobody, therefore, can hope to exhaust within his single self the possibilities of the experience of the whole of mankind. Secondly, the intelligence, inclinations and tempers of different individuals being different, they cannot be expected to have similar psychical reactions even in relation to an identical environment. On the other hand it is true that human individuals can imaginatively identify themselves with the cognitive and affective responses of others when they are made to view—as in history and fiction—the objective situation in a particular light. This phenomenon of "empathy" or psychical sympathy, as it may be called, lies at the root of all spiritual communication between man and man. Potentially, therefore, or, at any rate, imaginatively, every individual is capable of placing himself in the position of every other individual. This does not mean, however, that, left to himself, anybody can rehearse the parts of other men and women physically or even mentally. While I can, with the aid of the historian or biographer, for the time being enter into the mentality of a Napoleon in a weak imaginative manner, I cannot possibly be expected to create and rehearse that mentality out of my own individual resources.

EXPLANATIONS AND GENERALISATIONS IN HUMAN STUDIES

We shall now proceed to examine the difficult problem of explanation and generalisation in the human studies. To explain a phenomenon is to exhibit it as issuing from a cause or set of causal factors; to generalise is to affirm a necessary connection between two factors or sets of factors. In the realm of nature all connections are

regarded as more or less necessary, and are expressed by means of the functional equations. To explain an event in nature, such as the rise in temperature, is to indicate how it is connected with changes in other variables with which it is functionally related.

In the explanation of particular historical events, however, the connection between the effect and the cause or causes, *though intelligible*, is not necessary. This is a most important fact, affecting the status and validity of generalisations in the human studies. Consider the example of the continental blockade resorted to by Napoleon. One of the causes or determinants of this blockade was, to be sure, the desire of Napoleon to injure the financial interests, and thereby the political power, of England. Given this motive or end, however, it was not *necessary* that Napoleon should have behaved as he did. He might not have possibly hit upon the idea of blockade, or employed some other means to gain his objective. The means that a person employs to gain his end are determined not only by the character of the end and the "logic" of the situation, but also by the ingenuity of the actor. In any case the end or objective and the situation together may give rise to more than one course of action, thereby interfering with the operation of the law, same cause, same effect. From a practical point of view, the same effect does not similarly imply the same cause. Thus, Napoleon's pursuit of a universal empire could have been due to a cause different from the desire or plan to enforce a universal blockade.

The usual objection urged against the acceptance of plurality of causes is that its plausibility rests on taking the effect in too generalised a sense, *i.e.* on insufficient specification of the true effect. Death caused by cholera, it is said, is very different from the death caused by drowning or by administration of poison. The objection, however, loses its force when broader historical effects are under consideration.²⁴ Nor is it possible, in the domain of human affairs, and even in that of nature, to completely specify the exact causes and their exact effects, since all causation takes place within an order of events and forces which embrace practically the whole universe. That being the situation, effects can be specified only with reference to the inquirer's interests, and causes only with respect to those effects.

Two conclusions flow from the above discussion of a historical explanation. Firstly, the explanation should consist of intelligible transitions from causes to effects, or of intelligible inferences of causes from effects. Secondly, the connections between causes and their effects, though intelligible, *i.e.* understandable in terms of the relevant meanings involved in the total situation, are not *always* necessary. The second conclusion seems to call for some further elucidation. It is not denied that the causal nexus may *sometimes*

be necessary; what is denied is that it need *always* be so. Among the links that constitute the chains of human affairs are included the vacillations, choices and manœuvrings of the human beings, which introduce a more or less unpredictable element in different situations. This element renders contingent the connections between the various configurations of forces existing at different periods on the one hand, and the effects carved out of those configurations through human agencies on the other. As a consequence the actual course of historical events is never rigidly predictable.

All human activity in relation to physical environment involves the creation of objects and arrangements which could not have been produced by natural forces alone. Insofar as these products depend on the creative ingenuity of man, they are not strictly foreseeable. There is nobody in the world today who can exactly anticipate the discoveries and inventions that will have been made in the world, say, of 3000 A.D.; none could have anticipated the inventions and achievements of the modern man, both in the physical and in the spiritual sphere, a thousand or even a hundred years ago. The creativity of man eludes the prognostic grasp of man himself. If it be conceded that the present condition of man is, at least in part, an effect of his past creative activities relating partly to the physical and partly to the human or spiritual environment, then it must be granted that the bond between the cause and effect is not a necessary one. For the course of human development might have, quite conceivably, been different from what it has actually been. It is quite conceivable, for instance, that science might have failed to arise in Europe, as it failed to do in India and China. This single factor would have changed the course of the entire social, economic and political history of the world. 'If', observes Prof. MacIver, '... the Persians had defeated the Greeks at Marathon, the history of civilization would doubtless have been a quite different story'.²⁵ Unless you believe, with Hegel, that the victory of the Greeks was assured from the start owing to a Providential plan, and that the rise of science in Europe was similarly assured, you cannot possibly maintain that the present condition of man could not have been different from what it now actually happens to be.

Here an interesting question may be asked: Is not the ingenuity or creativity of man itself conditioned by the forces that surround him? Of the many alternative possibilities visualised by a person or group of persons in a given situation, it may be argued, only that one is actualised which is most facilitated by the collocation of the existing forces. In reply to this it may be pointed out that human intelligence does not always pursue the most rational course; man often commits mistakes, and he may not succeed in

making the best use of the opportunities available to him. And unless the possibilities of the commission of errors by men are as strictly necessitated as those of their taking fortunate decisions, a given historical situation cannot be pronounced to be a necessary effect of the past conditions.

This is not to suggest, however, that there exist no necessary connections whatever among the phenomena called human affairs. Insofar as man has to work under the limitations imposed by the physical environment, and by his own physico-biological and even psycho-sociological nature, his actions are more or less determined. Napoleon was defeated in Russia partly because his food-supply ran short, and human beings cannot long survive without food; and he was unable to subdue England because the latter commanded the seas, where the genius of Napoleon was powerless. It is on account of such definite limitations imposed on man's creativity by the nature of things, that his action can to a considerable extent be anticipated.

What, then, are the distinctive features of generalisations reached in the human studies? My first thesis is that these generalisations are non-quantitative or qualitative. A general statement asserts a connection between two (or more) terms. In order that such a statement may qualify for inclusion in the human studies, at least one of the terms should signify a meaning or meaningful phenomenon, *i.e.* an event or state of affairs which is accompanied by human consciousness. The meanings are generally incapable of quantitative specification;²⁶ the assertions of connections among meanings, or among meaningful and non-meaningful phenomena, are invariably so, *i.e.*, non-quantitative. This thesis may be illustrated and proved with reference to almost any generalisation arrived at in any of the social sciences.

Durkheim, the sociologist, was of opinion that the method of concomitant variation constituted the instrument *par excellence* of sociological research. He applied that method in his famous treatise, *Le Suicide*. It is noteworthy, however, that the generalisations with regard to the causation of different kinds of suicide, at which he arrived, were all qualitative in character. Thus, according to Durkheim, egoistic suicide results from lack of integration of the individual into society. This generalisation may be regarded as an explanation of three important series of inverse correlations which he discovered between suicide rate on the one hand and the degree of integration of the (1) religious society, (2) domestic society and (3) political society, on the other.²⁷

It may be noted that any event in the universe is correlated with thousands of other things, and there may be degrees of correlation between groups of events that are known on other grounds to

'The expenditure for the British be independent of each other. Navy', observe Cohen and Nagel, 'has been shown to be highly correlated with a growing consumption of bananas, and the spread of cancer in England with the increased importation of apples.' 'High coefficients of correlation', therefore, 'are not sufficient evidence for invariable connections. Correlations among degrees of phenomena, 'may be fortuitous and without causal significance'.²⁸

It follows that correlations should be taken seriously only when a causal connection is suspected between them. Both at the beginning of investigations, and at their conclusion, correlations are meaningful only in terms of *intelligible* relationships. This, at any rate, is the case in the sphere of the human studies. The mathematical scientist may follow a series of correlations blindly, and express them in terms of a functional equation; the procedure, however, is not adapted to the social sciences.

At the commencement of investigations the effect is suspected to be vaguely related to one or more situations; further analysis accompanied by the process of elimination relates that effect to a specific factor, which is common to the several situations. This is illustrated by the procedure adopted by Durkheim in the explanation of egoistic suicide.

Another point to be noted in this connection is that a correlation obtains only under a given set of conditions. When the conditions change materially, the character of the correlation may also change. Thus Durkheim observed that the protestants in England did not show the high rate of suicide characteristic of protestants in other countries. Since the conditions of human life exhibit wide differences in different countries and at different periods, the correlations among phenomena cannot be expected to remain constant. Consequently there can be no valid laws embodying quantitative relationships which would be applicable to all societies and all periods of history. These considerations seem to support the view of Sombart (and others) that 'there is no such thing as general economic theory applicable to the facts of any time or place but only the theory of an indefinite plurality of economic systems, each separate from the others'.²⁹

Add to this the complexity arising out of the plurality of causes, and, according to the considerations set forth above, the plurality of effects. Thus, on Durkheim's showing, the lack of integration of the individual into society may be caused by either the religious or the domestic or the political society. Obviously, different kinds of disintegration will have different effects on different individuals. Durkheim, indeed, writes as if what mattered was the integration of the group to which the individual belonged and the character of the individual himself had no significance. Suicide, he says,

'varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social group of which the individual forms a part'.³⁰ The statement, however, expressing as it does Durkheim's anti-psychological bias, is not an adequate description of the facts. The individual is more than a part of the group; and, as a distinct individual, he may not feel integrated with a group which has the highest degree of cohesion. A genius may feel lonely in the midst of a people who themselves are highly integrated.

Conversely, it is obvious that the lack of integration of the group affects its different members differently, since only a few are driven to commit suicide.

While the number of suicides may be counted, it is not possible to find a quantitative expression for "the lack of integration of the group" or for "the susceptibility of the individual" to that condition. Similarly in the general statement, "the death of a dearly loved child causes sorrow", neither 'death' nor 'sorrow' can be properly couched in quantitative terms.

Generalisations in the human studies, then, are qualitative. My second thesis is that these generalisations must express intelligible relationships among phenomena. This characteristic of the generalisations in question follows from the limitations of the statistical approach to human phenomena indicated above. The limitations may be further illustrated with reference to the work of Mrs. Dorothy Swaine Thomas who studied the relations between "business cycles" and some "important social phenomena" such as marriage and death rates, alcoholism, crimes, emigration, etc.³¹ As examples of the sort of correlations she obtained, two may be mentioned. One of her findings was that marriage rates showed a high positive correlation with business conditions; another, that 'a higher death rate is found in periods of prosperity.'

The first of these observed correlations is understandable in terms of our knowledge of the normal working of adult human minds: increased business producing conditions of prosperity and security induces men to settle in families. The second correlation, however, seems to be frankly incredible. How can increased prosperity lead to increased death-rate, one wonders. The suggested explanations are: increased consumption of alcohol in prosperous times; increased industrial employment of mothers; extensive emigration of the young and vigorous members of the community during prosperous times.

The reader is requested to note a number of things in connection with above facts and findings. (a) In the physical sciences, no correlation ever looks paradoxical, as does the second of the correlations given above. (b) The paradoxical character of that correlation has been sought to be explained by reference to factors

understandable in term of our common-sense knowledge or experience. (c) The correlations in question might not have existed at all had the people of the locality been disinclined to a drink (due either to prohibition or regard for religion), to migrate, and to send their women-folk to work in the factories. In other words, the correlation might have assumed a different character had the observations been conducted over people with different living habits, or different social customs. Thus the correlation under reference has only a local validity, and cannot be used as a basis for the construction of one or more laws having universal application and validity.

In fact, the correlation in question, far from being helpful in the formulation of a general law from which it may be itself deducible, stands in need of explanation by laws (if they may be so called) whose validity is independent of its paradoxical character.

It appears, thus, that in the human studies, correlations obtained statistically do not at all serve the purpose that is served by correlations obtained experimentally in the physical sciences.

Another very significant difference between the position of the human studies and that of the physical sciences that emerges here deserves notice. Several empirical laws concerning the behaviour, say, of the gases are unified by a single theory as to the constitution of the gases, e.g., the kinetic theory of gases. The several correlations obtained between business cycles and various social phenomena, however, do not seem to be explainable by a single theory constructed on the basis of those correlations; on the contrary, they seem to be explainable, severally, with reference to different motives of human conduct.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN STUDIES

Here a very important issue crops up: Are the intelligible relationships established by the human studies reducible, ultimately, to psychological bonds among human motives? Are the laws discovered by the various human studies, in the last analysis, identical with or deductions from the psychological laws? Morris Ginsberg seems to imply an affirmative answer to the above questions when he states: 'it will . . . be observed that statistical associations are held to be "intelligible" when an interpretation of the relationship can be given in terms of motives assumed to be normally operative in popular psychology'.³² Ginsberg, however, allows the possibility that there may be sociological laws *sui generis*; he even envisages the possibility of the laws of biology being of importance 'in dealing with the evolution of societies'.³³ John Stuart Mill, however, enjoined it as an 'imperative rule never to introduce any generalisations from history into the social sciences unless sufficient grounds

can be pointed out for it in human nature'.³⁴ In conformity with this precept Mill recommended the celebrated inverse deductive methods for the proof or verification of generalisations in the social sciences. 'History' he says, '... does... afford empirical laws of society. And the problem of general sociology is to ascertain these and connect them with the laws of human nature, by deductions showing that such were the derivative laws naturally to be expected as the consequences of those ultimate one'.³⁵

Mill's account of the laws of the social sciences, however, though highly suggestive, suffers from several omissions and errors. Thus he fails to examine in detail how the ultimate laws of human nature can be reached. It is exceedingly surprising to us today to be told that these laws are nothing other than the principles of association in accordance with which 'one mental state succeeds another'. The psychology with which Mill was familiar was, in the main, introspective psychology. From the general laws of psychology, Mill thought, could be derived, by the use of the deductive method, the principles of ethology, *i.e.* the science of the formation of human character. The formulation of these latter laws, however, required, in addition to their deductive reference to the ultimate psychological laws, calculation of the influence of supposed sets of circumstances in which human beings acted. In this connection Mill expresses his awareness of two significant facts: that the circumstances in which different human beings act are 'extremely different'; and that 'human beings do not all feel and act alike in the same circumstances'.³⁶

These latter admissions are subversive of the psychologicistic thesis that laws in the social sciences are ultimately derived from our psychological self-knowledge. The view is mistaken inasmuch as it disregards the role of our insight into the world of circumstances which constitute the theatre of our activities. The complicated history of man is the resultant, not merely of his original individual nature, but also, and mainly, of the clashes of interests of innumerable individuals and groups and the collocations of circumstances facilitating and thwarting the realization of a thousand plans and interests, individual and collective. Generalisations in the social sciences are both framed and verified with reference to our insight into all these factors.

In the lives of human beings, both individual and collective, ends and means are not neatly separated; indeed, they are frequently interchangeable. Psychology is expected to give us an intimate knowledge of the needs that we experience and the ends that we pursue; however, even our needs, and consequently our ends, are subject to modification through the impact of the environment. This environment is social, even more than it is physical and

technological. Only historical experience can give us adequate insight into the working of the various factors in this environment. These considerations should curb the enthusiasm of the advocates of the "primacy of psychology" on the one hand and the protagonists of "autonomous sociology" on the other.

A man's historical experience, however, is not alien to his individual nature and experience; the former is generally taken, felt and enjoyed as an extension of the possibilities of one's own nature and behaviour. When the first shock of surprise has been overcome, even the inhuman aberrations of a Cesare Borgia are apprehended as falling within the range of the possibilities of human conduct. What is the secret of our success in imaginative identification (e.g., in history and fiction) with the reactions and feelings of men and women belonging to most alien environments?

The secret seems to be as follows: Man the purposive being apprehends the multifarious items of the universe as ends and means, or as values and disvalues to be pursued and avoided respectively. The intimate nature of the ends and values cherished by him renders intimate the character of the means frequently associated with the former. A multitude of new ends, coming into existence as a result of the interaction between the natural ends or values and the non-natural (social and technological) means, too, become intimate. Human beings everywhere translate the environmental objects—physical, social and even psychological—in terms of the same values or meanings; these values or meanings constitute the universal alphabet with which are spelt the various items in the general propositions belonging to the human studies.

This explains why we are able to identify ourselves so completely with the reactions of a Napoleon in history or a Pierre in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. The environmental objects, physical no less than social, insofar as they figure in various situations in the lives of the above persons, come before us as bearers of meanings or values—meanings and values which we share with them and with the rest of mankind. The specialized knowledge of the physicist or the chemist, or even the psychologist, is almost irrelevant from the viewpoint of historical or fictional understanding. It is interesting to note that Vāmana, the author of the *Kāvya-lāñkārasūtra*, considers the use of unfamiliar technical terms in poetry to be detrimental to its aesthetic effect.³⁷

The "intelligible connections" established by generalisations in the human studies, then, must be expressed not exclusively in terms of our psychological self-knowledge, but in terms of our insight into the total network of ends-means relationships, or the total complex of values and meanings. This insight may also be termed educated common sense or simply common sense. Nadel refers to such

insight or knowledge as "general empirical knowledge", *i.e.*, knowledge which is 'so fully familiar that it is simply taken for granted'.³⁸

The universal character of the "intelligible connections" enables generalisations in the human studies to have a sort of universal validity, *i.e.* imaginative validity, for all societies and all individual human beings. This leads me to enunciate my third thesis about these generalisations: *The generalisations in the human studies are concerned with the assertions not of the actualities but of the possibilities of human behaviour.* Whether the laws discovered by the physical sciences disclose the probable or the actual structure of the material universe may be left undecided; however, it is certain that they aim at describing the actual structure. Generalisations in the social sciences do not aim at such a description. History certainly proposes to describe the lives of actual individuals and societies; however, it may be doubted if it attains complete success in its mission. History remains, in the last analysis, a record of events whose occurrence in the past is no more than a matter of varying degrees of probability.

Wishing to counter the force of the "historical prejudice" (according to which our theories have meaning only in the context of a particular historical situation), Walter Eucken advances a view similar to our own concerning the character of economic generalisations. The propositions of the economic science, according to him, look as follows: "If perfect competition exists then . . .", or "If a crop failure occurs in one country, the balance of payments alters and then . . .", etc.³⁹ Lionel Robbins expresses an analogous view about propositions obtained by economic analysis which, according to him, consists in 'the elucidation of the implications of choice in various assumed circumstances'.⁴⁰

It was observed above that the "intelligible connections" established by the human studies must be expressed in terms of our common-sense knowledge. Robbins, however, seems to assign a different role and status to this knowledge. He says: "The propositions of economic theory . . . are deductions from a series of postulates. And the chief of these postulates are all assumptions involving in some way simple and indisputable facts of experience relating to the way in which the scarcity of goods . . . actually shows itself in the world of reality . . . We do not need controlled experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff of our experience that they have only to be stated to be recognised as obvious".⁴¹ Examples of such postulates or assumptions are: those concerning the existence of scales of relative valuation, of different factors of production, and of different degrees of uncertainty regarding the future, etc.⁴²

This view seems to assume that the common-sense knowledge

exists in a formulated form, from which postulates could be derived to be used as premises for the deduction of the economic laws. That, however, does not appear to be the case. The deliverances of common sense are neither like the hypotheses of physics that are framed by the ingenuity of creative scientists, nor like the *a priori* notions of the Kantian understanding; nor is their relation to the generalisations in economics and other social sciences analogous to that of more general postulates to derivative laws. *The laws of the social sciences, on the contrary, are obtained by a sort of imaginative extension and rearrangement of the elements of our everyday experience.* The framework or schema of ends-means relationships yielded by that experience is *stretched and readjusted by us in such a manner as to include within it the larger experience embodied in history or statistical figures.*

If the view of Robbins were true then it would follow that common-sense knowledge was more general than the knowledge of the historian and the social scientist, and that the man of common sense stood hardly to learn anything significantly new from a perusal of literature and history or other social sciences.

Contrary to this we hold that the comprehension of the particular actions and events of history and the lives and characters of fiction on the one hand and that of the general trends of phenomena disclosed in the social sciences on the other is made possible by the fact that men and women, who study history etc., find it possible to *imaginatively project themselves into those events, actions and trends and participate in the life-processes that give form and meaning to them.* This view explains clearly how the cultivation of arts and the study of the social sciences bring about an extension or enrichment of our spiritual being.

History has to weave consistent or meaningful patterns out of the given data. The reader of history casts himself imaginatively into the situational pattern and seizes its meaning from within. He is enabled to do so through a *creative expansion* of the motivational possibilities of his self with respect to the meanings involved in the situation. *Knowing in the sphere of the humanities and the social sciences, thus, is a creative act; it is an operation involving growth as well as contemplation, or rather, growth in and through contemplation.* Mathematical and scientific reasoning, on the other hand, is purely contemplative, unless it is informed with philosophical curiosity. Human sciences other than history concern themselves with the construction of abstract models intended to symbolise the essential connections or relationships among selected types of meanings.

My fourth and last thesis about generalisations in the human studies relates to their mode of verification. *Here the process of*

verification is continuous with that of comprehension. The process is essentially artistic or imaginative. The thesis implies an important corollary : insofar as the general propositions of a discipline are incapable of verification by or through imaginative perception, that discipline is not entitled to be included in the human studies.

It has been said that in a historical writing explanation is identical with successful narration. The art of historiography consists in exhibiting the relevant given data as meaningfully connected. The art of fiction involves a different capacity; it consists in establishing meaningful connections or harmony between the incidents and actions presented in the story on the one hand and the inner propensities of the characters concerned on the other. How, pray, are we able to tell a more real or convincing character from a less real one? Percy Lubbock has remarked that in his *Anna Karenina* Tolstoy has successfully portrayed all the characters except one, i.e., the lover of Anna.⁴⁸ Mr. Lubbock is right : but how do we know that he is right? How do we recognise a great novelist, and a great critic, or even a great sociologist and a great philosopher? Recognition of the greatness of a thinker or a novelist, and the appreciation of the degree of realism attained by the latter, are human phenomena, falling within the purview of the theorist of the human studies.

We judge the realistic grip of a novelist by the degree of identification we are able to achieve with the vision of life presented by him; and we judge the greatness of a thinker by the consistency, richness and clarity of the picture of a field of experience offered by him for our contemplation and acceptance. A critic bears the same relation to works of art as the artist does to life; the latter makes articulate and enriches our actual life, the former articulates for us the life presented in the work of art.

Consider now the general statements or hypotheses produced by the humanistic sciences. These may be divided into two classes, imaginative and speculative. The former correspond to the empirical hypotheses of the physical sciences, and are obtained by *an imaginative expansion and rearrangement of our everyday experience*. Such hypotheses are directly verified by our imaginative perception. They may be suggested by statistical data, but they are not proved or verified by those data. The imaginative perception also involves varying degrees of imaginative identification, empathy or sympathy, in the cases of emotional apprehension.

The second type of hypotheses, i.e. the speculative ones, are analogous to the physical theories. Examples of such hypotheses are : Anguste Comte's law of the three stages; Herbert Spencer's formula of cosmic evolution; Karl Marx's theory of history; etc. Theories of such generality are not verifiable by imaginative insight.

They are not verifiable by deductive reference to experience either, if only because they involve a number of assertions concerning past facts or events also. Their only and major justification consists in their power to unify a large range of phenomena. This sort of justification is enjoyed by physical theories as well; in addition, they lend themselves to be tested by deductive predictions. It follows from this that speculative theories in the physical sciences are much better founded than similar theories in the human studies. In fact, insofar as these latter disciplines entertain such theories or hypotheses, they pass beyond their proper sphere and tend to become metaphysical.

SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENTS

Generalisations in the human studies proper are grounded in an implicit assumption, *i.e.* the assumption of the identity of human nature. The assumption implies that the possibilities of the behaviour of one historical agent or person can be imaginatively shared or enjoyed by another agent or person. The postulate is as necessary to the human studies as the principle of the uniformity of nature is to physical sciences. The existentialist maxim that there is no human nature either means that, under a given set of circumstances, the human personality is not rigidly committed to a single course of action but admits of creative variations in its reactions, or it is a meaningless paradox. If human nature, with all its creative possibilities, were not identical from man to man, then there would be no writing and understanding of history, and no argumentation or reasoning to arrive at common or shared truths.⁴⁴

I now raise an important issue concerning the study of man: can we arrive at indubitable certainties in this field? Can we, in other words, discover universal and necessary truths about man's behaviour and values, his actions and feelings and ideals? The logical positivists have sought to deny that there can be any synthetic assertions which are necessarily and universally true. Others have held that such assertions are not attainable in such normative studies as ethics and aesthetics.

The attitude that no physical theories are final or ultimate truths was engendered by the breakdown of traditional physics. We have already observed that physical theories are speculative, and so constantly liable to modification in the light of fresh experience. As regards the empirical laws they are never exact, and their statement or equational expression is being modified, too, in accordance with the changing physical theories. It follows from these considerations that there can be no universal and necessary truths in the sphere of physical investigations.

Modifying his earlier position that all synthetic propositions

express only probable truths A. J. Ayer, in the second edition of his *Language, Truth and Logic*, remarks: 'I have come to think that there is a class of empirical propositions of which it is permissible to say that they can be verified conclusively. It is characteristic of these . . . "basic propositions" that they refer solely to the content of a single experience . . . propositions of this kind are "incorrigeable".'⁴⁵ It is difficult to make out what Ayer means by a "single experience", however, the statement clearly implies that there can be no universal and necessary propositions which are incorrigible.

Need we take such a pessimistic view in regard to our empirical knowledge or our formulation of synthetic propositions?

It may be remembered in this connection that developments in twentieth century physics have brought about a revolution in the realm of theoretical physics only; they have not produced any such revolution in the field of our common-sense knowledge. Thus, fire continues to feel hot and burn, and water to flow downward and quench our thirst. Nor has the revolution appreciably affected our knowledge of human behaviour. In fact, not even Freudian psychology has produced any radical rupture between our past and present notions about that behaviour. That is why the writings of ancient poets, dramatists and social thinkers such as Vālmīki and Homer, Kālidāsa and Shakespeare, Plato and Aristotle, continue to be intelligible and instructive to us.

Why, then, all this hue and cry, this pessimism and cynicism, about the possibility of all knowledge? Physics is not coextensive with the whole of human knowledge, and a crisis in physics is not a crisis in all the spheres of our knowledge. As for the former crisis, our explanation is as follows. All physical theory, even the so-called empirical theory, contains an element of speculation or guess-work; and wherever this element is present, there is bound to remain an element of uncertainty. The language of mathematics, in the end, is a construction of our brains, and there is no earthly reason why it should succeed completely in describing the structure of the physical world. While it has been found convenient to describe the world in terms of mathematics, it is no more sensible to say that the pattern of the universe is mathematical than to say that the latter is modelled on the phonetic and grammatical structure of the Sanskrit or the English language. For it is quite probable that, like several systems of geometry, there might have evolved several systems of arithmetic and calculus.

On the common-sense, more or less qualitative level, our experience continues to yield to us universal and necessary truths, both about the physical and the human world. Thus we can confidently assert that milk is a nourishing food for normal human babies, that fire produces heat, that the death of a dearly loved

child causes sorrow, and that a beautiful, cultured and virtuous wife is a source of pride to an ambitious, intelligent and sociable husband. A pedant may still doubt the truth of these statements; it may also be alleged that the statements lack accuracy, and so cannot be strictly tested. However, the demand for the accuracy of statements is always relative to our purposes, and hundred per cent accuracy or precision is hardly attainable outside mathematical calculations, where the slightest difference may be imagined and expressed with the help of numerical symbols.

It has been argued that only analytic propositions are universally and necessarily true. An analytic proposition, it is supposed, 'is true solely in virtue of the meaning of its constituent symbols, and cannot therefore be either confirmed or refuted by any fact of experience'.⁴⁶ The protagonists of this view forget that symbols have meanings, and those meanings relationships, only for the human minds and those meanings and relationships would not be valid except for the sanction of those minds. Ultimately it is the imagination of man (*i.e.* the normal human being) which alone can guarantee whether the relation of two meanings is permanent or variable. Let us take an example of an analytic proposition : "If *p* implies *q* and *q* implies *r* then *p* implies *r*." This proposition, it will be said, asserts nothing about "matters of fact" but merely asserts something about relations of symbols. However, the assertion that *p* implies *r* is a mere metaphor, for neither the symbol nor the meaning *p* has the capacity to do or not to do the implying. The assertion that *p* implies *r* means nothing more than this : that a person who asserts *p* is under the compulsion of his (logical?) nature to assert *r*. In other words this particular analytic proposition is really a proposition *not about symbols or their meanings, but about a certain possibility of human behaviour in relation to those symbols or meanings*. Take another example : If *a* is bigger than *b* and *b* is bigger than *c*, then *a* is bigger than *c*. This proposition is universally valid because it expresses a fact universally borne out by man's experience of magnitudes and quantities interpreted in terms of his interests and perceptual habits.

The so-called analytic propositions, then, are really not analytic but synthetic. The analytic propositions generally concern relationships taken in abstraction; however, relationships are no less objective than things, and it is an error to think that propositions about relations are propositions either about symbols or about forms without matter. For no form or relation has a meaning apart from implicit reference to some matter.⁴⁷

In fact, the forms and interrelations of things, insofar as they are investigated by human beings, have meanings only with reference to, or in terms of, the interests and purposes of those beings. Man

finds in nature, or nature exhibits to man, only those properties which are relevant in relation to his constitution and interests. Since man has direct insight into many of his interests and the qualities and relations that correspond to those interests, he can lay down in advance how those qualities and relations will be manipulated by him on future occasions. *The so-called analytic propositions are propositions about the abstract schemata of these qualities and relations; they derive their peculiar strength or validity from the fact that the human mind works under definite limitations in the imaginative manipulation of those schemata.*

What, then, is the difference between the necessity or certainty which can be claimed by the proposition "All fire produces heat" and that enjoyed by the statements : "If p implies q and q implies r then p implies r ;" and "If a is bigger than b and b is bigger than c then a is bigger than c ?

According to traditional logic a necessary idea (or proposition) 'is one the contrary of which cannot be entertained by the human mind,' or, as Leibnitz would say, the opposite of which 'implies a contradiction'.⁴⁸ "The inconceivability of the opposite", however, is a characteristic which is relative to the possibilities of the human imagination. A statement, let us say, is necessary if it asserts a single possibility of relationship for the human imagination. Necessary statements, one may suggest, refer to the irrevokable logical habits of the human mind. However, there is no logical nature separable from the total psychical nature of man. Man behaves logically, but he also behaves morally and aesthetically. Logic permeates all his behaviour no less and no more than does his moral and aesthetic nature. And man may be confronted with "single possibilities of relationship" in all the domains of his experience. The conclusion is that there may be necessary statements of several kinds, corresponding to the several spheres of human experience and behaviour.

The proposition, "All fire produces heat" is certain as far as human experience goes. However, it is imaginable (so the logicians argue) that there were fire which produced no heat. Fire might have as well been cold. The circumstance would not have affected logic at all. To deny the other two propositions, however, would produce logical complications of the first magnitude.

The difference between the two cases seems to be this : the first statement refers to the behaviour of fire which is known from without, while the other statements refer, primarily, to the habits of the human mind which is known from within. The certainty of the so-called logical principles rests on our implicit faith in the continuance of our habits of reasoning and imagination. It appears, thus, that, with respect to the possibility of achieving indubitable or necessary statements, human studies (of which logic is one) enjoy an advantage

over the physical studies. (However, since in most cases, the possibilities of human action and reaction with reference even to the same goal and same situation are manifold, we cannot generally assert a single possibility of relationship or make a statement which is universally and necessarily valid. This explains why necessary statements, *i.e.*, statements of necessary connection, should be rare in the human studies). The possibility of synthetic necessary judgments, however, is not ruled out for the human studies. As we have seen, the so-called laws or rules of logic are nothing but synthetic necessary judgments concerning the behaviour of the human mind on all conceivable occasions. There is nothing to prevent us from presuming that truths of this kind may be attainable in the spheres of psychology, ethics, aesthetics, and other human studies as well. Indeed, we have already referred to some statements concerning human behaviour in spheres other than—what is traditionally known as—the logical, which answer to the above description.

Can universal and necessary statements about physical nature be ever attained? Eddington replies to this question in the affirmative. He thinks that 'it can no longer be accepted as a principle of scientific philosophy that the laws of nature are uncompulsory';⁴⁹ and asserts, in the Kantian fashion, that, respecting the laws that have an epistemological origin, 'we have a right to expectation that they will be obeyed invariably and universally'.⁵⁰ Bridgman similarly observes: 'Our ideas of what external nature is will always be subject to change as we gain new experimental knowledge, but there is a part of our attitude to nature which should not be subject to future change, namely *that part which rests on the permanent basis of the character of our minds*'.⁵¹

These views offer a striking confirmation of the theory of the synthetic *a priori* (or synthetic necessary) propositions which we have advanced. All such propositions refer, ultimately, to the behavioral possibilities of the human mind as revealed to man's imaginative and critical self-scrutiny.

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF CULTURE: CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION AS VALUES

THE terms culture and civilisation are used in a bewildering variety of senses. To the layman both of these concepts appear to convey a vague reference to the excellence or achievements of men or groups of men to whose conditions of living they are applied. The experts, however, seem to be agreed neither in regard to the propriety of this reference nor as to the connection between the phenomena described by the two terms. To illustrate the second point: Bronislaw Malinowski suggests that the words culture and civilization should be used not synonymously but distinctively, reserving civilisation for a special aspect of more advanced cultures.¹ Other anthropologists, such as Tylor and Herskovits, regard culture and civilization as synonymous. Says Herskovits, 'one synonym for culture is *tradition* and another is *civilization*'.² As against both these views MacIver distinguishes between the technological order and the cultural order and regards these as corresponding to the realm of utilities and the realm of primary values respectively.³ He considers civilization to be in several ways antithetical to culture. The historian, Toynbee, does not use the word "culture" but prefers to employ the term "civilization". His conception of civilization, however, is quite opposed to that of MacIver. Not only does he distinguish civilization from the technological order and other material aspects of life, he is also emphatic that improvement of techniques is neither a pre-condition nor a correlate of growth in civilization. According to him, indeed, improvement in technology may show correlation with stagnation, and even retardation, in the march of civilization. 'The lack of correlation between progress and technique and progress and civilization,' according to him, 'is apparent in all . . . cases in which techniques have improved while civilizations have remained stationary or suffered setbacks'. He also remarks that an improvement in the technique of agriculture has in some cases 'been the accompaniment of a decline in a civilization'.⁴ Does, then, Toynbee take civilization to mean the same thing that MacIver refers to by the term culture? This seems doubtful, in view of the fact that Toynbee conceives civilization to progress through the mechanism of "challenge and response", where

challenge is usually offered by the physical environment. Toynbee's civilization, in other words, has a utilitarian aspect which seems to be excluded by MacIver from the cultural order.

Like Toynbee, Oswald Spengler has failed to give clear-cut definitions of the terms "culture" and "civilization". However, the latter conceives civilization to be the last phase of a culture. 'Every Culture has its own Civilization. The Civilization is the inevitable destiny of the culture'. Civilisations are the last, the most external and artificial states of Culture :

They are a conclusion, the thing become succeeding the thing becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built petrifying world-city following mother earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They may, like a worn-out giant of the primeval forest, thrust their decaying branches towards the sky for hundreds or thousands of years, as we see in China, in India, in the Islamic world⁵.

This diversity of opinions and pronouncements as to the meaning, inter-relationships, and significance of the phenomena denoted by the terms "culture" and "civilisation" testifies to the existence of a state of utter confusion in regard to the understanding of those phenomena. Nor is this confusion confined merely to differences in terminology : the confusion has deeper roots in the general misunderstanding as to *the nature and meaning of human achievements*. The first step towards the clearing of this confusion is the recognition that the terms culture and civilisation are not simple, descriptive concepts which represent existing realities. On the contrary, the concepts in question are complex constructs which are designed to be explanatory of human behaviour or achievements from definite angles. This means that the words culture and civilisation should be defined and used as technical terms; and those definitions should be justified, not in terms of their popular or literary usages, but with respect to their utility in ordering and rendering intelligible the complex panorama of human life and experience. The fact that the significance as well as the interrelations of these concepts should vary with the viewpoint of the writer or speaker who uses them should not disconcert us. However, the varying usages and interpretations of the terms under reference, no matter what their standpoint, must submit to one over-riding test or criterion : What is the extent of the territory of human life and behaviour that they are able to illumine, and what is the degree of illumination that they are able to achieve ? An approach to the cultural and other phenomena would be valuable in proportion as it were able to give us insight into the complexities of man's life, which includes

its social as well as individual phases, and is concerned with values no less than with facts. Such insight or understanding is the ultimate objective of all systematic enquiries, irrespective of the fact whether they are positive or normative. In fact, the division of sciences into positive and normative can justify itself only insofar as it produces and promotes that understanding.

The purpose of the present work is to achieve an understanding of culture considered as a value. This does not mean that we can afford to ignore the factual realities called culture or civilisation by anthropologists and sociologists. We believe that valuation is a central fact in human experiences and activities; it is a pervasive feature of human life and activity. Man, indeed, seldom concerns himself with mere facts; the facts that interest him are all meaningful or bearers of values. Man contemplates factual realities under the evaluative categories of "ends" and "means", and he is indifferent to the features of the universe which cannot be so contemplated. The most disinterested questions and queries with which science occupies itself will be found, on finer analysis, to be connected with one human interest or the other, and all that interests man is to him valuable. The normative study of culture, therefore, cannot be kept rigidly apart from a factual study thereof. In fact, the study of the former kind will be important, and justified, to the extent to which it enables us to comprehend the actualities of human life.

With the above considerations in our mind we shall proceed to review and evaluate some representative approaches and attempts that have been made towards the explanation and understanding of the phenomena called culture and civilisation.

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CULTURE

By far the most important positive or factual approach to culture is that embodied in the investigations of cultural anthropology. One of the oldest and most comprehensive definitions of culture is that given by Tylor. According to him 'culture or civilization is that complex which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'.⁶ Linton equates culture with "social heredity"; Lowie calls it "the whole social tradition".⁷ Herskovits describes culture as the sum total of man's "learned behaviour", as 'the things people have, the things they do and what they think'.⁸ According to Malinowski culture is social heritage comprising 'inherited artifacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits and values'.⁹ These descriptions of culture have both imaginative fascination and philosophical significance. They fix our attention on the *totality* of changes and modifications that man produces and suffers after his emergence from the animal world as a conscious being. At their

best, the anthropological writings direct our gaze to the vast complex of activities that characterize the *homo sapiens*; at their worst, they leave us with a motley crowd of snap-shots, taken from indifferent angles, of the variegated activities of an indifferently chosen society. At times, indeed, the anthropologist appears to be imitating the enterprising yet thoughtless spirit of Hanumān who, unable to identify the needed herb, removed the entire mountain to the battlefield where Lakshmana, the wounded hero, lay dying.

Anthropology, according to Kroeber, 'aims to investigate human culture as such : at all times, everything, in all its parts and aspects and workings. It looks for generalised findings as to how culture operates literally, how human beings behave under given cultural conditions, and for the major developments of the history of culture.'¹⁰ Anthropology proceeds very much like a natural science and endeavours to describe and correlate the facts of human behaviour and its products. The anthropologist is interested, not so much in man as in the observable changes that man suffers and produces as a conscious agent. Says Herskovits : 'Culture can be studied without taking human beings into account.'¹¹ In practice anthropology has been more concerned with the culture of the primitive societies, though the higher societies are by no means excluded from its scope. Again, the anthropologist has been more interested in tracing the influence of culture over individuals than that of individuals over their respective cultures. Imbued with a religiously scientific spirit, the anthropologist has been content to describe "the total way of living" of different societies : he dismisses the question of estimating the relative significance of the different "ways" of several societies, and of different items of behaviour within the same society, as unworthy of his attention. Thus, Ruth Benedict, having defined anthropology as the 'science of custom' or as 'the study of human beings as creatures of society', declares that the anthropologist as such 'is bound to avoid any weighting,'¹² of one social scheme in favour of the other.

Ruth Benedict offers an impassioned plea for another element in the standpoint of anthropology. 'The fact of first-rate importance', says she, 'is this predominant role that custom plays in experience and in belief.' For, according to her, 'the life history of the individual is first and foremost an accommodation to the patterns and standards traditionally handed down in his community'. And, in her support, she quotes John Dewey as having said in all seriousness that 'the part played by custom in shaping the behaviour of the individual as over against any way in which he can affect traditional custom, is as the proportion of the total vocabulary of his mother tongue over against those words of his own baby talk that are taken up into the vernacular of his family.'¹³

How far does the viewpoint in question enable us to understand the phenomena that anthropology professes to investigate? The merits of anthropology as a science should be judged purely in the terms of scientific understanding. The question is: Can anthropology completely avoid evaluation, without detriment to its efficacy as the science of human culture or cultural behaviour? It may be doubted if the anthropologist can do away entirely with selection and emphasis which activities invariably involve evaluation, particularly when the field of investigation is human behaviour. Secondly, the emphasis on customary and quantitative aspects of behaviour will tend to blind the investigator to those forces and factors which affect societies by their qualitative novelty. The pertinence of this latter objection will be obvious to anyone who considers the dynamics of the higher societies, though the qualitative factor could not have been unimportant even in the primitive society. Take an example. Most of the activities of the scientist Einstein consist of customary behaviour. His formulation of the Theory of Relativity is only one of the innumerable series of activities that make up his life. Shall we, therefore, affirm that that formulation cannot be regarded as a specially significant event, both in his life and in the lives of millions of other men and women living in different cultural traditions? That custom plays a predominant role in experience and belief may be granted; the quantitative predominance of customary behaviour, however, is no index of its importance, with respect either to the growth or to the dynamics of culture and civilisation.

The point that I want to make out is this: that the whole question concerning the relative significance of different factors as determinants of cultural change cannot be discussed at all without some presupposition as to the nature of values and the criteria of evaluation. *Unless we are agreed as to the relative importance of effects we cannot hope to succeed in our quest of the important causal factors.* Thus the query, "What are the forces that predominantly determine historical change?" is not unrelated to the question, "What is it that constitutes an important historical event or change, whose causes it is worthwhile to investigate?" The outlook of history and the character of its questionings have not remained stationary; however, it may be doubted if they have ever, so far, been sought to be based on a consciously adopted philosophy of values. Enterprising thinkers have been busy offering "Philosophies of History", without having first seriously tackled the issue as to what constitutes significant history. The historians and the interpreters of history, and to a lesser extent the anthropologists, have, in fact, been leaning heavily on what may be designated as the common sense of values; and they have had neither the time

nor the inclination to critically scrutinise the deliverances of that common sense. In our own time the practice of historiography has been greatly influenced by the emergence and propagation of the democratic and socialist ideologies. However, if the proper function of history is to trace the development of man's culture and civilization, it can perform that function only when, and to the extent to which, it is guided by an adequate conception of the elements that constitute culture and civilization.

To return to anthropology. The way this science has been proceeding is such as to preclude the possibility of its being able to understand the higher societies and their cultures. For that understanding cannot be achieved without the application of the evaluative concepts. With its distrust of such concepts, anthropology cannot possibly do justice to the role of the creative individuals in the modification of culture; and its emphasis on custom is calculated to prevent it from investigating such phenomena as ideological and political revolutions. The real reason why any study of man cannot afford to ignore values is this, that practically the whole of man's conscious behaviour is shaped and determined by his sense of values. Thus, it would be difficult to account for the tremendous success of the democratic and socialist movements of our time unless it were supposed that they were considered by the people to be contributory to better living conditions.

CULTURE AS A CLASS PHENOMENON

In primitive life the cultural and the utilitarian are inextricably bound together. Further, as even the Marxists recognise, the primitive societies are not stratified into classes. In more developed societies, however, culture, as conceived by the Marxists and by such writers as T. S. Eliot, tends to become a class phenomenon.

Mr. Eliot's account of culture, since it moves throughout in the realm of values, has special pertinence for the present discussion. I shall invite the reader's attention to three main contentions of Mr. Eliot, developed in his *Notes Toward the Definition of Culture*, which bring out, to my mind, both the rich suggestiveness and the limitations of his views.

In the first place, Mr. Eliot emphasizes that the culture of the individual is dependent upon the culture of a group or class, and that the culture of the group or class is dependent upon the culture of the whole society to which that group or class belongs.¹⁴ Secondly, he believes that there are "cultural levels", on the basis of which the culture of the class may be distinguished from that of the society. He does not, however, similarly distinguish the culture of the individual from that of the class.

Thirdly, Mr. Eliot holds that 'by far the most important channel of the transmission of culture remains the family'; and when family life fails to play its part, we must expect our culture to deteriorate (p. 43). The family, however, is the unit of a group or class; Mr. Eliot, therefore, puts in a strong plea for the "persistence of the social classes". What exactly are the functions of the class and the family? Criticising Matthew Arnold's conception of culture on the ground that there is 'the absence of social background to his picture', Mr. Eliot distinguishes refinement of manners, or urbanity and civility, as one important constituent of culture which is inseparable from a social class. The élite, the creators of culture, may be drawn from lower strata of society also; nevertheless, there must remain a dominant class which constitutes the nucleus of the cultural élite and the members of which remain the prime consumers of the works of thought and art. The élite drawn from other classes may be finally attached to the dominant class. 'It is the function of the class as a whole to preserve and communicate standards of manners which is a vital element in group culture. It is the function of the superior members and superior families to preserve the group culture, as it is the function of the producers to alter it.' (p. 42). The family should also transmit to its members 'a piety towards the dead, however obscure, and a solicitude for the unborn, however remote.' (p. 44).

The above is a brief outline of Mr. Eliot's views, concerning the conditions under which alone culture can flourish and the way it can be transmitted. As for his conception of culture, he has not tried to give any rigid definition. The culture, we are told, 'is not merely a sum of several activities, but a way of life.' (p. 41); 'Culture may even be described simply as that which makes life worth living' (p. 27). Culture is also regarded as being essentially bound up with a religion. Mr. Eliot's list of activities that constitute culture is, indeed, a fairly large one. Apart from good manners, learning, cultivation of the arts, etc. culture includes :

all the characteristic activities and interests of a people : Derby Day, Henley Regatta, cows, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart-board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beet-root in vinegar, nineteenth-century Gothic Churches and the music of Elgar (p. 51).

Since no one individual, or even society or age, can realize all the values of civilization—which values may even conflict with one another,—therefore, no individual or society may be regarded as completely cultured. And 'the person who contributes to culture, however important his contribution may be, is not always a "cultur-

ed person'.' (p. 23).

Mr. Eliot, I said, is concerned with culture mainly as a value concept. He is still more concerned with the standards of culture. Indeed, it is his solicitude for these standards that makes him plead for the continuance of a certain class or classes. 'Some disintegration of the classes in which culture is, or should be, most highly developed, has already taken place in western society' (p. 26) and, as a result, 'our own period is one of decline' and 'the standards of culture are lower than they were fifty years ago.' (p. 19).

Mr. Eliot is undoubtedly justified in his concern for the standards of culture. However, the sort of list of cultural activities that has been quoted above, leaves one in suspense as to the relative value, say, of Derby Day and poetry, or of Henley Regatta and philosophy. Nor does he tell us how the different levels of culture can be distinguished: the only definite criterion that he seems to offer is that of manners, *i.e.* the manners of the aristocratic class. Mr. Eliot, however, conspicuously fails to specify the principle or set of principles from which the cultural significance of manners, Derby Day, etc. on the one hand, and that of poetry, philosophy and religion on the other may be intelligibly deduced.

That culture rests on standards is an opinion shared with Eliot by the Spanish writer, Ortega Y Gasset. 'The varying degrees of culture', he observes, 'are measured by the greater or less precision of the standards'.¹⁵ Gasset, too, is afraid of what he calls the "mass man", who is easy-going, and does not make any special demands on himself. Gasset, however, is no admirer of the aristocracy and their manners. For the typical aristocrat, leading an easy and leisurely life, is not used to making "vital effort" which alone promotes the growth of an individual. The aristocrat is characterized by the 'propensity to make out of games and sports the central occupation of his life; the cult of the body-hygienic regime and attention to dress; lack of romance in his dealings with woman';¹⁶ etc. Commenting on the English aristocracy of his time Goethe observed: 'It is surprising to remark how large a portion of the life of a rich Englishman of rank is passed in duels and elopements'.¹⁷

Goethe, one gathers, was more favourably inclined towards the middle classes. 'A middle rank', he says, 'is much more favourable to talent, so we find all great artists and poets in the middle classes'.¹⁸ 'Who is it', asks Gasset, 'that exercises social power to-day? Who imposes the forms of his own mind on the period?' His reply is: 'Without a doubt, the man of the middle class . . . the technician: engineer, doctor, financier, teacher, and so on'.¹⁹ Gasset adopts the Buddhist virtue of strenuousness as the mark of the superior man, and he finds this virtue preeminently displayed by a section of the middle classes.

Strenuousness, however, is a virtue that can be exercised in different directions. Thus a businessman may be as strenuous, may make as heavy demands on himself, as an artist or a poet. The criterion of strenuousness, therefore, can hardly serve as a measure of cultural attainment.

I shall now pass on to another celebrated view which regards culture as a class phenomenon: I mean the doctrine of Marxism. The use of the word culture is extremely rare in the writings of Marx and Engels; and it is rather difficult to decide whether they take it to be a descriptive or an evaluative concept. Nor do the Marxists seem to be concerned with the standards of culture, except in an indirect sense, to be explained below.

Dividing the realm of experience into being or material relations on the one hand and consciousness or ideas on the other, Marxist materialism makes the latter dependent on the former. Culture belongs to the sphere of social consciousness; as such it is dependent on or derived from the social being, or the matrix of material social relations. 'In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will . . . the sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general.'²⁰ This, then, is the main thesis. Another important thesis is contained in Marx's celebrated epigram: 'In every epoch, the ruling ideas have been the ideas of the ruling class'. Sidney Hook explains it as follows: 'The division of society into classes gives rise to different ideologies—political, ethical, religious and philosophical—which express existing class relationships and tend either to consolidate or to undermine the power and authority of the ruling class. A struggle for survival goes on in the realm of ideas. Since those who control the means of production also control directly or indirectly the means of publication—the Church, press, school—the prevailing ideology is a buttress to the existing order'.²¹

The Marxist criterion for estimating the worth of an ideology or culture is historical. As long as the class that produces a particular culture is itself progressive, its culture is progressive also; when that class ceases to be progressive, its culture, too, becomes valueless or retrograde. Thus, for instance, the bourgeoisie was a progressive and revolutionary class when it overthrew the feudal order, since the former could ensure swifter and more abundant production of wealth than the latter. For that historical period, when the feudal order was being disintegrated, bourgeois culture was both progres-

sive and valuable. However, in relation to the rising proletarian class, bourgeoisie as a class, as well as the culture they represent, are both reactionary and retrograde. 'The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them'.²²

The ideologies produced by the ruling classes in all ages are nothing but rationalizations, not necessarily conscious, of the interests of those classes. These ideologies, in the last analysis, lend support to the class relations advantageous to the owners of the means of production, *i.e.*, the ruling classes. The ideologies remain useful to man as long as they lend support to the system of class relationships that contributes towards maximum production. When this system of relationships becomes outmoded, *i.e.*, when it constitutes itself into an obstacle to maximum possible production, then the ideologies favouring that system themselves become outmoded, obsolete, or reactionary. Thus the feudal ideas or ideologies—social and political, moral and juristic—became obsolete and reactionary when the bourgeoisie introduced new modes of production involving new property or class relations. Humanity, thus, must periodically break from past traditions in order that it may advance further in the direction of progress. The necessity of such breaks, however, will finally cease when the state represented by the communist society is reached. The development of that society, on the other hand, since it can be brought about only by a communist revolution 'involving the most radical rupture with traditional property relations', would mark 'the most radical rupture with traditional ideas'.²³

Marxism, thus, seems to suffer from no feelings of piety towards the past. Revolutionary to the core, it regards tradition as playing essentially a negative role, *i.e.*, that of retarding the rate of change in the non-material aspects of culture. 'The tradition of all dead generations', Marx wrote in the *18th Brumaire*, 'weights like a nightmare on the brain of the living'.

The contentions of Marxism seem to rest on some questionable assumptions.

First, Marxism seems to regard man as exclusively a social being. Secondly, it considers social life to consist exclusively or mainly in the exercise of functions incidental to class relationship. As a consequence of the first, Marxism denies that human life has any private or cosmic dimensions; as a result of the second, it treats the antagonistic classes as constituting different species with completely divergent interests, opinions and outlooks.

None of these related assumptions is justified. The mother's relationship with the child and the lover's relationship with the beloved are not examples of class relationship. Similar remarks apply to relations among friends. My friendship with a person may rest on a common interest very different from a class interest:

I may like him because he is a good gossip, a fine sportsman, a lover of poetry, or an enthusiastic mountain-climber. It is also noteworthy that mothers, lovers and friends, whatever the class to which they belong, experience practically the same emotions and sentiments in relation to their respective objects. That is why a modern lover can appreciate and share the sentiments ascribed to the Yaksha in the *Meghadūtam*, or to *Dushyanta* in the *Sākuntalam*. That, again, is the reason why we can still enjoy the immortal child poetry of Sūradūsa. The wonder is that the readers, who have not the remotest relationship with kings and princes, should be able to derive the greatest pleasure from the famous fourteen verses of the *Raghuvainīsam* wherein the bards are singing to prince Aja with a view to rousing him from sleep. The truth is that human beings, in virtue of their fundamental identity of nature, can enter into each other's feelings and vicariously enjoy the visions and emotions of one another.

DIMENSIONS OF LIVING EXPERIENCE

It was remarked above that the Marxists take a narrow view of social life, and unjustifiably identify it with the activities involving class relationships. We now observe that human life and experience extend into dimensions other than the social. Man does not exclusively reflect upon and react to the social reality. There are occasions when he contemplates the totality of human existence, and even of cosmic existence, and reacts to that totality both intellectually and emotionally. The philosophers have often been described as the spectators of all time and all existence; and the questionings of a prophet like the Buddha relate to the meaning and worth not of a narrowly social existence but of the human and the cosmic existences taken in their widest sense. Man as a religious and philosophical being, in other words, reacts to realities far wider than his social life.

If the term social life be confined to man's behaviour of give-and-take, *i.e.* the exchange of services with his fellow-beings, then we should be required to recognise a third dimension of his life and experience. This may be called the lyrical dimension, involving aesthetic and affective relationship with objects, human and natural, that are directly perceived. This particular dimension of experience finds pointed expression in the lyrical outbursts of such inspired singers as Wordsworth and Shelley, Keats and Tagore, Vidyāpati and Bihāri Lāla.

It has become a fashion of late to stress the dependence of man's art, philosophy, etc. on the social conditions of the time of their origin. That all our knowledge is so determined is emphasized by the new discipline founded by Karl Mannheim and others, called

the "Sociology of Knowledge". Despite the newness of its name, however, the discipline in question is nothing but a practical recognition of the Marxian thesis that social being precedes and determines social consciousness.

The question may be asked : What are the social conditions that have given rise to the doctrine of the social determination of our knowledge or ideas ? If this doctrine is the product of a certain set of modern or contemporary social conditions (whatever that expression may mean), will it still be entertained, and be valid, when those conditions have passed away ? Now to my mind the truth that all our truths are class truths cannot itself suffer to be called a class truth; and the thesis that all our theories are socially conditioned cannot itself suffer to be regarded as socially conditioned. Thus when Lenin observes that 'there can be no "impartial" social science in a society based on class struggle,'²⁴ he cannot be regarded as implying that this particular thesis of his is not the result of impartial enquiry. Nor is it obvious how this particular thesis can be more useful to one social class than to another.

The usefulness of the discipline called sociology of knowledge, and the validity of the thesis such as the one propounded by Lenin, depends, I suggest, on the assumption of man's capacity to take, in some measure, a *detached* view of his own activities. Unless man can detach himself, albeit temporarily, from the conflicts and limitations imposed by social living, he cannot make an impartial or scientific survey of those conflicts and limitations. The present writer believes that, thanks to his powers of imagination, man can and does practise such detachment; and, in the moments when he achieves this detachment, he lifts himself up from the plane of a narrow social existence to the loftier plane of cosmic existence, or from the plane of restricted class existence to that of broadly human existence.

If it be still insisted that the major part of a man's thinking is determined by the socio-cultural conditions in which he lives, the reply is : it is chiefly the thinking about social ideals and values that is so determined. It cannot be proved, for instance, as the Marxists believe, that the revolutionary developments in recent physics have had anything to do with the socio-political upheavals of our time. Moreover, our thinking is influenced or determined not only by the ideas and ideals prevalent in contemporary society but also by the *total significant history of man* available to us in the form of the immortal classics in history and philosophy, in art, science and literature. Thus the writings of Dante and Shakespeare continue to shape and influence our literary standards as the lives of the Buddha and of Christ do our moral standards. And contemporary writers of fiction are influenced not only by contemporary

taste and examples but also by the patterns set by such master writers as Flaubert and Balzac, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Contemporary philosophers, in a like manner, continue to derive inspiration from masters like Plato and Aristotle, Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna, Kant and Hume.

HISTORICAL NATURE OF MAN : THE CONTINUITY OF HUMAN CULTURE

In its treatment of culture Marxism, to our mind, has been guilty of a triple fallacy or of a threefold simplification of the material with which it is dealing. First, it makes the assumption that class differences can destroy or suppress the unity that exists among all men in virtue of their common bio-psychological nature. This assumption can no more be justified than the related assumption that men's ideational reactions are directed exclusively, or even mainly, to social reality. Secondly, Marxism seems to deny that there is any inner or necessary continuity between the cultural consciousness of one epoch and that of another. In this connection, the only relationship it can think of is one of negation or opposition. The means of production of a more advanced epoch, for instance, simply replace or supplant the means used in the earlier and less advanced epoch; the consciousness or the ideas of the latter epoch should similarly supplant the ideas or ideologies of the previous epoch. For the two ideologies would and should support respectively the interests of the classes who successively own the means of production in the two epochs. Marxism does not recognise the possibility of a *rapprochement* or compromise between the antagonistic classes; correspondingly, it does not visualize the possibility of a synthesis of the hostile ideologies. Hence the stress laid by communist writers on revolution, and on 'the most radical rupture with traditional ideas'. The Hegelian notion of synthesis, which "preserves" the better parts of both the thesis and the antithesis, does not play any conspicuous part in the Marxian scheme.

Our conception of the cultural advance of mankind, and of the nature of human personality through which that advance is materialised, is very different from that of the Marxists. We believe that man, both as an individual and as a species, is a historical being. As an organic entity, his nature is constituted by all the accumulated variations that his germ-plasm has suffered and preserved. As a spiritual being, however, he achieves cultural complexity, not by the automatic inheritance of the cognitive states and emotional attitudes of his ancestors, but through voluntary appropriation of the perceptions, ideas and sentiments embodied in varied sorts of symbols by the past generations. These symbols represent various kinds of perceived and felt objects or the concepts thereof.

The innumerable combinations or patterns of these concepts constitute man's dreams and ideals; his questions and hypotheses; his religious and philosophical systems; and the countless literary portraits of the individuals, heroes and heroines, kings and conquerers, projecting themselves into a myriad imagined situations. While the accumulated store of objective, scientific knowledge contributes towards man's greater and greater control of the external environment, the accounts of the historians, the disputations of the philosophers and moralists, and the creative constructions of the artists and poets constitute and enrich his spiritual existence. By saying that man is a historical being I mean that at any period in his history the richness and complexity of his cultural existence is a consequence not merely, or even mainly, of his contemporary environment, physical and economic, but of *all* the spiritual past of his kind that he has cared to inherit. It follows from this that of two persons, living in the same physico-social environment, following more or less the same customs and conventions, that one is more cultured who, in addition to being, say, an engineer like the other, has pondered over the questionings of the Buddha and enjoyed the poetry of Kālidāsa. This conclusion seems to be obvious to me, though I do not see how, on the Marxist theory, the acquaintance with the writings of a feudal poet or philosopher can materially affect a man's spiritual culture.

Another striking omission in the Marxist account of culture is the absence of any reference to the validity of the forms of consciousness that constitute culture. Marx, it appears, is not concerned at all with the truth or validity of the various ideas and ideals, legal and political, moral, aesthetic and religious; he is concerned solely with their bearing on the interests of the warring classes. Recently Marxists have tended to criticise and reject the expressions of what they call bourgeois culture, not because they are inadequate to reality, but simply because they are associated with the bourgeois class. Thus, in his *Studies in a Dying Culture* Caudwell cannot detect anything of value in the art and literature, philosophy and science, morality, law, etc. of the West European or bourgeois countries.

CULTURE AND CIVILISATION AS VALUES

The discussion of culture as a value should avoid the two extremes represented by the anthropologists and the upholders of the class view of culture respectively. Regarded as something valuable culture cannot, on the one hand, be identified with the *total* learned behaviour of one or more societies; on the other, it cannot be identified with the behaviour of a *particular class*. Neither in the case of the society nor in that of a class can the total behaviour be taken

as the norm of cultured existence. In fact, a normative discussion of culture should aim at discovering and defining the criteria by which the existence of culture and its different levels may be detected and distinguished. These criteria should enable us to compare, *i.e.* submit to comparative evaluation, the cultural achievements of different societies, classes and individuals. History acquaints us with a large number of societies, a number of aristocracies, and a galaxy of gifted individuals. That being so, *none* of these societies, aristocracies, or individuals could be taken to be the norm or measure of cultural excellence. Such a norm or set of norms could be obtained only by investigating the universals that manifested themselves in a multitude of particulars.

Man generally acts with a view to creating what he regards as values; however, it is possible for him to act both in a manner that is neutral, and in that which is destructive of values. Unless we recognise these obvious facts, we can make no progress at all towards an understanding of the value-phenomena, which the terms "culture" and "civilisation" are intended to encompass or signify.

The query, "What are the values?" is inseparable from the related question, What is it that is regarded as valuable by human beings? Despite the verbal criticisms that have been levelled against John Stuart Mill, his dictum remains substantially true: the desirable is what is actually desired. In any case, the desirable is a sub-class of the actually desired. The values cannot but consist of things or states that are desired either as ends or as means. The conditions of existence called culture and civilisation are values that are universally desired for their own sake.

However, it does not make any material difference whether civilisation is conceived of as an ultimate or as an instrumental value. What the human beings as conscious living creatures aim at is the unhampered satisfaction of their wants and needs. While all sorts of needs and desires are the causes of unrest to the individual concerned, primary wants or urgent appetites, when not satisfied, are sources of unmixed trouble and suffering to him. Desires and ambitions not directly connected with primary wants are not altogether painful; moreover, such desires and ambitions are not compulsive, but depend, to a considerable extent, on the free choice of the individual. This cannot be said of the primary needs and appetites whose non-satisfaction incapacitates the individual for free movement. The first concern of every human being, therefore, is to free himself or herself from the urgency and constraint of these biological needs or demands. Civilization is the instrument which helps man in creating the conditions of existence where security as to the fulfilment of the needs in question may be more or less guaranteed. Man shares with animals the needs for food

and shelter; his modes of living have given rise to some other needs which are equally urgent, such as the need for clothing and for artificial habitation. The arts and techniques which help man to meet successfully these non-optional needs and requirements constitute an important element in civilisation. Viewed in this light civilisation may be regarded as the growth in man's capacity to control and mould his environment with a view to creating conditions of secure living for ever larger numbers of men and women.

Technological growth, however, contributes only to one kind of freedom of man. Owing to differences in their natural endowments human beings tend to grow differences of status and privilege in their ranks. As a consequence, some people are able to compel others to work for their benefit. The privileged members of a society tend to procure for themselves the means of subsistence with attendant security and freedom through the labours of others. Thus arise the distinctions of the master and the slave, lord and serf, the employer and the employee. In order to gain freedom from wants, a person or a group of persons may have to forego another kind of freedom, *i.e.* the freedom from subordination to the will of other human beings. This second kind of unfreedom is only slightly less evil than the first kind, and conscious and intelligent human beings are naturally anxious to free themselves from irksome authority, though the less competent in all ages have as eagerly sought to solve the problem of their livelihood by courting the favours of those in authority. The growth of civilisation, however, has consisted in the progressive curtailment of unjust and dispensable authority, and in the extension of the freedom of thought, speech and action to ever larger number of men and women. The extension of this freedom has been possible through the enactment of various kinds of laws and through the establishment of various institutions, legal and civil, economic and political. These institutions, therefore, should be regarded as an integral part of the processes called civilisation.

The necessity of various kinds of institutions arises from the fact that human beings everywhere live in groups, and the additional fact that they are capable of acting severally not only for their individual benefit, but also in a manner that would injure the interests of others. Another significant fact must also be noted. There are individuals so exceptionally gifted, physically, morally and intellectually, that they can more than solve their individual problems; while there are others who cannot adequately help even themselves. These differences lie at the root of the inequalities and stratifications into castes and classes that are so prominent a feature of the advanced societies. Most of the legal and civil institutions are intended to define and safeguard the rights and duties of the people belonging

to the different strata of the society. Their purpose, on the one hand, is to legalise the differences of rank, status, and occupation; and, on the other, to ensure security to the people engaged in different socio-economic activities.

There is a third kind of freedom which characterizes civilised behaviour : the freedom from the dominance of irrational impulse. A civilised person exercises restraint on his impulses, which is beneficial both for his own private life and for the life of the community. To some extent this kind of restraint is enjoined and enforced by the society itself : it may, however, be exercised by the individual of his own free will, with a view to achieving a superior type of personality or a superior kind of progress.

Freedom in the first two senses is a commodity which may be transferred to others, or may be shared and usurped by others. The material objects that guarantee the satisfaction of our urgent needs may pass from the possession of one person or group of persons to another; authority and power too may be transferred or delegated to others. Civilised behaviour is marked by transactions or various kinds of exchange of the above commodities.

That material goods and authority or power are universally coveted is a fact which needs no proof. The phenomenon deserving special notice is that men's desire for their own freedom often leads them to put others in bondage. This latter act is performed, in the first place, with a view to escaping the drudgery of manual labour, which the enslaved and hired people are required to do; secondly, it is intended as an instrument of self-glorification or enhanced self-feeling. The slavery and the dependence of some people enables others to use the former as mere means to the gratification of their desires. The masters have access not only to the labour of the male slaves but also to the bodies of the female slaves. To some extent this is true of all cases of dependence of one section of people on the other.

The material goods or the means of subsistence, then, are desired partly because they contribute to the direct satisfaction of man's needs and partly because they enable their possessors to purchase the freedom of and to exercise authority over others. The capacity to purchase other people's freedom may, from a different angle, be also regarded as a capacity to grant to others freedom from their primary needs. The authority of some people may be obeyed by others for two different reasons; it may be obeyed because obedience is helpful in solving the problem of subsistence of those who serve the authority; it may also be obeyed on account of the power of nuisance or injury that authority possesses. While obedience and service in the first case are willingly given, they are resented in the second case.

Wealth and property, as Hegel taught, are forms of freedom, and the rich people are admired and flattered because they are in a position to share their freedom with others. On the other hand nobody cares to praise and hover round a rich man who is a miser. Writing of primitive societies Gunnar Landtman observes: 'Explorers have remarked that it is not always wealth by itself which brings consideration and authority, but rather liberality and hospitality, . . . he who is always ready to entertain his friends or bestow gifts upon them easily acquires an influential position . . . The more property a man distributes at . . . festivals or *potlatches*, as they are called, the higher he rises in social estimation . . . there was corresponding contempt for the miser'²⁵ (1) Among the Andaman Islanders, we are told, social status is not merely dependent 'on the accident of relationship, but on skill in hunting, fishing, etc. and on a reputation for generosity and hospitality'. (2) In addition to wealth and generosity bodily strength and fighting qualities such as courage are also admired by the primitive people. The latter qualities enable their possessor to protect himself and others from wild beasts and enemies. Thus the primitive man admires in his fellow-beings the virtues that are instrumental in the winning of freedom from wants and from hostile tribes and wild beasts. With the advance of civilisation the expressions of some of these virtues have suffered alteration, but the virtues themselves continue to evoke respect and admiration.

While extra-tribal slavery probably originated in the defeat of some tribes by others in wars, intratribal slavery often resulted from a voluntary selling of their liberty by some people to others in exchange for means of subsistence. Persons could be enslaved for non-payment of debts and for the commission of crimes; they could also pawn themselves, their wives or children for a sum of money and live as slaves of the moneylender for a definite or indefinite period²⁶. This brings out clearly the transferable character of human freedom.

How inability to check impulse may cause one to lose one's liberty is prominently brought out by the example of Yudhishthira who gambled away the liberty not only of himself but even of his brothers and of his wife. 'So strong', writes Mr. Landtman, 'is the propensity for gambling . . . with reference to all the Indian tribes in the vicinity of Puget Sound and Okanagan, that after parting with all their movable property, they will go so far as to stake their wives and children, and lastly even themselves for years of slavery.'²⁷

Civilisation, then, may be defined as consisting of *those products of man's activity which contribute to his security and freedom*, with respect to both the physical and the human or social environment. By building up civilisation man has added zest to the hard

business of living and has converted into sources of pleasure the imperative wants that swayed his animal existence.

As distinguished from civilisation, civilised behaviour is behaviour in accordance with the needs of civilised existence. The distinctive feature of such behaviour is the spirit of respect and consideration for the freedom and security of others.

The techniques, goods, and institutions which constitute civilisation are valuable because they contribute to man's freedom and security. Civilisation, then, may be regarded as having instrumental value, while freedom and security constitute ultimate values. The distinction between the so-called instrumental and ultimate values, however, is relative and fluid. While freedom, like health, is an end in itself, it is also a condition for the realization of other values.

Unlike civilisation culture does not consist of any products of human activity. On the contrary, it consists of a special class of those activities themselves. It comprises those of man's activities and their manifestations that are valued for their own sake. Culture is the sum total of those moments of living, or their manifestations, which constitute their own excuse for being. All living involves some sort of relationship with the objects or meanings apprehended as useful or significant. Civilised life is existence involving effective relationship to objects that satisfy our needs. Cultured life, on the other hand, involves relationship with objects or meanings, actual or possible, that have no utilitarian value. Man as a conscious and imaginative being seeks to relate himself not only to things that are useful, but also to orders of existence and meaning that have no direct bearing on his animal needs and his creature comforts. Not only does he seek to understand the immediate environment which administers to his needs; he seeks also to comprehend the meaning of the vast spectacle of existence that bears no direct relationship to him, and has no meaning for his existence apart from his curiosity. It is in the exercise of this curiosity, and in the pursuance of his non-utilitarian interests, aesthetic and intellectual, that man takes birth as a cultured being.

It is reasonable to suppose that the birth of culture was made possible by the freedom and security attained by man through the conquest of nature and the building up of the civil society. The supposition, however, need not be construed to mean either that freedom and security are mere means to cultural life, or that the process called culture had to wait for its inception until the problem of security and safety had been completely solved. The fact, rather, is that man begins to indulge in the cultural activity as soon as the pressure of his needs is appreciably diminished, giving him time to look around him in a disinterested spirit. In the actual life of man the utilitarian and cultural interests do not stand sundered;

rather, they tend to mix and interpenetrate, acting not as separate and antagonistic motives, but as phases in or aspects of a complex of processes constituting a significant unit of life. Thus the fusion of beauty and utility is as evident in the articles and tools made by the primitive man as in the houses and buildings designed by the architects and engineers in the twentieth century. Nor are our utilitarian motives and activities altogether free from the influence of our moral preferences and philosophical beliefs. The two orders of interests, cultural and utilitarian, then, cannot be strictly separated, though they may and ought to be kept distinct in conception and analysis.

With the above reservation in our mind we may proceed to define culture as follows : *culture is the sum total of the activities whereby a person relates himself to the significant though useless aspects of reality, actual or imagined.* The activity that relates man to such reality is cognition or consciousness, and, in order that the relationship in question may be effective, the consciousness involved should be valid. The validity of a cognition, in the last analysis, is inseparable from its universal sharability. The utility of an object has reference to the personal need of somebody; what transcends utility is significant in an impersonal sense. Culture, then, may be defined as consisting in the *sharable consciousness of impersonally significant reality*. The consciousness that characterizes man has two important features; it is selective, and it tends to assume a connected form. These two peculiarities of knowledge or consciousness prevent it from being merely reproductive, and render it creative in its grasp or comprehension of reality.

CULTURE AND REALITY : THE SYMBOLIC CONTINUUM

What is the import of the term reality in the above definition of culture? The Buddhists define the real as that which has causal efficiency. This definition, it seems, is applicable mainly to physical reality. Cultural consciousness relates to reality only insofar as the latter presents itself as having inherent value. One thing may be confidently asserted : the consciousness which constitutes culture is not to be identified with ordinary perceptual cognition. As Plato says in the *Theatetus* if knowledge were equivalent to sense-perception all persons would be equal in knowledge and therefore equal in wisdom. External reality can become an object for cultural consciousness only to the extent to which it has aesthetic qualities. These qualities may be met with in nature : in flowers, streams and starlit nights; they are more frequently to be encountered in the human world. All percepts, no matter whether they relate merely to identifying marks or to utilitarian and aesthetic qualities, are strictly private; they can be transformed into *sharable conscious-*

ness only by being translated into meaningful symbols or symbolised meanings.

The objectivity of a percept signifies the sameness of meaning attached to it by several normal observers. Things are experienced by us as bearers of meanings. A chair is what can be used by us for sitting, a solid surface, for supporting things. We refer to the colour of a thing for the purpose of identifying or distinguishing it, or for the expression of our aesthetic feeling in relation to it. The sense-datum theorists have insisted that most of the time, from many of the angles where we stand in respect of the penny on the table, we do *not* see it round, which may be proved by interposing cameras in the places where different eyes are stationed. However, the shape of the penny *means* "round" to the human observers, which it may not mean to the cameras.

Even the work of art is a complex of meanings, and not a collection of images, to competent observers or trained consumers. Persons with varying powers of entertaining visual and other kinds of images may agree in attributing similar, if not identical, meanings to a work of art, and derive similar pleasurable experiences through its contemplation. The greater the artist, the greater is the control exercised by him over the meanings evoked in the minds of the contemplating consumers. This control is exercised mainly through the relevant relationships which the artist establishes among symbolised meanings. The relevance of a relationship is determined by the interest, aesthetic or moral or aesthetico-moral, which has been operative in the artist's selection of materials, and which is sought to be evoked, consciously or unconsciously, in the mind of the consumer.

A striking instance of the determination of relevance of relations by interest is given by Eddington—of course from the field of physics. When an experienced candidate reads in an examination paper in physics something like this: 'An elephant slides down a grassy hill-side . . .', he knows that he need not pay much attention to the description. However, he begins to get serious as soon as he encounters, in the course of his reading, expressions such as the following: 'The mass of the elephant is two tons', 'The slope of the hill is 60°', etc.²⁸ The candidate has no interest either in the elephant or in the hill-side; what interests him are the *meanings* indicated by "two tons" and "angle of sixty degrees" formed by the slope. These alone can be relevantly related in his special language.

All logical relations such as identity, contradiction and implication exist among meanings and groups of meanings. Other kinds of relationship can be found in the fields of art and morality. In general, each different branch of inquiry and discourse occupies itself with the exploration of a *peculiar class of relations* characteris-

tic of a *special* type of meanings..

Explaining relativity Eddington in one place remarks: 'Perhaps the nearest approach to a formation of the principle is the statement that we observe only *relations* between physical entities'.²⁰ The truth is that, in respect of all entities, physical and non-physical, *we notice only the aspects which can be related relevantly to the interests active in us*. Relations, it is said, are indefinable. However, they can be metaphysically explained with reference to the interests which determine their character. *Relations are the moulds, projected by our interests, into which the perceived features of objects are cast*. Man comes to cognize and name relations because he is required by his conscious creativity to dispose things in relational orders. It follows that he cannot experience objects and their qualities *except* as having relational significance. By being pressed into relational moulds meanings become usable for the goals or purposes of man, which latter are the true sources of his varied interests. A goal is a change or a state desired to be produced by a living being either in the environment or in itself. A single goal, such as the infliction of defeat on an enemy, may put in action a large number of interests in a man or a group of men, thereby compelling them to mobilise their entire cognitive resources.

All qualities of objects which interest us fall in one or other of the following three groups: (a) those which enable us merely to identify them and distinguish them from one another, e.g. colours and forms; (b) those which appeal, positively or negatively, to our aesthetic or moral nature, e.g. proportion, charm and generosity; and (c) those in virtue of which they (*i.e.* the objects) move or affect and change one another or ourselves. These qualities may be described, with a high degree of appropriateness, as *identifying marks*, *aesthetic attributes* and *functional properties* respectively. They are all related to and determined by our interests, the second and third directly, the first indirectly. The laws of identity, contradiction and excluded middle, the so-called fundamental laws of thought, derive from our interest in identifying and distinguishing objects; the law of causation which, according to Kant, has the status of an *a priori* principle, flows from our interest in the manipulation of the environment. All principles of valuation derive from our innate preference for the just and the noble, the finer and the fairer, and from our interest in seeing our preferences prevail.

The totality of meanings embodied by a community in its language and other types of symbols constitutes the symbolic continuum. We tend to interpret even empirical reality in terms of the symbolised meanings. This is not to deny that the empirically given has a hard core of factuality with reference to which the particular meaning is understood and explained. However, the

relational structure attributed to groups of meanings or meaning-particulars can be so understood and explained only in relatively simpler cases, and it can only rarely be tested directly with reference to the given immediacy. In particular, the object of the cultural consciousness is always a whole constituted by the meaning-particulars. The constructs and theories of science no less than the works of art are such wholes. While the former, as observed by Eddington, are intended to be 'symbolic of the world of commonplace experience', the latter directly constitute both the object and the stuff of the cultural consciousness.

All the reality, to which man *consciously* reacts, which *counts* for his conscious and free life, which invites and directs his voluntary effort, is represented or reflected in his symbols and forms part of the symbolic continuum. Significant additions to this continuum are made by original thinkers, inventors, and adventurous explorers, who create new symbols for the representation of the meanings and relationships among meanings discovered by them.

Here a word may be added about the nature of meanings which enter as constituents in sharable consciousness. Meanings are concepts or conceived aspects of things; their one common characteristic is that they can be thought of apart from particular existents. The wholes composed of meanings may evoke all the responses including organic responses, which are not dependent on actual interaction with external matter. One may fall in love, in the manner of the hero of the epic *Naishadhiyacharitam*, with a lady who has been alluringly described, and may declare the heroine of a play or novel to be more beautiful than an actual person. The consciousness which constitutes culture is directed upon wholes which are significant for man without being useful for his existence as a biological organism, and even as a social being. The cultural consciousness or activity is preeminently non-utilitarian in its intention as well as in the foreseen results.

As observed earlier the activity called culture is essentially creative. It refers, on the one hand, to the production of new, symbolic patterns of reality and, on the other, to the imaginative "enjoyment" (in Samuel Alexander's sense) of the self in relation to those patterns. Man's consciousness, projecting itself into the region of possibilities, brings about an expansion in the realm of the objective as well as of the subjective being. In the activity of the imagination, consciousness at once produces and reflects the objective order. Awareness and creativity, thus, become interchangeable terms with reference to man's symbolic or imaginative life.

The creativity of a person constitutes a measure alike of his intelligence, his command of reality, and his culture. For intelligence is nothing but the capacity for the imaginative manipulation

of reality, sensuous or symbolised. Nor can an artist or thinker achieve much by way of creation unless he has an extensive command over his materials. Only a spacious intellect, endowed with a high sense of relevance and fine sensitivity to a particular class of materials, can erect spacious mansions in the fields of art and reflection.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURE

Culture is the quality or activity or group of qualities or activities which mark off the human personality from the animal organism. The animal is driven by impulses or instincts, operating more or less automatically and blindly, and his movements belong more or less to the realm of causal necessity. Secondly, the movements and responses of the animal organism are directed towards the fulfilment of its biological needs, *i.e.* are contributory to its occupations of living and procreation. Man partakes of animal nature but, through his developing cultural consciousness, endeavours continually to transcend the limitations imposed by that nature. This transcendence takes two significant forms: man learns to take interest in meanings or values which have no relation whatever to his biological needs of existence and survival; and he learns to choose and appreciate these values in the light of consciously framed standards. This twofold transcendence of biological nature is made possible by the prior transcendence of physical necessity through a measure of mastery attained over the forces of nature.

The progress of man from animal existence to cultured living logically involves the following stages. Man attains freedom through security from wants by learning to exercise control over natural (and social) surroundings. This freedom is the negative condition of the attainment of culture. Thus freed, man learns to take interest in values transcending his bio-social needs. He then seeks to order his life for the realization of those values in their highest forms, paying minimum possible time and attention to the activities whereby means for more or less effective bio-social life are secured. The ideal life, from the viewpoint of the cultured man, is the life devoted to the quest or realization of values which contribute, not to the business of living and procreation—pursuits to which mere animal life is condemned—but to the *excellence of the personality regarded as an end in itself*. The more time and energy a man is able to employ for this purpose the more fortunate he is; and the quality of his pursuit of those values is directly related to the measure of his awareness of the relevant standards.

It is the prerogative and privilege of man to seek to adjust himself to realities that have no relevance in terms of his bio-physiological and even social needs; he seeks to explore not merely his

immediate environment, the theatre of his overt activities, but the whole cosmos. Man is a being who wants to live in conscious relationship with the totality of existence. He considers his life as an organism, as a creature of needs and appetites, to be only a part of his life as a citizen of the universe. It is interesting to note that there is no great religion and no great philosophy that does not assign a superior role to the quest of spiritual values such as truth and virtue than to the satisfaction of the animal needs and the addiction to creature comforts. It is noteworthy also that the aristocracies of the world have always been contemptuous of manual labour. Even in most of the primitive societies, observes Landtman, 'it seems to be the rule that all handicrafts stand low in estimation . . . We cannot see any other special explanation of the weaver's degradation beyond the fact that handicrafts are in general considered mean'. The preoccupation with the merely useful, with what contributes merely to the satisfaction of needs, is not regarded as worthy of a superior type of human being. The superior people are constantly engaged in activities that contribute to the expansion or enhancement and qualitative improvement or refinement of the self. The processes that constitute culture belong to this class of activities.

It may be objected that the cultural consciousness, dealing as it does with symbols or invisible meanings, has little or no bearing on man's actual living. The objection is based on misconception as to what actual living means or involves. As we have repeatedly pointed out, man does not live only with reference to the so-called useful objects. Deliberately and consciously he seeks to relate himself to the universe in its totality. Nor is he satisfied with cherishing agreeable beliefs in regard to the constitution of the world and his place in it. On the contrary, he is only too anxious to be disillusioned, and to be posted with the most unpleasant facts concerning himself and the world. Man cannot rest content unless he has *validly* interpreted the total evidence that has a bearing on his beliefs and disbeliefs. Man's theoretical attitude towards the universe, in fact, is severely objective and serious, and his concern for the validity of his *imaginative vision* is as great as, if not greater than, his concern for some of his most practical issues. Man is anxious to have a correct attitude towards the universe, and towards the possibilities of his career in that universe, for two reasons. First, because this attitude determines the drift and character of what may be described as his purely practical concerns: his outlook as to the value to be assigned to wealth, power, comfort, welfare of the country, war, peace, international relations, etc.; and secondly, because that attitude affects the way he feels about the worth and security of his being in relation to the universe.

The so-called actual life of man is being constantly affected and modified by his cultural personality. A cultured life, in fact, involves, at every step, the union and interaction of the useful and the valuable. A need can be satisfied in many ways; the cultured man satisfies it in a manner which includes and implies the realization of a value: in a charming or generous, noble or courageous way. In the life of such a person, most of the utilitarian activities become part of a programme to realize some consciously chosen values and ideals. Culture, thus, tends to endow the ordinary objects and activities of life with a transcendent worth. To the savage the female partner is merely an object that satisfies a biological urge; to the cultured lover, whose mind has been shaped by scores of poets and philosophers, she is the living image of all that is beautiful and noble, the embodiment of all sweetness and grace, and the mysterious essence of the creation; and to be united to her would mean to him the highest fulfilment of his existence. The cultured person tends to view the most ordinary object and activity against the background of the entire known cosmos of facts and values. To such a person the apparently trivial may appear to be superlatively significant, and the apparently notable to be relatively trivial. Cultural consciousness exhibits in a magnified form both the pathos and beauty of man's life in the universe.

The culture of a person consists in the sense of values fashioned in the light of his knowledge. The consciousness that constitutes culture is as much a value consciousness as it is factual consciousness; it is the consciousness of the actual and the possible apprehended as significant. Man is constantly picturing to himself the possibilities of his existence; these possibilities constitute the values for which he lives. The richness and beauty, grandeur and sublimity of the values and ideals that inform a man's life provide a measure of his cultural excellence.

Soren Kierkegaard refers contemptuously to the life of the aesthete who 'plays emotionally and imaginatively with all possibilities', without committing himself to practical or ethical decisions with respect to vocation, marriage, belief etc. 'The misfortune of the present age,' he thinks, 'is not that it is one-sided, but that it is abstractly all-sided'. Bad as one-sidedness is, it is still superior to abstract all-sidedness. 'Every distinguished individual always has something one-sided about him, and this one-sidedness may be an indirect indication of his real greatness . . . since it represents "a vigorous resolution of the will, preferring to be something definite in a manner worthwhile, rather than to be a dabbler in everything"'.³⁰

This reminds one of the criticisms directed against the Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge. The knowledge or con-

sciousness, however, which is achieved through anxious investigation and earnest reflection is not just the superficial acquaintance that engenders a non-committal, shallow attitude towards living. Real and deep knowledge must involve conviction and commitment, and should act as a transforming agent and a formative force. Such knowledge inevitably implies the attempt to arrange the apprehended significances in a scale of values. That is why religion and philosophy, which supply the principles of such arrangement, are essential ingredients in an effective cultured life and consciousness. In fact, it is the absence of an acceptable philosophical and religious world-view that threatens to convert a modern man or woman into the type of aesthete and intellectual described by Kierkegaard.

To sum up : culture consists in the living and effective consciousness of things or aspects of things that are significant without being directly serviceable, "important" without being immediately useful. Equipped with this consciousness man succeeds in emancipating himself from the order of factual necessity and in effecting his entry into the realm of values. To dwell in this latter realm is for him to be attached to and anxious for things whose existence is bound up with his own creative longings and aspirations, with the requirements of his specifically human or spiritual self. These requirements are no less real and urgent to him than are those of his animal nature, and their genuine satisfaction depends as much on the correct handling of the objective reality, as does the satisfaction of hunger and thirst. Spurious or non-valid poetry, for instance, is no better relished by a man of taste than muddy water or the mirage is relished by a thirsty person. The world of human creativity and values appears to be subject to laws no less rigid than those governing the course of spatio-temporal actualities. The products of man's cultural activity, insofar as they are valid, are as impersonal and objective as the effects of his utilitarian activities.

CULTURE AND CIVILISATION

We shall now return to a consideration of the distinction, and possible relationship, between culture and civilization. Our discussion so far might tempt some of our readers to express the distinction as follows : civilization and culture refer respectively to achievements and activities that preserve and enrich life. Others might suggest that the relation between culture and civilization was analogous to that between an end and its means.

This manner of distinguishing between and relating culture and civilization, though straightforward and simple, is not quite adequate. Culture and civilization can no more be completely sundered from one another than ends and means. Nor can a sharp line be drawn between the preservation of life and its enrichment.

There are spheres of imaginative activity where the aspects of utility and beauty tend to coalesce or blend; likewise, there are modes of living which contribute both to the health and to the expansion of life.

Both civilisation and culture are the products of the creative activity of the human mind. When this creativity is directed chiefly towards utilitarian ends, it produces civilization; when it operates for quickening the consciousness of values, it produces culture. The two aspects or sides of creativity, however, tend to coalesce both in scientific and in socio-political thinking. The scientist, insofar as he pursues truth, engages himself in a cultural activity; when, in his capacity as an inventor or engineer, he seeks to harness nature to human use, he is behaving as a builder of civilization.

'Science', observes Mr. Sullivan, 'is valued for its practical advantages, it is valued because it satisfies disinterested curiosity, and it is valued because it provides the contemplative imagination with objects of great aesthetic charm'.³¹ The aim of socio-political thinking, similarly, may be regarded as being both practical and aesthetic or cultural. The types of social order conceived by philosophers and thinkers from Plato onwards have been intended, not only to administer to man's practical needs, but also to contribute to the fulfilment of his spiritual aspirations. The speculations contained in such immortal works as the *Republic* of Plato belong to the cultural order for two reasons. First, those speculations are motivated by the impersonal aim of benefiting the human society. Secondly, the benefit that they seek to confer on mankind is mainly spiritual rather than utilitarian. When Plato constructed his ideal republic, what he mainly thought of was not the problem of the satisfaction of man's primary needs; indeed, what bothered him most was the question of the proper relationship among men of different endowments and temperaments, and among different elements in human nature. The aspect of socio-political thinking which concerns itself mainly with the propriety, moral and aesthetic, of various human relationships, makes for its inclusion among the cultural activities. Even the reformers' concern with the amelioration of the lot of the down-trodden and the weak, insofar as that concern flows from moral and humanitarian considerations, is a species of cultural activity. The schemes of organisation that make for the establishment of greater justice and beauty in human relationships can be conceived and proposed only by thinkers engaged in cultural pursuits. Such thinkers, further, can flourish only in a cultured society. It follows from this that an uncultured people cannot, in the long run, produce a high type of civilization. Unless people have attained a certain level of culture, they cannot evolve such complex and comprehensive forms of socio-political and econo-

anic organisation as democracy and socialism. Nor can a people achieve much by way of technological progress unless they have amidst them investigators and thinkers who pursue scientific knowledge for its own sake.

Viewed in this light *civilisation may be regarded as a deposit of the cultural activity itself*. Civilisation, in fact, in any advanced form, can neither come to exist nor continue to exist without that disinterested pursuit of values which constitutes culture. The customs and usages, laws and institutions, which embody modes of civilised behaviour—behaviour which promotes cooperation and fellowship among human beings—owed their first appearance to the creative impulse that sought to visualise new and more satisfactory forms of human relationship.

The above thesis stands opposed to the Marxist view of the development of civilisation in two respects. We deny, in the first place, that the Marxist principle of "Being preceding consciousness" is applicable in the sphere of changes that make up civilisation and culture. Being may be prior to consciousness in the ultimate, metaphysical sense; but being in the sense of objects and situations produced by man is certainly posterior to the conceptions of those objects and situations. Thus the steam-engine and the aeroplane existed as ideas in the minds of their inventors before they were brought into actual existence; and the socio-political organisations called democracy and socialism had been visualised by certain revolutionary thinkers before they were installed in actual practice. It is true that the human imagination can effectively operate only on the basis of the real or the actual; that does not, however, mean that the novelty which its creations exhibit is a mere appearance. Nobody would seriously contend that the aeroplane or the radio already existed in *rerum natura* and that what was apprehended as the invention of a new object was but the reflection in human consciousness of a pre-existent reality.

A second difference from Marxism may also be noted. Contrary to the above metaphysical thesis, Marxism upholds the thesis of activism in epistemology. Thinking or knowing, according to Marx, is inseparable from practice. Even sensuous knowledge is a form of activity, *i.e.*, a mode of changing the external environment.³² Says Sidney Hook: 'Out of the interactive process of adjustment knowledge is born. Knowing is not a passive reflection or image of some fully formed antecedent existence but a method of acting upon existence . . . it involves a method of handling material instead of merely contemplating it.'³³ This thesis, which, incidentally, exhibits a strong influence of idealistic theories of knowledge, is incorrect, if the term practice is taken in its usual sense of overt activity. On the other hand, if this thesis is correct, it will be

difficult to attach any significant meaning to Marx's celebrated epigram: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it'. For, according to the thesis in question, interpretation, as a form of knowing, can never be isolated from practice, which consists of action upon the environment.

Cultural activity, which includes science and philosophy, consists, as conceived here, neither in the reflection or consciousness of a ready-made environment nor yet in the modification of that environment; it consists, rather, in the *imaginative recreation of the environment*, cosmic and social, in terms of its relevance for human values. Thus understood, culture is essentially bound up with value-consciousness on the one hand and with the creative activity of the imagination on the other.

The terms culture and civilisation exhaust between them the totality of man's achievements. The higher or spiritual aspects of civilisation are nothing but the realisations of the creative cultural consciousness in the forms of customary or institutionalised behaviour. Manners, to which T. S. Eliot and some other writers attach great importance, belong to the order of civilised behaviour; they form part of customs and usages that constitute respectable or desirable conduct in a class or society. Originating in the impulse to create a better world, or a more satisfactory pattern of life, individual and social, these modes of behaviour have a utilitarian as well as an aesthetic side. The elaborate ceremonials, rites and rituals accompanying various forms of institutional behaviour such as marriage, religious worship and sacrifice, etc. are regarded as contributing both to the well-being of the participants and to the pomp and splendour of the occasion. Manners seem to derive mainly from the aesthetic impulse, though they soon get associated with the considerations of prestige and status. As regards the aristocratic class, different forms of what Veblen calls "conspicuous consumption"³⁴ constitute an important part of their stock of manners. On its spiritual side civilisation may be regarded as the part of culture that has been made available to the people in general. Both in its material and spiritual aspects civilisation may be looked upon as the creative cultural consciousness congealed into habit. All the habits of civilised behaviour, including manners and customs no less than the material practices, tend to operate as conservative forces which block the way of future cultural advancement. Modes of thought and response may become rigidly fixed even in philosophy and the arts. It is in this important sense that civilisation may be regarded as the inevitable destiny of culture and an antithesis to it. As MacIver and Page have noted civilisation is more easily transmitted than culture. 'Culture is communicated only to the like-

minded. No one without the quality of the artist can appreciate art, nor without the ears of the musician can one enjoy music.²⁵ The role of the family is important not so much, as Mr. Eliot thinks, in the transmission of culture as in the passing of the manners and tastes than constitute civilised behaviour.

LEVELS OF CULTURE : CRITERIA OF CULTURAL MATURITY

A person's life or behaviour is cultured insofar as he conducts himself consciously, creatively and impersonally. Every human being, to the extent to which he is different from automaton-like brutes, enjoys a measure of culture. The level of maturity of culture is determined by factors that affect the volume, degree and quality of a person's consciousness, creativity and impersonality.

The first factor determining the level and maturity of a cultural consciousness is the sense of evidence or reality. Culture does not consist in a flight from the actual, but in a deeper sense of the real, of which the immediately felt actual is but a part. Even in art, where imagination is supposed to have a freer play, the artist's sense of reality is a factor constantly determining the validity and maturity of his creation. If we look at the history of fiction, we find a convincing demonstration of the fact that the art of fiction has constantly progressed towards greater and greater realism. In ancient fiction, even in the writings of such important masters as Bāṇa and Dāṇḍin, the authors of the celebrated works *Kādambarī* and *Dāśakumāracharitam* respectively, not to speak of such lesser writings as the *Arabian Nights*, supernatural and magical elements were frequently introduced to secure the effects of suspense and surprise. In a modern novel, such as *Anna Karenina*, or *Crime and Punishment*, the above effects are produced with materials that are strictly realistic. The processes of life being creative and variable, there are enough surprises in store for the writer or the reader who follows the course of the activities of the characters that are being depicted in a novel. A similar sense of realistic evidence characterizes modern historians, researchers, and scientific investigators. The characteristic obsession of our own century is—verification, i.e. insistence on the acceptance only of what is strictly verifiable. This obsession, consciously formulated in the creed of logical positivism, is, on the whole, a sign of greater maturity of the twentieth century. What the cultural consciousness seeks is a *real* extension into the domain of reality, and not an escape into the realm of fancy. The more a person is on his guard against the illusory and the fanciful, and insistent on realism in his acceptance both of scientific truths and of imaginative creations, the maturer he is culturally. It should be remembered, however, that the demand for realism or the sense of evidence in the acceptance of truths and opinions, has little in

common with the narrow spirit of caution which would exclude significant spheres of experience from its purview on the ground that those spheres do not lend themselves to exact mathematical treatment. This latter spirit would contribute to the cramping and impoverishment of the cultural personality rather than to its maturity and enrichment. This is seen to happen to those ultra-scientifically inclined investigators who cannot find reality in what is merely qualitative and so refuses to submit itself to experimental and quantitative treatment.

The most important element in cultural maturity is impersonality. *Prima facie* the concept of impersonality is vague and even misleading, for how can a man be interested in what transcends his personality, or is unrelated to it? The impersonal, however, is not the non-personal; it is antithetical not to the personal but to the purely personal. Impersonality is universality of varying degrees, a preoccupation with the interests of something wider than one's own self, *i.e.* the community, the nation or the race. The peculiarly individual interests, it appears, relate either to the attainment of means, or to the exclusive possession of objects that are valued. When I admire an exquisite statue, or a beautiful painting, I am indulging in a cultural activity, for my admiration can be universally shared. Not so my desire for and actual possession of those objects, which are purely personal matters.

The degree of the impersonality or universality of an interest may be measured by its distance from the interests that are purely personal, and its nearness to those that are truly racial, *i.e.* are cherished by men all over the world. The import of this remark may be made clear by an illustration. Imagine a Punjabi Indian reading the following headlines in the newspaper, sometime in the year, say, 1956 : "Ministerial Crisis in the Punjab;" "Growing Tension over Kashmir between India and Pakistan"; "Suez Crisis Threatening to expand into a World Conflagration". As a cultured person the gentleman may be worried by each of the news-items. However, if he has attained cultural maturity, he will be disturbed most by the last item and the least by the first. Compared to the threat of a world war, the other issues which concern respectively one or two countries, a province or state, are progressively smaller matters which should make progressively diminishing demands on the attention of a cultured person. The true man of culture identifies himself completely with the interests and values of the whole humanity, and behaves as a guardian of and fighter for those interests and values.

The notion of the degrees of impersonality or universality of the cultured life may also be explained with reference to the concept of the dimensions of human experience. The larger the

extent of the forces to which a personality is responsive, the richer it is culturally. Compared to the intelligent citizen who is wide-awake to the socio-political and economic realities of the world, the person whose life is governed by the psychological impulses of love and hate, greed and jealousy, etc. operating in narrow surroundings, is definitely inferior. The Marxist critics are right in assigning higher rank to the writers, novelists and dramatists, whose characters exhibit through their actions and sentiments the impact of the social forces—writers, in other words, whose literary creations have a social content. However, the man of the highest culture does not live merely in the field of the psycho-social forces : he lives with reference to the cosmos itself, feeling and thinking as a citizen of the whole universe. And the writings of the greatest masters depict man's life and destiny with reference to this, the cosmic or the religio-philosophic, dimension of experience as well.

The ideas and ideals of a cultured person have yet another reference, the reference, namely, to the experience and practice embodied in man's history. The consciousness of the ideally cultured person delights in extending its dominion over not only the expanse of space, but also the stretches of time; it seeks to gather within its fold all the experiences, cognitive and affective, which mankind have stored up and which the universe can yield. The historical experience of man refers partly to the social and partly to the cosmic dimension. While enriching our insight into the forces that mould man's inter-personal life, history confronts us, too, with the problem of the destiny of man and his various achievements, material and spiritual. No person can be considered to be completely cultured—to have attained cultural maturity—until he has developed the sense of history, which is an indispensable element in any mature philosophical outlook on life.

Impersonality, we have said, is universality; it is also detachment towards what has merely personal or local significance. The more cultured a person the less he will be disturbed by what affects merely himself, or what has but a local and temporary interest. Excessive sentimentalism seems to be incompatible with a highly cultured disposition. Detachment, however, connotes neither lack of feeling nor inhumanity; its characteristic mark is balance and serenity. Such a person is notably affected only by what has deeply human, historic or cosmic significance.

Impersonality is closely related to normality; only the impersonal is completely normal and sharable. The more conditioned a person is to the exclusive ideas and beliefs, interests and sentiments, of a particular class, community or nation, the farther he is from the essence or spirit of the normal man. The normal is not necessarily the primitive, though great art appeals in a peculiar

sense to the primitive nature of man. Normality of man, as observed earlier, includes all the creative richness that human spirit is capable of, provided that the development of that richness is controlled by the logic or laws of the normal human self. Men think, feel, and behave wrongly when they violate the principles of their normal nature. The progress of the social sciences and the arts consists partly in this, that the perceptions and sentiments embodied in them be brought closer and closer to the normal or universal spirit of man.

True normality is complete universality. It is the ability to look at things from the viewpoint not of a class, community or nation but of man. Normality is determined and defined by the bio-physiological constitution of man on the one hand, and his capacity for imaginative identification and reasoning on the other. This latter element of normality remains undeveloped or underdeveloped in most men and women and its full potentialities are being unfolded and realised only gradually through the cultural advance of mankind. But a few investigators are able to ascend to the standpoint of the completely normal man, and that too in restricted areas of thought and feeling. From the viewpoint of culture normality of a man consists in the capacity to share or appreciate the valid ideas and sentiments of others by imaginatively placing himself in their position. We shall see in a later chapter how truly moral behaviour depends on this capacity. Meanwhile it may be noted that all appreciation of reasoning, and all rational persuasion, depends on the fact that the persons concerned be able to identify themselves with the standpoint of the normal man.

GENIUS AND CULTURAL PROGRESS : THE LOGIC OF REBELLION

A truly cultural activity is one that wins new ground not merely for a class, community or nation but for the whole of mankind, *i.e.* for the race itself. The modes of impersonal living are the modes of the individual's assertion of identity with the race. As if, cut adrift from the main current of life, the rills and rivulets of individuality were constantly trying to return to it.

These modes of living are the supreme sources of happiness to the individual. Man seeks to live impersonally—the poet seeks to compose universally acceptable songs, and the philosopher to produce universally acceptable arguments and theories—not under the pressure of the external or social demands, as the Freudians would have us believe, but by an inner compulsion. For the highest kinds of cultural creation *precede* social demands, and not follow them. It is surprising that the poet himself, while indulging in the most uncanny and novel forms of creation, should be able to judge, in

the moments when his creative excitement is at the highest, whether and how far an image or a metaphor is likely to be considered appropriate or acceptable. He behaves as if the highest judge, the spokesman of the racial self, were seated within his own being.²⁸

The individual is happy only when his activities have the sanction of the community or society to which he professes to belong. And the greatest cause of his infelicity are the angularities and peculiarities of his person which society finds unacceptable.

How is it, then, that individuals are sometimes inclined to rebel against the established dogmas and practices of their several societies? What can be the meaning and significance of the rebellion which leads to progress, *i.e.*, which is seen and declared by later periods to have been progressive? What are the sources from which the rebel attitude derives nourishment and strength?

A distinction may be drawn between the rebel and the revolutionary. A rebel is a non-conformist who would not suffer society's interference with some of his affairs; a revolutionary, on the other hand, would not rest satisfied with his own freedom. The latter would, rather, seek to change the society itself, to mould it after a pattern which he likes. The revolutionary is an active rebel; not only is he unrepentant like the latter, he has also a claim to superior vision or wisdom the decrees of which he seeks to force on the community. Compared to the rebel, the revolutionary is more objective, and has or seeks to have a command over the forces that move and control the society.

Among rebels also, two types may be distinguished, the latently social type, and the asocial one. Criminals such as thieves and murderers belong to the asocial type. A latently social rebel is one who protests against unjust or undesirable restrictions imposed by society. A person of this type arouses sympathy, and even admiration, in a section of the society, though he may be alone or the first to voice the protest. With a large number of sympathisers for the cause, a rebellion of this type may gradually assume a more active form. An intellectual or moral rebel, however, who has drawn inspiration from abroad, has little chance of making his protest effective until improved opportunities of education and the changing background of human relationships produce sympathisers in his own society.

While a rebellion seeks merely the removal of unnatural or unjust restrictions, a revolution aims at nothing less than a redistribution of the opportunities and amenities hitherto monopolised by the few. The latter is necessitated by the fact that, in the context of new forces released by new knowledge and a new environment, men who had so far been advantageously placed, persist in confusing observance of custom with good behaviour, and hinder the more

adventurous and the less fortunate from a more creative exploitation of the new situation. Having so far enjoyed security and happiness themselves, they cling to established habits of living and valuation, and refuse to share the newly aroused hope and ardour of the destitute and the down-trodden. However, the vision of a new and better order can seldom fail to enlist effective support, and to issue in effective action. The moment a superior order, embodying improved opportunities for happier and nobler living, has been effectively suggested, the previous patterns of order and organisation, no matter how long held sacred, begin gradually to lose their hold on the minds of men, and are finally discredited. For the cause of the higher order, in virtue of its inherent appeal to the impersonal impulses of man, tends to win support and loyalty not only from the ranks of the have-not's or the badly off, but also from among those who either actually possess power and prestige or have them within their easy reach. Indeed, it is from the latter class, or from among the intellectuals allied to that class, that the first leaders of a revolutionary movement spring up.

The onward march of mankind, then, is governed by two contrary requirements: the necessity of the individual's conforming, both in thought and sentiment, to the social self; and the need of rebellion on the part of the individual when that social self, by its slavery to unhelpful tradition, ceases to provide for or welcome conditions that would contribute to the maximum development of the largest possible number of the members whose union it represents. While it is true that men live mainly by habit or custom, it is also true that they progress, generally, by abandoning or transcending custom, through the exercise of their creative imagination. The "cultures" studied by the anthropologists are so many alternative modes of living evolved, insofar as they are different, by different societies under different environmental and historical conditions. Viewed with reference to their past histories all the extant "cultures" may be regarded as the achievements of those societies. A "culture", however, turns retrograde the moment it fails to exploit, through creative self-expansion or adjustment, the new opportunities offered by history. It is in the suggestion of the possible lines of such expansion or adjustment that the role of the creative geniuses is distinctly exhibited.

The work that the geniuses accomplish differs according to the times and circumstances in which they flourish; it also differs according to their differing temperaments. The peace time genius, who acquiesces in the given order, occupies himself mainly with two things: he attempts, on the one hand, to make articulate and known the principles and processes which underlie the regulation of life in the period. On the other, he may explore or unfold the nume-

rous possibilities of rich and happy life by weaving new patterns of beauty, utility, etc. out of available resources of perception, thought and feeling. In poetry, the genius of this type gives birth to classics whose characteristic mark is balance; in philosophy, to comprehensive systems, theological, idealistic, or even materialistic. Both literary and philosophic classics, however, tend to acquire a romantic fervour if the peace time is marked by new discoveries, sensory and intellectual. Virgil and Dante, Parmenides and Spinoza in the West and Vālmiki, Bhāsa and Bādarāyana in the East belong to the first sub-type of the peace time geniuses, while Kālidāsa, Shakespeare and Hegel belong to the second.

The other type of genius, flourishing in periods of transition, upheaval or struggle, tends to be vigorous, pungent, and feverish; now sceptical and trenchantly critical, now afire with new aspirations and visions. The author of the *Mahābhārata*, Plato, Rousseau and Voltaire, Dostoevsky, Ibsen and G. B. Shaw, belong to this class of geniuses.

The genius differs from ordinary men and women in several important respects. Men are prone to look at facts and values through the media of symbols and slogans or hypothetical notions. The genius, on the contrary, refuses to allow himself to remain so highly conditioned to symbolic constructions. His eye, instead, pierces through the jargon of current and established thought and seeks to seize reality by direct or first-hand contact. His passionate nature cannot rest satisfied with second-hand information about things that are vital. *The passion for direct cognitional contact with reality is what distinguishes the genius from the mere scholar.* The scholar deals, primarily, with concepts and theories constructed by others. Lost in the contemplation of the details of different doctrines, he is delighted by their internal harmonies and jarred by inner inconsistencies. The genius, while not lagging behind the scholar in his appreciation of the architectonic beauty of a complicated doctrine, remains yet unsatisfied unless that doctrine does justice to all that *he* has seen of reality. He is ravished not so much by the ingenuity of the doctrine as by the depth and extent of the reality or vision that inspired the doctrine, and which the doctrine enables us to contemplate as a connected whole. And the reason why he is driven to deny or reconstruct it is not either that he is temperamentally irreverent or that he is anxious to prove himself original; but because the doctrine in question fails to provide for the additional aspects of the real which the genius and his age have seen, though these may not yet have been formally noted.

The genius, thus, is seen to be the *spokesman of ignored or overlooked reality*. This reality may consist of objective appearances and relations. Frequently, however, especially in the domain

of socio-political values and artistic creation, the reality concerned is largely subjective and imaginative. Thus the revolutionary thinker or writer draws our pointed attention to the frustrations and sufferings that could be avoided, and to the unjust arrangements that make for their continuance. Another writer enlarges our vision and enriches our sensibility by offering us new imaginative patterns of satisfied or lived impulses in relation to varied environmental situations. Often the genius thrills and surprises us by revealing a new aspect of a familiar object or situation, and by suggesting a significant turn in a familiar attitude.

Speaking generally, the genius is a centre of heightened awareness and sensibility, and the exemplar of a richer and finer life. He is less easily conditioned to bloodless symbols, and less easily persuaded to suppress his impulses. These are the reasons why he finds it comparatively easier to discard tradition. The genius, in fact, particularly of the artistic type, stands nearer to the primitive, unsophisticated nature of man, and shares the primitive capacity to see and feel in naked wonderment. The modes of living of a society consist, roughly, of two parts : first, there are the ways of satisfying different needs determined chiefly by the geographical conditions and by the stage of technical advancement reached by the society in question. Secondly, there are conventions, dictated chiefly by the interests of the dominant groups and by religio-philosophical beliefs. Societies differ in respect of both these classes of activities, but the differences in regard to the latter are the more significant. Practically in all the societies of all times conditions of living for the majority of the people have been hard. These conditions prescribe laborious living for the many, permitting them to indulge only the most urgent of their impulses. Freedom, the sense of self-respect and proper pride, leisure for artistic and intellectual pursuits, access to beautiful women and to superior types of amusement, vehicles and other articles of comfort—these are commodities that have generally been denied to the toiling majority, to slaves and serfs and the *Sūdras*, and monopolised by men in power. These denials necessitate an intricate system of rules and prescriptions, conventions and taboos in the maze of which the natural springs of action are wont to be lost sight of. It may be added here that rules and taboos also originate in the inherent needs of collective life, and in the inherent need for self-control on the part of almost every individual.

Whatever the sources of artificial conventions and taboos, they are always coming for exposure and indictment, direct or indirect, at the hands of the genius, who is by nature inclined to dig deep into the roots of human activities. 'Whatever the culture', it has been observed, 'the basic literary themes are the same . . . They are linked to the biological bases of life, to its psychological invari-

ances, to the necessities of collective experience.' That is why, 'the literatures of the most varied cultures have meaning and beauty for an outsider even when their social organisations seem to him bewildering and their basic values absurd.'⁸⁷ Not that conventions and customs peculiar to different societies do not influence their respective literatures at all; they do not, however, constitute the vital elements of those literatures. A literature that preoccupies itself too much with the outer coverings of custom and convention gradually loses its essential vitality and cannot be rejuvenated until it suffers "rebarbarization" at the hands of subsequent geniuses⁸⁸. In the history of literature the figures of those who have effected such rebarbarization of literature from time to time stand out prominently : Rousseau and Wordsworth; Tolstoy; Carlyle, Emerson, and Nietzsche; Lawrence and James Joyce—the votaries of the cults of nature, the peasant, the hero and the sex impulse respectively. In the realm of thought the method of critical analysis, which traces the concept back to original reality, performs a similar function of rejuvenation, through a sort of "barbarization" of the speculative notions.

Viewed in this light the genius appears as a connecting link among peoples and societies divided by the powerful barriers of custom and convention.

The logic of successful rebellion, then, consists in the appeal to the two main demands of human life and nature : the demand for freedom on the one hand and that for creative self-expansion on the other. The first is essentially a moral demand, and expresses itself chiefly in the movements for socio-political reforms. Such a demand follows generally upon changed material or technological conditions, which evoke the vision of a superior social order, *i.e.*, an order guaranteeing a larger quantum of comfort and freedom to all : or a considerable section of the people. The other demand, less obvious and confined relatively to fewer people, gives rise to finer types of revolt in the spheres of art, science and philosophy.

In either case the rebellious demand is related to man's creative nature. Given the vision of the possibilities of a better life, men can seldom be persuaded to remain satisfied with the existing order; and, when fresh knowledge opens out new possibilities of picturing a given domain of experience, older systems of thought can seldom continue to command following. The geniuses, in particular, are so constituted that they are constantly seeking to visualise more satisfactory arrangements of life and experience; and once such arrangements have been effectively visualised, it becomes a question of time when they are accepted and adopted by the generality of the people.

The Marxists believe that the rebellions or revolts of the second,

type are necessarily linked up with those of the first, and are caused by the latter. This, however, does not seem to be true. Thus, for instance, the revolution wrought by the theory of relativity cannot be shown to be correlated with socio-political upheavals of a particular kind. Similar remarks apply to the ideological revolutions in man's moral and metaphysical outlook brought about by the theories of Darwin and Freud. As observed earlier, man is more than a merely politico-economic or social being; he may suffer revolutions which have little or no relevance to his life as a member of a class or society. An experience of religious conversion may greatly change a person without seriously affecting his socio-political beliefs and ideas. It is not suggested that the institutionalised behaviour of a person can be wholly separated from his creative or cultural pursuits; however, the two sides are distinct enough not to permit the conclusion that the one is a derivative of the other. A person's metaphysical or artistic creed is no more a product of the way he makes his living than Einstein's Theory of Relativity is an effect of his Jewish parentage or German nationality. A man's metaphysical outlook, we believe, is determined more by the knowledge he has of traditional and contemporary thought-currents in the sciences and the humanities than by his membership of the middle or the aristocratic class, and by the occupation which brings him his bread. The Marxist theory of the dependence of culture on economic relationships fails completely to account for differences of philosophical and cultural outlook among thinkers belonging to the same class or community and living in the same historical period. In India, for instance, different systems of philosophy continued to develop side by side under the same socio-political and historical conditions.

Endowed with unusual powers of perception and feeling on the one hand, and with unusual capacity for the absorption of past knowledge and culture on the other, the genius cannot possibly confine him-self within the boundaries of his class consciousness. *Usually*, in fact, the genius is rebellious with respect to the ideas and values of *his own* class. As a matter of history the geniuses have generally belonged to the middle and the aristocratic classes, and most of the revolutionary ideologies have been created for the consumption of these classes. Most of the advocates of even democracy and socialism, not excluding Marx and Lenin themselves, have been either middle class men or aristocrats. Culture, then, insofar as it is created through the agency of the geniuses, cannot be regarded as a class phenomenon. This means that cultural consciousness, even in the phases in which it affects socio-political institutions, cannot be taken to be determined by economic class relationships. What happens when thinkers and writers rebel against the ideas

and practices of their own respective classes? The Marxists speak of the phenomenon of "declassing", meaning thereby that the rebel leaders of thought and action identify themselves with the oppressed classes. But why do such leaders choose to transfer their allegiance from one class to the other? The only possible reply, which is plausible, is this, that the leaders in question are prompted by the feelings of justice and propriety—feelings which set them in opposition even to the members of their own class. What induces the moral and political thinkers and writers to plead the cause of the exploited and the oppressed is not an unaccountable consciousness of their solidarity with those people—a consciousness which should now make them hostile to the rest of the world—but the intuitive sympathy and vision which reveal to them the utter futility and injustice of the suffering that could be avoided. No special class motive is needed to account for the sympathies and the moral and social ideas of the great and noble souls like Christ and Gandhi and Marx himself; these teachers of mankind were impelled by the desire, characteristic of men of the highest moral culture, to see established on this earth the conditions of maximum possible freedom for the largest number of men and women. In every conceivable sense of those terms, they are to be looked upon as teachers and benefactors, not of a particular class or section of human beings, but of the whole of mankind. Having risen far above merely personal desires and ambitions, such teachers and thinkers seek to inculcate values whose appeal is truly universal or impersonal. Thus the chapter in Marx's *Das Capital* entitled "The working Day" is calculated to arouse sympathy for workers in the hearts of all types of reader, not excluding the capitalists. That writings and visions of such teachers and thinkers are historically effective is proved by the history of labour legislation and the improved living conditions of the workers even in the so-called capitalist countries. Not that the capitalist employers ceased to behave selfishly, or immorally, after the gospel of Marx had been propagated: they had slowly to yield ground to the pressure of general opinion finding expression in a series of state legislations.

What relation, then, does the genius bear to the people and the times to which he belongs? The relation, to our mind, is one of reciprocal influencing or mutual determination. The genius shapes his age no less than the age shapes the genius. If the genius did not determine the course of the society, he would be useless; if the age had no hand in shaping the genius's personality, he would not appear to be peculiarly related to it. The fact of the influence of the age or environment on the genius is patent: it trains his faculties of perception and ratiocination, inculcates in him peculiar moral and aesthetic sentiments, and introduces him to the com-

munity's rich heritage of imaginative life. True, the genius appropriates much of the significant cultural heritage of his people and of other nations through his superior mental powers; however, it is in terms of the needs and values of the age itself that he views and interprets that heritage.

The genius, in his turn, makes two types of contribution to his times. On the one hand, he renders more articulate the value perceptions and feelings of the people with whom he is associated; on the other, bringing his creativity to bear on the experiences of his age, he suggests new patterns of thought, feeling and action. The greater the genius the finer is his analysis whereby the experience of the age is articulated and clarified, and the larger the synthesis or reconstruction calculated to give new direction to the lives and energies of the people.

In addition to the above intellectual contribution, the genius frequently makes what may be called a moral contribution to his times. The onward march of mankind is being constantly arrested by inveterate habits called customs, and by hypocritical conventions masquerading as respectable tradition. Chafing and suffering under the weight of the above the people yet find it difficult to discard them. Having the strength and courage to do so, the genius strikes at the bases of custom and convention, and deals cutting blows at hypocrisy. As a consequence of these activities he frequently invites the anger and hostility of those who have vested interests in the established order. And if the genius ultimately succeeds in exposing the hollowness of that order, it is because his perceptions and feelings are nearer to the creative requirements of the normal and impersonal human self than those reflected in that order.

What do I mean by calling the requirements of the human self "creative"? The expression is intended to underscore the fact that human needs are not a fixed stock but change according to the possibilities offered by the environment, physical, technological and social. Thus the demands for comforts among wage-earners are pitched higher in a highly industrialized democracy such as England or the United States than in an underdeveloped country like Arabia or Afghanistan. Even with respect to the same class of interests the requirements of one age or country, therefore, may be different from those of another age or country. It is difficult, however, to agree with the view that these requirements constitute a historical necessity, for the fulfilment of which the genius is, so to say, historically summoned. Apart from the highly metaphorical character of these expressions, the fact should not be overlooked that the efforts and destinies of men generally operate in fields each charged with several though limited possibilities. The various needs or systems of needs of a people being intricately linked together in an

ends-means order—an order which assumes different forms under emphases on different needs—those people, like Tennyson's God, may fulfil themselves in many ways. The vision of a new order presented by the genius, therefore, need not be looked upon as the anticipation of the *inevitable* next stage in the development of history. Such an interpretation would rob that vision of its most distinctive feature, *i.e.*, the creative factor involved in the conceptual reordering of the elements of experience and environment. Insofar as the genius is genuinely creative he is not determined by history; and insofar as history is affected or determined by the creativity of the geniuses, its course cannot be regarded as being fixed or determined.

If the "requirements" of history, as some historicists affirm, necessarily called forth great men, then no nation would suffer decline, and history everywhere would move in the direction of progress at the same pace. That this logic of inevitable progress does not hold good of every national history is proved by the indifferent records of the achievements of a number of societies or nations. Moreover, a nation may not adopt progressive measures despite directions and warnings from its great men.

The role of the genius, insofar as he thinks about socio-political matters, may be roughly compared to that of the onlooker in a game of chess who offers clever suggestions for acceptance by one of the players. The player concerned may accept the suggestions, wholly or partly, according as he is more convinced or less of their promising character, or has enough of boldness and courage or less to carry them out consistently in practice. The fate of the more or less utopian order visualised by a socio-political thinker or genius similarly depends as much on the spirit and temper of the people who contemplate that vision or order as on the merits of the vision itself.

Apart from the above considerations of a general nature, two series of facts may be adduced to refute the extravagant claims of ambitious historicism. The devastation caused by such raiding and plundering hordes as the Huns under Atilla cannot possibly be fitted in the logical framework of an interpreted history; nor the destruction caused by such forces as the great pestilence which, breaking out at the end of the second century A.D., 'shattered the Roman empire' and overthrew the Han dynasty in China.³⁹ The great divergencies in the courses of development followed by different historical societies constitute another and a more massive type of evidence against historicism. There are hundreds of societies—about six hundred and fifty according to Toynbee's computation—that have continued to this day in the primitive stage, defying all the formulated laws of change and development; there are societies that

continued to develop for a considerable period, and then became ineffective or extinct; and of the five societies which, according to Mr. Toynbee, have gone on developing and have enjoyed a continuous existence since A.D. 775, namely Western Christendom, Orthodox Christian Society, the Islamic, the Hindu and the Far Eastern societies, no two seem to have followed an identical or even a similar course of development. Unless one subscribes to the chauvinistic creed of "the chosen people", it becomes difficult to understand why history, pursuing a rational course, should proceed along such diverse paths in different countries, and produce such wide discrepancies in their attainments in the different fields.

This brief exposé of historicism is intended to make our readers guard against two presumptions : that mankind are inevitably progressing towards better and higher forms of living; and that this progress has for its terminus a form of society which can be finally visualised.

The conclusion that history does not pursue a predetermined and foreseeable course should be heartening not only to the Asian people who are awakening slowly from a long slumber of uncreative traditionalism, but also to the Europeans whose doom has been prophesied by a number of their thinkers from Danilevsky and Spengler down to Schubart and Berdyaev. The duration and extent of man's recorded history are far too short to permit us to indulge in such wild generalisations about the future of nation, and "cultures". In this connection it may be noted that Alfred L. Kroeber has found, in the past histories of several major nations, evidence for the fact that they have experienced two or more pulses of creative growth or cultural florescence.⁴⁰

A culturally progressive individual or society, we are suggesting, must tend towards the conditions of the genius. To this assertion a strong exception may be taken on the ground that geniuses are known to be frequently erratic, unbalanced and abnormal; that they are impractical and unrealistic, being nothing better than idle dreamers and visionaries. In reply we must point out, first, that the description can hardly apply to all types of geniuses, e.g., to military and diplomatic geniuses such as Napoleon and Bismarck. Nor does it fittingly apply to the great thinkers, scientists and philosophers, such as Newton, Galileo and Einstein, Aristotle and Descartes, Leibnitz and Kant, Bergson and Bertrand Russell. The description, perhaps, appears to be eminently applicable to artists and literary geniuses, with their highly strung and emotional natures. How can such persons, we may be asked, be set up as models for cultural advancement?

The final answer to the above objection consists in pointing out that it rests on a confusion or misunderstanding : the geniuses

are to be our models not in respect of their weaknesses, but in respect of their strength. Not all artists and literary geniuses, however, are emotional to the point of being unbalanced. Ruskin has pointed out how the greatest artists are the most objective in their emotional reactions, and do not suffer from the pathetic fallacy. The reason, however, why some of the geniuses, and the artists among them, appear to be erratic and unbalanced is this: that they are less respectful towards conventions, less easily affected by general opinion, and too honest and courageous to hide their real feelings. The cultivation of these qualities, I believe, is a necessary condition for the attainment of real culture.

Men in general can safely emulate, and they should emulate, the genius' passion for truth, and for giving expression to truth; the passion for contacting as extensive an area of reality as possible; the passion for creative novelty; the passion for justice; and the sense of deep love and compassion for the weak and the destitute. The genius is oblivious of petty personal affairs; he takes interest only in what has universal and enduring significance. This does not mean that the more humble work and duties of daily life should be eschewed; what it means is that the work and the duties should be performed, not with a view to individual again, but as part of one's concern for and contribution towards the preservation of the species.

'The person who contributes to culture . . . is not always a "cultured person,"' says Mr. Eliot; for the contributor to culture or the genius may be (1) a person of narrow specialization, and (2) a person without good manners. As for the first, it may be remarked that not even an artist can become really great unless he has tolerable acquaintance with spheres of experience other than that to which he makes a contribution. Practically all the great poets and writers, Shelley and Wordsworth no less than Shakespeare and Dante, Kālidāsa and Tulasī Dāsa, have been men of catholic taste and wide learning. Maybe some great musicians and painters have been lacking in this catholicity and in intellectual greatness, since their arts tend, on occasions, to be purely sensuous. Such geniuses, however, do not exert as great an influence on men's lives as the former, which means that their contribution to culture is not as great as that of the poets and other writers.

As regards Mr. Eliot's second consideration for adjudging some geniuses to be uncultured we observe that the culture of a genius as well as his contribution to culture, has to be assessed not merely, or even mainly, from the viewpoint of the community of which he was a member, but from that of the human species as a whole. The genius, by nature, feels repelled from the artificialities and mannerisms of the society in which he lives; and his major concern is to

uncondition men to formalities and affectations and to lead them towards more natural conditions of feeling and behaviour.

The thesis presented here is as follows. The cultural progress of both the individual and the society consists in gradual transcendence of the peculiarly individual and communal ways of seeing and feeling, and in ascending gradually to the viewpoint characteristic of the species.¹ The geniuses in different fields constitute the vanguard of the marching humanity divided into numerous societies. It is not our contention that the cognitions and sentiments of a genius are wholly unrelated to his social milieu. What is actually contended is this: that geniuses are usually rebellious; and in those aspects of their spiritual behaviour in which they rebel, they are, generally, nearer to the viewpoint of the species than their respective societies. In fact, much of the genius' energy is spent in combating narrow sentiments and parochial viewpoints.

This important truth has been pointedly expressed by Hegel and Marx in their concept of negation or contradiction as the motive force of history and the world process. Compared to his emphatic and convincing negations the positive formulations of the genius are but gropings in the dark whose validity can be judged only by their effects on future generations.

As against the Marxists we believe that culture is a human and not a class phenomenon. It follows from this conception that cultural divisions are not coextensive with class divisions, though they undoubtedly depend on different degrees of opportunity, available to children of different classes, to contact different orders of reality. According to this view the exploited class may develop a culture similar to that of the ruling class when the opportunities open to the latter are made available to the former. And when opportunities in the form of education, etc. have been made available, the hitherto backward class may absorb the culture of the erstwhile rulers as natural inheritance. In fact, the culture of one class or nation, understood as imaginative and shared consciousness of significant reality, is supplemented and enriched rather than contradicted by the culture of a different class or nation. This is the reason why the fiction depicting the life of one class or nation can be appreciated and enjoyed by readers belonging to other classes and nations.

The cultural progress of the different societies consists in the gradual substitution by them of universally sharable beliefs and ideals for creeds and practices traditionally handed down to them. Societies and individuals are led to modify their views and practices either under the influence of the creative personalities in their own environment, or through their contacts with other peoples and societies. Man is by nature inclined to accept truth; he also seeks

communion with as many of his fellow-beings as possible. On the one hand he wants to claim for his beliefs and ideas universal validity, on the other he is anxious to avoid being erratic and arbitrary. This anxiety manifests itself in man's willingness to examine critically the methods of his investigation and the foundations of his beliefs. This critical tendency is the force that has been making steadily for the cultural unification of all the civilised societies. Gradually does the individual learn to pass from the plane of personal whims to that of communal or social truths; gradually do the societies learn to ascend from the level of sectarian ideals and opinions to the altitude of truly human or universal truths. What is true of societies is also true of the different classes. In the sphere of cultural activity as understood here, the progress of mankind lies, it may be affirmed, in moving towards the state of a single class, or a single society. The members of this class or society would resemble those ideal literary and reflective geniuses whose sentiments and ideas, in all their creative richness, are completely sharable and enjoyable.

The view that a culturally progressive society tends towards the condition of the genius finds striking support in Toynbee's analysis of the genesis and growth of civilisations. Concerning the first process he observes :

An essential difference between civilizations and primitive societies . . . is the direction taken by mimesis or imitation . . . In primitive societies, as we know them, mimesis is directed towards the older generation and towards dead ancestors . . . On the other hand, in societies in process of civilization, mimesis is directed towards creative personalities who command a following because they are pioneers. In such societies, 'the cake of custom,' as Walter Bagehot called it in his *Physics and Politics*, is broken and society is in dynamic motion along a course of change and growth.⁴¹

Not only are civilizations born, but they also grow, by responding to the call of the creative personalities. The contention that geniuses tend to be the spokesmen of a wider humanity than that represented by their class or society is borne out by Henry Bergson, at least in respect of the moral and religious teachers. Referring to these he says :

..... There have arisen privileged souls who have felt themselves related to all souls, and who, instead of remaining within the limits of their group and keeping to the (restricted) solidarity which has been established by nature, have addressed themselves to humanity in general in an *élan* of love.⁴²

The sweeping generalisation, indulged in by the sceptic and the relativist, that all truths and ideals are relative, must be supplemented by the recognition of the important distinction between truths that are relative to the experience and interests of this group or that, and those which claim to be relative or related to the experience and needs of the entire humanity. No sceptic can transcend this latter relativism, and nobody can attain a truth which is more than a human truth. All the rules of logic, which lie at the basis of entire human thinking, are, in the last analysis, rules concerning the behaviour of man, in respect of the manipulation of certain relationships represented by symbols—rules which are supposed to be the embodiment of the laws of universally valid thinking.

To sum up, culture understood as a value stands for the activities that contribute not so much to the maintenance as to the enrichment of life. This enrichment is secured chiefly through the expansion of consciousness, *i.e.*, through the direction of the mind's contemplative activity on aspects and areas of reality that are impersonally or universally significant; and through the formation of adequate attitudes towards those aspects and areas. In the end, culture is the one and the sole instrument of human progress, though this progress cannot be measured except in terms of culture itself. Culture, thus, appears to be something pursued for its own sake. It is, in fact, a synonym for higher and richer life, a life worthy of the specifically human attributes and powers of the *homo sapiens*.

This life is essentially a historical life; it is also a shared life. It is communal or social life in the deeper sense of those terms. When I say that cultured existence is historical, I mean that its realization and accomplishment is spread over the entire life-span of the individual, and of the race. There is a life that the individual lives alone, and which ends with the extinction of his personal existence. The processes of this life are the subject-matter of biology and physiology. On the other hand there are impulses of cognitive and emotional living that are rekindled in the individual through his contact with other minds, and the like of which he seeks to pass on to others. These moments of significant living are immortalized by man in his literature, in his histories and biographies, and in his fondly cherished systems of scientific and philosophical thought. In all such moments man is face to face with some significant sector of reality; frequently, this reality is nothing other than an imagined relationship between the self and an object or objective situation, or between one's own self and one or more other selves. And if we remember that a personality is nothing but a complex of such relationships formed according to

a definable pattern, we may be easily led to look upon culture as the activity whereby creative and significant moments of living associated with innumerable centres of consciousness, past and present, are visualized and assimilated. Culture, thus, may be described as the process or group of processes by which individuals participate in, and enhance, the conscious and creative life of the human race, or of one another.

No individual, community or age, left to its own resources, can visualize and live the infinite possibilities of human existence consisting in multifarious and multitudinous contacts, physical and spiritual, actual and imagined, at innumerable points with the multiform reality. Pressed with its own peculiar problems, equipped with its peculiar tastes and its characteristic tools and implements, every age and community makes its own discoveries as to the meaningful or significant phases of reality, and the patterns of significant relationship with those phases. Of these patterns the ones that are imaginatively valid, *i.e.*, sharable more or less universally, are passed on to posterity as classical records and valuable remains. These constitute the cultural heritage for the coming generations. Needless to say, according to the degree of universality achieved by the patterns in question, they are valued and preserved by the succeeding generations of a particular community, a number of communities, or the entire humanity. This, by the way, affords us a clue to find an adequate definition of a classic : A classic is a record, in an intelligible form, which has still the power to rekindle in us, partly if not wholly, the pattern of significant living which originally inspired it. The greatness and the genuine character of a classic are directly measurable by the length and breadth of its influence or acceptability both in space and in time.

Intimate contact with, or the inheritance of, classical culture influences men in two ways : it directly enriches their lives by putting them in close communion with the forms or phases of life and reality to which their own age has been paying insufficient attention; and it initiates and exercises them in the art of conscious, creative and impersonal living. Classical education, thus, enables man on the one hand to retain the ground that has already been won by way of the enrichment of the human personality; and, on the other, to obtain necessary training and fitness for making further spiritual conquests, aesthetic, intellectual, and moral. Cultural traits being non-hereditary, classical education plays the same role in the preservation and transmission of beneficent spiritual variations as biological heredity, acting through the modification of the germ-plasm, does in respect of physically advantageous changes or variations. Education, in fact, is the medium through which the cultural or spiritual evolution of our race is accomplished and continued.

Maybe the aim of biological evolution is nothing more than the preservation of the lives of the fitter species; the aim of spiritual evolution, however, is not so much the preservation as the enrichment of human life, once that life has learnt to rise above the needs of a day-to-day physical existence.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE AND USE OF ART AND OF CRITICISM

THE symbolic continuum, the reservoir of meanings created by the activity of the historical group mind, is a condition and an instrument of the increased creativity of individual and social consciousness. How does this creativity operate in the spheres of science and art respectively?

As pointed out by Eddington the constructions of science, its theories and theoretical models, aim at being symbolic 'of the world of commonplace experience'. Science interprets this world in its functional aspect, *i.e.* as a system of causal processes or energies. The goal of science is the complete and connected description of the total system of causal physical forces, no matter whether that system as a whole ever affects, or is likely to affect, human beings or not. Science has little or no significance apart from this power to describe or delineate objectively the system of forces that make up the physical world.

Art seems to present a contrast to science in the above respect. A work of art does not derive its worth from its relation or reference to anything outside itself. The value of a play like *Hamlet* or a novel like *Anna Karenina* does not depend on its correspondence with the life of one or more men or women known historically to have flourished in this or that epoch in the history of this or that country. Art, it seems, has no representative function like science. As Clive Bell points out, the representative element in art, even if present, is always "irrelevant". For, to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, 'no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions'.¹ According to Dr. Richards, too, poetic statements do not embody references, but consist simply in the 'emotive use of language'. (Unlike Bell, however, he does not suggest that the emotions embodied in poetry are entirely different from those of life). He observes: 'Many arrangements of words evoke attitudes without any reference being required *en route*. They operate like musical phrases. But usually references are involved as *conditions* for, or stages in, the ensuing development of attitudes, yet it is still the attitudes not the references which are important'.²

As a corollary from the above it follows that there is nothing in

life or nature which is poetic in itself, that there is no poetic subject matter. It matters little what the poet says, provided he says it well, or succeeds in evoking an attitude.

We believe that the above views concerning the *difference* between science and art and the *relationship* between art and life are one-sided and therefore misleading. In the following discussion, while not ignoring other forms of art, we shall be concerned mainly with literature which is the highest, or, at any rate, the richest, expression of the artistic impulse.

While stressing the representative or referential character of scientific statements we tend to overlook two factors. First, we tend to forget that science deals mostly with the functional aspects of physical phenomena, to the exclusion of their other aspects. Thus the scientist tells us very little about colours and visual forms to be met with in nature. Secondly, the scientific statements, particularly the general statements, refer to *possibilities* rather than to *actualities*. Thus the statement that, under certain conditions of pressure etc., water boils at 100° centigrade is not a statement about actualities, as is commonly supposed. The specified conditions are generally too ideal to be reproducible even in the best laboratories. As we noted on a previous occasion the exactitude of a mathematical law is not quite compatible with the inexactitude of nature. A law refers to an ideal or limiting case, rather than to a case which can be actually observed.

The aforementioned limitations are markedly characteristic of artistic representations of reality, *i.e.* of nature and life. The painter is concerned to explore *not* colours and forms as such, but the *aesthetic possibilities* of their varied combinations. In a painting the representation of such a possibility is identical with its creation. The same is true of the musical possibilities of various sound-combinations. Moreover, painters and musicians seem to leave whole tracts of colours and sounds or noises unused, in contradistinction from the scientist who seems to take into consideration most of the physical reality. The anomaly would seem to lose its sharpness if we consider that (a) the discoveries of painters and musicians are no less general in their significance and hence no less wide in their scope than those of the scientists; and (b) the scientists are no less ignorant, and therefore no less likely to progress, with respect to their subject matter than painters and musicians.

Literature, too, represents life, though not the whole of life. Writers of drama and fiction generally leave out most of the things about men and women that interest the economists, medical men, historians, etc. Literature, in other words, abstracts from life, even as the sciences of man do. And we have the authority of Aristotle to affirm that it is more universal in import than history.

The vital difference between science and the arts in respect of their representation of reality is as follows. Science aims at the representation of reality whose character is more or less an accomplished or fixed thing. Science therefore seems to progress as its description of reality approximates more and more to the latter's presumed true structure. The arts, particularly the representative arts, on the contrary, deal with a reality, *i.e.* life, whose manifestations are continually assuming new forms, and whose variations and forms are practically endless. Art, it seems, can succeed in representing not the whole of life but only various types of life. And every age requires its own art to express its peculiar modes or types of life and experience.

Art, then, has reference to reality in nature and/or life. What is the mode of this reference? According to Charles Morris 'the aesthetic sign designates the value properties of actual or possible situations and . . . it is an iconic sign (an "image") in that it embodies these values in some medium where they may be directly inspected'. This theory seems to be directly applicable to music and to simpler forms of painting. In literature, too, a novel or play represents the life of an age or "culture", and thereby a variation of human life and culture, by exhibiting it through its characters. Art, it seems, represents life by producing types of life through its peculiar medium. The theory, however, is only broadly true. It is not true if it implies total exclusion of referential meanings in art. It has affinities with Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and suffers from the limitations of that theory. Art, particularly literature, often produces symbolic models of characters and situations which bear to life the relation analogous to that of scientific models to physical reality.

We may now approach the problem of the relation of art to life from a different angle: are the feelings and emotions (or experiences) embodied in art identical with or similar to those encountered in actual life, or are the former altogether different from the latter? Analogous questions may be asked with respect to thinking embodied in scientific and philosophical works. Attempts to answer these questions must proceed along similar lines. Art can no more be sundered from life than scientific and philosophical thought. In fact, the sort of experience that is embodied in art-works occurs in and forms part of the lives of the artists. Scientific thought and philosophical reflection similarly form parts of the lives of the scientists and philosophers respectively.

The confusion that art and life are entirely distinct arises from the following two factors. The sort of detached or disinterested experience that is embodied in art-works can be met with in an actual life only sporadically. The pressing claims of practical life

in family and society seldom allow us time to develop and enjoy our occasional visions of beauty and rare flashes of thought. Only avowed artists and thinkers find it possible to set themselves to expand and amplify, through the medium of symbols, their vague intimations of truth and beauty. This leads us to notice the second factor. The developed visions of the artists and thinkers, in virtue of their incarnation in symbols, tend to have a life of their own, independent of this or that mind, including the minds of their creators. This circumstance gives rise to the notion that those visions are not parts of any life at all. That notion, however, is an illusion. The symbolised vision of an artist or thinker is still life, though it is only potential life. It is life in abeyance, as it were, which may be converted into living consciousness through contact with any appropriately trained mind. The innumerable works of art and thought which constitute the spiritual heritage of civilised societies are units of life which once formed detachable parts of the life-histories of their authors, and which may be appropriated and absorbed by cultured members of those societies.

A third factor making for separation or distinction between life on the one hand and the world of art and thought on the other may be noted. This latter world has its own laws of development, and its own principles of comparison, contrast and evaluation. These laws and principles cut across the barriers of age, nation and "culture", and have a significance apart from the vicissitudes of historical individuals and societies.

And yet, it remains true that all the works of art and thought arise, in the last analysis, from life, and finally return to it. Symbolism itself is an outgrowth of man's intellectual and imaginative life, operating on various utilitarian and non-utilitarian planes. The individual who creates artistic and reflective works is the person who is in contemplative contact with surrounding life or reality on the one hand, and has inherited and assimilated the significant symbolic life of the past on the other. The consumer, again, is one who is engaged in the process of assimilating the life newly materialised in symbols, in terms of his own actual and inherited (symbolic) experience.

With the help of the ever-expanding complex of symbols mankind appear to be engaged in creating a type of life which is at once continuous and growing, timeless and immortal.

This explains, incidentally, the use of the activity called art. Detaching us from the life of spatio-temporal struggles which contribute to its preservation and continuance, art transports us into the realm of disinterested contemplation of values or value-bearing objects created out of meanings furnished by life or reality. The processes of contemplative experience which occur only fitfully and

intermittently in actual life find methodical prolongation, systematic development and significant completion in the works of art. Composed primarily or mostly of meaningful symbols a work of art is a unit or segment of life itself, separable from the life of its creator, and capable of enriching the being of the contemplating psyche.

THE NATURE OF ART

Art embodies a type of experience which is valued for its own sake, *i.e.*, as an end in itself. The *Bhāmatī*, a commentary on the *Sārvākā Bhāshya* of Śāṅkara, defines experience as consisting in "the revelation or shining forth of the object" (*artha-prakāśa*). Art may be defined either in terms of the type of *object* which it presents before a contemplating mind, or in terms of the type of *life* or *experience* which it generates in the history of such a mind. The two approaches to art, however, are closely related. For the mind contemplating an art-work ceases for the time being to have any life other than that evoked by that work. As Hume observed long ago at no moment in its existence can the mind be distinguished from the mental *states* which constitute it. In the moments of the contemplation of an art-work the mind roughly consists of feelings and perceptions, or of perceptions charged with a peculiar aesthetic "feel", aroused by the former, and is dissociated from the past history and future commitments of the conscious organism of which it forms a part. The mind in those moments may almost be described as identical with the art-work enlivened into a sort of "enjoyed experience", by the emergence of self-consciousness.

Viewed as an object the work of art is a complex of symbolised meanings, the complex itself being describable as a meaning or meaningful object. A meaning is any entity, capable of being contemplated, conceived or imagined by the mind with the aid of symbols, which may either constitute, or enter as a constituent in, an act or state of that mind valued either in itself or for its utility. According to this definition meanings are characteristic only of the symbolic life of the mind, and they are involved only in the conscious and purposive phases of that life. Dreams and reveries, no less than pure immediacy, sensuous and mystical, are excluded by the definition from the sphere of meaningful life. This is not to say that the life expressed in dreams, mystical states, etc. is not valuable; the implication is that purposive or goal-directed, hence more or less organised and determinate, experience expressed in symbols alone is sharable, and that experience alone can be objectively analysed and evaluated.

What are the characteristic marks of the meanings which make up aesthetic experience, *i.e.* the experience evoked usually by art-works? As suggested above such a meaning carries with it, or has

the capacity to arouse in the contemplating mind, a peculiar "feel" which distinguishes it from other types of meanings, reflective and pragmatic. An influential Indian school of aesthetics uses the term "*rasa*" to designate the distinctive quality of the experience embodied in art. It is not easy either to define or to translate the term *rasa* which vaguely suggests a peculiar type of enjoyment or the attribute of "enjoyedness". The contemplative act directed on an art-work involves a kind of enjoyment or "enjoyedness" which is unrelated to the utilitarian or practical consciousness of success or failure, doing or suffering, and to spatio-temporal accidents of the biosocial being to which it (*i.e.* the act) is attached. The *rasa*-or "feel" seems to signify a type of involvement or commitment, in respect of the contemplated whole of meanings, which is willless and timeless, and which is cherished as an act of disinterested faith.

This "feel" which distinguishes the objects contemplated in aesthetic experience from those pondered in philosophy and cogitated in the sciences is not to be confused with the hedonic overtones of the practically and biologically committed life. Great art as often induces the mood of melancholy and sadness as that of luminous delight, and the one is felt to be as significant as the other. Indeed, art and literature with sad and tragic themes are generally considered to be superior to those with contrary preoccupations. According to classical Indian aestheticians love-poetry depicting separation has deeper appeal than the one describing union, and Shelley believes that man's sweetest songs are those that tell of the saddest thoughts.

The *rasa* theorists have endeavoured to enumerate and classify the kinds of "feel" that characterise aesthetic experience. They recognise nine kinds of *rasa* (a word literally meaning sap, juice, flavour, etc.), *i.e.* the erotic or amorous, the ludicrous, the pathetic, the fiery or rageful (*Raudra*), the heroic, the wonder-producing, the fearful and the repugnant. The classification is unsatisfactory on two counts. First, it fails to do justice to the particularity of the "feel" characteristic of each instance of aesthetic experience. The very poverty of our language stands in the way to name different shades and types of wonder, amorousness, fear, etc. Secondly, the attitudes involved in such subtler forms of art as metaphysical poetry are too complex to be fitted into a neat scheme of classification.

However, the "feel" in its deeper sense of *rasa* or aesthetic emotion is indicative of a real involvement with the object of the aesthetic experience. This involvement may occur at different levels, or in different dimensions of our living, and touch our being, as it were, in its different layers. The involvement may be sensuous or moral, metaphysical or religious, or of two or more of these kinds

at one and the same time. While not unrelated to the individual's being as a man, the involvement is yet unconnected with those phases of his life which throw him in conflict or in interested co-operation with other members of his kind. It is the involvement of man as an observer and creator of spiritual values, or as an enjoyer of spiritual relationships.

A major work of art, in its wholeness or in parts, commits or involves us in respect of all the possible modes of existence and experience. It appeals in different degrees to our sensuous and moral nature, and has significance for our religio-philosophical urges. In an important art-work the meaning-patterns are so organised as to produce simultaneously the "feels" of several kinds, some as main notes and others as undertones. These "feels" spread in the meaning-space like concentric circles of varying diameters, with their circumferences composed of luminous curves. The light of the outer rings gently touches and intermingles with the illumination of those nearer to the conscious centre.

THE MATERIALS OF ART

The materials of art are meaning-particulars characterized by (the capacity to evoke) peculiar aesthetic "feels", and the mysterious "ways" or "forms" in which those particulars are organized. The resultant organisations are the units of aesthetic experience embedded as it were in the complex of symbols called the work of art. The meaning-particulars may consist of images but not of necessity, they may equally well include suggestions of relationships between man and man, man and vicissitudes of circumstances, man and the universe. The common feature of the meaning-particulars and the wholes composed out of them is that they all invite man's involvement in terms of his weal and woe, or in terms of the possibilities of his spiritual nature.

It is noteworthy that in drama and fiction depiction of every kind of life and of all types of character appears interesting. Life in all the forms seems to be the supreme object of aesthetic interest. While the reader or the spectator is required to be detached or disinterested, the characters are permitted to indulge all their impulses and stage all their conflicts in narrative fiction and dramatic representations. Man's foremost involvement, it seems, is with the lives of his fellow-beings which embody and express for him the possibilities of the universal man in his own being. The possibilities of action and sentiment depicted in literature contribute to the vicarious satisfaction of our own creative urges.

This account of the materials of art should enable us to detect the elements of truth as well as the errors of emphasis contained in different theories of art and in different descriptions of literature.

The distinctive function of art, according to us, is the creation or embodiment in symbols of the "moments of enjoyed experience", the distinguishing feature of those moments or that experience being the capacity to produce an effective involvement on the part of the reader, the percipient, or the spectator. This involvement may have reference to matters sensuous or moral, perceptible or intellectual, metaphysical or religious.

Our thesis is opposed to the view of art propagated by Benedetto Croce, who draws a sharp distinction between intuition and concept, between aesthetic and intellectual knowledge, between art and philosophy. Intuitions, which constitute art, consist, according to him, of the representations of the particulars, while the contents of the concepts are general. Thus a river or a lake is an intuition, while water in general is a concept⁴. The plausibility of the Crocean doctrine of art as intuition arises from the fact that artists tend to express themselves through imagery of different kinds. However, intuitions or images as embodied in art can never stand without relations, and relations are concepts. The artist and the poet do not represent the lake *per se* taken in isolation from the rest of the universe; on the contrary, each of them seeks to depict it as it figures in his own sensibility, or in the sensibility of some other persons. The representation of the particular in art is always relative to the interests of this or that person; and if artistic experience is sharable, it is because those interests embody the general forms of the human sensibility. For this reason, the categories in terms of which the particular is described are all general; every adjective stands for a universal. It is also true that the same adjective or noun arouses different images, and images differing in distinctness and strength, in different minds, depending on the differences in their power to experience images, and also in their geographical and cultural surroundings. Thus the expression "red lips" or "curly hair" may suggest different images to persons belonging to different countries and even to the same country. The truth is that the poet controls the meaning of the image-evoking word or expression not in virtue of the precision of the suggested image, but in consequence of the definiteness of the *quality* bestowed on the indeterminate image by the context of the meanings in which it is placed. The quality of the image may be suggested by the effect or "feel" which it is interpreted as having in the particular human context. Thus, as a resident of an Asian country, I may never succeed in visualizing the physical personality of a particular heroine of Jane Austen, say Elizabeth; the circumstance, however, is not likely to interfere with my enjoyment of *Pride and Prejudice* as a work of literature.

Croce's mistake concerning the nature of art arises from the fact that he takes too narrow a view of what constitutes a concept.

Not all concepts are the generalized representations of the particulars; concepts also arise by the imaginative extension and rearrangement of experienced elements. And man reacts emotionally not only to the particulars presented in what Croce calls intuition but also to possibilities and ideals presented by conceptual imagination. When Ezra Pound says :

Of all these young women
not one has enquired the cause of the world

it may be doubted if he is seeking to entertain us with images or intuitions. The lines seem to appeal not so much to our sensuous imagination as to our intellect, and the feeling they evoke has a distinctly intellectual flavour.

If literature were purely an affair of sensuous intuition then fitness to produce and appreciate great literary works would be wholly unconnected with intellectual growth and with the capacity to appreciate moral issues and religio-philosophical attitudes and ideas.

The last objection can equally be urged against those who, like Dr. I. A. Richards, maintain that the art of poetry excludes all references to cognitive meanings, and that what it aims at is merely the evoking of the emotional attitudes. If that thesis were true then a number of paradoxical results would seem to follow. It would then follow that a poet, *qua* poet, needed neither eyes nor ears, having no necessity whatever for observing either the natural or the human world. A poet could be completely indifferent to the manifold intellectual, moral, and socio-political issues of his time, and yet be a great poet. Nor could he seek to convey, or succeed in conveying, the conflicts and convictions of the age in which he lived. If poetry involved no reference to objective reality then a poet would no more belong to one age or country than to another. Dr. Richards's conception of poetry, indeed, implies a total denial of the relevance or significance of sociological criticism.

Nor does the theory in question explain why different kinds of poetry are written in different ages, and why repetitions of older styles and types of art are not generally admired. In reply to this it may be pointed out that different ages have their characteristic attitudes and emotions, which the artists of those times are required to express. The reply, however, is not convincing. For if emotions and attitudes are wholly subjective entities, having no reference to objective conditions, it is difficult to see how the former can materially change from one age to another. Nobody has seriously contended that human nature and its modes of feeling underwent any considerable change between Shakespeare and Tolstoy, and if the contents of their writings exhibit far-reaching differences, it is be-

cause that nature was manifesting itself under completely different conditions in the characters of the two artists. Indeed, if subjective attitudes and emotions were all that art aimed at expressing, then works of art produced by different masters would be little more than repetitions of each other's performance.

The truth is that what the artist wants to express is not an emotion or attitude *per se*, but objects or situations presented as meaningful. The final aim of art is to enrich and enhance our being by "involving" us in respect of situations and possibilities apprehended by the artist as significant. As the map of the environment, physical and social, cosmic and moral, changes through the agencies of scientific investigations, historical research, technology, etc., new meaningful situations for man arise, necessitating new valuations and valuational attitudes on his part. The artist becomes the explorer and revealer of the new environmental meanings, and the creator and spokesman of the attitudes appropriate to those meanings. An emotional attitude, in fact, is not something detachable from the cognising or experiencing of a meaning-situation; it is, as Dewey has suggested, a quality of the experience itself. As he puts it: 'Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions.'⁵

The aesthetic outlook of such modern thinkers as Dr. Richards seems, indeed, to be characterised by the decadent trait consisting in what Dr. Joad calls "the dropping of the object".⁶ Decadence, a condition or characteristic of the spiritual life of an individual or society, might be more accurately defined as the attitude of non-committal indifference towards what properly invites involvement, an unwillingness to exercise one's creative powers on the plea of unhealthy, escapist agnosticism.

It would be amazing indeed if such a major cultural activity as art had nothing to do with reality. In that case, like day dream or phantasy, creation of art would be of interest only to the person who indulged in it. If there be no subject matter which is intrinsically poetic, then it should be possible for a poet to write, *without any reference to the nobler situations of human life*, as great an epic on, say, the internal combustion engine as that written on Rāma by Vālmīki and the one on the Buddha by Aśvaghosha.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF ART

It is in virtue of its reference to reality, to something inherently interesting and significant, that art achieves objectivity and rises to the position of valid experience. The affective attitude that characterizes aesthetic experience realised in an art work can neither be defined nor transmitted except in relation to the situation represented or depicted by the artist through signs or symbols. The univer-

sal appeal of great art particularly literature and painting is due to the circumstance that, under the impulsion of their deeper nature operating disinterestedly, men and women tend to discover the same value-patterns in given aesthetic-moral situations, and to attach an identical significance to the orders and integrations of meanings produced by the artist.

The artist or poet endows his work with determinate meaning and significance by making all its component elements contribute to a single effect, definable by the type of valuational involvement which is sought to be produced. What the artist presents is primarily a perception or vision, or a situation which he wants to be perceived in the intended light. The meaning of the situation is thrown into relief by the drift of the relationships into which its components are arranged and ordered. The drift expresses itself as a demand for a proper evaluative attitude on the part of the reader or the observer.

All successful communication, whether in art or in reflective and scientific works, involves the inhibition or suspension of the processes of association. The role of the association of ideas as a determinant of the mind's workings has been unduly exaggerated by writers like Hume, who have failed to perceive the inherent purposiveness not only of the movements of the organised bodies but also of the operations of the minds. The perception of the causal connections in particular is due, not to the blind functioning of the laws of association, which should determine the expectations of different minds differently, but to the universal practical urgencies of the human organisms to adapt physical objects and energies to their manifold needs and requirements.

THE NATURE AND USE OF CRITICISM

The function of criticism is to analyse, interpret and evaluate the experience embodied in a work of art; its aim is to make the enjoyment of that work an articulate and conscious process.

All analysis is controlled by a purpose. The object of the critical analysis of an art-work (henceforth to be called a "poem") is to disclose or bring before the critical attention the factors which make it significant or valuable to us. The being of the poem consists in the "enjoyed experience" it embodies. What makes this experience valuable to the readers? And how valuable is that experience? These are the two pivotal questions to which the critic may and should seek the answer.

The "experience" may please or intrigue us by many types of qualities: by its vividness and imagery, its energy and intensity, its high seriousness and depth, its (power to induce) calm and tranquillity, its insight into the character of man, age or life in general,

its beauty, its pathos, etc. How does the critic bring home one or more of these qualities to us? Not by just mentioning them but by analysing the "poem" or "experience" in respect of the quality under reference. The analysis consists in separating the constituent factors which make up or illustrate that quality. There may be a quality which characterizes the whole poem; another which is characteristic only of some part or parts in it. Thus there may be humour here and there in a play which is not necessarily a humorous work. On the contrary, the perusal and analysis of the entire *Hamlet* alone can impress on us the success with which his reflective and/or feigned madness has been depicted.

Theorists of art have fought endless battles over the issue whether this or that quality constitutes the essential secret of the greatness of art. Vividness of imagery; energy; nobility and loftiness of tone; realism (naturalistic and socialist); organic unity; capacity to give pleasure; normality—all these characteristics of art-works have pressed through their respective votaries the claim to be regarded as the exclusive cause of artistic greatness. And those votaries have tended to understand and interpret the beauty and greatness of "poems" each in his own way. What should be our attitude towards these conflicting claims and counter-claims?

Before taking up this question I should like to define "interpretation", and show how it is pertinent for the assessment or evaluation of the poem. Interpretation consists in relating the analysed elements to the wider wholes in the historical-cultural environment. To interpret a poem (a lyric, a play, a novel) is to place it within the context of the cultural-historical *milieu* wherein it has made its appearance. Interpretation may also mean the tracing of the influences, contemporary and historical, that have determined the selection of materials (imagery, allusions, situations, etc.) and the mode of emphasis involved in the fashioning of the work under scrutiny. Briefly, by the interpretation of a poem is meant the attempt to connect it, both as an effect and as a cause, to the "culture", age and environment of the artist. For artistic creations are both the products of their cultural environment and also the moulders or modifiers of that environment.

Evidently the influence exerted by a poem on other poetic or literary creations, and on the tastes, morals, etc. of a people may be better assessed after the lapse of some years than at the time when it is first offered to the consumers. However, a penetrating critic may be able to foresee some of its likely influences in the light of his knowledge of poems written in the past. And a critic or reader with historical experience may be able to give a juster estimate of a literary movement or vogue than one whose information is confined to only contemporary literature.

A masterpiece belonging to the past can seldom be appraised apart from the influence it has had historically on the tastes of the people and on the practice of other artists. There is a weightier reason why no poem can be properly assessed by the reader who has not known other poems. An evaluative judgment in every case is a relative if not a comparative judgment: it is relative to the "taste and maturity" of the reader, which have inevitable reference to the type of productions he has been studying and enjoying. No person can attain any significant degree of competence, not to speak of expertness, for judging a new poem without having read and enjoyed some other poems before. This implies that the critic *has* to go outside the given work of art in order to be able to judge it. Ultimately, I can judge a poem only by temporarily living and enjoying the experience it embodies, and I can assess this experience only in the light of other kindred experiences, which I might have felt to be higher or lower in richness and quality than, or of the same standard as, the experience realised in the given poem. Ultimately, the standard or standards which important critics should and do employ consist in the overall feelings or impressions which acknowledged masterpieces of various types leave on their responsive and trained sensibilities. All generalisations as to the nature and criteria of great art are but imperfect echoes or partial formulations of these feelings and impressions.

A poem, then, needs both to be analysed and interpreted, in the sense indicated above, if it is to be properly assessed. The greatness of the poem has *something* to do with the age whose experience and sensibility it attempts to fashion and represent; it has *something* to do with the history, previous and subsequent, of the art of which it is an example: with the history of its techniques, its themes and its varied moral and emotional influences. Above all, it has *something* to do with the "involvements" in terms of attitudes of evaluation, action and enjoyment which are reflected in the creative social and spiritual history of the artist's country or community, and probably also of mankind.

This "involvement" is a continual and advancing process, depending on the progressive discovery and definition of the environment, socio-technological and cosmic, on the one hand and the vision of the possibilities of life in that environment on the other. The involvement has as many sides as our experience has dimensions, and its level and quality is a correlate of the breadth and vitality of the vision that inspires our relations with the world-environment. Ultimately, the involvement is an expression of the creative restlessness which characterises our apprehension of values, or of the possibilities of the realisation of values.

It is not possible to adequately define and delineate these

involvements in terms of the subjective attitudes such as materialism, idealism, optimism, pessimism, etc., for the quality, say of the pessimism, of one writer may be very different from that of another. The quality depends on the degree of the maturity of the artist's vision, which is definable by the supporting evidence of significant or expressive details incorporated by the artist in his work. These details and their arrangements change from one work of art to another, and from the productions of one age to another. They change according to the changing views of life and the world characteristic of different artists and of different ages. The variety and richness of experiential material makes even writers and artists of the same period different in the expression of attitudes peculiar to their times. The expressions of attitudes are more or less mature and thorough, more or less inclusive, and more or less representative of the age, depending ultimately no less on the ontological subtlety and sweep of the artist's imagination, than on his inventiveness in respect of techniques which enable him to achieve individuality and emphasis.

However, it is wrong to suppose that the individuality of a poem or a writer is purely a matter of technique, style, language, etc. Recently great emphasis has been laid by both poets and critics on language. There can be no doubt that poets tend to devote great attention to language and they enjoy exploring its possibilities. Nevertheless, it seems that language serves rather to distinguish the poetry of one age or epoch from that of another, than to mark off one poet from another contemporary poet. The distinctive individuality of writers and poets of the same period is constituted chiefly by traits other than their language : by their differing predilections as to imagery, areas of experience, problems, ideologies, etc. It is these traits which define the more important aspects of a writer's work, in virtue of which it attains or fails to attain permanence.

Even the poem with the quality of endurance may fail to appeal to all types of readers. In general, we tend to like a poem which enables us to put to creative use our own more or less chaotic impressions and experiences, or impressions and experiences having a measure of kinship with those we have already realised. Only the greatest works of art and literature have the power to appeal to observers and readers with widely different experiential capacities and histories.

This explains why different works of art may have varying appeals to different classes of readers. Some may have innate preference for lyrics, others for dramatic or fictional writings. There is another reason why even men of taste should tend to patronise different works of art. Like the personalities those works may be significant or great for different reasons. Men tend to admire and

adore different types of heroes; they may similarly tend to admire different kinds of greatness in art. Some may prefer intensity, others depth; some vividness of imagery, others seriousness of tone and meaning. In these respects different ages may differ as much as different individuals. It follows that only a critic with a catholic taste and wide experience of classical works may be able to do justice to different kinds of artistic greatness. Meanwhile, we should be content to recognise a plurality of qualities or values which bestow greatness on art, even as we recognise a variety of qualities which constitute greatness of such different historical personages as the Buddha and Jesus Christ, Plato and Śaṅkara, Beethoven and Shakespeare.

In conclusion it may be pointed out that while short literary pieces, individual poems, etc. may be understandable without elaborate interpretations, the total achievement of an artist cannot possibly be assessed without reference not only to the work of other artists, antecedent and contemporary, but also to the problems and ideas peculiar to the age and culture of the artist and to problems and questionings characteristic of civilized minds in all ages and climes. Significant criticism inevitably aims at a *relational* comprehension of the poem or poetic experience. It is the business of criticism to separate the elements of a particular artistic experience by analysis, to classify those elements, and to describe them in general, comparable terms. By finally submitting the whole composed of those elements to evaluative judgment, criticism contributes to the qualitative improvement and progress of human experience and sensibility. These functions of criticism are essentially philosophic and criticism is in the main a philosophic activity. It differs from aesthetics, a recognised branch of philosophy, merely in this, that while the latter directs its attention to the general forms of art, criticism proper has to concern itself with particular examples of artistic creation.

CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHY AS A CULTURAL ACTIVITY

NOTHING betrays more pathetically the cultural plight of the modern man than the fact of his radical uncertainty as to the meaning and significance of his most cherished forms of activity. He reads and occasionally writes poetry, without having the least idea why poetry should be regarded as an important human concern. He behaves morally and passes moral judgments, but he is not at all certain that these operations have any serious import. To the logical positivists poetry as well as moral pronouncements are nothing but expressions of feelings couched in words that are utterly devoid of "objective" meaning. Philosophy, in a similar fashion, is an enterprise wholly unconcerned with reality, its sole function being to facilitate the recognition of logical equivalence among sentences.

Man differs from animals in being self-conscious; he liberates himself by assigning reasons for his activities. To assign such reason is, among other things, a function of philosophy. It is because contemporary man has no adequate conception of philosophy that he is unable to assign its proper place to any of his more important activities. Man, in other words, can be liberated only by philosophy. And Philosophy can liberate man by first asking the question: What is philosophy? What is the function and value of philosophy in the economy of human life, and of human culture?

Philosophy has been conceived in the past as (a) an attempt to investigate the nature of reality or ultimate reality as distinguished from the appearances; (b) an attempt to determine the nature of the ultimate or first cause of the world; (c) completely unified knowledge consisting in the formulation of such wide generalisations (e.g., the Spencerian law of cosmic evolution) as would comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of the different sciences. The first two definitions fail to distinguish philosophy from the sciences, which have divided up between them different areas of reality, and different kinds of causes, for investigation. Sciences, too, endeavour to know reality as against appearances: physics, according to Eddington, draws a distinction between the real and the apparent table. Physics proceeds by formulating deductive theories, which have the advantage of being experimentally testable. This

advantage is not enjoyed by deductive metaphysics, which, therefore, stands suspect in our time. As for the third definition, it loads philosophy with too ambitious an aim, which is not realizable in practice. How can laws so disparate as those of mathematical physics, history, sociology, etc. be deducible from the same metaphysical generalisation? How can an *exact* quantitative law of physics, for instance, be deduced from a vague, qualitative principle formulated by the philosopher?

The analytical philosophers of our time repudiate and reject deductive metaphysics of the traditional types. We are, on the whole, inclined to sympathise with this rejection. However, there are indications of attempts being made to revive deductive metaphysics in our own time. Surprisingly enough, this is being done by some of the logical positivists themselves, the arch-enemies of metaphysical thinking. Thus the thesis of physicalism, which is being sought to be defended by the sponsors of the movement for "unified science", is, at bottom, a metaphysical thesis. The programme of the physicalists is twofold: First, they want to reduce the terms of the social and biological sciences to those of the physical sciences. Secondly, they think it will be possible to reduce the statements or laws of biology, behaviouristics, or sociology to physicalistic statements or laws.

'The question of the unity of science', says Carnap, 'is meant here as a problem of the logic of science, not of ontology . . . a question . . . concerning the logical relationship between the terms and laws of the various branches of science'.¹ The rules of logic, however, apply only within the same universe of discourse; no contradiction or logical dependence can be shown to subsist as between propositions belonging to qualitatively different frames of reference. As Mr. Waismann points out: ' . . . the application of logic is limited in an important sense . . . the known relations of logic can only hold between statements which belong to a *homogeneous domain*; or that the deductive nexus never extends beyond the limits of such a domain'.² Thus, it would appear, the programme of the physicalists falls beyond the confines of purely logical investigations; it is, in fact, metaphysical. The logical positivists, it seems, have no objection to metaphysics provided the latter is used to reduce the non-physical to the physical and thereby lend support to their special brand of materialism.

UNIFICATION THROUGH REDUCTION

The programme of the physicalists, in fact, is one among the numerous attempts that have been made by philosophers from time to time to reduce the multiple aspects of things to a single one, regarded as constituting their essential nature. In this direction,

consisting in the direct records of the given. The statements of equivalence made by philosophy, according to them, were analytical.

In his later phase Wittgenstein propounded another view of the business of philosophy, which gradually became influential. According to this view philosophy should solve puzzles arising out of confused linguistic usages. Doing philosophy is not offering solutions to problems, answering questions, putting forward theories, or trying to discover some elusive facts; it is rather grappling with puzzlement, trying as it were to find one's way out of a maze. Wittgenstein suggests that this can be achieved by bringing words back 'from their metaphysical to their everyday use' . . . (*Investigations*, I, 116), though elsewhere he tells us that what he wants is 'to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view . . .' to which end he would 'consistently be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language *easily* make us overlook'. (I, 132-*Italics ours*). It seems there is an ambivalence in Wittgenstein's attitude with respect to the way in which philosophy should deal with language.

We do not find any of the above descriptions of philosophy adequate and satisfying. An adequate and acceptable view of philosophy should satisfy the following three conditions: (1) it should clearly mark out the province of philosophy by distinguishing it from the sciences; (2) it should assign to philosophy a role at once specific and worthy; and (3) it should indicate the nature of philosophical method and proof. In addition, a satisfactory view of philosophy should be true to its history, *i.e.*, should enable us to detect the elements of truth contained in various descriptions of philosophy given by important historical thinkers.

The views in question conspicuously fail to conform to the last condition: They would scarcely find it possible to accommodate thinkers like Śāṅkara and Spinoza, Hegel and Nietzsche in the company of philosophers. Nor do they seem to meet the other requirements mentioned above. Those who want to assign to philosophy the business of describing the world of facts, should explain why that job may not rather be left to the sciences. Or, is there a special realm of facts, unexplored by the existing sciences, which is to constitute the province of philosophy, and which can be studied only by methods peculiar to philosophy?

The logical positivists would make philosophy a discipline auxiliary to the sciences, its function being the "analysis" or "clarification" of the scientific statements. In practice, this analysis has tended to assume the form of attempts to derive complicated scientific statements from direct reports of the senses, thereby contribut-

ing to the confirmation of the verification principle. The business of philosophy, it seems, is to go on strengthening the positivist thesis through a series of analyses!

Surely it cannot be the aim of philosophy to describe *all* the facts that make up the world, or to apprehend or reveal the structures of *all* sorts of facts, particularly when those facts are held, as they are done by logical atomism, to be distinct and separate from one another. As Mr. Black observes 'the philosopher is not "an extra-cautious scientist"—trying to talk like the scientist, but more carefully and about everything'.⁵

Nor can the philosopher be expected to busy himself *indifferently* with the elucidation of any and every proposition or type of proposition, relating to any and every fact or type of fact. The philosopher must be permitted to exercise his choice, both with respect to facts and to propositions, if he is to preserve his sanity. And a correct view of philosophy should indicate *the principle on which the choice is to be exercised*. Whether philosophy has to deal with facts or with propositions (about facts), it should be clearly specified what sorts of facts or propositions fall within its purview. The reason why analytic philosophy fails to enunciate any such principle is that it has no clear conception of the specific aim and purpose of philosophy. It seems to believe that philosophy is nothing but a discipline subservient to physical and other sciences.

The later views of Wittgenstein seem to save philosophy from its position of subordination to science. The business of philosophy is neither to reveal the structures of facts nor to elucidate the statements of science and common sense; its proper function is the solution of linguistic puzzles. As to the genesis of these puzzles or confusions Wittgenstein remarks that they 'arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work'. (*Investigations*, I, 132) It is not clear, however, why a philosopher should at all attend to language when it is idling, nor why this activity of his be taken seriously and regarded as important. Others write as if the puzzles or paradoxes such as those relating to motion presented by Zeno constituted the sole reason for the existence of philosophy. In that case, it would appear, the discontinuance of the highly inconvenient study of such philosophers, if not the total destruction of philosophical libraries, would be the ideal solution. These accounts of the genesis of philosophical problems or puzzles seem to make that discipline a mere aberration or an adventitious property of the human mind, a mere accident of man's intellectual history without any serious meaning or purpose. Philosophy so conceived can obviously have no future, not, at any rate, important future. For we believe that philosophy cannot survive unless it continually

goes on asking new and significant questions, and not merely rest content with the solution of old puzzles. A correct view of philosophy should be able to show how it constitutes a real and serious need of the civilised man.

The view in question is open to another serious objection. Is it the function of philosophy to go on solving puzzles as they happen severally to present themselves, without caring to inter-relate the different solutions? Should not philosophy rather proceed systematically to collect its various problems and to try to tackle them together? Ought not philosophy to aspire to constitute "connected knowledge", in the manner of scientific knowledge? When Wittgenstein opines that 'there is not a philosophical method', but methods, 'like different therapies' (I, 133), he forgets that different therapies flow from a single science of medicine, which constitutes more or less a connected body of knowledge.

Analytical philosophers, old and new, have not cared to raise the question of the nature of philosophical proof. Thus, while suggesting his peculiar analyses of ethical sentences in his *Language, Truth and Logic*, Prof. A. J. Ayer did not betray any suspicion that those analyses might be wrong. Nor did he raise the issue how a particular piece of analysis could be tested as to its rightness. It was curiously supposed by these philosophers that a proposition could be analysed without any reference to the intention of the likely speaker, or any reference to the context. As Mr. E. F. Carritt has noted, Ayer argues that the sentences they (*i.e.* those announcing an obligation or passing a moral judgment) pronounce 'cannot mean what he (Mr. Ayer) allows them to mean'.⁶

Recently Friedrich Waismann has come out with the declaration that in philosophy not only there are no proofs, but no theorems, and no questions which can be decided, Yes or No.⁷ And yet, if philosophical statements are to escape the charge of being arbitrary, there should be ways and processes, more or less definable, which make the former appear at least plausible.

These inevitably brief and inadequate references to older and recent views about philosophy are intended to introduce the reader to the complexity of the problem on the one hand and to the confused state of the current approaches to it on the other. Up to date the analytical philosophers do not appear to have made up their minds as to the nature of philosophical statements, which are variously described now as "nonsense", now as analytic, and now as proposals to alter linguistic usage. All these philosophers, however, seem to be agreed that philosophical propositions are in some sense about language and not about facts. We shall see reasons to believe that they are about facts of a special kind.

THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY

We may safely begin by saying that philosophy is properly concerned with "concepts", with modes of conceiving, rather than with words or things. Philosophy concerns itself with words only insofar as they are instruments of conceiving, and with things inasmuch as they figure in our conceptions. Further, philosophy does not concern itself with *all* concepts or all modes of conceiving, but only with those which are regarded as being *intrinsically* interesting and valuable. Philosophy is not concerned with the ordering of the external environment through concepts. The concepts with which philosophy deals may, and frequently do, arise in man's contact with his environment, but this contact is not what directly interests the philosopher. What interests him is that aspect of the concept which makes it aesthetically interesting or valuable to the cogniser; which contributes, in other words, *to the excellence of the concept as a mode of experiencing or organising experience*.

The philosopher's approach to concepts or modes of conceiving, then, is evaluative without being utilitarian. Philosophy deals with, dissects or analyses concepts in order that it may be able finally to evaluate or appraise them. Further, the conceptual modes with which philosophy deals are general or typical; they refer to types or orders of experience, rather than to particular items of experience.

The subject-matter of philosophy is that total conceptual or symbolic life of man which is desired and valued for its own sake. Before developing this point it will be useful to compare and contrast the functioning of philosophy with that of science.

Science (and here I am thinking mainly of physical science) concerns itself with two types of concepts, those embodying the experimental data, and those evolved in order to correlate or explain those data. I call the records of experimental observations concepts, for two reasons. Inasmuch as an experiment can be repeated, it expresses or exemplifies a class or series of similar phenomena, and not a single phenomenon. Secondly, all experimental records are generalized records of several or many particular observations made by the same or different observers in one or more laboratories. Two more reasons may be given for treating the experimental records as concepts. 'Every observational or experimental measurement', Max Planck informs us, 'first acquires its meaning through the significance which a theory gives it . . . the finest and most direct measurements . . . have to be corrected again and again before they can be employed for any practical (or theoretical?) purpose'.⁸ Moreover, logical connections which a theory seeks to embody can be established only among concepts. It follows

that theoretical physics, too, deals with concepts. However, the point relevant for our present purpose is this : that *the experimental records are contemplated by the scientist in an axiologically neutral spirit*. Philosophy, therefore, does not concern itself with concepts of science embodying experimental data. On the other hand, the explanatory concepts evolved by the scientist are considered by him to be *important and valuable*, inasmuch as they claim to delineate the structure of reality reflected in the experimental data. Philosophy, therefore, may legitimately concern itself with these latter concepts, and analyse them with a view to evaluating them. While the philosopher's analysis of scientific concept will be determined by this final purpose which is its evaluation, the process of evaluation conducted by him must have reference to the professed aim of the scientist himself. In this connection two general observations may be made. The philosopher concerns himself not so much with this or that explanatory concept of science, as with the general approach or mode of conceiving of the scientist exemplified in one or more concepts. Secondly, it may be noted, the philosopher examines the explanatory mechanism of the scientist mainly with a view to determining the extent or degree of its excellence. The characteristic excellence of the scientific activity as embodied in its explanatory mechanism is termed validity. Philosophy, it follows, examines a type of scientific theorising mainly with a view to determining the extent or degree of validity which may be legitimately claimed by it.

It may be objected that the scientists themselves are constantly scrutinizing the claims made on behalf of different theories, in which enterprise they scarcely need the services of the philosopher. Moreover, the philosopher is hardly fitted by his training to pronounce on the merits of the scientific theories. Our reply is as follows. The scientist assesses the claims of different theories, partly if not wholly, with reference to the experimental data. He may also examine the neatness, simplicity and internal consistency of the theory, as also its harmony with other theories. The philosopher, on the contrary, has, *qua* philosopher, no access to the experimental data. Nor can he sit in judgment on the mathematical and related merits of a scientific formulation. However, the philosopher is the only person who can assess the merits of a general scientific approach to reality relatively to other approaches exemplified in the practices of investigators in other fields, as well as to approaches of a non-scientific kind. Thus, the philosopher may scrutinize the concept of causation, or correlation, as employed by the physicist, and assess its merits relatively to other formulations of the same concept employed, say, by the social scientists. The philosopher, in other words, is the only person who can *place the theoretical enter-*

prise called *physical science* in the context of the total cognitive enterprise of man, thereby contributing to the comprehension of the general characteristics of the latter and the special features of the former. Secondly, the philosopher is the only person who can pronounce on the ultimate worth of the scientific enterprise as viewed in the total context of the value-producing activities of man. These remarks explain, incidentally, why philosophy cannot be regarded as a discipline auxiliary to science, whose sole function is the elucidation or clarification of the scientific statements. Another incidental observation may be recorded. Since the philosophical analysis of science is not concerned with the improved description or correlation of observational or experimental data, statements made by philosophy cannot be verified with reference to those data.

We have explained the relation of philosophy to science. We shall now attempt to explain and exemplify the more general description of philosophy given before. All concepts or modes of conceiving are embodied by man in symbols. Man's conceptual life, indeed, is coextensive with his symbolic life. As Susanne Langer remarks 'symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are *vehicles for the conception of objects . . . and it is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly "mean".*'¹⁰ This view of symbols, incidentally, contradicts the earlier Wittgensteinian notion of propositions as pictures of facts; and renders futile much of the discussion concerning general and negative propositions, and facts corresponding to those propositions, to be met with in Russell's lectures on logical atomism. Even ostensive symbols do not refer to bare, presented particulars. Thus, the word 'red' refers to a family of shades of a particular hue, and any ostensive reference through the word 'red' inevitably involves the notion of similarity. Likewise, the logically proper name 'this' does not signify the total presented object with all its properties, but the object as it is seen by and known to the observer.

Now modes of conceiving are facts (not, of course, in Wittgensteinian sense, but as occurrences) or processes. By being symbolized, they do not cease to be parts of the history of one or more subjects. *All concepts and propositions are facts in time.* Only, when we discuss them logically, we ignore their temporal aspect, concerning ourselves exclusively with their intentional or referential aspect. When I am engaged in considering an hypothesis or view, that view, a unit of life-process itself, presents itself to me as a candidate for being cherished and included in *my way of seeing things*, as a part of that sector of my cognitive consciousness which I regard as valid and valuable. It is a peculiarity of symbolized modes of conceiving or experiencing that they can present themselves in the capacity of such candidates to more than one mind.

Experience, insofar as it is symbolized, tends to have a life independent of this or that mind, though not independent of all minds.

Since the symbolic life studied by philosophy comes to form part of the human psyche, philosophy may be regarded as a species of self-knowledge. However, the self that philosophy studies is not the individual self. *It is the self constituted by the shared symbolic life of man.* This self is a historically continuous and growing entity. Another peculiarity of this self is that its being consists in being known or enjoyed. A mass of symbols is not yet life; it is life in abeyance, or potential life. It is enlivened into conscious life through the contemplative activity of a self which is already alive, and is in the process of creative self-expansion. The symbols constituting a poem or a theory become parts of a living psyche when the latter incorporates them as units in the totality of its significant awareness.

THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy may be defined as the attempt to analyse, interpret and evaluate the general forms of the significant symbolic life of man. This life is necessarily shared, impersonal or universal life. It constitutes its own excuse for being, and is the repository of what may be termed the ultimate values. Since the life constitutes man's culture, philosophy may be described as the descriptive and critical study of human culture. Philosophy is the attempt of the cultural consciousness of man to attain self-articulation and self-awareness.

Philosophy concerns, or should concern, itself with the general forms of all those symbolized conceptions, or experiences, which are valued as ends by at least some competent minds. All such experiences claim some sort of validity and/or aesthetic worth. By the aesthetic worth of an experience I mean that characteristic or aspect of it which makes it significant or interesting, positively or negatively, to the experiencing subject otherwise than as a means to another experience. A scientific theory may have validity as well as aesthetic worth. Insofar as it claims validity, its value is relative to the observational expectations it does or does not fulfil; insofar as it is aesthetically satisfying, it may be neater and simpler than a rival theory. Artistic, moral and religious experiences, it seems, are valued primarily for their aesthetic worth. *However, critical remarks about these experiences lay claim to validity like scientific statements.* These remarks report, not existential facts, but preference, which may be regarded as facts of a special type.

Philosophy seeks to analyse the nature of scientific thinking, artistic creation and moral and religious life with a view to determining the character and criteria of the characteristic excellence of each. It aims, in other words, to discover the principles or criteria

by which the relatively higher, maturer or more adequate forms of the activities or experiences embodied in art, scientific thinking, etc., could be distinguished from their inferior, less mature or less adequate forms. Viewed in this light philosophy would appear to be *the instrument of the qualitative improvement of man* as he expresses himself in his higher cultural activities.

The function of philosophy, then, is to analyze and interpret *the general forms of the value-bearing consciousness of man*, as embodied in different sets or kinds of symbols. Since philosophical activity is itself a form of such consciousness, philosophy seeks to understand its own nature as well. The peculiar value pursued by philosophy itself is validity. Philosophy aims at discovering the *true* criteria of the excellence of the aforementioned types of activities or experiences. Man creates and enjoys art, lives moral and religious life, and indulges in argument and reasoning. He also occupies himself with the assessment or appraisal of these activities. The function of philosophy is to give proper form and direction mainly to these latter activities.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Philosophical analysis is controlled by the philosophical purpose, which is *the comprehension of the value-aspect of the concept or conceptual (symbolic) life being analysed*. It may be doubted if philosophy can usefully undertake the analysis of beauty as experienced in nature; that experience is bound to vary from man to man. However, analysis of the nature of beauty as symbolised in art is specifically the function of philosophy. While criticism is directed on particular works of art, aesthetics concerns itself with the study of the general features of artistic experience. Philosophical analysis of art should disclose the factors which contribute to the distinctive beauty or excellence of a work of art; it is none of its concern to indicate the *causes*, psycho-biographical or social, which lead to the production of art. For this reason we consider most of the pronouncements about art and art-works by the Freudian critics to be irrelevant from the viewpoint of the philosophy as well as the criticism of art. The theory of repressed (infantile?) wishes, while giving a more or less acceptable account of the urge for artistic creation, fails conspicuously to take notice of those distinctive features of art which make it aesthetically satisfying to men of taste.

Philosophy may seek to analyse the nature of art, morality, etc. as also its own nature. The analysis may involve *creation* of concepts or explanatory principles designed to indicate or explain the specific features of the type of consciousness or experience under scrutiny. Or it may involve redefining of the concepts already

in use, when those concepts signify relatively better known aspects of cognition or experience, and are being already employed as explanatory principles. Examples of this latter type of concepts are : freedom, causation, justice, etc. The need of redefining these concepts arises from the fact that they are not constructed out of known relations in the manner of mathematical concepts or even scientific concepts; they are framed, rather, as attempts to interpret numerous phenomena which are but vaguely apprehended. This may be illustrated with reference to the concept of causation. Is causation reducible to regular sequence, or regular correlations? It may be sufficient for the purpose of the physical scientist to conceive causation in either of these two ways, for he is concerned with events whose direction is a matter of indifference to him. Direction of events, however, is of utmost significance to the historian.

Successful philosophical analysis of causation, thus, could not be based on observations made by the physicist, or on features of causal situations noticed by the historian. That analysis would not merely sum up the heterogeneous features of the causal situations observed by investigators working in different sciences, physical, biological and social; rather, it would seek to reconstruct the *conceptualised observations or interpretations of the phenomena in such a way that the latter may assume the form of an intelligible whole.*

Philosophical analysis, in fact, is inseparable from philosophical explanation. In philosophy, the process of analysing a concept is identical with that of framing or constructing an explanatory principle. A philosophical concept aims at picturing successfully a certain field or aspect of experience. This picturing is effected by *showing that the field or aspect in question constitutes a self-consistent and intelligible system.* Thus a philosophical concept serves the same purpose as an explanatory principle or hypothesis. A philosophical explanation, in fact, starts with a definition or defined concept; it ends by placing the initial concept in a system of connected definitions.

Analysis of a concept may also be undertaken with a view to examining its adequacy or validity. It is in this spirit that Bradley analyses the notions of space, time, cause, etc. While analysis proper is constructive, and aims at evolving definitions or explanatory concepts, analysis of the second type is part of the critical or evaluative function of philosophy.

The analysis of a philosophical concept, in fact, is a sort of venture. It attributes a certain structure to an area of cultural experience or activity, and this attribution is of the nature of an hypothetical construction. Philosophical analysis of the positive type aims at making this construction systematic and coherent.

Thus the process of the constructive analysis of a concept cannot be separated from that of its justification. To accept a piece of philosophical analysis to be correct is generally tantamount to accepting the analysed concept as valid. Thus a successful analysis of the terms causation, duty, etc. would be indistinguishable from their justification. However, a clear and consistent definition of the term "Absolute" could be considered valid only in terms of the system of which it formed a part, e.g. the system of a Śaṅkara, a Hegel or a Bradley. On the other hand, a definition or piece of analysis will have universal validity if it succeeds in systematising the relevant area of cultural experience.

INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION

Interpretation everywhere consists in critical interconnection, i.e. in the processes of comparing, distinguishing, contrasting, etc. Thus the Vedāntists seek to distinguish their *Brahman* from *Īśvara*, as Bradley does his *Absolute* from *God*. Logicians similarly distinguish between a *condition* and *cause*. Secondly, a concept may be interpreted by being assigned a place in a system of concepts. This may be done either for the sake of a higher level of intelligibility, or for the comprehension of a qualitative order or hierarchy. Examples of the latter will be found in our account of obligations. As an instance of the former, various types of causation and correlation may be arranged in a system, elucidating the varied types of scientific explanation. Interpretation of the types of causation may lead the philosopher to declare that causation in the realm of meanings studied by the humanistic sciences has nothing in common with physical causation.

In our view statements cannot be analysed; they can only be interpreted. To interpret a statement or proposition is to draw out its implications; it may also involve indicating its place in a system of statements.

The final and most important function of philosophy is evaluation. Having analysed the nature and character of different modes of cultural experience or activity philosophy seeks to evolve the principles or criteria by which the various historical manifestations of those modes may be evaluated. Philosophy is also concerned to define the overall or ultimate purpose of man's value-producing activities and to assign its proper place to each of those activities with reference to that purpose.

Having completed our description of the various functions of philosophy, we may now briefly touch upon the nature of philosophical method and proof. Philosophy belongs to the group of disciplines called the human studies, its subject-matter being the general, symbolised forms of the value-bearing consciousness of

man. Philosophical statements, therefore, can be examined and tested with reference not to sense-experience but to the relevant area of the symbolised experience. The activity called philosophy is both critical and constructive. On the one hand it seeks to expose the inconsistencies and inadequacies of certain approaches to facts and values; on the other it attempts to formulate new and more satisfactory approaches to those phenomena. What exactly is involved in these activities, particularly the second type of activity?

The two types of activity are well exemplified in Plato's *Republic*. The Platonic Socrates manages to examine and expose several inadequate conceptions of justice, and even to silence Thrasymachus and others, by brief exercises in formal and destructive criticism. However, when it comes to proving his special point (that justice is more advantageous than injustice), Socrates feels that nothing short of the construction of an ideal republic with lengthy discourses on the nature of the soul, on education, on the working of various constitutions, and what not—in fact, nothing short of speaking out the whole treatise of *Republic*—would really make an effective case for his thesis. Here, then, is almost a perfect example of a philosophical proof. (I say "almost", for the proof is still incomplete, and even ambiguous, since Plato does not pause to elucidate the various meanings of the term "advantageous" and draws too much on the analogy between the individual and the state). Other examples of philosophical proof are the systems of Spinoza and Hegel. In general, *philosophy seeks to prove the adequacy of a concept or conceptual approach by giving to the concept, in terms of its special purpose, a comprehensive and consistent content*. It may be recalled here that F. H. Bradley considered the consistency or harmony and the comprehensiveness of a concept to be the measures of the degree of its truth. Without accepting the metaphysical implications of Bradley's views, it may be asserted that philosophical reflection does and should aim at evolving consistent and comprehensive pictures with respect to the areas of experience under review.

THE SYNTHESIZING FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

This leads us to consider a related issue concerning the nature of philosophy. In what sense, if any, may philosophy be regarded as having a synthetical function, or as synthesis of human knowledge? Such a function has been traditionally assigned, and is assigned by competent thinkers even today, to philosophy. Thus Dr. Broad observes: ' . . . philosophy involves at least two closely connected activities, which I call synopsis and synthesis. Synopsis is the deliberate viewing together of aspects of human experience which (are) generally kept apart by plain men . . . synthesis is the

attempt to supply a coherent set of concepts and principles which shall cover satisfactorily all the regions of fact which have been viewed synoptically.¹⁰

Now it may be doubted if philosophy can ever supply the sort of set of concepts that Prof. Broad envisages. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such a set would be different from the first principles formulated by classical thinkers like Spinoza, Hegel and Spencer. There is no denying the fact, however, that philosophers tend to take a whole or synoptic view of the human experiences or the phenomena of the universe. I suggest that they take such a view with a purpose which is different from the objectives pursued by the scientists. The scientist is interested primarily in the causal determination of the phenomena; he investigates the laws which govern the occurrence or appearance of diverse phenomena. The philosopher, on the contrary, is interested in the processes and experiences that are bearers of values. He explores the various regions of experience with a view to ascertaining the possibilities of the realization of values by man. The philosopher is not interested in establishing causal inter-connections among various orders of phenomena. Philosophers have frequently behaved as if what they were after was the first cause or the ultimate reality; what they have actually been seeking is *the condition of existence or the arrangement of experiences which may be regarded as being surpassingly significant or valuable*. Some of the greatest philosophies and philosophers of the past, I believe, can be interpreted in conformity with the above thesis. Thus the *Brahman* of the Vedānta cannot properly be described as the cause or the first cause of the world, for the causal category is inapplicable to a being which is transcendent and immutable. Moreover, the appearance of the world being illusory, it cannot properly be said to have originated at all. The Vedānta, in fact, is hardly interested in tracing the origin or explaining the creation of the universe; its supreme interest lies in defining the condition called *mokṣa* or *Brahmabhāva* and in telling the spiritual aspirant (*Sādhaka*) how that condition can be reached.¹¹ The *Brahman* or ultimate reality of the Vedānta is identical with the *summum bonum* or the highest good which the human beings can attain.

Kant has similarly refused to identify his God with the first cause; the causal concept, according to him, is applicable only *within* the phenomenal world. The Buddhist *Nirvāṇa* is as much a name of the highest stage or goal to be reached by man as of the Absolute or the highest principle. Thus Nāgārjuna, in the opening verse of his *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, describes it very much in the vein in which the idealists describe their Absolute.¹² By no stretch of imagination can the *Nirvāṇa* be identified with a first cause. The

Hegelian Idea similarly represents the condition or stage of the highest consciousness; it is difficult to see how it can be considered to be the generating or the causal principle.

On the other hand, when the classical thinkers declare this world to be an appearance, or in some sense unreal or less real, they frequently mean to assert that the pleasures and triumphs of our earthly existence are transient and short-lived, and lack enduring value or significance. Thus the Platonic Theory of Ideas, as illustrated by the allegory of the cave, seeks to detach the minds of men from the domain of the sensible, and to turn them towards the intelligible world of forms. A similar explanation has actually been offered of the Vedāntic insistence on the unreality of the world. Thus Viṭṭhaleśopādhyāya, the last of the important sub-commentators on the *Advaitasiddhi*—a work whose avowed purpose is the establishment of the phenomenal character of the world—observes that 'the main aim of the Advaita doctrine of the unreality of the world is . . . the instilling of the feeling of disgust in worldly affairs'. 'The attachment to the world', we are told, 'does not melt away so easily by the determination of the *transitoriness* of the world, as by the knowledge of its *falsity*'.¹³ Long before the above dialectical treatise was written, Kumārila, the great realist, while criticising the subjective idealists, attributed a similar motive to the Buddha in preaching the falsity of the world. 'As a matter of fact,' he says, 'this denial of (the reality of the external) objects . . . was declared by the Buddha, with the sole object of alienating the affections (of men from such worldly objects); and somehow or other, some people . . . fell into a mistake (and accepted it to its utmost extent as the denial of all external substratum of cognitions').¹⁴

The synoptic and synthesizing functions of philosophy, we are maintaining, are related to its character as the study of values.

Contrary to the prevailing analytic prejudices we believe that philosophy can never abandon its habit of taking a 'synoptic view' of experience and of indulging in synthesis. These operations of philosophy, however, should now be consciously confined to defining the possibilities of man's cultural life, *i.e.*, to exploring the prospects of his cognitive and aesthetic, ethical and religious experiences and activities. Driven by his creative impulse, man is constantly looking for new possibilities of his realizing the highest values. It should be the business of philosophy to give to this quest direction as well as an ordered form.

As observed earlier, propositions belonging to different universes of discourse cannot have logical inter-connections. However, since the various interests of man, reflected in those universes of discourse, coexist in the same human personality, the assumptions,

methods and conclusions of the different sciences come to have a bearing one on the other. *The unity or synthesis of the various departments of human knowledge and experience, insofar as it can be worked out by philosophy, is axiological rather than logical.* Philosophy cannot hold together into a coherent system the different discourses, scientific and aesthetic, moral and religious, except in the forms of a series of graded or comparable values.

These remarks have a pertinence in relation to the "Ontological Pluralism" which was advocated by us in the first chapter. In what sense, if any, it may be asked, may the physicist's account of the physical world be taken to be truer than the common-sense view? Do the chairs and tables and the human beings *really* exist? Or, are the latter merely the appearances of a more fundamental reality consisting of the electrons, protons, etc.? Our reply to these disturbing queries is as follows. No theory of the universe, scientific or philosophical, can deny objectivity or reality to the objects of everyday experience without stultifying itself. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the physicist's description of the world is the only description which is veridical, and that all other descriptions, including not only those given by painters and poets but also that offered by common-sense, are erroneous. All that the scientist can legitimately claim is this: that, for certain purposes, *his* description of the world affords better insight into the workings of nature than the so-called common-sense description, or other descriptions. The admitted superiority of a particular kind of description of a region of experience will be found, on close scrutiny, to be a reflection of the more fundamental and enduring character of the interests which that description subserves. Thus the chemist's description of an explosive or a poisonous gas is supposed to be important because it leads men to have power. The physicist's way of looking at the world derives prestige mainly from the practical successes which that way has made possible. However, when there are guests to be seated and fed, insistence on the physicist's view of chairs, and of bread and butter, will be found to be highly disturbing.

Scientific account of the world occupies the same place of privilege among various factual descriptions of the world as the motive of power does among the hierarchy of human motives. Nay more: science contributes not only to the power but also to the well-being of man, by enabling him to produce more wealth. Science, indeed, constitutes the main basis or support on which modern civilization rests. To admit this, however, is not to deny that other cultural activities of man, *i.e.* the humanities and the humanistic sciences, are not equally valuable. In fact, it is one of the main objects of philosophy to win for man insight into the characters and merits of the different cultural activities regarded as instruments

both of valid knowledge and of worthy existence.

Philosophy must change and grow because the various forms of man's cultural consciousness are changing and growing with the advance of man's creative history. Let us briefly review the character and conditions of these changes. Science will continue to change because of the infinity of possible experiments, only a limited number can be tried and examined at a particular period in its history depending on the tastes, fashions and laboratory conditions prevailing in that period. More important than these, science may suffer changes in its method and approach as a result of the emergence of some unusual experimental data. In other fields changes occur because human life and experience are not completed or accomplished phenomena. Thus, the emergence of a new moral or religious genius may modify the character and contents of man's moral and religious experience, even as the appearance of a new literary masterpiece—an *Illiad*, a *Divine Comedy*, a *Ulysses*—may enrich and modify his aesthetic consciousness. Similarly, changes occur in the domains of logic and mathematics as well. All these changes, separately and cumulatively, affect the character and course of philosophy.

It should not be supposed, however, that even rapid and revolutionary changes of the type described above involve abrupt and unintelligible breaks from the past. Viewed in historical perspective even catastrophic changes would generally be seen to be the results of slow but continual new developments. Philosophy and its different branches, logic, ethics, philosophy of science etc., it may be added, are historical studies. While examining the contents of a particular type of man's symbolized experience or consciousness, they do not and ought not to confine themselves to a particular period of man's history. Instead, they should take into consideration the total historical experience of man relevant to their respective purposes. In this respect our viewpoint concerning philosophy differs from that of existentialism, and probably also of phenomenology. These latter tend to concentrate their attention chiefly on the contemporary and individualistic phases of man's consciousness, to the exclusion of its varied historical and more universal forms.

CHAPTER VI

MORALITY AND WISDOM

THE NATURE AND TYPES OF OBLIGATION

I

MORAL experience, comprising the perception of moral distinctions and the propensity to pass moral judgments, is a ubiquitous feature of all human societies. The existence of moral life is bound up with the feeling of moral *obligation*, which is sharply distinguished from *inclination*. Obligation is a kind of necessity for some one to do something. As used in ethical literature the term definitely excludes *causal* necessity of all kinds, physical, biological, psychological, etc. That necessity seems to be implied by the term *inclination*. The phenomenon of felt obligation, as it occurs in moral life, seems to involve two contrary factors : on the one hand there is the recognition on the part of the person concerned that something ought to be done (or ought to have been done) by him under a certain set of circumstances; on the other there is the awareness, accompanied either by prudential calculation or by the perception of the strength of the inclination or temptation to be overcome, that one may not after all do it. The felt obligation is a force or factor which, to borrow a phrase from Leibniz, "inclines without necessitating".

Inclination is characteristic of man as a biophysiological organism and as a psycho-social being; obligation characterizes his life as involved in the pursuit of impersonally significant values.

The data of ethics consist roughly of the following : (a) various types of heroic or ideal personality to be met with in the literary historical persons in different sets of circumstances; (b) judgments and reflections respecting those obligations and conflicts embodied in the moral and legal codes and ethical writings of communities and individuals; and (c) pen-portraits and estimates of various types of heroic or ideal personality to be met with in the literary and other kinds of writing belonging to different peoples and communities. It may be added that the codes, estimates, etc. referred to above are fashioned and propagated *not* by the common man, but by the élite or recognised experts and leaders in different communities. Just as in the history of a community the experts of one

generation may be superseded by the experts of another generation, so in the history of civilised nations the opinions of some experts may come to be more widely accepted than those of others. Opinions concerning the heroic personalities belonging to different times and places, too, may be gradually modified. Analogous changes may occur in opinions respecting masterpieces of art and literature and the judgments passed on those masterpieces. Ethics and Aesthetics have generally to concern themselves with opinions in their respective fields which have come to prevail among contemporary experts in different civilized societies.

It is wrongly supposed that the work of moral philosophy is to furnish proofs or offer justifications why certain obligations should be accepted. A moral obligation remains an obligation and a morally good act remains a commendable act whether or not philosophers are able to find good proofs or reasons for judging it to be so. Analogously Kālidāsa and Dante will remain great poets whether or not experts are able to give correct analyses of their greatness. By his reasoned judgment an expert merely *explains* the *already recognised* goodness or greatness of an action or life or a masterpiece. The explanatory or justifying principle invented or invoked by the expert derives whatever strength it has from the intuited moral or aesthetic significance attaching to particular actions, artworks, etc. and not *vice versa*.

What, then, is the proper business of ethics? Ethics is concerned to analyse and interpret the nature of the phenomena of moral obligation so as to enable us to assign to each kind of obligation its proper place in the purposeful lives of individuals and societies. Analysis is definition; it should disclose to us the generic and specific features which characterize the phenomena of obligation. Interpretation should furnish us with principles which would enable us to arrange various types of obligation in an intelligible order. The aim of analysis is to seize the essential traits or characters of the phenomena being investigated; that of interpretation to define the mutual bearings of those phenomena in respect of a relevant characteristic. Both these enterprises are theoretical, and involve creation of concepts, constructs or hypotheses which would meet the demands for specific types of understanding or intelligibility with respect to the phenomena in question. Both analysis and interpretation in philosophy may be carried on at different levels of generality; and the interpretation at the highest level would correspond to *explanation* in the light of theories practised by the physical sciences.

I contemplate the following procedure for discussing the issues in hand. I shall first propose two sets of concepts or principles which in my view can explain respectively (1) the nature of moral

obligation; and (2) the conflicts arising from different types of obligation as well as the relative urgency and significance of those obligations. I shall also indicate how and how far those concepts or principles can be derived from the basic postulate of human creativity and the philosophy of culture outlined in a previous chapter. This will be followed by an attempt to distinguish and arrange in a hierarchical order different kinds of obligation interpreted in the light of those principles and postulates.

II

Before embarking on the above plan of discussion I would like to indicate and give reasons for rejecting two solutions of the problem of obligation which have been historically influential. First, I reject the view, elaborated in the *Republic*, that the doing of one's duty or of what is obligatory is *always* or even generally advantageous to the agent. The view finds considerable support in Bishop Butler, and even in Kant who believes that virtue will ultimately be rewarded with happiness by God. It seems to me that this view is clearly inconsistent with the following cases of the performance of duty: the paying of a debt owed to a rich man by a poor man; the sacrificing of one's interest for the sake of a stranger or of community; the risking of his life by a soldier for his country or by a swimmer for a drowning man. Examples like these could be multiplied indefinitely. Moral rules and moral conduct do not always seem to have a prudential basis. The rejection of this view, however, should *not* be taken to imply that obligation cannot be explained with reference to some kind of good impersonally conceived. And here I find myself in disagreement with another influential view, *i.e.* that of the intuitionists and the deontologists. No action, I hold, is likely to be right or obligatory which does not produce any good for anybody. Maybe the good produced by some right actions (of the individual or the state) is only negative, consisting in the removal of a feeling of frustration, or in the discouragement of an inclination either in the evil-doer himself or in the spectators with minds akin to his. Nor can I see how an evil inclination can be defined except in terms of the desire to produce (unmerited) suffering or frustration. A poor man who does not pay back a debt on the promised date because he cannot is morally on a different footing from the other man, also poor, who does not pay not merely because he cannot but also because he has no real inclination to pay back and is bent on frustrating the legitimate demand and expectation of the creditor. On the other hand a poor man and even a robber (who means to dispose of the stolen money in helping the poor) may not be unjustified in withholding payment to the rich man, or in depriving him of money, if the latter has accumulated

wealth by evil means. The deontologists, I am suggesting, are wrong in holding obligation to be either inexplicable or unconditional.

III

I think the phenomena of moral obligation admit of explanation with reference to two concepts, the concept of "desert", and the concept of "fittingness" or "suitability to circumstances" introduced by Professor C. D. Broad. There is a sense in which the first concept may be said to be included in the second, for what is deserved by a person is something which it is fitting in the circumstances for him to get by way of reward or punishment. However, it would contribute to greater clarity if the term *desert* were confined to what appears to become due to a person on account of his own conduct. A poor man may deserve to be helped with my money, but that money could not be included in his "*deserts*". That the poor should be helped by the rich can be explained only on the principle of overall suitability to circumstances.

The notion of *desert* has played a significant role in the history of world's ethico-religious thought. There seems to be present in us an innate demand to the effect that a person should get what he deserves in terms of happiness, misery, etc. This may be called a demand for justice or just return for the individual's behaviour absolutely and in relation to his fellow-beings; it also expresses itself in the feelings of sympathy, gratitude, revenge, etc. The Indian law of *karma* is an attempted rationalization of the same demand as also are the notions of heaven and hell and the Day of Judgment. The Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school of philosophy no less than Kant find it possible to argue for the existence of God on the basis of this demand of our nature.

The demand may arise as a blind or irrational impulse, but it is not unreasonable. It implies the recognition that the human individual is a free agent deliberately engaged in the creation, distribution, and exchange of values and disvalues. It also implies every individual's natural right to enjoy the fruits of his labour, and his right not to be thwarted in his reasonable expectations. When such a thwarting is due to chance or the "conspiracy of circumstances" it is called bad luck or a calamity, which calls for our sympathy; when due to man, it is a case of injury or injustice, of being wronged to different degrees, and calls for our resentment and denunciation, if not active infliction of punishment, in respect of the person or persons concerned.

We sometimes expect a treatment in virtue of our being members of a family, community, or nation, so that the good and evil doings of those with whom we are related seem reasonably to visit us.

The notion of fittingness, though less easily defined, has been equally operative in man's judgments of worth, chiefly in those relating to behaviour involving good will or lack of it in a general sense. If I see a small child moving towards fire or a snake, it becomes my duty to prevent him from reaching the object of danger. Given the present advanced methods and means of production, it is the duty of rulers and administrators to see that they are used for the maximum foreseeable benefit of the people. In a society where electricity has been discovered, it would be criminal for rulers (unless they are ignorant and/or superstitious) to prevent its use and exploitation by the public. If capitalism leads to decreased production of useful goods, then capitalism as a way of organising society involves what the Marxists call a contradiction.

Insistence on "desert" implies that human beings should be treated as free agents engaged in producing and enjoying values; that on "fittingness" seems to enjoin that they should actively plan for the production of values and the prevention of disvalues. The twofold insistence seems to derive from the recognition of man's creative freedom and his right to it on the one hand and his presumed duty to pursue values on the other.

Here it may be noted that the concepts of "desert" and "fittingness" are by themselves not quite adequate to explain the facts of obligation. To them must be added the notions of values and disvalues which are "deserved" and which are "demanded" by circumstances as being fit to be produced, eliminated, or prevented from emergence. These latter concepts are still more necessary for explaining the conflicts of obligation. In fact, it is the plurality of goods or values to be pursued and evils to be avoided by man which gives rise to the phenomenon of conflicting obligations. It follows from this that the deontologists' interpretation of moral facts and judgments is as one-sided as that of the axiologists *i.e.*, those who define duty *only* with reference to the goods or values to be produced.

Conflicts of obligation seem to be resolvable on the following two principles: (1) Prevention of unmerited or avoidable suffering is a greater obligation than the production or conferring of positive good. (2) Among positive goods those relating to the culture of the personality are to be preferred to those which affect the bio-social being of man. From these the following corollary may be drawn: (3) Among cultural goods preference should be given to those which, in addition to being ends in themselves, tend to help the individual and mankind in their fight against evil *i.e.*, the propensity to cause unmerited suffering, ignorance and suffering. These principles should help us to clarify our intuitions concerning typical cases of conflicting obligation and also to understand the different degrees of admiration, gratefulness and reverence felt by

men towards various historical personages. However, it is not claimed that the principles can be used as a rule of thumb, obviating the need of reflection in individual cases, and eliminating completely the possibility of differences of opinion. In some cases, indeed, it may not be possible at all to choose between two courses of action or two obligations.

I should keep the promise to pay back a debt within stipulated time, and even the promise to meet a person at a theatre, because non-fulfilment of the promise is likely to interfere with the plans and calculations of the party concerned, thereby causing undeserved trouble or inconvenience. Considerations of ordinary personal inconvenience or trouble should not interfere with the fulfilling of the pledge or promise. However, if an accident in the way involving a stranger who had to be removed to the hospital prevents me from reaching the theatre in time, thereby wrecking the possibility of my friend's enjoyment, I cannot possibly be blamed by the friend unless he is an absolutely selfish and heartless fellow. Consider, however, a complicated case. If I do not pay my debt to Mr. X within the stipulated time, he may not be able to marry his daughter; if I do, I may not be able to secure necessary medical treatment for my mother or son suffering from the tuberculosis of the lungs. Here the only way to decide as to which course of action is more obligatory is to try to assess impartially how greater and less easily reparable suffering can be avoided.

Any conflict of obligations is an indication that of two goods which I am expected to bring into existence only one seems to be permitted by the circumstances; or of two evils which should be prevented only one is avoidable in practice. The conflict points toward the existence of a fundamentally tragic element in life, which prevents us from fulfilling even our reasonable expectations with respect to the attainment of goods and the avoidance of evils. However, it does not seem to be correct that obligations are always other-regarding, and so have nothing to do with the pursuit of goods or values for ourselves. In the above case the conflict of obligations would be equally tragic if, instead of my mother or son, I myself needed treatment for tuberculosis. The tragic element would appear to be more pronounced the more my life were seen to be valuable for the welfare of my dependants and the world. The possibility cannot be ruled out that, in an extreme case, it may be the greater obligation on my part to spend the money on the treatment of my son who holds out the promise to be of great service to humanity as a poet, philosopher or statesman, than to make the promised payment to a person who, after all, like Shylock the Jew, may not be needing the money so urgently. In any case it is a wrong or evil not to fulfil the promise of payment, but in some

cases it may be the lesser evil, for which suitable amends may be made in future.

The sanctity of a promise or contract ultimately derives from the sanctity of the individual's right to creative freedom, which is the indispensable basis for the realization of any value whatever. In cases where this freedom is clearly seen to be liable to be abused, it may be our duty *not* to fulfil the promise or contract. I may not return the borrowed pistol to the owner if the latter is likely to commit suicide with it; and I may rightly repay the loan taken from the head of a family to his wife or son if that head has in the meanwhile turned a debauch likely to squander away the sum in defiance of the needs of the family. This shows that the individual's right to have fulfilled the agreements and contracts entered into with him may not be taken to be absolute and unlimited. It is subject to the overriding consideration of the possibilities of the avoidance of evils and the production of goods or values.

Obligations flowing from contracts, etc. may also be modified by the *deserts* of the benefiting party. Even for reasons not directly connected with the contract if the party to benefit *deserves* frustration and suffering the non-fulfilment of the contract may not only be *not* wrong but even be a duty. It may be my public duty *not* to make good a promise made to a blackmailer or to a person subsequently discovered to be an enemy of my country. This does not mean that contracts and promises may be broken lightly. Dishonouring a promise or a contract may be justified only in those rare cases when the misery saved by that act would have *far exceeded* in amount the pain that has undoubtedly been caused. In such cases, notice may also be taken of the evil likely to result from the setting up of a wrong precedent. Certain agencies such as the government, it seems, cannot violate a contract without producing much evil in the form of general uncertainty and lack of confidence.

The emphasis on the avoidance of evil is justified both psychologically and historically. The secret of the appeal of Buddhism and other pessimistic philosophies lies in their emphasis on the undesirableness and elimination of suffering. Such philosophies somehow look deeper than those which dwell on the attractiveness of goods attainable in life.

IV

Mr. Prichard has admitted that 'obligation admits of degrees', but he is not agreeable to the axiologist's thesis that the greater obligation consists in originating the greater good.¹ I propose that a distinction be drawn between the *urgency* of an obligation and its *quality*, between the greater obligation and the higher one. A greater obligation is one which I must discharge here and now as a

matter of duty; a higher obligation, on the other hand, demands my loyalty as a principle governing the progress of my life and personality. The term "greater obligation" belongs to the vocabulary of morals, while the expression "higher obligation" forms part of the vocabulary of wisdom, i.e. the terminology of a philosophy of life. The urgency of an obligation or duty is indicated roughly by the amount of resentment its non-performance produces in the onlookers; while the quality of it is measured by the degree of admiration, gratitude, reverence, etc. which its performance evokes. In general, people devoted to higher principles of living or higher values should not find it difficult to discharge their ordinary duties, but there may be cases when their relative indifference to ordinary values leads them to be negligent in respect of their more obvious obligations. I shall conclude this discussion by arranging different types of obligation in a qualitative scale or order. This, however, cannot be done in accordance with a clear-cut and neat formula. The test proposed here is the intuitive (imaginative)-historical evaluation of lives devoted to the pursuit of different types of goods or values, or lives lived as illustrations of devotion chiefly to one kind of obligation or another.

(1) The lowest type of obligation is to avoid inflicting unmerited pain, frustration or suffering by dishonouring a contract or breaking a promise, or by failing to satisfy the legitimate claims and expectations of others. Most of the social obligations including those towards our dependants fall under this class. Cephalus in Plato's *Republic* defines justice in terms of these obligations which he claims to have fully discharged. Almost all our basic duties belong to this category of obligations. They constitute the indispensable minimum stock of duties for men as social beings.

(2) A more heroic type of obligation consists in feeling concerned to prevent unmerited suffering by intervening on behalf of the victim against his oppressors. In a limited but well-defined sense this duty is performed by the police and the judiciary in a state. The creatively moral individual, however, has to go beyond the codified laws of the state and to detect and fight cases of subtler forms of injustice, social and political. Such an individual may feel called upon to question the very basis of legal and political authority, or of social customs and conventions. Obligations of this type are thrust on a person not so much by social expectation as by his capacity or fitness for advancing a just cause and his willingness to take personal risks. Rebellious thinkers and revolutionary leaders such as Marx and Lenin, Nehru and De Valera, belong to this class of persons. Such persons are endowed with a creative vision of the possibilities or conditions of justice and happiness, and with the courage and inclination to sacrifice lower personal goods

and advantages for the sake of what they regard as higher values. It is implied in this account that prevention of unmerited suffering is a higher value than the enjoyment of personal quiet and safety.

The above two types of obligation belong properly to the order of morality or duty. The type to be mentioned next may more properly be said to belong to the order of charity or virtue.

(3) A person goes out helping others in an unobtrusive manner, and feels happy in being able to bring relief and happiness to others. A university professor, not caring to buy a car for himself, chooses to help poor students by paying their fees. This type of altruistic conduct may be called charity, and the virtue expressed therein saintliness.

What are the differences between the second type of moral goodness and the third? Several things may be noted in this connection. The revolutionary thinker or leader, in virtue of his identification with a class or country, may himself be among the victims of the injustice which he fights. Or, he may be driven to fight by the resentment he feels towards an unrepentant and insolvent oppressor or by the hope to be able to assert himself against him in future. He may also feel encouraged to go on fighting by the admiration and applause given by the multitude. In any of these cases his conduct cannot be regarded as being wholly disinterested and therefore purely virtuous, *i.e.*, determined solely by moral sentiments and considerations.

The performance of duty involves conflict and strain which are absent in the practice of saintly charity. The heroic variety of moral activity evokes applause and admiration mixed with gratitude, charity and saintliness arouse a sense of grateful regard and reverence. The heroically dutiful person is seen risking his security and sacrificing his comfort—things for which he normally *cares*; the saintly man seems to be above the needs for comfort and security.

The moral disposition in all its manifestations involves the sense of justice which is the ethical counterpart of cognitive objectivity. Both these qualities derive from normality which, as was shown in a previous chapter, is closely allied to impersonality.

The saintly man is not merely impersonal and normal, he is supernormal. He is not only unmindful of the personal like the heroic man-of-duty—but seems to be *above* the requirements characteristic of the normal person.

(4) Both duty and virtue have reference to an "other". I seem to have the metaphysical or ontological obligation (whatever that expression may mean) to prefer the higher to the lower in my cognitions, feelings and volitions, irrespective of their repercussions on "my fellow-beings". I have, in other words, an obligation to cultivate

wisdom and to live in the light of that wisdom. I seem also to have an obligation to share and propagate that wisdom. Wisdom may be defined as the capacity to discriminative between higher and lower ends, and between higher and lower dispositions. This type of wisdom seems to be as necessary as creative freedom for the development of a truly good and virtuous life. Only a truly wise man—it seems to have been supposed by most of the moral and religious teachers—can be truly unselfish and good. Wisdom, in other words, is a weapon for fighting the most important type of evil, *viz.* moral and spiritual evil, the evil that infects the individual's will and disposition thereby sowing the seeds of misery and suffering for him as well as for those who would have dealings with him.

Teachers like the Buddha and Socrates help humanity not so much by relieving their temporary sufferings, but by sharing with them the secrets which have raised their selves above smaller concerns and elevated them to the heights of sublime detachment and serene contemplation. Those who seek the highest wisdom may be called philosophers; those who live that wisdom are saints; and those who propagate such wisdom by example and precept are prophets. In the cultural history of man prophets like the Buddha and Lao Tse have been rated higher and considered greater than relatively passive saints and mere philosophers.

If we now raise the question, "Can duty or obligation be defined with reference to goods and values to be produced?" the reply would be as follows. Right and duty may be deduced from the concept of the good provided the latter is conceived as including, not only pleasure, knowledge, virtuous disposition, etc., but also the following: the creative freedom of the individual and his right to satisfaction through punishment of those who seek to violate it. These latter goods may be looked upon either as a restatement of the principle of desert or as deductions from it. In the sphere of morality it seems that a good which is worth seeking both as an end and as a means of the prevention of evil and/or suffering is superior to other goods. The creative freedom of the individual, *i.e.* his right to plan his life freely, seems to be a basic good not easily exchangeable with others.

There seem to be only two types of obligation which are unconditionally binding on all men, the obligation not to violate the creative freedom of others by causing undeserved frustration and/or suffering to them, and the obligation to seek wisdom and enlightenment. From the viewpoint of morality only that knowledge is worth seeking which would lead to the elimination of suffering and evil. All other obligations are relative to the powers and capacities on the one hand and the inclinations on the other of the persons concerned. Thus it cannot be my duty to actively fight for the

removal of social injustice, if that fight interferes with my chosen vocation as a scholar and writer. Likewise I am under no obligation to aspire to be a saint or a prophet, though it is my duty to develop my sense of the relative worth of different kinds of personalities, and to extend admiration, respect and support where it is due. The obligation, indeed, is part of my duty to cultivate wisdom. However, it seems to be my metaphysical duty, so to say, to exert myself to attain higher and higher levels of excellence in respect of the perfection for which I am temperamentally suited. This is not to deny that it is my duty to cultivate the traditional virtues of temperance, courage, humility, etc. which are necessary for the attainment of all types of excellence.

ETHICAL DIFFERENCES

These basic principles should enable us to understand and resolve some of the more important differences among moral philosophers which have tended to generate and nourish ethical scepticism. By far the most important of these have tended to centre round the problem as to what constitutes the ultimate or highest good for the individual which, when realized, transforms the latter into an ideal person. Moral and religious teachers and thinkers in different ages and communities have given diverse pictures of what they consider to be an ideal human being : the philosopher king of Plato, the magnanimous man and the contemplative man of Aristotle, the Stoic wise man, the *Sthitaprajña*, i.e., the man of poised understanding, of the *Bhagavadgita*, the Bodhisattva of the Buddhists, the Christian saint, the superman of Nietzsche, etc. etc. Other conceptions of the ideal man or the hero may be gathered from the writings of poets, dramatists and novelists and such literary essayists as Carlyle and Emerson.

How can these conflicting conceptions of the "ideal man" be reconciled with one another ? There are internal differences among thinkers who believe in supernature, and among those who believe only in the world of nature, while there are more radical differences between the viewpoints of the two groups. Under these circumstances, how can we possibly arrive at an ideal or principle of moral behaviour which would command universal assent ?

We may at once indicate the lines along which the solution to the above and analogous problems may be found. A person may be regarded as ideal for one or both of the following reasons : (a) because he has been instrumental in the prevention or elimination of unmerited or unnecessary pain and suffering, or of evil which becomes the cause of suffering; (b) because he has exemplified a way of living which tends to promote satisfaction and happiness, personal

and impersonal. Now human beings, in virtue of their differing capacities and susceptibilities, may suffer frustration and pain in different ways, and so tend to admire different kinds of saviours or Messiahs; they may also feel attracted towards different kinds of achievements and accomplishments. Suffering may be caused by hunger and poverty, by the injustice of the tyrant, by the death of dear ones, and by loss of faith. Different kinds of suffering have varying degrees of urgency and significance for different individuals and times, which accounts for the varying degrees of admiration and reverence towards different great men felt by different individuals and communities. However, inasmuch as elimination of suffering is considered to be more important than bestowal of positive pleasure and happiness, a Buddha or a Christ may appear to be a greater personage than a Plato or a Goethe. The question of the relative greatness of heroes in different fields, it may be remembered, cannot always be settled by an act of immediate intuition; if at all, it can be settled only by historical evidence, which should take into account both the influence exerted by the personage concerned and the fondness with which his memory has been cherished by mankind. In this connection it may be remarked that comparisons of excellence and greatness should be made at the same levels of achievement in different fields. Thus, while great saints may appear to be greater than poets of comparable greatness, a great poet may be a greater man than an ordinary saint.

It was laid down in a previous chapter that the fundamental and ultimate values of life were only two : the state of freedom from the pressure of wants and from other kinds of suffering and the condition or activity of the individual that made for the enrichment, creative expansion or qualitative refinement of his personality. For the attainment of the first objective, *i.e.*, freedom, philosophers have often recommended that the individual should learn to cut short his requirements and curb his passions; others, however, have suggested that, rather than reduce one's requirements, one should actively seek to satisfy his growing needs and ambitions. It is not for us here to take a decision as to the relative merits of these and other ideals. However, a few observations may be made in regard to this fundamental conflict.

First, it may be noted that the desirability of self-control and curtailment of one's needs has been stressed not only by religious teachers but also by such hedonists as Epicurus. Epicurus regarded 'absence of pain, rather than presence of pleasure, as the wise man's goal'.² He preferred static pleasures which consist in a state of equilibrium to dynamic pleasures, consisting in the attainment of a desired end, the previous desire having been accompanied by pain. In this connection it may be noted that it is not possible for

anybody to satisfy all his desires. Nobody, for instance, can obtain every beautiful woman that he happens to develop a fancy for. Many of our desires being imitative and competitive, not all the wealth of our industrial civilization would suffice to gratify them. In fact, the philosophy of life that encourages all sorts of passions, desires and ambitions could never suit the majority of mankind, and would, probably, be ultimately ruinous to the few who seriously practised it. On the other hand, it is arguable—and this is our second point—that a person who reasonably exerts himself to fulfil his own and his family's needs is superior to the idler who pretends to be contented. A society in which people work for the production of material wealth is certainly preferable to one where idleness and poverty are not felt to be undesirable.

It is interesting to note that Buddhism, which encouraged renunciation of worldly pleasures, laid the greatest emphasis on the virtue of strenuousness (*appamāda*) for spiritual aspirants. Patañjali, the author of the *Yogaśūtras*, similarly prescribed a hard course of discipline for the *yogins*. With the great religious teachers of the world indifference to worldly goods and pleasures generally meant attachment to a higher spiritual goal. A superior person, whether religious or non-religious, is one who ever exerts his creative powers to reach a higher destiny.

These remarks are intended to impress upon the reader the truth of the thesis that, apart from our personal inclinations and pursuits, it is possible for us to imaginatively identify ourselves with different, even conflicting, ideals. This is strikingly borne out by the attitude of Plutarch, the famous Greek biographer, towards Alexander's career of conquest on the one hand and towards Diogenes the philosopher on the other. Plutarch, who nowhere conceals his high sense of regard and admiration for the great Macedonian, records the incident of Alexander's meeting with Diogenes in a vein of philosophic humour. When Alexander went to see the philosopher, the latter happened to be lying in the sun. "The king addressed him in an obliging manner and asked him if there was anything he could serve him in. "Only stand a little out of my sunshine", said Diogenes. Alexander, we are told, was struck with such surprise at finding himself so little regarded and saw something so great in that carelessness that, while his courtiers were ridiculing the philosopher as a monster, he said: "If I were not Alexander, I should wish to be Diogenes".

The anecdote, whether historical or not, brings out an attitude which might have been expressed by Alexander and which was shared by Plutarch. Elsewhere, quoting a remark of Anaxarchus, Plutarch comments as follows: by that remark Anaxarchus intimated 'how truly despicable those glittering things are which con-

querors pursue with so much danger and fatigue, since, after all, their enjoyments are little or in no way superior to those of other men.⁴ The idea of the vanity of worldly possessions, so pervasively present in such religious writings as *The Imitation of Christ*, is not, after all, alien to the imagination of historians and other secular writers.

Investigators of our time capable of taking a sufficiently detached view of the ideals prevailing in different contemporary and past civilised societies should not find it difficult to sympathise with most of those ideals. Men incapable of the requisite degree of detachment, however, would feel attracted towards the ideals which are more in conformity with the needs of their own society. For the ideals or norms of behaviour are certainly relative to the requirements either of the society as a whole or of one or more sections of the society. Even such seemingly revolting practices as the killing of the old people may be justified in a society suffering from acute shortage of food.

From these considerations it follows that no categorical imperative or rule of thumb can be laid down for the infallible guidance of man's conduct for all societies and all occasions. Nor can such precise and invariant laws be formulated as would enable us to accurately and infallibly foresee and predict the course of voluntary human behaviour. Variability of response, in fact, is as much a characteristic of conscious human behaviour as uniformity of reaction is that of the natural objects. Like successful or intelligent behaviour in general, moral behaviour in man is an affair of creative insight. Even the most scrupulous and God-fearing person cannot behave rightly if he is considerably lacking in such insight.

Here a significant question arises: If creativity is such a pervasive feature of human behaviour, then why are people so anxious to get at infallible principles or rules-of-thumb? And why do the honest and scrupulous people occasionally suffer from acute moral conflicts?

Our reply to the first question is as follows. While everybody enjoys sharing the impulse to creative living, not all persons love to exercise their creativity. In fact, the exercise of one's creative powers is enjoyable only as long as it is involuntary and uncompulsory. Even the genius, whose restless nature urges him on to continual creative effort, does not find it to be either an easy occupation or an unmixed blessing. The creation of a great work of art or a monumental system of thought, indeed, is as exhausting as, if not more so than, the bringing into existence of a new baby. It is far easier to enjoy reading a novel than writing one, far more comfortable to see a film or play than to produce one. To propose to be creative is to launch oneself on an adventure; men are generally

utilitarian in their outlook and prefer the security of the prosaic familiar to the lure of the romantic unfamiliar. This explains why the laws of human behaviour obtained statistically are to a considerable extent reliable. And if the more significant course of human history remains unpredictable, it is because that course is shaped largely by exceptional men and women whose radically creative behaviour refuses to be fitted into the framework of those laws.

Like the heroes of history whose bold decisions defy the ordinary rules of safety and expediency, the moral heroes hurl defiance at the traditional codes of respectable behaviour, and proclaim new ideals of decency and justice suited for the changed environmental conditions.

Gotama the Buddha and Karl Marx were such heroes who exposed the inhuman practices prevalent in the priest-dominated Hindu society and the profiteering capitalist order respectively and preached radically new ideals before the suffering masses and their bewildered exploiters. Veblen accomplished something similar on the academic plane when, in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, he unmasked the utterly hollow and decadent character of the pretensions and practices of the historical aristocracies.

In humbler situations the creatively moral individual goes rather by the spirit than by the letter of the moral law, and does not allow dead rules to overpower his living humanity. However, the flouting of general opinion is not easy even for the creatively moral person. A decision against the prevalent notions always involves inner conflict. This conflict rages between the dictates of authoritarian custom, often masquerading as conscience, on the one hand, and the demands of the primal, creative sensibility on the other. Only the person who has sufficient moral courage to be rebellious, and to persist in the attitude of rebellion, may succeed in advancing the cause of creative morality. Another kind of conflict, too, besets moral decisions. We are frequently called upon to choose between two courses of action both of which involve either the sacrifice of some good or the acceptance of some evil. In the first case our problem is to ascertain and accept the higher or superior good, in the second to avoid the greater evil. At a point in his career P. B. Shelley had to choose between poetry and philosophy; Henry Bergson, similarly, had to decide between philosophy and mathematics. In a tragically dramatic situation a woman may be required to choose between the death of her husband and that of her son or brother. No rule-of-thumb can be laid down for making one's choices on such occasions. Multiple possibilities of joy and sorrow are of necessity bound up with man's multiplex creative nature.

The evolution of moral insight consists not so much in approxi-

mating to a correct conception or an accurate statement of an hypothetical moral law or standard as in the growing consciousness of the variety of ways and situations in which individuals and groups may suffer, and of the factors which bring about that suffering. The comprehension of the forms, causes and conditions of suffering, individual and collective, is advanced far better by the perusal of great works of literature, biography, and history than by the abstract disquisitions of the philosophers and the dry discourses of the uninspired clergy. The *Strīparva* of the *Mahābhārata* (where the wives and mothers of the heroes killed in the great battle have been shown weeping and wailing for their loved ones), novels like *War and Peace* and *All Quiet on the Western Front*, can inculcate, with varying degrees of subtlety, greater hatred for war than many a writing by distinguished moral and political scholars. Insight into suffering directly produces in normal men and women the impulse to fight and eradicate the causes that produce it. The great moral teachers of mankind have been artists who gave, through oral word, to the people of their respective times direct vision of the conditions of misery in which they or their less fortunate brethren had been living. It is not denied that the general statements arrived at by moral philosophers assist individuals and communities in framing their general policies of conduct. Such statements, however, can seldom serve as principles capable of universal and unreserved application; and the notion that any of them has the status of such a principle, often proves to be an impediment and obstacle to human advancement. Reactionary diplomats and politicians have often sought to put brakes on human progress in the name of one or more time-honoured principles: principles like the one of the divine rights of kings, the freedom of individual enterprise, the dichotomy between the actual and the real or rational self, etc. etc.

This denial of the possibility of obtaining rigidly applicable moral principles will appear shocking to two classes of persons: those who seek the security of habit not only in leading their day-to-day lives, but even in the direction of their higher aspirations; and those who expect the laws of human behaviour in general and the principles of moral behaviour in particular to resemble the pattern of the physical laws. In settled or relatively static times ordinary men and women can lead their lives in conformity with accepted values and standards, and even the exceptional or more creative persons do not find it necessary to depart appreciably from those values and standards. During the periods of crises, however, both the ordinary and exceptional types of individuals are thrown into a state of unusual tension, the former finding it difficult to adjust themselves to the conflicting demands of social propriety, the latter experiencing trouble in giving shape to the creative forces. Honest

creative cooperation and effort, both on the part of the people and their intellectual and moral leaders, is the only possible answer to the uncertainties engendered by rapidly changing and critical times.

It is no fault of the laws of human behaviour that they cannot be fitted into mathematical formulas. That the language of mathematics is the most precise and perfect so far evolved by man is no reason why that language should be a fit medium for the expression of all sorts of our experiences. No poet, for instance, can be expected to obey the command to write his poems in mathematical symbols; nor can a lover make or talk love in the language of differential calculus.

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY : EGOISM AND ALTRUISM

We may now face some of the most difficult questions of ethics : why should the individual make any sacrifice at all for the sake of society, *i.e.* for his fellow-beings ? If such sacrifice is virtuous, and virtue is what contributes to the attainment of a worthy end, what is the end to be attained by self-sacrifice ? Contrariwise, what can it mean to say that virtue is its own reward ? Did not even Kant hold that virtue stood in the need of being rewarded with proportionate happiness ?

These problems cannot be tackled adequately unless we have a proper conception of man's social temper and its needs. It has been emphasized since the time of Confucius and Plato that man is a social animal. Some modern thinkers have expressed the view that social life is present even at the sub-human level. At the animal-level, however, collective existence is primarily an instrument of self-protection. At the human level, it was pointed out by Plato, society provides for the cooperative satisfaction of needs on the basis of specialised training and division of labour. Since man is endowed with forethought and imagination, he aims not only at the satisfaction of his immediate or present needs but also at securing himself against the pressure of his future needs. This quest for security leads man to build up what was earlier described by us as civilization. The progress of civilization has consisted mainly in two things : in the growing perfection of the techniques and methods whereby production of useful goods is carried on, and in the evolution of the institutional machineries whereby increasingly more efficient and effective cooperation among ever larger numbers of men and women is secured. However, men and women not only cooperate for the production of goods, they also fight for the possession of those goods. The struggle for power leads to friction among individuals and groups, giving rise to ruthless competition, class-conflicts and inter-statal wars. Thus arise the phenomena of

subordination and control in the mutual relationships of those individuals and groups, classes and states or nations. The growth of civilization also consists in the progressive elimination of unjust authority and control, and in the extension of freedom and the right of self-determination to progressively larger numbers of individuals, groups and nations.

The above considerations drive us to the following unpleasant conclusions: it is not in virtue of their pursuit of security and freedom that men love to associate with one another. These utilitarian motives as often lead to conflict as to cooperation. Men, in fact, frequently want to enjoy leisure, freedom and security which wealth and power bring *at the cost of others*; and they can be restrained from the unscrupulous quest of these objects only by the fear of law and public opinion.

The deeper roots of man's social disposition, I suggest, lie not in the urgency of his animal needs, but in the requirements of his creative temperament. Creative variation in responses to stimuli seems to be characteristic of life in all stages of evolution. The gregarious or herd instinct, active alike in animal and man, is an indication that living beings derive pleasure from physical proximity to one another. The presence and contact of friendly living beings appears to add, in a peculiar manner, to the warmth and wellbeing, heat and intensity of our own existence. This explains partly why some men and women are so fond of pets, and why crowded fairs and festivals have ever been popular.

Man craves for the company of his fellow-beings not only on the physical but also on the spiritual plane. The human individual continually renews and enriches his being through participation in the spiritual or symbolic life of other men and women.

The creative restlessness of man has a double character. On the one hand he must satisfy his urge for self-expansion by sharing the significant perceptions and feelings of others; on the other he must have his own meaningful experiences shared and appreciated by those others. No poet sings and writes merely for himself, and no philosopher ever produced his theories merely for his private consumption. Life, it appears, seeks to propagate and perpetuate itself as much at the spiritual as at the purely organic level. As for our insatiable hunger for vicariously living and enjoying the experiences of others, it is attested not only by the general over-crowding in the theatre and the cinema, and by the amount of printing and reading accomplished daily in the whole world, but also—and chiefly—by the tremendous volume of oral intercourse carried on every minute by millions of speakers, talkers and gossips. No wonder, then, that solitary confinement should be accounted to be one of the hardest forms of punishment.

Our acquisitive and possessive impulses tend to make us selfish and calculating. Under the power of those impulses, we tend to view other human beings as mere instruments or means, to be used for our personal ends. On the contrary, a person impelled by the urge for creative companionship finds men and women interesting for quite different reasons. Such a person takes interest in the growth and development of other people not because they are potential sources of material gain to him, but because they are potential sources of creative awareness, and potential sharers in the spiritual life in whose creation and enjoyment he is interested. *It is in his capacity as a spiritually creative being that one man can be legitimately asked to take interest in and make sacrifices for another man.*

It is for the same reason that a superior type of person subordinates the promptings of his lower nature to the requirements of his higher self. Intelligent and decent people exercise self-control, not merely because it is dictated by the needs of social existence, but also because it is necessitated by their desire for self-improvement. The direction of this improvement lies in progressive detachment from the merely personal and in the pursuit of values, ultimate and instrumental, which have impersonal significance. It is my attachment to freedom, justice and truth, to art and literature, valued without reference to my personal gain or loss, that may prompt me to make sacrifices in their cause.

It will be a mistake to suppose that such sacrifices bring no rewards. When a poet labours hard to produce a nice song, and a scientist to frame an elegant hypothesis, they are trying to create something whose contemplation will be a joy to themselves and to kindred spirits. When others enjoy our spiritual creations, we experience a pleasure similar to that of the proud mother whose child is liked and admired. The prospect of fashioning and perpetuating a new spiritual form of life is as deeply satisfying as that of giving birth to a new being. Both the processes involve tremendous labour or strain; they seem to be necessitated by life's irrepressible urge to recreate and propagate itself.

VIRTUE AS ITS OWN REWARD

The virtuous man who constantly sacrifices his own comfort for the sake of others gets other sorts of rewards. Like the artist and the scientist he is largely indifferent to ordinary, non-creative comforts. Having achieved his freedom through indifference to goods that attract lesser spirits, he proceeds to help his weaker brethren who suffer for lack of those goods. Nor does he mind his bodily discomfort when engaged in the service of the suffering men and women. He directly creates significant forms or moments of life, felt and enjoyed by the sufferers, and vicariously enjoyed by himself.

While the merit of a work of art or thought may be questioned by hostile critics, the benefits flowing from a moral act are visible to every eye, and are universally appreciated. The appreciation of art and science frequently requires previous training; the universal language of suffering, and of relief from suffering, is intelligible to the meanest creature. The moments of "relieved suffering" or "joyous living", brought into existence by the virtuous man, have another peculiarity. While being imaginatively sharable by the onlookers, they are *directly* enjoyed by the beneficiaries of the moral act. The significant moments of life produced by the artist or the thinker, on the other hand, are enjoyable by others only on the imaginative plane. A yet another difference may be noted. The impulse of relief or joy that the virtuous man imparts to the sufferer directly reacts on his own self. His effort is crowned with immediate success; the happiness he intended to create emerges before his own eyes like a full-blown flower, and covers his being with the fragrance of its gratitude. The artist or the thinker, on the contrary, seldom witnesses the excitement and enthusiasm which his work occasions in thousands of minds; those impulses become highly diluted as they reach him through the sophisticated reactions of a snobbish and not too friendly critic.

Is virtue its own reward? The reply is, it is. A virtuous act is like a lover's kiss which brings joy both to the one who gives and the one who receives it. It is probably for this reason that the practice of virtue tends to be contagious. When a poet is applauded or a thinker admired, we may wish to be like the one or the other; that wish, however, produces in us neither the competence nor the will and confidence to acquire the competence that makes one a successful poet or thinker. A moral act, on the contrary, directly inspires us with noble impulses. Long ago Plutarch wrote: ". . . virtue has this peculiar property: that at the same time we admire her conduct, we long to copy the example . . . The beauty of goodness has an attractive power."⁵

The virtue, however, which is its own reward is something superior to the "duty" which we are required to do by law and custom. True virtue is an attribute of a morally creative individual, the individual or person who rejoices in multiplying free and happy moments of sentient experience. A man who is law-abiding for fear of the police or the public would certainly be happier if he could break the law without the risk of detection. The happiness of a "dutiful" person is of a different order from that which is enjoyed by the morally creative or truly virtuous man. Like the novelist or the playwright who shares the life that he himself gives to his characters, the virtuous man imaginatively lives the happiness that his activity produces.

The truly virtuous person, then, is one who feels creative joy in the promotion of other people's good. The dutiful person, on the other hand, acts in accordance with the rules and conventions adopted by state and society. No doubt there are some persons who do their duty with greater understanding, and with a sense of delight. Such persons have what may be called an imaginative perception of the value of the laws and customs that they are called upon to obey. They stand midway between those who do their duty reluctantly, and those who experience creative satisfaction in promoting the well-being of others.

Some writers have argued that man should live an unselfish or altruistic life because living that way is the better policy, involving superior wisdom. Thus, it has been frequently pointed out that the pursuit of one's own pleasure or happiness defeats its own end. Pleading the case of the naturalist Mr. Stace observes : 'the great discovery of the moral geniuses such as Christ and Buddha was precisely this : "that the selfish life is not the happy life, and that the best road to one's happiness is to forget one's happiness and work for that of others".' And he adds : 'Why this is so is perhaps impossible to say. It is impossible, because he is "involved in mankind", and their happiness *is* his happiness.'⁶

Our own view differs from the above in important respects. It cannot be argued that selfishness never pays, and that a person cannot be happy unless those around him are happy. The comfort and happiness of kings and nobles, masters and employers, has at least partly been due to the fact that they have found it possible to have some people labour for them and administer to their comforts. In a competitive society with scarce avenues of gainful employment a person frequently earns security and happiness by defeating his rivals in the field. Surely these evident cases of some people's being benefited by the defeat and ill-success of others cannot be explained away by speculative theses as to the individual's "involvement in mankind".

The conflicts among individuals, classes and nations and their respective interests are real. These conflicts centre, as was explained in an earlier chapter, round claims relating to goods, offices, strategic positions, etc. that contribute to security from wants and to power over the means, material and human, which guarantee that security.

The philosophy of life advocated here offers a different solution of the problems arising from conflicting interests. While it may not be possible, and even desirable, to completely eradicate these conflicts, their incidence in a society may be considerably diminished by proper organisation of economic and socio-political institutions. To this problem we shall return. Meanwhile we

shall make some remarks as to the attitude which the individual may profitably adopt towards different values.

For conflicts arise not only among the interests of different individuals but also among those of the same individual. Our central thesis concerning the art of living may be stated as follows. Since man has a creative nature, he cannot be happy without making provision for the realization of that nature. Wealth and material goods undoubtedly contribute to man's happiness; that happiness, however, is mainly negative. The average man desperately needs the security which a regular supply of material goods can bestow, but mere security is not enough. Man cannot be happy unless he is actively engaged in one creative pursuit or another. What we have called culture in these pages is not a luxury; it is a necessity of human nature. For this reason an artist or thinker with a modest income has a far better chance of being happy than an uncultivated millionaire.

The creative nature of man, however, fulfils itself in many ways. The creativity of the virtuous man, perhaps, is in some respects superior to that of the artist or mathematician of a comparable rank. That hardly proves, however, that a person cannot be happy unless he is devoted to promoting the happiness of others. A great mathematician, poet or philosopher, I believe, can be perfectly happy without being morally concerned to ameliorate the condition of others. No person, however, can be perfectly happy who neglects to cultivate his creative interests, and assiduously pursues merely utilitarian ends. Excessive preoccupation with one's selfish or exclusive interests is bad not merely because it interferes with the well-being of others but also because it tends to weaken the urge for creative pursuits. Even the confirmed materialist must curb his selfish and acquisitive impulses and encourage the softer and finer creative propensities of his nature if he is to get the maximum out of his life. A hardened business-like person can scarce know the joys of that friendship and intimacy which causes personalities to unfold themselves to one another in all their delicate complexity; nor can he persuade himself to go through that hard discipline which is needed for the sharing of the spiritual riches of mankind.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION AND SAINTLINESS

It was stated in an earlier chapter that the agency called civilization tended to promote man's freedom. Developing or growing civilization enables man to enjoy more and more freedom from (a) the pressure of his animal wants and needs and (b) the pressure of brute force or interference by unjust authority. The absence of these freedoms means a general sense of insecurity attended with fears and anxieties of various kinds. Man, however, has fears and anxieties not only as a bio-social being but also as a being endowed with imagination. He is afraid of death and extinction. He is anxious to enter into satisfactory relationship with the totality of existence, past, present and future. The so-called civilization does not assist him at all in getting rid of fears and anxieties of this latter type. It is powerless to secure man against deeper kinds of suffering arising from various types of disappointment and frustration, separations through deaths, etc.

Even the problem of security for man's bio-social life is but partly solved by our advancing civilization. For science and technology tend not only to satisfy but also to multiply human needs, which leads to increased competition and friction among individuals and nations. Nor have various forms of socio-political organisation been able to suppress the factors which produce ill will and war among nations and the sense of insecurity among citizens of the different states. Thinkers like Schopenhauer and creeds like Buddhism have averred that the business of living, the use and assertion of the will for the preservation and continuance of life, the craving and thirst that is life itself, is essentially painful. The march of civilization has done nothing to mitigate the severity of the competitive struggle for the conditions and goods that are supposed to make life worthwhile.

Culture, we have said, is sought by man as an end in itself. In the perspective of his total life, however, it seems to have another, negative role as well : it tends to relieve "the burden of existence". During the moments when we pursue art and knowledge "the will to live" or "the craving and thirst for life" is suspended, with consequent relief from pain and suffering. But both the suspension and the relief are temporary. Complete growth of man's cultural per-

sonality requires something over and above the cultivation of the arts and the sciences and even of philosophy: that something is religion. *Religion is the only agency which claims to offer a complete solution to the problem of suffering in its deeper and more radical forms*; it can also claim to be one of the forces which have continually dominated or affected the lives of men throughout the historical times. Has this domination been, on the whole, beneficial or baneful to mankind? Has religion any meaning for the modern man? Has it a future? Answers to these questions obviously depend on what we take to be the nature and essence of religion.

THE NATURE AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The Philosophy of Religion should define, interpret and evaluate the specifically religious attitude or consciousness. It is curiously supposed by some scholars, particularly the anthropologists, that an adequate conception of religion should explain and comprehend *everything* associated with *all* forms of religion including the most primitive. Similar demands are sometimes made on moral philosophy. Sceptical thinkers in ethics are occasionally seen arguing that no moral conception could claim universal validity unless it could be shown to have been accepted in the least developed communities. Thus, it is argued, "respect for life" or "non-infliction of pain" should not be regarded as a genuine principle of morality because societies are known to exist or have existed where old people are killed and slaves or animals are cruelly treated. Such thinkers forget that (1) the moral consciousness may be perverted not only by self-interest but also by wrong belief and superstition even as the logical consciousness may be distorted by attempts at rationalization; and (2) moral consciousness develops through its differentiation from other experiences and concerns and through the growth of social experience and imagination.

It is noteworthy that this type of sceptical argument, often seriously debated by moral philosophers, is not generally taken half as seriously by literary critics and thinkers. Thus, while attempting to define poetry or criticism a writer like T. S. Eliot does not at all feel called upon to consider the poetry and criticism written or produced by some obscure African tribes, or even by under-graduates in a civilised country. The literary theorist feels justified in concentrating on the highest specimens of poetry written in the past; nor is he afraid to take into account the poetry of his own time. And he need not feel diffident to suggest a conception of it which is not applicable to all that goes by the name of poetry in ill-informed circles.

Analogously, I am suggesting, the moral thinker today may be

completely justified in ignoring certain specimens of behaviour considered moral or immoral in the past, and the judgments of worth associated with those specimens. In any case, it is not incumbent on him to take all kinds of moral judgment seriously and to seek to justify them. The moral philosopher is expected to pay serious attention *only to the opinions of experts* in the line, not overlooking the possibility that some of even those opinions may have to be modified and restated, if not wholly superseded, in the light of contemporary considerations and criticisms.

I claim similar freedom for the philosophy of religion. Both morality and religion in the past have been associated and mixed up with matters extraneous to their specific concerns. Morality has been linked up with religion and metaphysics; and religion itself with almost all the other concerns of man: myth and magic; art and music; ritual and ceremony; war and agriculture; cosmogony and cosmology; philosophy; etc. etc. I am far from suggesting that morality and religion should be practised and lived in seclusion from other concerns of life; what I do recommend is that they should be kept reasonably apart in thought, so that their specific essences may be more clearly apprehended.

'The lower the stage of development at which we can observe the ethnic consciousness,' remarks Wundt, 'the more complete is the confusion of the religious elements in the mental life with all its other constituents.'¹ The statement would be equally applicable to such other forms of cultural activity as poetry and philosophy. However, religion differs from the latter two in one important respect. Poetry and philosophy can exist apart from their creators and be enjoyed by persons who are not themselves poets and philosophers in an active sense. Not so religion. While religious lives may be appreciated by people in general, religion itself cannot be dissociated from those lives and passed on to others. Of course religious leaders may exert varying degrees of influence on the lives of their different followers; poets and philosophers likewise influence the minds, and perhaps the lives, of their readers and admirers; but the former can no more be expected to make people religious in the highest sense than the latter to transform their lovers into poets and philosophers. For these reasons we welcome the suggestion put forward by William James that the study of religion should be based on the experiences of the "geniuses" in the religious line 'for whom religion exists not as a dull habit but as an acute fever'.² However, it should not be forgotten that even in a genius the religious consciousness may be mixed up with elements drawn from national mythology, ritual, philosophy, etc. A truly rational approach to religion should aim at isolating the religious consciousness from all extraneous elements and studying it in its most essential

forms and manifestations. It may be objected that such a procedure is likely to miss the concrete and vital reality of the lived religion. The objection does not seem to constitute a serious difficulty. We do not miss the essence of poetry by considering it apart from its undoubted relationship with moral, philosophic, and national concerns of diverse kinds.

The philosophy of religion need not concern itself *directly* with the lives and experiences of the religious persons; that would be the proper business of religious psychology. Our task as philosophers is to examine the contents of the religious consciousness as expressed in the literatures of advanced religions. These literatures express *representative* opinions about the nature and worth of the religious attitude and life. The philosophy of religion should critically deal with these opinions more or less in the spirit in which moral philosophy deals with moral judgments; it should also attempt to discover the criteria by which the value of different forms of religious life and practice may be assessed.

The question, 'What is morality?' is indistinguishable from the question, 'What sort of life or what type of man should be regarded as moral?' Similarly the question, 'What is religion?' is equivalent to the query 'What sort of life or what type of person should be judged to be religious?' Different traditions in religion offer different conceptions of the religious man, even as different moral traditions present different descriptions of the moral man. Philosophical reflection on these conceptions and descriptions should attempt to discover the essential core of agreement underlying differences due to varied environmental and "cultural" factors.

THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION

After these brief remarks as to the nature and problem of the philosophy of religion I shall proceed to define religion. Any definition in philosophy is an hypothesis, which can be justified only through successful elaboration and application. A satisfactory definition of religion should enable us to have an intelligent understanding of the conceptions of religious life offered by the classical or advanced religions of the world.

The specifically religious attitude, in our view, is that which expresses itself in saintly life and character. This attitude has a positive and a negative side. Positively, the attitude or consciousness involves the apprehension of a mysterious goal or presence; negatively it is characterized by a sense of dissatisfaction with and detachment towards values cherished by the generality of mankind.

We have described the object of the religious consciousness as a mysterious goal or presence. This description underscores the fact that the nature of the object in question is but vaguely defined

and imperfectly understood. When the object is conceived as a being or presence, it is endowed with all sorts of perfections; when it is treated as a goal, it is regarded as a state or condition wherein the principal values of life have been realized. The object may be conceived to be the supreme God, or a pantheon of gods. In the latter case, the various values or perfections may come to be associated with different members of the pantheon. Thus, in the polytheistic religion of the *Rigveda*, of the two principal gods, Indra and Varuṇa, the one is lauded for his might and strength, the other for his solicitude for moral order. In monotheistic religions the single Godhead is endowed with all conceivable perfections. In Buddhism, the dominant religious concept is that of *Nirvāṇa*, which is the mysterious goal of human existence. *Nirvāṇa*, however, is the same as Buddhahood, and the more popular cults of Buddhism tend to conceive the Buddha very much in the image of the God of the theistic religions.

The various conceptions of Godhead, and of the perfection which constitutes the goal of human life, show marked similarities and glaring differences. The conceptions invariably bear the imprints of their respective "cultures". Thus the Moslem God is noticeably different from the God of the Vaishṇavas; and the Buddhist *Nirvāṇa* has little in common with the heaven of the Moslems. The differences or contrasts become still sharper as we pass from the primitive to the modern civilised societies. On the other hand the forms of mystic and devotional consciousness, and even those of ritual and worship, evolved by or known to different civilised societies, exhibit striking similarities and far-reaching resemblances.

In this connection another interesting fact may be noted. Within the confines of the same "culture" the learned and the spiritually advanced conceive God or Ultimate Reality differently from the common people. In India, for instance, it was recognised that different forms of worship and different conceptions of the Deity were meant for people of varying intellectual capacities and differing moral and spiritual attainments. The recognition was embodied in the well-known concept of *adhikāri-bheda*. The notion of esoteric knowledge which can be imparted only to the select few implies a similar recognition.

What are the factors responsible for changes in man's conception of "the unseen order" or the gods or Godhead whose presence informs the religious consciousness? One way in which the change occurs is through the growing differentiation of early human sensibility in which moral and intellectual, cognitive and emotional elements were as inseparably mixed up as the visionary and the realistic, the sacred and the profane, the religious and the magical. The growing differentiation of man's interests and their objects

tends to modify his conceptions as to the character and domain of the objects which he worships and to which he addresses his prayers. The character of the Deity that man worships also depends on the needs which he feels to be paramount. Thus the Vedic Aryans who depended on agriculture tended to conceive their supreme god, Indra, as the power that commanded the clouds and produced rain. As man advanced in his control of the physical forces, he began to attribute to his gods finer and more spiritual qualities. Speaking generally, men tend to invest their gods with the virtues and perfections which they consider to be supremely desirable and/or difficult of attainment.

In the hymns of the *Rigveda* we do not find any marked expression of the spirit of detachment towards earthly values. That spirit makes its first conspicuous appearance in our literature in the *Upanishads*. Should we infer from this that that spirit was altogether absent at the time when the Rigvedic hymns were composed? I do not think so. In any age and place the spirit of detachment in a marked degree is characteristic of only a tiny minority: the majority everywhere are generally engrossed in the objects and affairs of the world. On the other hand, the potentiality for imaginative detachment from perishable values is present in all normal human beings, which accounts for the almost universal reverence shown to the saints who reject material goods.

Two conclusions flow from the above considerations. First, while every human being has the capacity to appreciate the religious life and attitude, and hence to develop a measure of that attitude, not everybody can become religious in the true sense, even as not everybody can become a successful poet or mathematician. Hence, according to us, *it is a confusion to speak of communities or masses of people as being religious*. That expression can only mean that those communities or masses subscribe to certain beliefs concerning God or gods, and follow certain prevalent modes of worship, etc. If religious life be defined as life lived with reference to the *felt* presence of a supreme being or destiny, and with detachment towards lower orders of values, then it is clear that that life can be attained only by exceptional individuals.

Secondly, the dependence of the religious conceptions of the supreme goal or presence on "cultural" and historical conditions proves that those conceptions do not correspond to any directly apprehended reality. Nor can it be maintained that what those conditions influence are only the *descriptions* of the reality, which latter remains identical for all religious minds, for there is no way to discover such a reality independently of the descriptions. Even apart from such atheistic religions as Buddhism and Jainism, for

instance, it may be difficult for the non-Christians to appreciate the following statement of Saint Teresa :

Our Lord made me comprehend in what way it is that one God can be in three persons. He made me see it so clearly that I remained as extremely surprised as I was comforted . . . and now, when I think of the holy Trinity, or hear It spoken of, I understand how the three adorable Persons form only one God and I experience an unspeakable happiness.³

Analogous statements may be collected from the writings of saints and mystics belonging to other sects and religions—to a Tulasi Dāsa God appears in the form of Rāma, to a Chaitanya in the form of Kṛishṇa. This clearly indicates that the character of the visions received by different saints has a definite relation to the imagery with which their sub-conscious minds are furnished.

THE GENESIS OF RELIGIOUS NOTIONS

This leads us to discuss the problem of the genesis of religious notions, which may throw some light on the vexed question of their validity. Our definition of religious experience stresses the element of mystery that envelopes the object of that experience. How to account for this fact of mystery? And how to grasp and comprehend it in terms of our everyday experience? We cannot possibly admit the claim of some of the mystics and their votaries that religious experience is wholly esoteric, being inaccessible to ordinary human sensibility. The admission of that claim would be tantamount to declaring religion to be a radically abnormal phenomenon, confined to the lives and experience of some radically abnormal persons. As it happens it has been found possible to explain the behaviour even of abnormal individuals in terms intelligible to the normal people. If the behaviour of the so-called mystics and saints were wholly unintelligible to others, then the former would have to be conceived as constituting a different class or species of beings altogether. In that case it would be utterly impossible to account for the tremendous fascination and influence that saints and prophets have exercised over vast masses of people belonging to different ages and climes.

For these reasons we are unwilling to grant the existence of such entities as Sri Aurobindo's Supermind, which may be regarded as the instrument or locus of a knowledge or experience inaccessible to normal human beings. The deliverances of the highest intelligence and the obscurest intuition, according to us, are, in principle, transmissible to the meanest of human beings, provided that the latter be prepared to undergo the necessary intellectual and imaginative training. The highest flights of the intellect and imagination do not, in the end, really transcend the limits of normal human

experience. The most novel creations of the most uncommon individuals will be found, on finer analysis, to be nothing more than extensions and rearrangements of the desires and expectations, experiences and ideas, of ordinary men and women.

The mystical element that characterizes religious consciousness or its object, then, does not really place it above and beyond the confines of normal experience. The sense of mystery is included in the equipment of normal human beings. That sense can, indeed, be suppressed or weakened by the exigencies of practical life, but it can never be wholly eradicated.

MYSTICISM AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Man is creative, but the way his creativity works remains unknown. Writers and artists speak of inspiration, which is another name for the mysterious processes that put forth, with suddenness, novel combinations of feelings and ideas. The most important thoughts and hypotheses of the genius come to him as flashes of insight.

Mathematicians are known to have hit upon the solutions of some of their most difficult problems during the hours when they were asleep or when they had been occupied with non-mathematical matters. The happy move on the chess-board, which decides the final outcome of the game, is as much the result of sudden perception as of wise calculation. The creative advance of our psychical life, it appears, accomplishes itself chiefly in the dark recesses of the unconscious or the subconscious, though it is by no means unrelated to the region of conscious effort. This latter fact is proved by the circumstance that valuable insights occur only to the experts in different fields.

The relation of the creations of the unconscious to the conscious needs some elucidation. The present writer has no faith in the existence of Jung's racial unconscious. Every element in the so-called unconscious must have been ultimately derived from the realm of conscious experience. The unconscious of a person is constituted, mostly, by that part of his experience which has not yet been put to tangible use in his scheme of life. The unconscious may consist of repressed wishes or perceptions, but it does not consist merely of these. The fact is that a man's stock of perceptions and feelings is always exceeding the needs or demands of his practical life. Such perceptions and feelings, too inarticulate to be brought into relationship with the more useful and better understood experience, tend to be buried into the subconscious strata of the psyche. Even the most thick-skinned of us tend to have such feelings and perceptions, *e.g.*, when they confront the spectacle of death, or are face to face with the sublime majesty of an ocean, a

mountain, or an act of heroic courage or sacrifice. The subconscious or the unconscious does not consist exclusively of repressed wishes is proved by the fact that its revelations are as varied in nature as the tastes of different individuals, and as often pleasant and exhilarating as they are disturbing and painful. The creative accomplishments of a great mathematician, a physicist or a chess-player cannot possibly be attributed to repressed wishes and there is no reason to think that the mechanism of their creativity is materially different from that of the artists, poets and musicians.

Viewed in the light of its creative manifestations the unconscious may be regarded as the store-house of perceptions and ideas, desires and feelings that have remained unused or unfulfilled. People living in the same "cultural" surroundings tend to develop similar patterns of unconscious processes which manifest themselves in myth, folklore, etc. The activity of the unconscious consists in effecting either extensions or novel arrangements of the stored elements. Once, however, these extensions and arrangements have been admitted into the conscious, they begin to be examined and tested by the critical faculties of man. The creations of the unconscious, thus, have to come to terms with the existing logical and scientific knowledge evolved under the aegis of the conscious. On the other hand, the logic of the conscious may occasionally be required to extend the scope of its laws so as to bring under their domain the indubitable deliverances of the unconscious.

One consequence of this interaction between the conscious and the unconscious may be noted. As the scope of the former widens, that of the latter tends to contract or diminish. Thus the growth of science has tended to prevent the unconscious of the modern man from conjuring up visions of miraculous occurrences and magical connections. At any rate, a scientifically trained person is less likely to have such visions than one who is completely ignorant of the character and achievements of modern science.

THE DIVERSITY OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

Religious consciousness, we have noted, is historically and "culturally" conditioned. Its character also depends on the temperament of the group or individual in whom it figures. This is true of religious consciousness in all ages and in all its stages. 'I hold', says Rudolf Otto, 'that, in spite of all the similarity of terms which can be surprising enough, there is a diversity in mystical experience which is not less than that of religious feeling in general'⁴ Otto differentiates the "cool" and unimpassioned mysticism of Saṅkara not only from that of the illuminists, "with its fantastic visions, occultism, or miracle-hunting" but also from Persian mysticism which is "heated and impassioned" and in some cases, "fervent"

and "intoxicating".

In view of the differences among diverse forms of religious experience, it is difficult to evolve a single descriptive formula applicable to all those forms. Dr. Otto, indeed, has claimed that the object of religious consciousness, in all ages and climes, uniformly exhibits certain qualities, e.g., the characteristics of majesty and power, mystery and fascination, which, according to him, are constituents of the peculiarly religious category, the holy or the numinous. The thesis, however, seems to be contradicted by some of the conclusions reached by the same writer elsewhere. For the rational mysticism of Śaṅkara can scarcely be described in the above terms. His *Brahman*, devoid of all qualities including causal efficiency, can scarcely be characterized as awful or majestic, or even as fascinating. Probably the only attribute which it may permit to be applied to itself is that of being mysterious. Nor has Śaṅkara's world-view any real scope for what Dr. Otto calls the "creature consciousness". The advaitin who constantly meditates over the identity of the self with *Brahman* cannot possibly be expected to cherish the feeling of his self's worthlessness. Leuba is of opinion that 'fear and awe have almost completely disappeared from the modern man's religion'.⁵

RELIGIOUS OBJECT AS *Summum Bonum*

In advanced religions such as Buddhism and the Vedānta the object of religious consciousness is generally identified with the supreme goal or *summum bonum*. Buddhism rejects the notion of an ultimate cause or causal principle; the Vedāntic *Brahman*, too, as we have seen in a previous chapter, cannot properly be described as a first cause. All religions, however, agree in investing the religious object with supreme worth or value. And religious life invariably involves a practical or conative attitude towards such worth or value. I want to make a further assertion. The supreme worth or *summum bonum* towards which the religious attitude is directed is something whose nature is only dimly perceived or vaguely apprehended. In all stages and at all levels of man's spiritual growth his *summum bonum* remains to him a mystical goal, an occult possibility obscurely suggested by the creative forces of the unconscious. An important corollary follows from this thesis : *Any goal or object which is clearly and definitely conceived is not a religious goal.*

The specifically religious attitude seems to consist of the following elements : a vague consciousness of a higher destiny or *summum bonum*; a consciousness, having varying degrees of intensity according to the temperament of the person concerned, of the inadequacy of all earthly values; and a consequent state of dissatisfaction with

one's present involvements coupled with a *nisus* toward the higher destiny, variously called Godhead or *nirvāṇa*, perfection or salvation. It is well known that the different schools of Indian philosophy conceive salvation or *mokṣa* in different ways. The Vedāntic conception differs from that of the Sāṅkhya and the latter from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The theists, such as the followers of Rāmānuja, have a conception of *moksha* which is quite distinct from that of the older Hindu metaphysicians. The Buddhist conception, similarly, has some unique features though it has points of resemblance with the Vedāntic viewpoint which it influenced. The diversity of the descriptions of the ultimate goal or destiny of man bears out our contention that that destiny is only dimly deciphered by the religious consciousness. The religious goal or destiny, one suspects, marks the highest limit of the possibilities of man's life as suggested by the subconscious processes of the most developed individuals of an epoch or country.

THE NEGATIVE DIVINE

It is noteworthy that, in the religio-philosophical literature of the world, ultimate goal is frequently described in negative terms. Philosophically, such a goal is identified with ultimate reality. The mystics or mystic philosophers of all civilized countries generally hold the Absolute or Godhead to be indescribable, i.e., incapable of being characterized positively. Such descriptions are of frequent occurrence in the *Upanishads* and are not wanting in the sacred writings of other countries. Thus a famous passage in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (III, 8) describes the Brahman negatively as follows: it is not oily, not gross, not subtle, not small, not large, not red, without shadow, without darkness . . . without taste, smell, visibility, audibility, movement, etc. Elsewhere the *Brahman* has been described as *neti-neti* (not like this, not like this), which means that it is impossible to characterize it in terms of its likeness to anything known to us. The *Kaṭhopanishad* (Valli IV, 12) likewise asserts that 'the *Brahman* can be reached or grasped neither by speech or mind nor by the eye; the only way it can be known or characterized is by saying that "it is".' Similar negative descriptions of the *nirvāṇa*, often regarded as identical with ultimate reality, are frequently met with in Buddhist literature. Thus Nāgārjuna, in the opening verses of the *Mādhyamika-kārikā* which are intended to be a salutation to the Buddha, says:⁶

The Perfect Buddha
 The foremost of all Teachers I salute
 He has proclaimed
 'The Principle of Relativity
 'Tis like blissful (*Nirvāṇa*)

Quiescence of Plurality
 There nothing disappears,
 Nor anything appears,
 Nothing has an end,
 Nor is there anything eternal,
 Nothing is identical (with itself),
 Nor is anything differentiated.
 Nothing moves,
 Neither hither nor thither.

Elsewhere the same author states :⁷

What neither is released, nor is it ever reached,
 What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternity,
 What never disappears, nor has it been created,
 This is *nirvāna*, It escapes precision.

For parallel descriptions of Godhead or Reality in Western literature the reader may be referred to W. T. Stace's book, *Time and Eternity*, Chapter two. Mr. Stace significantly entitles the chapter, "The Negative Divine".

Another way in which the mysterious and inscrutable character of the religious object has been suggested in sacred literature is by the use of paradoxical expressions and contradictory epithets with reference to it. Thus in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* we read : "Sitting he goes far; lying down, he goes everywhere. Who, save myself, can know that God who has joy and has it not ?" (Valli II, 21). It is interesting to note that Saṅkarāchārya, in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-Sūtras* (I, 1, 19) seriously discusses the question whether happiness or bliss (*ānanda*) can be attributed to the *Brahman*. The conclusion reached by him in the matter is negative.

THE SPIRIT OF DETACHMENT : OTHERWORLDLINESS

The religious object, then, is apprehended as being something quite different from the cognitions and values of earthly existence. Religious experience consists in the suggestion of a goal or reality which is transcendent. Consequently that experience tends to weaken the individual's loyalty to earthly values. This accounts for the persistent strain of asceticism that runs through world's great religious literature. Stace has asserted that the negative divine, while it makes its appearance in all great religions, finds the strongest expression in Hinduism.⁸ This may be true, insofar as the philosophical side of that expression is concerned. But it would be untrue to suggest that the practical attitude of ascetic otherworldliness is a characteristic peculiar to Hindu religion. The following excerpts from the *Imitation of Christ*, one of the most popular texts of the Christian religion, will testify to the prevalence

of that attitude among devout Christians :

Fly the tumultuousness of the world as much as thou canst; for the talk of worldly affairs is a great hindrance, although they may be discoursed with sincere intention; for we are quickly defiled, and enthralled with vanity. (Book I, Chapter 10)

If we were perfectly dead unto ourselves, and not entangled within our own breasts; then should we be able to taste divine things and to have some experience of heavenly contemplation. (Book I, Chapter 11)

The greatest saints avoided the society of man . . . One said, "As oft as I have been among men, I returned home less a man than I was before." (Chapter 20)

For to eat and to drink, to sleep and to watch, to labour and to rest, and to be subject to other necessities of nature, is doubtless a great misery and affliction to a religious man, who would gladly be set loose, and free from all sin . . . But woe to them that know not their own misery; and a greater woe to them that love this miserable and corruptible life! . . . So long as we carry about us this frail body of ours, we can never be without sin, or live without weariness and pain. (Book I, Chapter 22)

Religious teachers have always laid stress on inward life. The *Kathopanishad* says : 'Only that rare man of wisdom, whose eye is turned inwards and who desires immortality, has a direct vision of the soul. (Valli IV, I) Thomas A Kempis likewise observes : 'He that can live inwardly, and make small reckoning of things without, neither requireth places nor expecteth times, for performing of religious exercises . . .' (Book II, Chapter I)

What can these expressions mean and signify to a humanist ?

The expressions of other-worldliness signify man's deep-seated dissatisfaction with the utilitarian order, the realm of ends and means, the world of struggle, of stress and strain, of consciousness yoked to the useful and the expedient. Marked out for a creative destiny man seems to resent the unavoidable limitations imposed by his animal nature. Endowed with the capacity to envision a higher order, he begins to chafe under the actualities of his lower nature. He wants to escape from the consciousness that keeps him bound to the region of lowly struggles and pursuits.

The perishable character of life and its values frequently induces the mood of pessimism in sensitive natures. However, truly religious minds can seldom rest in pessimism. Neither Buddhism nor the various schools of Hindu philosophy can be really called pessimistic, since they all believe in a realizable goal or state where

ignorance, evil and suffering have been transcended. In fact, the mysterious goal or presence which haunts the religious consciousness is a source of constant inspiration and unfailing strength to the *sādhaka*; it sanctions and sustains his efforts to move towards a destiny which is but dimly apprehended. Faith in such a goal or destiny, indeed, is a distinguishing mark of the religious person. This faith is a sort of inner assurance not based on tangible evidence or rational calculation. Our faith in moral and aesthetic values is similarly grounded in inner assurance. In the last analysis this faith is tantamount to the conviction that certain values must prevail. Speaking of *karmayoga* the *Gitā* affirms: Even a little of it, when put in practice, protects one from great dangers. (ii, 40). Elsewhere it declares: Never did a person who practised virtue suffer an evil lot. (vi, 40) If virtue is its own reward, then the practice of virtue can never be in vain.

It seems that the religious man's faith in his destiny and in virtue is independent of the findings of the different sciences; our aesthetic and moral consciousness is likewise independent of theories framed by physical and other sciences. Ultimately, the only sanction and proof of a value recognised by man is the *experience*, lived or imagined, which constitutes or realizes it.

The value or goal pursued by the religious mind, though it may contain elements drawn from the aesthetic or moral consciousness, is *sui generis*. We may call it holiness or saintliness. It is a state or condition wherein man ceases to care for things for which lesser spirits struggle, compete and fight. The religious mind, indeed, is the *aristocratic spirit* developed to the highest point on the highest plane. The aristocrat is a person who refuses to bother about petty things and petty affairs; to the spirit treading the heights of religious detachment, all the treasures that the world can offer, all its gains and losses, defeats and victories, appear to be small affairs unworthy of his serious notice. The values cherished by the man of religion, in fact, are absolutely different from those pursued by worldly persons. Stationing himself in the perspective of eternity, he refuses to occupy himself with things that can touch only his temporal life or perishable self. It happens, however, that the religious man, who is completely indifferent to the vicissitudes of his own career in space and time, is extremely sensitive to the suffering and pain falling to the lot of other living beings, both men and animals.

THE SAINTLY CHARACTER

Detachment towards the lower, utilitarian order seems to be the necessary condition of all creative activity. This seems to be the truth underlying Toynbee's conception of "withdrawal" as practised

by the genius. There never was a genius who did not, impulsively if not deliberately, withdraw himself from the affairs of the world in order to accomplish his creative work. In the lives of most of the gifted individuals, however, the practice of detachment is fitful and unsystematic. It is the religious Sādhaka, the saint or the wise man, who cultivates detachment in a disciplined manner.

What is the significance or value of saintly character from the viewpoint of the individual who cultivates it, and from that of society?

In order to answer this question it is necessary to have a closer view of the saintly nature. The detachment that characterises the saint's life and temperament is not altogether a negative trait. The saint alienates himself from everything which has a constrictive, narrowing effect, which tends to involve one in selfish pursuits and to lead one to conflict with one's fellow-beings. Towards things contrary in disposition, e.g. virtue, contentment and beauty, his attitude is one of sweet friendliness and silent approval. The characteristic note of a saintly person, in fact, is serene or balanced sweetness. The saint, indeed, may have an emotional temperament as was the case with most of the Vaishnava poets and saints of India including Sūradāsa, Chaitanya and Ramkrishna Paramhansa; however, his emotion is different in quality from the *agitation* which characterizes the lower spirits. Patañjali has indicated the following method for the attainment of spiritual balance or poise: The Sādhaka should cultivate the feeling of friendly satisfaction in the happiness of others, compassion towards the afflicted, delight in the activities of the virtuous, and indifference towards the wicked (*Yoga-sūtra*, I, 33). In an illuminating chapter on "saintliness" James enumerates a number of qualities associated with the saintly character. Some of these are: A conviction of the existence of an Ideal Power which is continuous with our own life; asceticism, increase of charity, tenderness for fellow-creatures; the sense of enveloping friendliness and the disappearance of all fear from one's own life; an inexpressibly sweet calmness of the soul; etc. etc.

Which psychologist would dare assert that the personality of the saint is in any sense undesirable? As for his value to society James observes that, economically, 'the saintly group of qualities is indispensable to the world's welfare'.⁹ Without some measure of that detachment towards the utilitarian values which the saint practises there could be no administration of justice and no wise government. Neither science nor art nor the virtues of friendliness, fellow-feeling, patriotism, courage, etc. could flourish in a society wholly devoted to acquisitive and selfish pursuits.

By their absorption into the arts and the sciences, their concern for suffering fellow-beings, and their devotion to visionary

ideals, the gifted individuals of all times and places have proclaimed the superiority of man's creative spiritual nature over his sensual, animal self. The saints and prophets have ever constituted the vanguard of the procession of such heroic personalities.

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Two important questions remain to be answered. First, what is the relation of the religious consciousness to the values that count for us in our earthly life? And secondly, what is the logical status of the revelations of that consciousness? The two questions are interrelated, and the answers to them, too, are likely to be interrelated. In answer to the first question it has been said that there exist two disparate orders, the natural order or the order of time, and the divine order or the order of eternity. The two orders are wholly incommensurable so that 'any proposition asserting any relation between God and the world is a symbolic proposition and not a literal truth'.¹⁰ All religious language, in the opinion of Mr. Stace, must be taken as symbolical and not as literal; that language is evocative, as distinguished from the scientific language which is descriptive. So sharp is the separation between the two orders that the one may be regarded as unreal from the viewpoint of the other. From the point of view of the natural order, the divine one is an illusion; from the viewpoint of the latter, the former is worthless, which is the same thing as saying that it is unreal.

A humanist would hesitate to admit a divine order transcending the human order. He cannot but regard the human personality as the centre where all the forces of the universe meet. Anything that really eludes the perception and imagination of man cannot, for that very reason, be meaningful or relevant for his existence. Man could not have understood nature had not her operations been intelligible in terms of his interests and perceptions. The so-called divine order, too, can reveal itself to man only as an extension of visions and ideals that he normally cherishes. Nor can the divine order be radically opposed to the natural; they both coexist and interact in the personality of man.

The disinterestedness and detachment that culminate in religious life are intrinsic to human nature, and not imposed on it from without. Nor are those characteristics to be conceived negatively. Detachment from the sensual and the acquisitive impulses is not only compatible with, but even a precondition of, attachment to the spiritual and the creative. This compatibility or connection is clearly implied by Patañjali's counsel to the *Yogin* to cultivate the feelings of *maitri* and *mudita*, i.e. friendly satisfaction and delight respectively, with reference to the happiness and virtuous activity of others. The recommendation that the saint should

develop the habit of compassion towards sufferers goes to show that vital morality (as distinguished from routine duty) forms part of the religious values.

The detachment that constitutes the essence of the religious spirit is characteristic of all developed, finer natures. It consists partly in a person's refusal to bother about things whose limited value is clearly visible to him. The loss of the doll which quite upsets a young girl leaves her father amusedly indifferent. A saintly king may similarly remain unaffected by his son's ill-success in battle. Both the girl's father and the king, indeed, may feel sympathy and concern for the misery of their respective wards, and try to alleviate it. The saints, in particular, who are ascetically indifferent to their own personal troubles and sufferings, are singularly sensitive to the afflictions and tribulations of others. The great saint-poet *Tulasi Dāsa* speaking of saints (in his *Rāmacharitamānasa*, BK I, *Doha 3*), says : 'Just as flowers placed in the hollow of the joined hands make fragrant both the hands, similarly the saints do good both to friends and enemies'. Towards the end of the *Aranyakāṇḍa* or the Third Book, Rāma describes the nature of saints in the following words : 'They feel abashed when they themselves are praised, happy when others are being lauded; simple in nature, they are friendly towards everybody; . . . faith, forgiveness, friendliness and compassion . . . are their essential characteristics'. The four great virtues, called *Brahma Vihāras*, enjoined by Buddhism on the Bhikkus and recommended even for layman, are exactly those mentioned in the *Yoga-Sūtras*, viz. *Metta* (*maitri*) or friendliness, *Karunā* or compassion, *Muditā* or gladness, and *Upekkhā* or indifference. Buddhism enjoins positive love for all beings. 'And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole world, above, below, around and everywhere does he continue to pervade with heart of Love, far-reaching and beyond measure.'¹¹ James remarks that 'when we are in need of assistance, we can count upon the saint lending his hand with more certainty than we can count upon any other person.'¹²

The saint's detachment to things worldly may be due to, or accompanied by, a positive faith in the existence of a superior goal or destiny; or it may be based just on the perception of the lack of value or limited value of the objects of the world. In the former case, the religious man is likely to experience some of the attitudes or emotions described by Otto; in the latter case, he may just enjoy the peace of mind that comes from the renouncing of fretful worry and effort, and consider that peace itself to be the goal of religious endeavour. However, even by those who have no faith in a God or Absolute, the religious goal is seldom regarded as being utterly

devoid of positive content. It is now generally recognised that the *nirvāna* of Buddhism, the only major religion without God, does not mean extinction. 'To think that *nirvāna* is annihilation is according to Buddha "a wicked heresy".'¹³ The *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* explains: 'Final deliverance is declared by the sage Buddha to be nothing other than a *flow of faultless states of consciousness*'.¹⁴ In this connection it is pertinent to refer to the revealing statement of Nāgārjuna that 'in no wise does the *samsāra*, i.e. the world, differ from the *nirvāna* or the *nirvāna* from the *samsāra*'. (*Mādhyamika Kārikā*, XXV, 9). The Buddhist *nirvāna* is not a negation of world-consciousness, but the world-consciousness characterized by some special qualities. The *Bhagavadgītā* recommends that the *Karma-yogin* should live and act just like the worldly people; he will be differentiated from the latter only by the fact of his detachment (III, 25). The religious man, in fact, is attached only to those impersonal values which have meaning and relevance in terms of the highest good visualized by him. Such a good or goal is nothing other than the culminating point of the creative possibilities of man in a certain direction.

The creations of the unconscious, however unusual their contents, are, we have insisted, ultimately rooted in our conscious life. The most esoteric utterances of the mystic bear a relation to the cultural *milieu* and the philosophical idiom of his time and place.

'The mystical experience', in the opinion of G. A. Coe, 'simply reproduces the teachings the mystics had previously received'.¹⁵ Not only the character of the mystic's utterances but also the *quality* and *strength* of his detachment depend on the range and nature of his acquaintance with the values of life. Detachment is not synonymous with the avoidance or abhorrence of life. One can be properly detached only towards that whose character and limitations have been exposed to one's view. True detachment is the culminating point, not of the process of fleeing from life, but of the activity of earnestly pursuing the values of life. The *Mimāṃsaka* view that one should seek to become a mendicant only after one has passed through the stage of the house-holder seems to be based on sound insight into human nature.

VALIDITY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

What about the logical validity of religious experience? It is difficult to accept the reported argument of Fechner and of Samuel Alexander¹⁶ that our propensity to or need of worship proves the existence of God. Many persons may find it difficult to testify to the feeling of such a propensity or need. Insofar, however, as religious sensibility refers to an imagined attitude towards the values of life, its effective existence is a proof of its validity. Similar

validity is enjoyed by the aesthetic and emotional states of the artist's mind which are embodied in his creations. Nor need these states, in order to be valid, be uniform in all religious persons. All art-works created by master artists are simultaneously valid, though no two of them are alike in essentials, each artist's sensibility being individual and peculiar. I, therefore, do not share Sadhu Shantinatha's scepticism¹⁷ as to the possibility of truth-realization in the state of ecstasy or *samādhi*, on the ground that the experiences of different *Yogins* are *different*. Creative variation being ingrained in human nature itself, the variety of the experiences of the *Yogins* does not prove their falsity. They may all be simultaneously valid for those competent to judge them. The fact that the differing realisations of the disciples accord with the teachings of their respective *gurus* no more proves the illusoriness of those realisations than does the lover's sympathetic response to the love-poetry written by a master poet prove the falsity of that response. The virtually infinite sentiment or experience of the lover can, through selective rearrangement, fit itself into any expression of love fashioned by a poet; the amorphous experience of *samādhi*, one may presume, similarly lends itself to differing formulations.

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

In our discussion of religion we have confined our attention mainly to the advanced religions. The anthropologists' studies of primitive religions, however, seem to point to conclusions concerning religion which are diametrically opposed to our own. This opposition or difference has two important aspects. First, the anthropologists seek to assimilate religious life and experience to the utilitarian order; secondly, they tend to regard religion as pseudoscience, or as a stage in the development of science or the scientific outlook. The view leads some of them to the conclusion that religion is destined to disappear from human life.

The famous anthropologist Sir James G. Frazer expressly favours the view that religion is a stage in the growth of the scientific world-view. Religion arises in the failure of magic, and dissatisfaction from religion leads man to science. The movement of the higher thought, he says, 'has on the whole been from magic through religion to science', so that 'religion, regarded as an explanation of nature, is displaced by science'.¹⁸ According to Frazer religion 'consists of two elements, a theoretical and a practical, namely a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate or please them'.¹⁹ Science gradually substitutes forces of nature for gods and spirits and experimental knowledge and control over those forces for the activities of propitiation and worship.

Freud, too, considers religion to be an illusion which is destined

to pass away. Rooted in the longing for a protective father the illusion called religion is derived from man's wishes. Thus the benevolent rule of divine providence allays our anxiety in face of life's dangers, the establishment of a moral order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of justice, which within human culture have so often remained unfulfilled, and the prolongation of earthly existence by a future life provides in addition the local and temporal setting for those fulfilments.²⁰ We remember how Kant advanced these considerations as reasons for believing in God, immortality, etc. Another way in which, according to Freud, religion has been useful is through its contribution towards the restraining of asocial instincts. What have we got to say about these views about religion and the gloomy prophecies concerning the future of religion associated with those views?

The view that the primitive man is essentially religious is so widespread that one does not know how to combat it. It seems to be supposed by those who hold it that being religious is one of the easiest things for a man to accomplish. It may be difficult for him to be truly virtuous, and even truly and completely moral, but no pains need be taken by him in order to be religious. The prejudice prevails in spite of the fact that in advanced religious circles it is considered to be the highest distinction, attainable by but a few, to be a true man of religion.

This is not intended as a denial of the fact that the primitive man, too, has a share of the religious propensity. That propensity, however, expresses itself in his life not so much in the practice of magic and in the performance of rites calculated to please gods or to injure enemies, as in the *faith*, accompanied by various degrees of hope and fear, that the distinctions of good and evil are objective, which should be honoured and observed by him. It is in virtue of a mysterious sense of good and evil, unsupported yet by self-conscious reflection, and of intimations of a mysterious destiny, not explicable in terms of tangible experience, that the primitive man can claim to have the religious consciousness or experience.²¹ However, to the extent to which these intimations fail to detach him from the concerns of his precarious animal existence, he may not experience the serenity and exultation of a developed religious or saintly life.

The concepts of religion given by Frazer and Freud would hardly apply to creeds like Buddhism, and even to Vedāntism. The prophecies about the future of religion based on those conceptions, therefore, are likely to be both misconceived and misleading.

The religious frame of mind derives from two factors in man's nature: his capacity to transcend, emotionally and imaginatively, the order of visibly finite values on the one hand, and his *nisus* to-

wards the realization of ever higher forms of attitude and awareness on the other. Both these elements in man are part of his creative nature, which necessarily involves him in the quest of values. As long as man continues to own and enjoy this nature, there is no danger whatever of his growing indifferent either to art and science or to philosophy and religion. For it is through these that man is enabled both to conceive or visualise his mystic higher destiny and to realise it.

CHAPTER VIII

LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP : EDUCATION AND THE STATE

WE have analysed the adventures of the creative spirit as it expresses itself in art and philosophy, morality and religion. We shall next enquire into the conditions which contribute towards the fulfilment of that spirit. To do that, we shall have to descend down from the dizzy heights of religious detachment, and enter once again into the region of the mundane and the finite, where the drama of the spirit's advance has of necessity to be enacted.

Is the detachment of the religious spirit directed towards the goods and commodities of the world, or towards its men and women? Is the religious man capable of friendship and love? Or, should it be understood that love and friendship are inconsistent with a truly religious life? If religious life be regarded as the highest type of spiritual existence to which man may aspire, then the question whether and how far that existence includes or excludes our more important emotions becomes deeply significant to us.

Traditionally the saints, believing in an otherworldly order, are supposed to live in aloofness from this world's affairs. This attitude towards religious or saintly life is reflected in Thomas à Kempis's advice to "fly the world". However, the picture of saints drawn by such Vaishnava writers as Tulasī Dāsa is not so negative. The prophets and saints who have influenced most the course of our history were men who lived and moved among the people. To this order of teacher-saints belong the great Buddha, Jesus Christ, Kabir, Nānak, Dādū, etc., as also the great saint-poets Sūradāsa and Tulasī Dāsa, Raidāsa and Tukārāma. Who could assert that these holy personages were lacking in friendly or emotional qualities? Some of the above, such as Sūradāsa and Tulasī Dāsa, had been great lovers in the worldly sense, before they took to the religious and monkish life. In his great epic, *Rāmacharitamānasa*, Tulasī Dāsa describes in a number of places how good people, and particularly the devotees of Rāma, rejoice in the company of saints or saintly persons. There seems, however, to be one differentiating mark of the emotional life of true saints: it is completely free from the sensuous element. The danger of this element creeping in makes the saints generally unwilling to have dealings with women.

Leaving the saints aside for the moment we shall ask : what is the role of love and friendship in the more secular phases of our life ? What is love, and why do we need it ?

Ralph Linton has somewhere noted man's great need for "emotional response from others". This need seems to be involved in, or rather to constitute, man's social nature. Driven by organic needs the human infant, indeed, depends on other human beings for its very survival. This early dependence, however, is not a sufficient explanation of his continued interest in his fellow-beings in later life. Nor do our organic needs explain our desire for the sort of complicated response from one or more human beings which we call love.

Civilised existence depends on mutual cooperation and exchange of services among men and women. While these activities may, and occasionally do, lead to the development of comradeship feelings, they need not necessarily do so. In a modern society, where relations among men and women are mostly contractual, cooperation is generally a mechanical process, consisting mainly in the coordination of the activities of a large number of individuals brought about by a few persons concerned directly or indirectly to achieve some results. Examples of such cooperation may be found in the functioning of a typical modern workshop, factory or office. Nor is this cooperation confined to the members of a single society or nation. In the domains of international trade, transport and postal services, workers and citizens of different countries co-operate for the benefit of the peoples of all the countries. These examples show how cooperation may exist without the cooperating units getting even to know one another.

Love and friendship, one may conclude, are not necessary elements in civilized existence. The policeman and the magistrate, the judge and the legislator, the scientist and the engineer, no less than the factory worker and the bank clerk, the manager and the salesman may carry on their business efficiently without knowing what the above sentiments mean or signify.

Love, I suggest, is a necessity of our creative life, at all levels and in all forms. Man needs to be loved, and he also seeks to make love. The "emotional response from others" which a human being desires expresses itself in the craving for appreciation, admiration and love. Man desires these responses as the creator and bearer of values. Having rendered a service to one or more fellow-beings, a person expects to be rewarded for that service by the expression of gratitude and/or appreciation; having excelled in a recognised course of valuable action, he hopes to get admiration. Gratitude, appreciation, admiration, etc., belong to the same family of emotions as love : they are the ways in which the creative achievement

or worth of a person is recognised. The difference between gratitude, appreciation and admiration on the one hand and love on the other seems to be as follows : we express the former towards a person for what he *does*, while we love him for what he *is*. The nearness of these sentiments to one another, however, is shown by the fact that gratitude and admiration felt by one party towards another may often lead the former to love the latter. Conversely, the sentiment of love cannot possibly continue its existence without the concomitance of the feeling of admiration, appreciation and/or gratitude.

From the viewpoint of the lover, the worth of the object of his love consists in the qualities which make for the enhancement of his being. Each person's creative needs being different and peculiar, different individuals tend to make love to different kinds of person. The enhancement of lover's personality through love may be brought about in two ways : by his participation in the life of the loved one, and by the extension and improvement of his creativity through the aid and appreciation offered by the beloved.

To the lover the beloved appears to be an object of transcendent worth. Who can describe her more hyperbolically than he ? The qualities of the beloved are such as arouse desire. Her beauty and sweetness, her sensitive and affectionate nature, her intelligence and tact, her graceful bearing and frank demeanour, her noble and sincere disposition—all these are objects of fond longing and contemplation to the lover. Desire and longing are forms of quickened life-impulse and love is an indication of enhanced vitality. The experience of "being in love" is so ravishingly significant mainly because it involves the stirring up of all the feelings and impulses in the lover's personality. The lover wants to possess the beloved with all her virtues and perfections. He thereby hopes, albeit subconsciously, to *share in the exquisite life-processes, physical and spiritual, of the loved one's being*. In an incalculable and mysterious manner the beloved stirs up the lover to new life, making him feel more alive, firstly physically, then emotionally, and lastly, at least in some cases, spiritually, even religiously.

Men and women who are actively creative, such as artists and thinkers, stand in continual need of "being loved". They are generally attracted towards persons who have some spiritual affinity with them. While the passive type of lover is thrilled by the prospect of participating in the beloved's life-process, the active one rather seeks a companion who would help him in attaining his own self-fulfilment. The first type falls in love with the woman who has qualities complementary to his own; the second type with one who, having temperamental and intellectual likeness with him, can extend appreciation to him for his own distinctive qualities. Of course,

the two types may coexist in the person of the same lover. Perhaps every lover approaches the beloved with a measure of both kinds of expectation. One thing, however, is certain. A creative spirit can bind itself only to the person who is capable of appreciating its distinctive merits. Nothing binds one person more to the other than the latter's capacity to extend just and generous appreciation to the former. Ultimately, I can love only the person who appreciates what I consider to be distinctively significant in my personality. A measure of mutual respect and appreciation is a necessary element in the sort of understanding called love.

The creative spirits are peculiarly prone to hunger for such appreciation. Such appreciation constitutes to them what they call inspiration. The beloved inspires the artist or the thinker by extending to him her intelligent yet sympathetic appreciation, which, while soothing the pains his creative labour has occasioned, encourages and prepares him for further creative effort. The beloved's just appreciation or admiration, her loving care and assistance, both sustain the creative spirit and make it grow.

Love, it appears, involves a sense of dependence. The lover comes to depend on the beloved for his happiness and strength. Without her he feels wretched, miserable, ineffective. The attitude of a real lover towards the beloved is : I absolutely need you. The beloved must be able to feel towards the lover as the mother does towards the child. The lover must appear before her, in intimate moments, as a suppliant, an humble petitioner, without any pretensions, any exhibitionism. One may have proper pride, but the proud man is not yet a lover. The desire for ampler life through her association must be stronger than any sense of pride. The woman, in her turn, must be capable of extending her motherly protection to the man she loves.

How is it that only a woman inspires man? Is it that the exercise of creativity everywhere (*i.e.*, not merely on the physical plane) needs the cooperation of the other sex? Probably their differing endowments make man and woman peculiarly fitted to fulfil each other's needs. The woman loves to receive and share the riches, material and spiritual, which the man brings. She is not fitted directly to struggle and create, except in the case where nature forces her to bear the burden of creation. Compared to man, woman is more balanced, less restless, and less variable. She is more constant in her affections, too. Perhaps she can contribute to culture only through the man she loves. She is the source of his inspiration, and the accepter of his dedication. She looks at the universe through her lover's eyes. Probably she likes him to have a wide vision, but she aspires to have no independent vision. The man seeks an anchorage, a mother-beloved, a guardian angel; the woman,

a protector at the socio-physical level, and a hero who will make conquests for her, bringing for her protective keeping the riches of the universe. The woman, it appears, does not like directly to struggle and conquer the world; she wants to be proud of the achievements of a son, a brother, or the lover. Her seductive charms are intended to capture or conquer for her a man who would work throughout his life to enrich her existence.

The woman likes the strong man; however, she can love only the person who needs her protective affection. A woman loves her child more than she does her husband; and she can love the husband only to the extent to which he shows himself to be dependent on her. In the absence of a lover who could arouse and fulfil her motherly impulses, a woman cannot be happy until she has a child.

Why does the creative artist or thinker need love? The tremendous fatigue of creation, it seems, does not disappear until the creation has been lovingly chared. In the *Uttararāmacharitam* of Bhavabhūti Sītā regrets the fact that Rāma is not present by her side to kiss the children she has begotten.¹ The artist, similarly, wants his creations to be loved by his lady-love. Life, in all its creative variations, seems to need love; it seeks, so to say, to reproduce and continue its being in others.

Our best creations are spontaneous. But the creative effort has to be disciplined and organised in order that it may be acceptable to society. Discipline is sometimes needed by the inner logic of the created life-moment, an aesthetic experience embodied in a picture or a poem, or an intellectual vision incorporated in a theorem. Such discipline brings a peculiar satisfaction. Sometimes, however, discipline is artificial and irksome. Much of our social living involves discipline which is little better than meaningless routine and convention. Society requires me frequently to wear a mask; it is constantly interfering with the spontaneous expressions of my innermost impulses. That is why the artist, the spokesman of the normal or natural self, finds himself so often at odds in society. The creative restlessness of the artist makes him peculiarly prone to feel lonely in a conventional world.

It is not merely the artist, however, who, indulging in bolder innovations, needs love. Love and appreciation seem to be universally demanded. It seems that every human being, in every significant gesture that he or she makes, stands in the need of approval—approval and acceptance by a loving companion or set of companions. Every man and woman waits for the advent in his or her life of a companion who will after all understand him or her, and find the maximum meaning and use in everything he or she is. The presence of such a companion seems to be necessary for the full growth and flowering of every personality. I want a friend or companion

who will accept me entire, who will save me completely from the strain of hypocrisy, who will love me for what I am without any mask or pretension, who will love my spirituality without hating me for my animality. I want to be seen and loved in my naked naturalness which I am constantly seeking to hide from society. Many of the Freudian complexes arise because of the strain caused by the incompatibility between the demands of society on the one hand and those of the natural, normal human self on the other. Viewed in this light, love would appear to be a force making for sanity.

LOVE AND MATRIMONY

The intensity and romance of love is generally supposed to be incompatible with the matrimonial relationship. 'Many a man', says Kierkegaard, 'became a genius, a hero, a poet, or a saint through a girl, but not through the girl he got.'² He becomes one or more of these through the girl he does not get. This is a startling statement, being an indirect condemnation of one of the oldest and most important institutions of our social life. It is impossible to do justice to such a complex issue within the short space at our disposal. However, some pertinent observations may be recorded. Love and friendship belong to the creative, as distinguished from the utilitarian, order of our existence. Lovers tend to idealise each other, to see each other as beings operating only on the plane of aesthetic and other values. The sordid necessities of family life tend to interfere with the romantic dreams of the lovers, and to drive them to disillusionment with respect to each other. Two remedies may be suggested for the evils of this disillusionment. First, the intending parties to marriage should be prepared by competent agencies, literary and scientific, to have a more realistic appreciation of the problems concerning their prospective relationship. The parties should not be carried away by mere physical attraction, and neglect to take into account their temperamental and spiritual agreements and disagreements. Secondly, they should try to see whether, in view of their peculiar tastes and aspirations, they are likely to continue to need each other. Only the husband and wife who need each other continually in some non-utilitarian or creative direction can possibly continue to be perpetually interested in one another.

We have defined love as the desire to participate in the life-processes of another; it is also the desire to have one's life-processes shared by another. Complete love involves both these elements. Love is likely to prove unstable if it is confined to the mingling and mutual sharing of the physical life currents only. Nor can love be reduced to merely a socially convenient relationship. Stable love can exist only between persons who find each other continually

charming, and who continue to be the sources of spiritual enrichment to one another.

True lovers do not seek deliberately to conceal themselves one from the other; nor do they attempt to dominate one another. Their constant effort is to communicate their selves each to the other, and dedicate themselves to each other's happiness. It is perverted or partial love which demands surrender in place of this dedication, and seeks brutally to crush the individuality and independence of the other. True lovers constantly try to help each other in mutually exploring and possessing one another; they also endeavour to protect and further the growth of each other's personality.

Friendship is love without the element of physical attraction, i.e. the sort of attraction which invites the parties to mingle their corporeal life currents with one another. The relation of friendship is characteristic of persons of the same sex who are kindred in spirit. Deep friendship between members of the opposite sex can seldom exist without psychological complications. Where deliberate self-control by the parties concerned succeeds in maintaining such relationship on a Platonic level, they may be able to derive the noblest and the sublimest inspiration from one another.

LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP IN SAINTLY LIFE

We have already spoken of the saint's compassionate concern for the wellbeing of others. Does he himself need love like artists and thinkers and other human beings? Saints and religious teachers, it seems, learn to feed themselves exclusively on the feeling of friendship. However, it does not seem to be true that the saintly nature is wholly free from the need of emotional response from or dependence upon an "other". The desire to be loved, we have maintained, is at the bottom of the desire to have our value-bearing self accepted and cherished by another person. The saintly teacher may find such person in the body of his disciples and followers; he may also find that person in the felt reality of a God or Absolute. Thus even Saṅkara, the great Absolutist, has composed devotional lyrics addressed to the *Brahman*. In one place he declares: Although the dualism (of thou and me) has disappeared, still I belong to thee and not thou to me; surely the wave belongs to the ocean and not the ocean to the wave! St. Augustine's highly emotional confessions are all addressed to his God. The saintly devotee of Rāma, Tulasi Dāsa, seems to have lived with the sense of the constant presence of his beloved Deity.

It seems, then, that even the saintly nature is not free from the need or desire for being loved or accepted by an "other". This need seems to me to be more universal and real than the alleged propensity to worship. Writers and artists have generally sought

to find the desired "other" in the person of a beloved woman; if saints have not been visibly so inclined, it is partly because the woman is by nature much too practical to extend her appreciation to sovereignly detached spirits; partly, no doubt, the inclination has been hindered by prejudices engendered by the cultural backwardness of woman on the one hand and her reputation as a temptress on the other.

It is noteworthy that Mahatma Gandhi, probably the greatest *karmayogin* and saint of this century and one of the very greatest saints produced by history, was living with his wife and several women friends and disciples up till almost the very end of his life. Having taken the vow of *brahmacharya* when both he and his wife were about thirty-seven, he continued to have her by his side until she died at the age of seventy-four. The great sage Yājñavalkya had two wives of whom he loved more the one with philosophical curiosity. The *Gītā* teaches us that true renunciation consists, not in formally taking to monkish life, but in the abandonment of attachment to worldly objects. While the saint must renounce or subdue the lust of the body, he need not be afraid of loving relationship with his wife or even with a woman friend. When Kasturba died, Miraben (Madeleine Slade) saw tears in Gandhi Ji's eyes, 'the first tears she had ever seen him shed'.² Only a misanthropic bigot would affirm that the tears detracted from the saintliness of the great Mahātmā:

ON EDUCATION

We shall next ask the question : What are the aims and objects of education, and what part may it be legitimately expected to play in the promotion of cultural life?

Education has been described as 'the induction of the maturing individual into the life and culture of the group' and as 'conscious and purposeful control of learning by the more experienced members of society'.³ The first definition or description emphasizes that education consists mainly in the transmission of "cultural" heritage; the second, that this transmission is a selective and controlled process. The need of ascertaining the aims of education and of framing an educational policy arises from the following facts. First, the total heritage of the known ways of behaviour and response in different fields is too vast to be transmitted to the young and adult members of a society taken individually. Secondly, different educable children and adults have different tastes and capacities. Lastly, the educating authorities, e.g. the church during the middle ages and the state in modern times, are generally interested in promoting some attitudes and habits of response and inhibiting others. Society, particularly a modern society, in its collective capacity,

knows far more than can be taught to any single individual. Further, society, taken collectively, has attitudes and habits some of which are regarded as undesirable by most of the people, and others as questionable by a few. Under these circumstances the educator may be faced with the task of selecting those parts of the cultural heritage whose universal transmission through education would be commended in the more vocal and influential quarters.

What should be the principles controlling the selection of certain parts, which are to be deliberately transmitted through education, from the vast heritage of habits, attitudes, cognitions etc. which constitute national or human "culture"?

Education is universally considered to be something useful and desirable. Further, it is generally regarded as being advantageous to the child or adult to whom it is imparted. Receiving education, particularly higher education, is usually supposed to be a privilege. In most of the modern societies this privilege is enjoyed only by adults belonging to relatively better-off families, or by gifted young men who can manage to secure fellowships, scholarships, etc. This, at any rate, is the case in our country. In this respect the main difference between the conditions prevailing in India and those obtaining in more prosperous democracies such as Great Britain and the United States is this, that in the latter countries the number of scholarships, etc. available to deserving students is much larger than in our own land.

I have been trying to make out the trite point that education is generally held to be beneficial and desirable for those who receive it. Does this circumstance warrant the conclusion that the purpose of education is to prepare the children and the adults to acquire and enjoy certain goods or to produce and realize certain values? Curiously enough there is no unanimity among the educational theorists on this point. To say that education benefits those who receive it is not necessarily to imply that the conferring of such benefit is the aim and object of education. The liberal democrats, indeed, believing as they do in the worth and dignity of the individual, have emphasized that the educator should take the child to be an end in himself and regard his perfection as the proper goal of his educational efforts. But the view is not acceptable to all. In the Fascist countries, for instance, the glory of the Fatherland, or the establishment and protection of a certain political and/or economic system is taken to be the ultimate value to which all other values should be subordinated. In despotic regimes education is generally used for the purpose of moulding children into obedient and devoted citizens. While the liberals have contended that there is no good other than the good of individual human beings, others have stressed the fact that the good of the individual being insepar-

able from that of the community, the interest of the latter should be allowed to override those of the former.

Granting that education seeks to do good to the individual and/or the community, the question arises: What is the nature of the good that it aims at promoting? In the attempt to answer this question educational philosophy imperceptibly passes into the philosophy of life. As Plato realized, education is by far the most potent agency that moulds the personality of the growing individual. The responsibility of the educator, consequently, is very great. A wrong philosophy of education must of necessity lead to a defective educational policy. The latter, if pursued vigorously over a long period, must affect adversely not merely the present well-being of the community, but also the future prospects of its growth and advance in culture and civilization.

The question as to the proper aim of education is as difficult to answer as the related philosophical query, What is the true aim of life? Education, it may be assumed, is intended to prepare the younger members of a community to lead happy and significant lives. But how is a happy and significant life to be defined? The supernaturalists and idealists may like to define it in one manner, the naturalists and materialists in another. In this connection I would like to start with the following humanistic assumption: The rival descriptions of ideal life must all be intelligible in terms of the experiences which occur to us here on this earth, and which are similar enough to be comparable and communicable.

I shall now attempt to state two antithetical views concerning the nature of desirable or good life, and the nature of desirable or good education. Each of these will be found to be related to a number of metaphysical world-views as well as to a number of educational theories.

The first may be stated as follows. Man is a creature with a number of needs several of which he shares with the animals. These needs are generally satisfied with the help of objects obtainable from the physical environment. Man can obtain or produce the objects necessary for his well-being by scientifically studying his physical environment. For such a study man should proceed empirically and critically. Not by wishful thinking, not by reverie or phantasy, but by careful observation and cautious reasoning can man learn slowly to master his environment and to use it to fulfil his needs. Education is the machinery which trains and prepares the individual to adjust himself to the environment, and to extract most out of it. Man is also required to adapt himself to the human environment. It is needful for us, therefore, to study human beings, human institutions, and human history. Here again we should be

careful to apply strictly scientific methods and accept only verified conclusions.

Man fulfils himself and his knowledge through action. Therefore, knowledge divorced from action is valueless. The growth of human knowledge is parallel to and dependent upon man's growing capacity for "material practice", or action. Information becomes knowledge by being linked to human interests, and knowledge becomes truth by being tested in action. What interests the individual pupil must form the basis for the motivation of his instruction. The curriculum of the school, therefore, must centre round the activities of the pupils.

What really counts is the present and its interests. "The on-going *present* is always the fulcrum of interest; hence if the study of history is to be significant, it must necessarily be drawn upon whenever learners see its significance for the present."⁴ History unrelated to the present is useless. In the swiftly changing world in which we are living much of the teaching of the old masters has become simply pointless. As Whitehead observes :

The note of recurrence dominates the wisdom of the past . . . in the past the time-span of important change was considerably longer than that of a single human life. Thus mankind was trained to adapt itself to fixed conditions. But today this time-span is considerably shorter than that of human life, and accordingly our training must prepare individual to face a novelty of conditions.⁵

The above view of life and education may conveniently, though rather vaguely, be called scientific-realistic. Powerful echoes of it, mixed with varying degrees of pessimism and optimism, may be heard in the writings of such ancient and modern thinkers as Democritus and Epicurus, Holbach and Diderot, Marx and Engels, Herbert Spencer, Pareto, Dewey and Russell. Briefly, this philosophy exhorts us to be scientific and empirical, rational and realistic, just and reasonable. It disapproves of religious supernaturalism as well as of extravagant romanticism.

The other view, which may be termed, vaguely again, moral-aesthetic-humanistic, may be stated as follows. The significant approach to life, to quote Lin Yutang, is "the approach of values" as distinguished from "the approach of facts". The values in which we are interested are necessarily human values; they inhere and are expressed in human life; they are forms of desirable or good life. As Pope said, 'The proper study of mankind is man'. In other words, what a man should be properly interested to know are the ways in which human life attains beauty, worth or goodness. The Upanishadic sages exhorted the student to know himself. To know

oneself, however, is not merely to know what one is at a particular moment of one's existence, but to know what one may be, and what, one should be. Knowledge of the self is the knowledge of the potentialities, intellectual, moral and aesthetic, which the self has in its power to realize. To know oneself is to know what man has been in the moments of his vital and heroic existence on different planes. It is to be acquainted with the rectitude and courage of a Socrates, the noble questionings and the great renunciation of a Buddha, and the passionate ardour of a Dante, a Petrarch, a Shakespeare, or a Yakṣa as depicted by Kālidāsa.

It is not enough to be able to control the environment, or to own wealth. The main thing is not what one *has*, but what one *is*, or is in the process of becoming. The aim of education is not so much the extension of man's power over man and things as the expansion of his being, actual and imaginative, into the innumerable forms of significant thinking, feeling and acting realized in their lives by the worthier members of our species. Wealth and power should be looked upon, not as ends to be sought for their own sake, but as means which would enable us to attain higher and nobler forms of existence.

This implies that the main purpose of education is to inculcate in the pupil the sense of values, the power of discriminating between the lower and higher forms of intellect, feeling, and action, so as to stimulate him (or her) to make out of himself (or herself) a superior personality. Education should also seek to implant in the pupil a proper sense of respect and reverence towards superior and nobler persons. The pupil should learn to look at other human beings as ends in themselves and never merely as means. 'The Confucian final test for any civilization', as explained by Lin Yutang, 'is whether it produces good sons, good brothers, good husbands, good friends and *good individuals who have a delicate sensibility and are most anxious to avoid hurting others' feelings.*'⁶ Education should aim at producing such individuals, such sons, brothers, husbands, etc.; in addition, it should aim at producing persons in whom the best impulses of mankind, its finest visions and noblest aspirations, find their continuance and creative reliving.

The view reflects the core of the teachings of some of the greatest moralists and philosophers, religious teachers, humanists and classicists. Among its votaries may be counted such significant figures as Plato and Aristotle, Confucius, Lao Tse and the Buddha, Jesus Christ, Kant, Gandhi and Tolstoy, and the humanist thinkers from the renaissance down to our own times. The viewpoint stresses for man the importance of "being" as against "having" and even "doing", when the latter is taken to mean "acting on the environment".

Can the antithetical claims of these philosophies of life and education be synthesized into an inclusive viewpoint? The same question may be asked in regard to the conflicting requirements of individual and social good, and those of specialized and general education.

We have already explained how all the values created by man may be subsumed under two general concepts, civilization and culture. While civilization stands for the extension of negative freedom, *i.e.* freedom from wants and unjust authority, culture signifies the activities which contribute to the expansion and enrichment of the human personality. Both civilization and culture being the concerns of man, and the activities called culture being largely dependent on the security afforded by civilized conditions of existence, the educator must equip the pupil to play his part in the preservation and growth of both civilization and culture.

Civilization, as already explained, consists of two kinds of processes, denoted roughly by the terms technology and institutional life. Every man, willy-nilly, participates in both these kinds of processes. Everybody is connected with the technological order, in the capacity of either a producer or a consumer or both. Gandhiji put forward the view, regarded by him as an ideal measure, that everyone should be required to perform bread-labour, *i.e.* the labour needed to produce commodities necessary for the satisfaction of his primary needs. The proposal, however, is not feasible, seeing that the demands of specialized training may leave some persons absolutely without time to work in the field or the factory. The business of maintaining and running our civilization has come to be a tremendously complicated affair, needing specialised knowledge of such abstract and difficult subjects as mathematics and physics, chemistry and engineering, anatomy and physiology. No one can be expected to master any of these subjects without expending a good deal of time and energy, and no one can master several such subjects, or even all the branches of a single subject. The realm of the existent, it appears, is no more explorable by any single individual. Mankind cannot benefit from the knowledge of the experts or specialists in different fields unless the latter choose to cooperate for the well-being of one another and of their fellowmen.

Specialized training, then, is necessary, though it is not needful that any particular individual should specialize in a particular field. However, it is essential that the experts in different spheres should all be imbued with the sense of socio-political cooperation and responsibility. This means that they all should learn to be human and to regard their knowledge as intended to be an instrument of human happiness. The regard for human happiness involves an

intelligent appreciation of the worth and dignity of the human personality.

The scientific expert, in other words, no less than any other adult, needs being initiated into the world of values. He should be told that the knowledge of "what is", though useful, is not enough; that man has also to know what is valuable and desirable. This latter kind of knowledge comes partly through self-intuition, and partly through imagination stimulated by the study of the humanities.

Let us try to see more clearly what the initiation into the realm of values involves. The scientist is accustomed to study things which simply *are*, being neutral in respect of the values. The sciences are concerned with knowing how things come into existence, how one existent leads to another, how the various existents or occurrences condition and give rise to one another. The quantitative sciences aim at discovering or formulating equations which would accurately relate the changing modes of connected phenomena. The question of values simply does not arise when we are dealing with the actual existents and events.

That question arises only when occurrences or actions are viewed in relation to the human purposes. The scientist boasts that the sort of knowledge he acquires by his special methods is valuable. While saying this, he is generally trying to suggest that it is serviceable to man. The aeroplane, the radio, the cinema,—all the achievements of science are *achievements* because they have been found useful for man. Science, therefore, cannot, without undermining its own cause, deny the value of man and his purposes.

Here the more sophisticated scientist might be tempted to exclaim : 'Ah ! but science is not valuable *merely* for that. Science is valuable as *knowledge*, as an aesthetic encounter with the universe of facts !' In reply you might mildly suggest : 'you probably mean that the discipline of scientific investigation and thinking, in some obscure fashion, renders interesting and valuable the personality of the scientist himself.' The scientist may be tempted once more to differ from you, but he is not likely to discover a different and convincing interpretation of the value of science.

Objects and activities may be valuable to us either as means or as ends in themselves or as both. The aeroplane and the radio are valuable to us as means; the state of mind induced by a poem or a song is valuable as an end in itself; health and scientific knowledge are valuable both as ends and as means. The aim of education should be to train the individual in the arts of creating, preserving and enjoying the different kinds of values.

Above all, the educator should inculcate in the pupil a sense of genuine affection, regard and reverence towards the human per-

sonality, considered as the reservoir of the possibilities of knowledge and feeling, attitude and action which may be looked upon as ends in themselves. In the rest of the universe nothing is valuable which does not, either directly or indirectly, contribute to the preservation and betterment of living beings in general and the human personality in particular. Kant spoke of the good will as the only object which was good without qualification; I should substitute for that will the human personality, preserving and enjoying itself in its creative richness. Every personality is an end to itself, and a personality becomes an end to others insofar as it fashions and radiates significant experiences which may be shared by others. No person has a right to interfere in the attempted pursuit of health and creative fulfilment by others, except when that pursuit interrupts or thwarts similar attempts of other human beings.

The general aim of all our actions is the promotion of the desirable forms of sentient life or experience. The specific object of education is the qualitative improvement of the pupil's personality. This is true of scientific education no less than it is of education in the humanities. How is this improvement effected? It is effected chiefly by making the student participate in the life-possesses, intellectual and emotional, of the master thinkers and writers of the world. The statement needs elucidation. The student may be told that the instructions which are being imparted to him are intended to lead him to gradual mastery over his environment. He may also be told that the instructions in question are meant to train his mind in scientific investigation, so as to equip him for discovering fresh scientific truths. The enthusiasm of the student, in other words, may be fastened either to the utilitarian or to the aesthetic side of the scientific enterprise. He may be led to view science either as a spiritual venture, designed to put man in contemplative communion with the secrets of the universe, or as a materialistic occupation directed towards the attainment of power and prosperity. The second end may also be emphasized in a different manner. The student may be encouraged to feel that education is an instrument, not so much of improving and enriching his personality, as of launching him on a successful career. While the different ends of education may all be kept in view by both the pupils and the teachers, it is the emphasis on one of them or the other which would determine the ultimate effect of education not only on the lives of the students but also on the quality of the national culture.

Here the thoroughgoing naturalist may feel impatient to urge some objections against us. 'In the name of the ultimate worth of the human personality', he may tell us, 'are you not trying to belittle the achievements of our material civilization, and to minimise the blessings that science has conferred on us? Moreover, by'

disparaging the role of what one has, are you not subtly suggesting a return to the ideal of ascetic otherworldliness? We plead not guilty to the charge. The well-being and development of the human personality embrace its physical as well as spiritual side. All that is contended here is that material wealth and possessions do not have a value independently of the needs and requirements of the human beings. An important implication of the view is that one section of a society may not be permitted to be used by another as merely an instrument for producing comforts and luxuries for itself.

A second implication may be noted. The development of one's personality involves not so much the suppression of the impulses that nature has implanted in one's being, as the subordination of the lower to the higher impulses, or the encouragement of the higher impulses in preference to, and sometimes at the expense of, the lower ones. The development of personality is a qualitative concept, and cannot but consist in the growing capacity to discriminate between the lower and the higher, the inferior and the superior, and the growing inclination to prefer the higher and the superior, to what is lower and inferior. The wise Manu has said: 'No fault attaches to indulgence in meat (*i.e.* savoury dishes), wine, and women; such indulgence is natural with sentient human beings; (relative) withdrawal from them, however, is greatly rewarding.' The aim of education should be to acquaint the students, through rational and imaginative sympathy, with finer, higher and nobler forms of intellection, affection and volition, so that, through the greater fascination for these, they may learn to be temperate with respect to sensual pleasures.

We do not deny, then, that sensuous pleasures must be given a due place in the scheme of a rich and creative life. When the senses are starved, the mind is not likely to function in a balanced manner. Excessive emphasis on ascetic self-denial, both in the life of the individual and in that of the community, always leads to an unhealthy reaction in favour of sensuous indulgence. What is prohibited, according to Freud, must become desirable. Forbidden pleasures are generally coveted. The better policy, therefore, is not so much to seek to prevent young men and women from tasting sensuous pleasures as to encourage them to cultivate the taste for higher pleasures. Students must be instructed in the arts and the sciences, in such a manner that they come to acquire a genuine taste for those pursuits. Above all, they must be encouraged to raise and discuss ultimate or philosophical questions and to react as citizens of the whole universe.

While not deprecating the sensuous pleasures, we should nevertheless feel alarmed at the increasing preoccupation of our

times with the corporal and the material. The disappearance of religious beliefs and taboos and the multiplication of comforts and luxuries through scientific inventions may be important causes behind this phenomenon. It may also be asserted that the religious emphasis on life-negation, preached and practised during the middle ages, provoked a violent reaction in the opposite direction. Humanism itself led this reaction during the renaissance; it was joined by Protestantism and rationalism during the later centuries.⁷ Whatever the causes, excessive involvement in the bodily and the physical marks a failure, and consequent degeneration, of the creative forces of human life.

These phenomena of failure and degeneration need careful analysis. Man's creativity is directed both outward and inward. The first leads him to transform his environment, the second to project and realize ideal images of his own self. The transformations of the environment, physical as well as social, are tangible processes, accomplishing themselves at definite moments of time, and producing tangible results. The transformation of the individual psyche, however, remains largely a symbolic process, manifesting itself in speculative and artistic constructions. Needless to say, the two kinds of creative processes are constantly acting and reacting on one another. At the highest level, the characteristic of the creative activity is the projection and apprehension of the mysterious or mysteriously valuable. Einstein has said, 'The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science.'⁸ To this we should add: The mysterious is always apprehended as charged with unaccountable and immeasurable significance. At the highest level, human creativity assumes a transcendental or religious meaning. One consequence of such creativity, therefore, is the feeling of dissatisfaction with, and detachment towards, the finite and the tangible.

An individual or a "culture", therefore, can completely lose itself in the physical only when he or it has ceased to be creative at the higher levels. These higher levels are the philosophic and religious levels. Man reaches these levels either through faith or through prolonged contemplation and cultivation of detachment. Creativity being an essential characteristic of man, he cannot be happy without exercising it more or less continually.

This accounts for the barren emptiness of a life devoted to the pursuit of purely sensual pleasures. Whether or not sensuality is a sin—whether or not anything can be correctly called a sin—it is certain that the way of sensual gratification is not the one by which one gets the most out of life. The paradox of hedonism is a well-known psychological phenomenon. Deliberate pursuit of pleasure leads not to happiness or the quickening of the life-impulse but

to satiety and insufferable boredom. Cattell finds in contemporary society, among the other symptoms of maladjustment, 'an almost maniacal hunt for pleasure'. 'It was usual to say', he proceeds, 'that the vogue of hectic enjoyments, speed, cocktails, and jazz was a consequence of the war; but this sensual preoccupation of a large section of the population, extending beyond anything known in happier ages in so large a fraction of the people, is obviously chronic'.⁹ He attributes these aberrations to 'a lack of deeper satisfactions in some fundamental purposive frame of living.'

Such a frame of living, it is submitted, can be obtained only by an honest though critical acceptance of the value-consciousness. The word "critical" here refers to the functions of the mind involved in taking a comparative and integrated view of the phenomena under review. A study or contemplation of the values, in fact, is a species of self-contemplation. For the ultimate ends or goals with reference to, or in terms of, which various values are finally assessed are nothing but the possibilities, enjoyed or contemplated, of the self's existence. 'Because of this immediacy', it has been well said, the ultimate goals or values 'are prehended rather than apprehended'.¹⁰

The deeper satisfactions and loyalties of life relate generally to goals and objects that have a mysterious fascination for us. Such, for instance, is the fascination exercised by the person one loves. The life-processes of the beloved, physical, sensory and spiritual, that one wants to seize and share, are apprehended to be mysteriously meaningful, holding the promise of incalculable joy and unforeseen delight. Such joy and satisfaction can seldom be obtained from the so-called rational goods, which generally consist of the means of tangible advancement such as wealth and power. Any good that is non-rational, belongs to the category of the end-in-itself and has an aura of mystery around it. Even health and the charm it carries are mysterious. In general, the experiences aroused by beautiful objects, moral deeds, etc. are mysteriously significant. A child smiling in response to the sweet movements of the mother's face, a pair of lovers lost in fond contemplation of each other, a waterfall sparkling under the silvery lustre of the full moon, all these evoke experiences whose charm is both ineffable and incalculable. When the goal or ideal is such as to lend unity and organisation to our separate perceptions and responses, moral and aesthetic, relating to the qualitative and the mysterious, we have a cause for which it is worthwhile to live and to work.

I do not believe that a sense of ultimate purposiveness of life necessarily involves a belief in God and a supernatural order. Early Buddhism, which influenced a large section of the Indian people, did not believe in either of these. The Hindu philosophers believe

in God or a spiritual principle. But even they recognise that the ultimate goal of life, *Moksha* or liberation, can be realized and tasted by us *here* in our earthly existence. The notion of *jivan-mukti* implies that the consummation sought by man, though invested by him with infinite worth, is yet not transcendent with respect to his normal spiritual potentialities. Among Greek thinkers Aristotle did not believe in the immortality of the soul; nor did he connect human happiness with the grace or worship of God. To Aristotle human good or happiness is coextensive with virtuous living, and the highest type of life, the life of contemplation, is still the life of a man living in this mundane world.

INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY AND STATE

What type of socio-political arrangement is necessary for fostering the qualitative growth or development of the personalities of the people? The question is important, since no teacher can hope to successfully implant in his pupils ideals contrary to those encouraged by society and the state. Indeed, in most of the societies the teacher would not be permitted at all to propagate ideas and norms unacceptable to society and particularly the state. Nor can the teacher remain appreciably unaffected by the standards and values that prevail in the community. Thus in a competitive capitalist society even a well-meaning teacher cannot remain indifferent to the acquisition of wealth. If not for himself he may desire wealth for the sake of his children. With the best of intentions he may not, in the education of his own children, be able to waive the consideration of their future financial prospects. Educational ideals have, of necessity, to be related to the needs and values involved in the pupils' social existence.

Of course, it is possible for a theorist to conceive educational ideals in a spirit radically different from that prevailing in the society. However, it is difficult to see how such ideals can be enforced in a modern society without the consent and even active cooperation of the state. Plato was guided by a sure practical instinct when he observed that an ideal transformation of society could be brought about only through the agency of ideal rulers. While good men without power would be impotent to effect far-reaching changes, rulers without goodness would ignore if not wreck the best schemes prepared by the best men.

The anarchists, of course, may object to so much importance being attached to the state. However, even if the state is ultimately to disappear, as the communists hope and believe, or if it should disappear, as the anarchists desire, it is difficult to see how the disappearance could take place except through the will of a sovereign body representing the state. In virtue of the possession of weapons

Invented by science, a modern state is too powerful to be overthrown by peoples' rebellion. Until, therefore, the most powerful state or states of the world desire actively to liquidate or dissolve the existing national states, and finally themselves, there is no likelihood that the states and governmental organisations of the different countries in the world will disappear. Historical evidence, too, is overwhelmingly in favour of the continuance of the organisations called states. Rather than count on the disappearance of the state, therefore, we should be interested in obtaining a reliable answer to the following question: what type of state is likely to be useful to us in enforcing educational ideals outlined above?

Different, even contradictory, attitudes have prevailed as to the nature, functions and ultimate desirability of the state. Political philosophers have been busy defining the aims and purposes for which the state exists, and devising the criteria by which the working of actual states may be assessed. Philosophers of such diverse temperaments and persuasions as Plato and Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Rousseau and Hegel agree in holding the state to be not only useful but indispensable. While all communities, observes Aristotle, in the opening section of his *Politics*, 'aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other and at the highest good'. Hobbes the materialist sage who finds in man 'a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death,'¹¹ considers the state to be a necessary instrument of civilised social existence. Going farther than both Hobbes and Aristotle Hegel describes the state as 'the absolutely rational, the divinity which knows and wills itself, the eternal and necessary being of spirit, the march of God in the world'.¹²

On the opposite pole are the communists and the anarchists who believe the existence of the state to be necessarily bound up with evil. Thus, according to the communists, the state is an instrument of class domination, which will and ought to disappear with the abolition of class distinctions. Thoroughgoing communists as well as the anarchists are opposed to the institution of private property. Private property, according to Bakunin, 'which is both the ground of existence and consequence of the state, creates physical and moral evils of all kinds'.¹³ According to Kropotkin the state is without any natural or historical justification and is opposed to man's naturally cooperative instincts.¹⁴

How to understand and reconcile these contradictory statements about the state? The facts seem to be as follows. There can be no doubt, in the first place, that the state tends in some respects to be useful to *all* the members of a community. By maintaining law

and order within and by offering protection against aggression from without the state creates an atmosphere in which the citizens can move about freely in the pursuit of their legitimate ends. As Prof. Laski puts it, 'With the state there comes security; and security is the condition upon which the satisfactions men seek to secure are capable of peaceful attainment.'¹⁵ The satisfactions sought by men are material as well as spiritual. Men derive pleasure not merely from the material goods they produce or procure but also from their peaceful intercourse with other human beings and from higher cultural pursuits. Even when the society is stratified into classes and the state favours one or more classes at the expense of others, citizens of all ranks and positions may continue to enjoy what may be called the non-material pleasures.

In the second place, it is true that state power frequently tends to be concentrated into the hands of some persons and classes. This phenomenon is due mainly to two factors. First, in every society there are persons who have greater boldness and tact and stronger wills to be important and dominant than others. Such persons manage to rise and make their way to power. However, a person can seldom rise to power without the assistance of some influential persons and the indifference or connivance of others. Nor can a person remain in power without the consent and cooperation of many active and influential persons. Since socio-political influence is frequently associated with wealth, the state, or the officers of the government representing it, generally tend to support the wealthier sections of the people. Where, however, wealth is dissociated from such influence, as was the case in Hitler's Germany, and is the case in present day Soviet Union, men desirous of power no longer flatter and oblige the rich but seek to please the party bosses on whose favours their fortunes depend.

At the same time it is true that no government can afford to alienate the loyalties of the larger section of the people, for numbers have their importance no less than has wealth. A ruling oligarchy, with the armed forces fully under its control, can, indeed, go on defying the wishes of the people for a long time. However, such a state of affairs is seldom considered desirable; and constituted governments are generally anxious to have their rule backed by proper authority. For force alone does not establish a government. As Rousseau pointed out, 'force does not create right' and 'the strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right.'¹⁶ The states effect this transformation through the propagation of various "myths" (as MacIver calls them) or ideologies. The state enjoying constitutional authority must assign reasons for its differential treatment of various sections of the people. What is more, these "reasons" must be acceptable to the

majority of the people. The ideology supporting state activities, in other words, must, generally, be an ideology of the people themselves. This means that the ideology in question should not be merely a class ideology. For in that case the state would be exercising, with respect to the classes excluded from power, "naked" rather than "constitutional" power.¹⁷ An ideology may be said to belong to the whole people when, no matter by whom propagated, it is accepted by practically all the sections of a community, and a rival ideology is not heard of and discussed. Ideologies are generally invented by the intellectuals and thinkers of a community, and not directly by the governments. However, governments or states tend to support the ideologies which suit their respective ruling classes. Nevertheless it need not be supposed, as the Marxists seem to do, that ideologies opposed to the interests of the ruling classes and favouring the oppressed ones should originate among leaders and intellectuals belonging to the latter classes. The emergence of a new, revolutionary socio-political ideology seems to depend, at least partly, on the fact that new forces in the environment of a society almost thrust on the attention of its intellectual leaders the vision of a better and juster order. The inherent moral appeal of the new ideology, again, is what contributes most to its propagation and popularity. The historical creed of socialism itself, which Marx advocated, affords the best proof of the above contentions. Of the three principal founders of modern socialism, Ferdinand Lassalle, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, none was a wage-earner or a member of the wage-earning class. And the widespread diffusion of the socialist ideology, in its varied forms, all over Europe during the thirty years after Marx's death in 1883 was due, *not to its acceptance by the rulers of the European countries, but to the ethical quality of its challenge and analysis.* With respect to these years of the socio-political thought of Europe it may be truly said that the ruling ideas of an epoch need not be the ideas of the ruling classes.

The emergence and careers of the totalitarian regimes in the present century, however, bid us revise our attitude towards the possibility of the suppression of heretic creeds or dissentient ideologies by the rulers of the states. Science has placed stupendous resources into the hands of these rulers. They can beguile and condition the peoples' minds in a thousand ways, and they can wipe the rebels out of existence by the application of the most cruel and cunning methods. Indeed, there seems to be today virtually no protection for citizens against the rulers of powerful states and their satellites.

In view of these evil potentialities in the behaviour of the state thinkers with anarchist leanings recommend a drastic curtailment of

its powers, if not the total abolition of the state itself. But how is this curtailment of the powers of the state to be effected? Who can compel the state to reduce its power, or to restrict its area of action? The major concern of the rulers of all types is the acquisition and maintenance of power; how can they agree voluntarily to have it pared or restricted?

The answer to the above question, as also to the question posed in connection with the enforcement of a certain policy of education, is that the state can agree to enact legislations, directly or indirectly harmful to its power or prestige, only when pressure for such legislation is brought to bear on it by the people, and when the state is under compulsion to be responsive to that pressure. The miracle of the state's taking action to curtail its own powers can, in other words, occur only when the state is a democracy. The only alternative to this democratic method is the way of revolution, by which the desired change in the state machinery may be effected. However, in an age of aerial bombing and atomic weapons, an armed resurrection by the people, however well-organised, is not likely to succeed against an unscrupulous and powerful government.

The state has been described as a method of organising the public *power* of coercion;¹⁸ a democratic state may also choose to organise the collective *wisdom* of the people. Under pressure from the enlightened leaders of the community it may adopt an educational policy which would discourage the pursuit of wealth and power and encourage the cultivation of aesthetic sensitiveness and moral and intellectual virtues. These objectives could never be entertained by the rulers of autocratic and totalitarian states. For, wedded to the cult of power, those rulers would be inclined to listen rather to their assistants and followers than to men of thought and wisdom who generally choose to keep away from politics. Under a democracy, on the contrary, the possibility of the election of really cultivated persons to important offices is not ruled out. Even when such persons are not elected to the legislative and other bodies, they can influence their government through the pressure of public opinion which they are free to shape and mobilise. Under autocratic and totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, where freedom of thought and expression is denied, the collective wisdom of the community and its intellectual leaders has no chance of fulfilling and asserting itself.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALISM

The marxist dogma that all governments are class governments has been falsified by the practice of the advanced democracies of the world. It has been noted that party loyalties cut across class divisions.¹⁹ In England, for instance, the membership and following

of the left-wing parties is not confined to the proletariat, and their leaders have not infrequently been drawn from the "upper classes". The right-wing parties, likewise, have a mixed following. MacIver observes : ' . . . wherever democracy triumphed the identification of party and class was transcended.' In our own country such parties as the Congress, the P. S. P. and the Jan Sangh have all a mixed membership. The middle class people, in particular, can be met with in noticeable numbers in almost all the parties, not excluding the Communist Party. The middle classes, in fact, have not only not disappeared—contrary to what Marx had predicted—but have been growing in numbers in the democratic countries²⁹; they directly give a lie to the Marxian thesis that the state necessarily represents one particular class. Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party of England, for instance, equally depend for their electoral success on the middle classes. That the democratic governments are not mere puppets in the hands of the capitalists is amply borne out by many anti-capitalist laws enacted and measures adopted by the former. Examples of such laws and measures are by no means rare : the introduction of a progressive or graduated income tax; the imposition of death duties; gradual nationalisation of key industries; etc. etc. Nor can such activities of the state as the provision of free education for all children be construed in terms of exclusive class interests.

A democratic government, in fine, cannot be characterized as a class government. Nevertheless it is true that even a democratic state tends to pass into the control of the wealthy and the influential. A democracy which would make the qualitative development of the personalities of its citizens its central concern must of necessity move towards a socialist order. Socialism, to my mind, means or involves two things. It means, in the first place, a system of economic relations which renders impossible the exploitation of one section of the people by another. Secondly, it involves the absence of gross inequalities among men as regards their access to the necessities of life and their command of material comforts and luxuries. A perfect democracy should be able to provide equal opportunities for self-development and progress to all its citizens. It is difficult to see how provision for such equality can be made unless the state is permitted to exercise democratic control over the material resources, avenues of employment, education, etc. existing in its territory.

In a society where material goods are considered to be a source not only of comfort and pleasure but also of prestige and importance, such goods come to be prized and coveted in a competitive spirit. This accounts for the fact that even in such a rich country as the United States most of the people are not happy or contented,

as the pervasive spirit of competition keeps them perpetually worried and restless. Only a socialist pattern of society can save the sensitive and intelligent people from the neurotic strain and anxiety that a competitive, materialistic order tends to engender.

We should aim, then, at the establishment of a socialistic society ruled by democratic methods. If, however, I were required to make the unpleasant choice between "socialism without democracy" and "democracy without socialism" I would prefer the latter. The reason is that there cannot be much hope for a society where the fundamentals of democracy, *i.e.* freedom of thought and expression, are denied. In the form of universal suffrage and above-mentioned freedom a democracy possesses, so to say, an instrument of automatic self-correction, which may save it from falling into a state of persistent stagnation or decay. For if the community continues to have a supply of far-sighted and thoughtful leaders, there is no reason why it should not be able to learn from its occasional mistakes and eliminate the chances of their repetition in the future.

But is democracy coupled with socialism enough? The twentieth century has witnessed an abnormal growth in the power of the state, and a proportionate diminution of the importance of the individual. In the modern state, it has been frequently noted, the individual seems simply not to count. Even such important personages as Einstein and Russell could not make any significant difference to the course of world-events, or to the policies and decisions of their respective governments. The growing regimentation of life, economic, political and even cultural—witness the influence of such agencies as the popular press, radio, television, films, etc.—threatens, on the one hand, to sap the creative resources of the people, and on the other to inspire their minds with the feelings of unaccountable fear and insecurity. People everywhere want peace, and yet nobody knows how the danger of another and yet another world-war can be averted. How far can the ideals of democracy and socialism help us in resolving these national and international contradictions?

There can be no doubt that much of the fear and insecurity prevailing in the world today is due to the state of tension existing in the relations among the more important states. Tension of this sort, however, has always existed. 'It is of the essence of the state', observes Russell, 'to suppress violence within and to facilitate it without'.²¹ The state prevents the use of violence by individuals within its borders, but it suffers from no scruples in promoting violence and war without. In its relations with other countries the state is guided by no principle other than that of expediency, its chief aim being the pursuit of economic gain and political power. What makes these traditional pursuits of the state particularly al-

arming to thoughtful people is the fact that a modern war, being a total war, involves the whole populations of the fighting states and is far more destructive of life and property than wars fought in the previous centuries.

Prof. Laski has argued that the root cause of war in our time is the class structure of the capitalist societies. No effective world-order can be established unless the states agree to abdicate some of their sovereign powers in favour of an International Authority, and this the capitalist states would never do. For 'the state in a capitalist society needs to remain sovereign in order to protect the interests of capitalism.' 'So long, therefore', he goes on to say, 'as the effective purpose of the state, internally regarded, is to protect the principles of capitalism, so long, in its external aspect, will it require to retain the use of war as an instrument of national policy.'²² The continuance of capitalism, in other words, is the greatest obstacle to the establishment of an effective world-order. Prof. Laski seems to believe that war and other evils will disappear from the world as soon as capitalism has been liquidated and a socialist way of life established.

We wish we could accept this optimistic thesis of Prof. Laski. However, it is not clear why a socialist state, *qua* state, should behave so differently from a capitalist state. The political records of the Soviet Union and China do not at all tend to show that a socialist state, *i.e.* a state where class distinctions based on economic relationships are non-existent, would be less interested in playing the game of power politics. The above states have been as much interested in extending their spheres of influence as any other state. The fact whether or not the Soviet Union or China has been interested in the extension of her trade hardly makes any significant difference to the situation. For the final objective of every state is power, and political power can scarcely be divided from economic advantage. Modern states expend stupendous sums of money in arming themselves for power.

The truth is that neither socialism nor democracy, nor both in conjunction, can furnish a solution to the many intricate national and international problems of the modern man. At best these systems supply an external framework, wherein the spirit of man has a chance of being regenerated. The regeneration itself, however, is a spiritual process, an inner discipline; the adjustment of the external environment, physical and socio-political, may assist man in that discipline, but the former can never be a substitute for the latter. This is the important lesson to be learnt from the limited success that has so far attended man's scientific achievements and socio-political experiments. It is not enough that man should be able to transform his environment, natural and human;

it is also necessary that that transformation should be adapted to his higher spiritual needs and aspirations. Man can properly experience those needs and formulate those aspirations only under the impulsion of his higher aesthetic, philosophic and religious nature.

Democracy and socialism provide the necessary outer conditions for the spiritual development of the modern man; they do not in themselves constitute that development. It may be necessary, even indispensable, that we should take interest in politics; from this it does not follow that there is nothing higher than politics, and that we need not take interest in anything else. Politics is not a substitute for philosophy, and a political creed can scarce serve the purpose of a philosophy of life.

Man in general, and the western man in particular, needs to-day to unlearn, to some extent, the maxim that he is primarily and exclusively a social animal, and that an ideal man is identical with an ideal citizen. A man certainly belongs to a society or community and owes allegiance to it; as a thinking and imaginative being, however, he owes deference and loyalty, and even reverence, not only to the past but also to the future of his race, to the beauty and virtue realized in human history no less than to the possibilities of their realization in future. In addition, it becomes man to behave as a citizen of the whole universe and to contemplate the entire range of facts and values. Plato believed that an ideal state or republic could be established only under philosopher-rulers; *a democratic state could assume an ideal form only if its rulers, i.e. the citizens, managed either to be philosophers or to be guided by the wisdom of philosophers.* Philosophical knowledge or wisdom, be it remembered, consists mainly in the sense of the relative significance of different values.

Modern man cannot even begin to solve his problems unless he learns to appreciate the significance of the emphasis on self-knowledge and self-transformation laid by ancient teachers and thinkers: by Laotse and the Buddha, Socrates and Jesus Christ, the *Upanishads*, Patañjali and Thomas Aquinas. In our own time similar emphasis was laid by Thoreau and Tolstoy, Ramkrishna and Gandhi. Human personality, the repository of the highest values, is not a mere system of responses to the stimuli originating in the immediate environment. Man's glory consists in his transcendence of the immediate and the useful, and in his responsiveness to the cosmos pictured by his reason and the values and ideals fashioned by his moral and aesthetic imagination. That is why a Buddha or a Plato appears to be so far superior to the wealthiest millionaire of modern America. The essence of man as man consists in his creativity, and, as a creative being, he does and must constantly

transcend the limits set by his bio-social needs and their satisfactions.

The greatest need of the modern man, briefly, is this : that he should recover his faith in, and his sense of wonder and reverence towards, the mysterious possibilities of his own creative nature operating in a mysterious universe. This is not to imply that every single man and woman should rise to the heights of religio-philosophic contemplation, before the present-day world can be saved. All that is needed is that men and women should learn to set up as ideals before their imagination not the business magnates and diplomats who own wealth and power, not the ministers and the members of the parliament, but the thinkers and writers and moral heroes, the saints and teachers, who nourished their souls on suffering and sacrifice, and nurtured their spirits in the silence of contemplation.

The quality of human life and experience and not the quantity and extent of wealth and territory, of armaments and trade, should be the watchword and principle guiding the reconstruction of our lives, individual and social, at all levels. The acceptance and propagation of this principle by the leaders of thought, and subsequently by governments, should prepare the ground for the establishment of genuine socialist democracies in all the important countries.

Nikolai Berdyaev has expressed the view that there is an opposition between culture and life, and between culture and civilization. 'When life becomes "civilized", "happy and prosperous", then the creativity of culture declines and culture is replaced by "civilization".'²³ The view contains an element of truth. The multifarious activities and preoccupations of civilised life no less than the diversity of goods and amusements tend, on the one hand, to divert men's minds from serious cultural pursuits; and on the other, to beguile them with transient pleasures and partial satisfactions. Such aberrations of the cultural spirit, however, can occur in societies less complex than our own : in the Athens of a Pericles no less than in the Rome of the Caesars. The truth is that the advancing life of culture has ever depended on few sensitive, not-easily-satisfied, determined spirits engaged in the quest of superior and more abiding fulfilments. Such spirits have flourished in all civilized societies. For life, even prosperous life, cannot be truly satisfying unless it is accompanied by cultural pursuits. Nor has the growth of science and civilization the least tendency to arrest the functioning of human creativity, for man's sense of wonder and mystery, whereby art, science and philosophy are nourished, tends to grow rather than diminish with the growth of scientific knowledge and civilization. The true causes or concomitants of cultural decline and decay seem to be the following : general increase of greed and cupidity accompanied by loss of faith in higher values; absence of

moderation in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures; growth of scepticism with respect to the standards of conduct; lack of inwardness, lack of direction in the planning of life's activities and the pursuit of its varied interests; loss of the stamina, will and patience needed to attain higher levels of achievement in different cultural fields. Cultural decline or degeneration, in other words, is correlated with the loss of faith in the value and possibilities of human personality, and the direction of human aspirations towards the material and the transient. Such a state sets in when a general atmosphere of uncertainty, socio-political and cultural, renders people unwilling to look farther ahead and live in the imagination of the high and the remote, inclining them to seek momentary pleasures with unscrupulous and restless impatience. A declining culture is irreligious in this deeper sense. An aspect of this decline is the growing indifference of the élite towards the weal and woe of the common people. This moral aspect of degeneration may be directly traced to the growing lack of concern for the human personality.

By arresting the processes of unscrupulous competition and exploitation, socialism must be able to foster a more balanced attitude towards material possessions. Under a socialist economy the growth of material amenities should cease to be a menace to the pursuit of spiritual or cultural values. For, beyond the requirements of a reasonably comfortable existence, the attraction of material goods lies mainly in the social status and distinction which they bestow on their owners. In a socialist society, where equitable distribution of wealth prevails, those goods would cease to be a source of such status or distinction. Further, a society which adopts the development of personality as the major objective of its socio-political and educational efforts, will not seek to exploit other peoples and states for its material advantages.

Our acquisitive and possessive impulses tend to make us self-seeking and egotistic. Under the power of those impulses, we tend to view other human beings as mere instruments or means, to be used for our personal ends. On the contrary, a person impelled by the urge for creative companionship finds men and women interesting for quite different reasons. Such a person takes interest in the growth and development of other people not because they are potential sources of material gain to him or his nation, but because they are potential centres of creative awareness and potential sharers in his or his nation's spiritual life. Such international bodies and organisations as the Unesco, I suggest, can contribute to the cultural unity of mankind by stressing the need of the cultivation of this latter attitude by individuals and nations, and by inspiring the intelligentsia of different countries with zeal and enthusiasm to share and enrich the spiritual heritage of one another. When

nations and communities make spiritual culture, as distinguished from wealth and power, the main object of their collective pursuits, then they would not find it difficult to surrender part of their sovereignties to an International Body, which, according to Prof. Laski, is a condition indispensable for the establishment of an effective world-order.



NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹ Karl Jaspers, *Man in the Modern Age* (English Translation George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., London, 1935), p. 43.

² Vide *Twentieth Century Sociology*, edited by Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore, (The Philosophical Library, New York, 1945). *Sociocultural Dynamics and Evolution*, p. 98.

³ E. Westermarck, Preface to *Ethical Relativity* (Kegan Paul, London, 1932).

⁴ See *Twentieth Century Sociology*, *British Sociology*, p. 579.

⁵ *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (MacMillan, New York, 1948), Volumes VII-VIII, p. 541.

⁶ See F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism* (MacMillan, London, Second Edition, 1912), Preface, p. xxi.

⁷ See Corliss Lamont, *Humanism as a Philosophy* (Watts & Co., London, Third Edition, 1952), pp. 30-31.

⁸ Vide, Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism* (Geoffrey Bles, London, Third Edition, 1941), Introduction.

⁹ *Ethical Relativity*, p. 3.

¹⁰ The "Principle", be it noted, claims simultaneous validity for Differents and Contraries and not for Contradictries. Contrary to the views of those who believe in the dialectic, life seldom requires us to choose between the opposites, between the doing of a thing and not doing it. We have generally to choose between the doing of one thing and the doing of another thing, between the possibility of realizing one value and that of realizing another value.

¹¹ Tarko na pramana-sangrhitu na pramanantaram, pramananam anugrahakah tattvajnanaya kalpate (*Nyaya Bhashya*, I, 1, 1).

¹² H. Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis* (English Translation The Walter Scott Publishing Co., London etc., 1905), p. 13.

¹³ Eugenio Rignano, *The Psychology of Reasoning*, English Translation (Kegan Paul, London etc., 1923), p. 191. (Italics are the author's).

¹⁴ Vide, Gardner Murphy, *An Historical Introduction to Psychology* (Kegan Paul, London, etc. Reprinted 1938), Supplement by Heinrich Kluver, Chapter XXVI.

¹⁵ See his paper entitled *Outlines of an Emergent Theory of Values in Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (The Muirhead Library of Philosophy, Second Edition, 1952), p. 387.

¹⁶ F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (MacMillan, New York, 1949), p. 375.

¹⁷ See Radhakrishnan, *Comparative Studies in Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951), *The Spirit of Western Philosophy* by C. A. Moore, p. 61, Footnote 1.

¹⁸ Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1947), p. 23.

¹⁹ See Lewis Mumford, *The Conduct of Life* (Secker and Warburg, London, 1952), p. 242.

CHAPTER I

¹ G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (The Home University Library, Oxford University Press, London, reprinted 1943), p. 101.

² A. C. Ewing, *The Definition of Good* (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1947), p. 5.

³ The reader should make a special note of this point which is overlooked not only by the subjectivists but also by their critics. Thus Moore states: 'This fact . . . that different men do feel differently towards the same action, and that even the same man may feel differently towards it at different times, is, of course, a mere commonplace'. (*Ethics*, p. 97). The confusion arises from the identification of the moral act or situation with a series of physical movements (see the following paragraph). According to us what we judge in a moral act or situation is the meaning or value it signifies in terms of the *deserts* and the *woe* or *woe* of the parties concerned. The meanings are sometimes reviewed by religiously and metaphysically inclined people in the context of the supposed destiny of man; they are reviewed by the state and historians with reference to their likely consequences on the present and future of the community or nation. This explains, incidentally, how one's moral ideas may be bound up with one's philosophy of life, including a philosophy of or about progress.

⁴ W. D. Ross, *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 33-4.

⁵ *Vide*, Harold J. Laski's article on Liberalism in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (The MacMillan Company, New York, reprinted 1948), Vol. I, p. 105.

⁶ A. A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1928), p. 1.

⁷ W. T. Stace, *Religion and the Modern Mind* (MacMillan, London, 1953), p. 26.

⁸ *Vide*, F. A. Hayek, *The Counter Revolution of Science* (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952), pp. 25, 27, 27.

⁹ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1947), p. 630.

¹⁰ *Limitations of Science* (Pelican edition), pp. 188-189.

¹¹ C. Caudwell, *The Crisis in Physics* (John Lane The Bodley Head, London, reprinted, 1949), pp. 10, 11, (Italics ours).

¹² Arthur Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (Cambridge University Press, Reprinted 1949), p. 17 (Italics ours).

¹³ P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (MacMillan, 1927), p. 25.

¹⁴ Eddington, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁵ F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (Oxford, Second edition, Ninth impression, 1930) pp. 24, 22.

¹⁶ Quoted in *Bertrand Russell's Dictionary of Mind, Matter and Morals* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1952), p. 165.

¹⁷ The *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. L, No. 10; May 7, 1953; p. 285.

¹⁸ Quoted by Mr. Walhout, *ibid.*, p. 294.

¹⁹ Herbert Dingle, *Science and Human Experience* (Williams and Norgate Ltd., London, 1931), p. 14.

²⁰ J. F. Brown, *The Psychodynamics of Abnormal Behaviour* (MacGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. New York, 1940), p. 410.

²¹ Quoted by Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* (Garden City Publishing Co., Inc. New York, 1953), p. 363. Schopenhauer further observes: 'Genius is the power of leaving one's own interests, wishes and aims entirely out of sight, of entirely renouncing one's own personality for a time, so as to remain pure knowing subject, clear vision of the world.' One is reminded of the conditions laid down by Sankara for the person who seeks to know the nature of the *Brahman*. Such a person should have renounced all desires and be detached

towards the pleasures of this world and the next. The idea of a pure, detached observer, the pure witness or witness self, is particularly prominent in the Vedanta.

²² L. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism* (Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner and Co. Ltd., London, Sixth Impression, 1938), p. 194.

²³ Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (Everyman, reprinted 1947), p. 8. Max Planck likewise contrasts the real world from the world of sensory experience. The latter, including the measurements made by the scientists, constitutes merely a sign, to be interpreted by the physicists, of the real world. See his *Where is Science Going?* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1935), pp. 84-85.

²⁴ Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1948), p. 219.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 220, 221.

²⁶ Loc. cit.

²⁷ J. W. Weinberg, *An Examination of Logical Positivism* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1936), p. 151.

²⁸ See, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* edited by H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1953), Article by A. Einstein, p. 254.

²⁹ Ibid., Article by William Kneale, p. 356.

³⁰ W. Kohler, *The Place of Value in a World of Facts* (Liverlight Publishing Corporation, New York), p. 174.

³¹ *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 31.

CHAPTER II

¹ Bertrand Russell observes: 'Most of the unconscious consists of what were once highly emotional conscious thoughts, which have now become buried. It is possible to do this process of burying deliberately . . .' Vide, *The Conquest of Happiness*, (The New American Library edition, 1951), p. 47.

² Vide, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, edited by Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, (Harvard University Press, 1952), page 47.

³ Vide, *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, edited by Ralph Linton, (Columbia University Press, New York, Seventh printing, 1952). Present World Conditions in Cultural Perspective, page 204.

⁴ How the desires and ambitions of a person may be completely transformed by his changing experience and growing self-confidence is well brought out by the classic instance of Napoleon I. His greatest ambition as a boy was to fight for the liberty of the petty Corsican island under the banner of Paoli, a local patriotic leader; as an emperor and general, he found even Europe too small for his mounting ambitions! Who can believe that this most ambitious specimen of the human race wrote, in 1791, an essay in which he preached against the 'sin and folly of ambitions'? Vide, Holland Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I* (G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1919), p. 33.

⁵ Parsons and Shils, op. cit., p. 92.

⁶ Holland Rose, op. cit. pp. 188, 214.

⁷ Vide, *The Prince* (Everyman, Reprinted 1945), p. 213 et seq.

⁸ Vide, Karl Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1953), p. 241.

⁹ Vide, *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, (Victor Gollancz, London, 1932), The Science of History by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, p. 777.

¹⁰ *Methods in Social Science*, Edited by Stuart A. Rice, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931), Analysis 30 by Henry Pirenne, p. 435.

¹¹ E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (Edward Arnold & Co., London, Reprinted 1944), p. 67.

¹² Ibid., p. 75.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

14 Erwin Shrodinger, *Science and Human Temperament*, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1935), pp. 69-70.

15 *Perception—An Approach to Personality*, edited by R. R. Blake and G. V. Ramsay (The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1951), p. 209.

16 Walter Eucken, *The Foundations of Economics* (English Translation William Hodge and Co., London, 1950), p. 35.

17 *Ibid.*, page 42.

18 See R. M. MacIver, *Social Causation* (Ginn & Co., Boston, etc., 1942), page 9. For the criticism of the causal concept see: Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, Chapter IX; Morris Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (Kegan Paul, London, 1931), pages 224-25. Prof. Aliotta observes: 'The functional formula cannot comprehend any kind of activity or any successive development of events in a determinate direction.' (*The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, MacMillan, 1914, page 69). The opponents of the causal relation seem to take their cue not from experience, but from the symbolism of science, a practice which does not always help to advance our knowledge.

19 *Social Causation*, p. 123.

20 *A History of Europe* (Edward Arnold & Co., London, 1937), pp. 832-33.

21 For convenient summaries of the views of these thinkers see Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (Harper & Brothers, London, 1928), Chapter III.

22 Barbara Wootton, *Testament for Social Science* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1950), p. 1. For specimens of systematic attempts to apply the methods of physical science in the domain of social studies see Stuart C. Dodd, *Dimensions of Society* (MacMillan, 1940); and G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology* (MacMillan, 1939).

23 Quoted from an article by A. Bevan, reprinted in the *Hindustan Times*, Delhi, June 8, 1952.

24 It is true that, had Napoleon's pursuit of the universal empire been differently motivated, he would have sought to impose different conditions on the subject nations. However, the goal of attaining political hegemony over those nations would have remained the same in either case; and this goal might be taken as being quite specific.

25 *Social Causation*, p. 171.

26 This point has been worked out with thoroughness by Pitirim A. Sorokin in his *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time* (Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1945). Every cultural phenomenon, according to him, has a meaning component, and meanings lack such quantitative or measurable features as 'material mass, volume, color, sound, chemical composition, and other physico-chemical properties.' Meanings, in fact, are, 'immaterial, spaceless and timeless.' See *ibid.*, pp. 32, 4.

27 J. S. Mill, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, edited by Ernest Nagel (Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1950), p. 317.

28 Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (English Translation Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1952), p. 208.

29 Quoted by Talcott Parsons in *The Structure of Social Action* (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1949), p. 495.

30 Emile Durkheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 100.

31 See, *Methods in Social Science*, Analysis 41, p. 567 et seq.

32 *Reason and Unreason in Society* (Longman's Green and Co., London, 1948), p. 36.

33 *Loc. cit.*

34 J. S. Mill, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 347.

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 319.

37 *Vide*, *Kavyalankarasutra*, 2, 1, 8.

38 Vide, S. F. Nadel, *The Foundations of Social Anthropology*, (Cohen and West Ltd., London, 1953), pp. 284, 278.

39 Walter Eucken, *Foundations of Economics*, page 234.

40 Lionel Robbins, *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (MacMillan, London, Second edition, Reprinted 1949), p. 83.

41 *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 79.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 81.

43 See Percy Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction* (Jonathan Cape, London, Reprinted 1926), pp. 248-49.

44 Cf. F. A. Hayek: To speak of a mind with a structure fundamentally different from our own, or to claim that we can observe changes in the basic structure of the human mind is not only to claim what is impossible; it is a meaningless statement. (*The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 77).

45 A. J. Ayer, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

47 Morris R. Cohen also criticises the positivistic position. See his *A Preface to Logic* (George Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, 1946), Chapter III.

48 Vide, *The Vocabulary of Philosophy* by William Fleming, 3rd edition by H. Calderwood (Channel Griffin & Co., London, 1876), p. 337.

49 *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, p. 20.

50 Loc. cit.

51 *The Logic of Modern Physics*, page I. (Italics are ours). A similar assertion is made by H. Poincaré about mathematical laws or formulas obtained by mathematical induction. 'Mathematical induction', he says, '... is, on the contrary, necessarily imposed on us, because it is only the affirmation of a property of the mind itself.' (Vide, *Science and Hypothesis*, English Translation, The Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd., New York, 1905), p. 13.

CHAPTER III

1 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. IV, p. 621.

2 M. J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (Alfred A. Knopf 1949), p. 17. For 'Tylor's view identifying the two concepts see below note 6.

3 See, R. M. MacIver, *Social Causation*, Chapter X; also R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, *Society, An Introductory Analysis* (MacMillan, 1949), p. 498 et seq.

4 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridged by D. C. Somervell (Geoffrey Cumberlege, London etc., third impression, 1949), pp. 196, 195.

5 Quoted by P. A. Sorokin in *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis* (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1952), pp. 77-78.

6 E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Volume I, fourth edition (John Murray, London, 1903), p. 1.

7 Quoted by A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New edition, George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London, 1948), p. 252.

8 *Man and His Works*, p. 625.

9 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. IV, p. 621.

10 Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

11 Herskovits, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

12 Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Mentor Books, The new American Library, Fourth printing, 1948), p. 1.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

14 T. S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (Faber and Faber, London, 1948), p. 21.

15 J. Ortega, Y. Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (Mentor Books, second printing, 1951), p. 52.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

17 Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe* (Everyman, reprinted, 1946), p. 90.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 89.

19 Gasset, op. cit., p. 79.

20 Karl Marx, Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*.

21 See, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume X, Materialism, p. 280.

22 See, Karl Marx, *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1946), *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 116.

23 Ibid., p. 129.

24 See, *Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Selected Works of Karl Marx*, p. 45.

25 Gunnar Lundman, *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes* (Kegan Paul, London, 1938), p. 70.

26 Ibid., p. 232 et seq.

27 Ibid., p. 233.

28 Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 244.

29 A. Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (Cambridge University Press, 1949), p. 31.

30 Quoted by H. J. Blackham from *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* in his *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1952), p. 12.

31 *Limitations of Science*, Introduction.

32 See, *Theses on Feuerbach*, 1, 2, 5 and 9.

33 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Materialism, p. 215.

34 See, Thorsten Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chapter IV.

35 Society : *An Introductory Analysis* (MacMillan, 1949), p. 501.

36 Cp. R. W. Emerson : 'To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men,—that is genius'. *Essay on Self-reliance*.

37 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume IX, Article on Literature, p. 525.

38 See *Ibid.*, p. 526.

39 See H. G. Wells, *A Short History of the World* (Penguin, 1936), p. 135.

40 Vide, A. L. Kroehler, *Configurations of Culture Growth*.

41 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridged), p. 49.

42 Quoted by Toynbee, *Ibid.*, p. 212.

CHAPTER IV

1 *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, edited by Melvin Rader (Henry Holt and Co. New York, 1952). Extract from *Art* by Clive Bell, p. 323.

2 L. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 267.

3 *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, p. 306.

4 See, Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetics* (Eng. Tr. MacMillan London, second edition, 1922), p. 22.

5 John Dewey, Extract from *Art as Experience* in *A Modern Book of Aesthetics*, p. 70.

6 Vide, C. E. M. Joad, *Decadence : A Philosophical Inquiry* (Faber and Faber, London, 1948), Chapter IV.

CHAPTER V

1 Vide, *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science* Vol. I, No. 1, Article by R. Carnap, p. 49.

2 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N.S. XIX, (1945) paper on "Verifiability" by F. Waismann, p. 131.

3 B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, edited by R. C. March (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1956), p. 215.

4 Vide, *Ostentation*, reprinted from *Psyche* (1933) in *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), p. 8.

5 Vide, *Philosophical Analysis*, edited by Max Black (Cornell University Press, 1950), Introduction.

⁶ *Vide, Readings in Ethical Theory*, edited by W. Sellers and J. Hospers (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 408.

⁷ See *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 3rd Series, Article by F. Waismann, p. 447.

⁸ Max Planck, *Where is Science Going?* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1933), p. 92.

⁹ *Vide, Philosophy in a New Key* (Mentor Book, 1959), p. 61.

¹⁰ *Vide, Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research* (Routledge and Kegan-Paul, London, 1953), p. 8.

¹¹ Sankara says: 'There is nothing to be gained by the knowledge of the order in which creation (of different entities) took place; that immortality (or liberation) is attained by the knowledge of the unitary character of the *Atman* is a well-known tenet of all the *Upanishads*.' (See his commentary on the *Aitareya-Upanishad* Chapter II, Introduction).

¹² The description runs thus: 'Unceasing, unproduced; indestructible, non- eternal; manifold, not manifold; without coming, without going . . . etc.'

¹³ *Vide, Nyayamrtadvoitasiddhi*, edited by A. K. Sastri (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1934), Introduction, p. 77.

¹⁴ Kumarila, *Slokavarttika* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta, 1903), p. 148, stanza 202.

CHAPTER VI

¹ See W. Sellers and G. Hospers (Ed.) *Readings in Ethical Theory* (New York, 1952), H. A. Prichard's article, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? p. 156 Footnote.

² Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin, London, reprinted 1947), p. 267.

³ *Vide, Plutarch's Lives (Selected)* (Mentor Books, 1952) p. 173.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁵ *Plutarch's Lives*, Pericles, Introduction.

⁶ W. T. Stace, *Religion and the Modern Mind*, p. 288.

CHAPTER VII

¹ Wilhelm Wundt, *Ethics*, Vol. I, *The Facts of the Moral Life* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, third edition, reprinted 1922), p. 55.

² William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (The Modern Library, New York), p. 8.

³ Quoted by James, *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ Rudolf Otto, *Mysticism East and West* (MacMillan, New York, 1952), p. 139.

⁵ See A. Rudolf Uren, *Recent Religious Psychology* (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1928), p. 160.

⁶ Translation by Th. Secherbatsky, *Vide, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad, 1927), p. 69.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74. The verse occurs in Chapter XXV.

⁸ *Vide, W. T. Stace, Time and Eternity* (Princeton University, 1952), p. 9.

⁹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 368.

¹⁰ Stace, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

¹¹ Quoted from Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Dialogues of The Buddha* by Christmas Humphreys in *Buddhism* (Pelican Books, 1952), p. 125.

¹² James, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

¹³ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* Vol. I. (Revised edition, George Allen & Unwin, 1929), p. 450.

¹⁴ Quoted by Radhakrishnan, *ibid.*, p. 448.

¹⁵ Uren, *Recent Religious Psychology*, p. 212.

16 Reference to Fechner's argument has been made by C. E. M. Joad in his book *The Recovery of Faith* (London, 1952) on p. 91. For S. Alexander's view see *Space, Time and Deity*, (MacMillan, London, 1920), Vol. II, Book IV, Chapter II. He says: '... religious feeling itself suggests the notion of God which when elaborated by reflection is discovered to be that of the world big with deity' (p. 378). To him the object of religious sentiment is 'no mere imagination which corresponds to a subjective and possibly illusory movement of mind' (p. 377). However, insofar as Alexander takes Deity to be a quality 'not realised but in process of realization' he is not very far from our own view. Godhead, to us, is the highest imaginable condition of human existence or experience projected by man's imagination operating unconsciously and mysteriously.

17 *Vide*, Sadhu Santinatha, *Experiences of a Truth Seeker*, Vol. I (Published by Shri Avedyanath, Gorakhpur), Chapter XXV.

18 Sir James G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (Abridged edition, MacMillan, New York, 1947), pp. 711-712.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

20 Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (English Translation Hogarth Press, London, 1928), p. 52.

21 Some more thoughtful anthropologists do hint at the presence of a private, mystical content in the primitive man's religion. Thus Bronislaw Malinowski writes:

Everyone who has experienced religion deeply and sincerely knows that the strongest religious moments come in solitude, in turning away from the world, in concentration and in mental detachment, and not in the distraction of a crowd. Can primitive religion be so entirely devoid of the inspiration of solitude? No one who knows savages at first hand or from a careful study of literature will have any doubt. Such facts as the seclusion of novices at initiation, their individual, personal struggles during the ordeal, the communion with spirits, divinities and powers in lonely spots, all these show us primitive religion frequently lived through in the solitude.

(*Magic, Science and Religion and other Essays*, Illinois, 1948, p. 38).

CHAPTER VIII

1 *Vide*, Reider Thomte, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion* (Princeton, 1949), p. 21.

2 See, Eleanor Morton, *Women Behind Mahatma Gandhi* (Max Keinhardt, London, 1954), p. 241.

3 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume V, Article on Education, p. 463.

4 Theodore Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* (World Book Company, New York, 1950), p. 157. Whitehead affirms: '... the understanding which we want is an understanding of an insistent present. The only use of a knowledge of the past is to equip us for the present.' (*The Aims of Education*, Mentor Books, p. 14).

5 Quoted by John L. Childs in *Education and Morals* (Appleton-Century-Crafts, Inc. New York, 1950), p. 113.

6 Lin Yutang, *The Wisdom of China* (Michael Joseph, London, 1948), p. 14.

7 In this connection see Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (English Translation by Talcott Parsons, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York); and Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1951) Chapters IX and X.

8 *Ideas and Opinions* by Albert Einstein (Crown Publishers Inc. New York), p. 11.

⁹ R. B. Cattell, *Psychology and the Religious Quest* (Thomas Nelson and Sons, London and New York, 1938), p. 53.

¹⁰ J. S. Brubacher, *Modern Philosophies of Education* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. New York, 1950), p. 305.

¹¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford), p. 64.

¹² *Vide*, George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (George C. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1939), p. 641.

¹³ *Vide*, F. W. Coker, *Recent Political Thought* (D. Appleton Century Company, New York and London, 1934), p. 304.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

¹⁵ Harold J. Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1936), pp. 16-17.

¹⁶ Quoted by R. M. MacIver in the *Web of Government* (MacMillan, New York, 1947), p. 17.

¹⁷ For the definition of "naked" power see Bertrand Russell, *Power, A New Social Analysis* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, reprinted, 1946), Chapter VI.

¹⁸ Harold J. Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁹ MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

²⁰ Roy Lewis and Angus Maude, *The English Middle Classes* (Penguin Books, London, 1953), Chapter I.

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²² *The State in Theory and Practice*, p. 229.

²³ *Vide*, P. A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, p. 143.

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